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Xavier Bultel
Researcher at University of Auvergne
Publications - 38
Citations - 296
Xavier Bultel is an academic researcher from University of Auvergne. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Computer security model. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 31 publications receiving 201 citations. Previous affiliations of Xavier Bultel include Centre national de la recherche scientifique & University of Rennes.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof for Makaro
Xavier Bultel,Jannik Dreier,Jean-Guillaume Dumas,Pascal Lafourcade,Daiki Miyahara,Daiki Miyahara,Takaaki Mizuki,Atsuki Nagao,Tatsuya Sasaki,Kazumasa Shinagawa,Kazumasa Shinagawa,Hideaki Sone +11 more
TL;DR: A proven secure physical algorithm is proposed, only relying on cards, to realize a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for Makaro, a logic game similar to Sudoku that allows a player to show that he knows a solution without revealing it.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
A Terrorist-fraud Resistant and Extractor-free Anonymous Distance-bounding Protocol
Gildas Avoine,Xavier Bultel,Sébastien Gambs,David Gerault,Pascal Lafourcade,Cristina Onete,Jean-Marc Robert +6 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a novel approach to obtain provable terrorist-fraud resistant distance-bounding protocols that does not rely on an accomplice being able to extract any long-term key.
Journal ArticleDOI
The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol
TL;DR: This paper model the privacy guarantees of TLS 1.3 when parties execute a full handshake or use a session resumption, covering all the handshake modes of TLS, and prove that TLS1.3 protects the privacy of its users at least against passive adversaries, contrary to TLS 1-2.
Book ChapterDOI
Efficient Invisible and Unlinkable Sanitizable Signatures
Xavier Bultel,Pascal Lafourcade,Russell W. F. Lai,Giulio Malavolta,Dominique Schröder,Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan +5 more
TL;DR: This work constructs (non-accountable) invisible and unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures on equivalence classes and other basic primitives and puts forth a generic transformation using verifiable ring signatures to turn any non- accountable sanitized signature into an accountable one while preserving all other properties.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
A Prover-Anonymous and Terrorist-Fraud Resistant Distance-Bounding Protocol
Xavier Bultel,Sébastien Gambs,David Gerault,Pascal Lafourcade,Cristina Onete,Jean-Marc Robert +5 more
TL;DR: The first distance-bounding protocol, called SPADE, is given, integrating anonymity, revocability and provable resistance to standard threat models, with a novel approach in which the prover does not leak his secret key but a reusable session key along with a group signature on it.