Wouter P. J. Wils

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present the economic and legal implications of the tendency to criminalize antitrust enforcement in the EU Member States, and discuss the potential for criminalization of EU antitrust enforcement.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that from the perspective of ensuring that the antitrust prohibitions are not violated, public antitrust enforcement is inherently superior to private enforcement, because of more effective investigative and sanctioning powers, because private enforcement is driven by private profit motives which fundamentally diverge from the general interest in this area, and because of the high cost of private antitrust enforcement.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the use of fines imposed on companies or other corporate entities to enforce antitrust or competition law prohibitions such as Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty or Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

TL;DR: The relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages, focusing in particular on the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, was examined in this paper, where the authors argued that public enforcement should aim at clarifying and developing the antitrust prohibitions and deterring and punishing violations, whereas private action for damages should focus at compensation.

TL;DR: In the current system of EC antitrust enforcement, the European Commission combines the investigative and prosecutorial function with the adjudicative or decision-making function as mentioned in this paper, in comparison with a system in which the adjudative function is separated from the investigative, such as the U.S. system, where the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission investigates and prosecutes before a federal court.