NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein Penguin Books, 2009, 312 pp, ISBN 978-0-14-311526-7This book is best described formally as a general explanation of and advocacy for libertarian paternalism, a term coined by the authors in earlier publications. Informally, it is about how leaders, systems, organizations, and governments can nudge people to do the things the nudgers want and need done for the betterment of the nudgees, or of society. It is paternalism in the sense that "it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better", (p. 5) It is libertarian in that "people should be free to do what they like - and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so", (p. 5) The built-in possibility of opting out or making a different choice preserves freedom of choice even though people's behavior has been influenced by the nature of the presentation of the information or by the structure of the decisionmaking system. I had never heard of libertarian paternalism before reading this book, and I now find it fascinating.Written for a general audience, this book contains mostly social and behavioral science theory and models, but there is considerable discussion of structure and process that has roots in mathematical and quantitative modeling. One of the main applications of this social system is economic choice in investing, selecting and purchasing products and services, systems of taxes, banking (mortgages, borrowing, savings), and retirement systems. Other quantitative social choice systems discussed include environmental effects, health care plans, gambling, and organ donations. Softer issues that are also subject to a nudge-based approach are marriage, education, eating, drinking, smoking, influence, spread of information, and politics. There is something in this book for everyone.The basis for this libertarian paternalism concept is in the social theory called "science of choice", the study of the design and implementation of influence systems on various kinds of people. The terms Econs and Humans, are used to refer to people with either considerable or little rational decision-making talent, respectively. The various libertarian paternalism concepts and systems presented are tested and compared in light of these two types of people. Two foundational issues that this book has in common with another book, Network of Echoes: Imitation, Innovation and Invisible Leaders, that was also reviewed for this issue of the Journal are that 1 ) there are two modes of thinking (or components of the brain) - an automatic (intuitive) process and a reflective (rational) process and 2) the need for conformity and the desire for imitation are powerful forces in human behavior. …

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness

This article surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the USA to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.

Corporate Governance in China: A Survey

This study collates potential economic effects of mandated disclosure and reporting standards for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability topics. We first outline key features of CSR reporting. Next, we draw on relevant academic literatures in accounting, finance, economics, and management to discuss and evaluate the potential economic consequences of a requirement for CSR and sustainability reporting for U.S. firms, including effects in capital markets, on stakeholders other than investors, and on firm behavior. We also discuss issues related to the implementation and enforcement of CSR and sustainability reporting standards as well as two approaches to sustainability reporting that differ in their overarching goals and materiality standards. Our analysis yields a number of insights that are relevant for the current debate on mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting. It also points scholars to avenues for future research.

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Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review

The article examines the effects of non-financial disclosure (NFD) on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We conceptualise trade-offs between two ideal types (government regulation and business self-regulation) in relation to CSR. Whereas self-regulation is associated with greater flexibility for businesses to develop best practices, it can also lead to complacency if firms feel no external pressure to engage with CSR. In contrast, government regulation is associated with greater stringency around minimum standards, but can also result in rigidity owing to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Given these potential trade-offs, we ask how mandatory non-financial disclosure has been shaping CSR practices and examine its potential effectiveness as a regulatory instrument. Our analysis of 24 OECD countries using the Asset4 database shows that firms in countries that require non-financial disclosure adopt significantly more CSR activities. However, we also find that NFD regulation does not lead to lower levels of corporate irresponsibility. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that, over time, the variation in CSR activities declines as firms adopt increasingly similar practices. Our study thereby contributes to understanding the impact of government regulation on CSR at firm level. We also discuss the limits of mandatory NFD in addressing regulatory trade-offs between stringency and flexibility in the field of corporate social responsibility.

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Mandatory Non-financial Disclosure and Its Influence on CSR: An International Comparison

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important components of the Chinese economy. Although SOEs are generally considered inefficient in operations, China’s economy, which relies heavily on SOEs, has been highly successful over the last four decades. This indicates the importance of SOEs in China’s past and future economic success. Therefore, in this study, we review the literature on economic theories and 40 years of practice of Chinese SOEs and discuss implications for future research. Our review consists of four parts: the theories of SOEs and their reform, the performance and financing strategies of SOEs, corporate governance in SOEs, and corporate social responsibility in SOEs.

State-owned enterprises in China: A review of 40 years of research and practice

The Effect of Mandatory CSR Disclosure on Firm Profitability and Social Externalities: Evidence from China

We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that an SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided holdup problem with ex ante investment.

Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoﬀ to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal can costly verify agents’ private signals. The information designer can inﬂuence the agents’ signal distributions, based upon which the principal maximizes the allocation surplus. An agent’s utility is simply the probability of obtaining the good. With a single agent, we characterize (i) the agent-optimal information, (ii) the principal-worst information, and (iii) the principal-optimal information. Even though the objectives of the principal and the agent are not directly comparable, we ﬁnd that any agent-optimal information is principal-worst. Moreover, there exists a robust mechanism that achieves the principal’s payoﬀ under (ii), which is therefore an optimal robust mechanism. Many of our results extend to the multiple-agent case; if not, we provide counterexamples.

Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification

We study a full implementation problem with hard evidence where the state is common knowledge but agents face uncertainty about the evidence endowments of other agents. We identify a necessary and suﬃcient condition for implementation in mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria called No Perfect Deceptions. The implementing mechanism requires only two agents and a ﬁnite message space, imposes transfers only oﬀ the equilibrium, and invoke no device with ”...questionable features...” such as integer or modulo games. Requiring only implementation in pure-strategy equilibria weakens the necessary and suﬃcient condition to No Pure-Perfect Deceptions. In general type spaces where the state is not common knowledge, a condition called higher-order measurability is necessary and suﬃcient for rationalizable implementation with arbitrarily small transfers alongside.

Yi-chun Chen

Papers

The Effect of Mandatory CSR Disclosure on Firm Profitability and Social Externalities: Evidence from China

Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms

Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification

Implementation with Uncertain Evidence