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Table Of Integrals Series And Products

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The author's preface gives an outline: "This book is about weakconvergence methods in metric spaces, with applications sufficient to show their power and utility. The Introduction motivates the definitions and indicates how the theory will yield solutions to problems arising outside it. Chapter 1 sets out the basic general theorems, which are then specialized in Chapter 2 to the space C[0, l ] of continuous functions on the unit interval and in Chapter 3 to the space D [0, 1 ] of functions with discontinuities of the first kind. The results of the first three chapters are used in Chapter 4 to derive a variety of limit theorems for dependent sequences of random variables. " The book develops and expands on Donsker's 1951 and 1952 papers on the invariance principle and empirical distributions. The basic random variables remain real-valued although, of course, measures on C[0, l ] and D[0, l ] are vitally used. Within this framework, there are various possibilities for a different and apparently better treatment of the material. More of the general theory of weak convergence of probabilities on separable metric spaces would be useful. Metrizability of the convergence is not brought up until late in the Appendix. The close relation of the Prokhorov metric and a metric for convergence in probability is (hence) not mentioned (see V. Strassen, Ann. Math. Statist. 36 (1965), 423-439; the reviewer, ibid. 39 (1968), 1563-1572). This relation would illuminate and organize such results as Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4 which give isolated, ad hoc connections between weak convergence of measures and nearness in probability. In the middle of p. 16, it should be noted that C*(S) consists of signed measures which need only be finitely additive if 5 is not compact. On p. 239, where the author twice speaks of separable subsets having nonmeasurable cardinal, he means "discrete" rather than "separable." Theorem 1.4 is Ulam's theorem that a Borel probability on a complete separable metric space is tight. Theorem 1 of Appendix 3 weakens completeness to topological completeness. After mentioning that probabilities on the rationals are tight, the author says it is an

Convergence of probability measures

Matrix Factorization Techniques for Recommender Systems

/pdf/a-break-in-the-clouds-towards-a-cloud-definition-svovsw1r5a.pdf

A Break in the Clouds: Towards a Cloud Definition

Cooperative spectrum sensing plays an important role in cognitive radio networks since it improves the detection performance by exploiting spatial diversity. However, the cooperation among terminals also brings additional communication overhead. In this paper, overhead-throughput tradeoff issues are investigated in four scenarios namely (1) identical sensing channel and perfect reporting channel, (2) identical sensing channel and imperfect reporting channel, (3) different sensing channel and perfect reporting channel, (4) different sensing channel and imperfect reporting channel of each secondary user (SU). Taking the reporting overhead into consideration, a novel frame structure consisting of an initial subframe and M consecutive subframes, is proposed to maximize the achievable throughput of the secondary network. And for each scenario, the overhead-throughput tradeoff is formulated as an optimization problem with respect to the number of reporting SUs. A brute-force approach is then used to resolve such optimization problem. Given the optimal number of reporting SUs, a set of candidate SUs is then selected according to the probability of detection, the probability of false alarm and the probability of reporting error. Numerical results show that an optimal overhead-throughput tradeoff is achieved given the optimal number of reporting SUs. In addition, the probability of false alarm is shown to be the most important factor affecting the performance of achievable throughput within the secondary network because the lower probability of false alarm corresponds to the case that the secondary network can use the channel with a higher chance.

Overhead-Throughput Tradeoff Under a Novel Frame Structure in Centralized Cooperative Cognitive Networks

This paper proposes a scheme combining multi-cell downlink joint transmission(JT) with 3- Dimensional(3D) beamforming. The proposed scheme is based on the following two observations: 1) The performance of multi-cell joint transmission is highly dependent on the received signal strength from the coordinated cells, 2) Interference may become more severe at the cell boundary due to the extremely flat beams serving the cell edge users with 3D beamforming. In the proposed scheme, users at the cell boundary are served with JT and 3D beamforming simultaneously, and those at the cell center are served with 3D beamforming. Simulation results based on LTE-Advanced systems show that significant gains can be achieved by the scheme, with about 14% gain on cell average spectral efficiency and about 58% gain on edge user spectral efficiency compared to traditional single cell transmission with 2-Dimensional(2D) beamforming.

Multi-Cell Downlink Joint Transmission with 3D Beamforming

By analyzing the NGAP protocol of 5G core network, we study the protocol format and find an effective security detection method. In this paper, Fuzzing technique is used to detect the security flaws in NGAP protocol of 5G core network. In order to improve the efficiency of Fuzzing, a selection mutation algorithms based on partition weight table is proposed. In the actual test we test NGAP protocol in 5G core network to test and use our proposed new algorithm in Fuzzing technique and find the security problem of NGAP protocol. Finally, we can prove that the selection of mutation algorithms based on the partition weight table is effective by counting the variation samples and calculating the increase in the probability of triggering anomalies in the target network elements after using the algorithm compared to before using the algorithm.

Fuzzing Method Based on Selection Mutation of Partition Weight Table for 5G Core Network NGAP Protocol

Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) standardized by IETF, is expected to support the global IP mobility. Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) is further proposed to improve the performance of MIPv6. However, FMIPv6 only concentrates on the protocol operation while it does not address other critical issues, such as the L2 and L3 identifiers mapping problem and precise L2 triggers generation. This paper proposes an efficient service-oriented framework for FMIPv6. In this framework, FMIPv6 is integrated with candidate access router discovery (CARD) mechanism, specified L2 triggers and different handover processes will be performed for different service types according to QoS requirements. The analytical and simulation results both show that the proposed scheme could achieve better performance in terms of handover latency.

Service-Oriented FMIPv6 Framework for Efficient Handovers in 4G Networks

This paper investigates joint power and subcarrier allocation issues for cellular OFDM-relay networks. Two novel decentralized schemes, namely semi-distributed method and distributed method based on multihop equilibrium are proposed, which aims to exploit the radio resource management (RRM) function for relay nodes (RNs) and decrease the amount of feedback information for RN-MS links. In decentralized mechanism, the base station (BS) distributes resources to direct users and RNs roughly first with partial CSI feedback or without CSI feedback for RN-MS link, and then the RNs allocate resources for each relay user by striking an efficient balance for the multihop transmission. Simulation results show that the proposed decentralized methods can achieve good performances in terms of average throughput and fraction of satisfied users, especially for relay users with multihop equilibrium mechanism. Moreover, the semi-distributed method is better choice for future LTE-A system due to excellent tradeoff between performance and complexity.

Ying Wang

Papers

Overhead-Throughput Tradeoff Under a Novel Frame Structure in Centralized Cooperative Cognitive Networks

Multi-Cell Downlink Joint Transmission with 3D Beamforming

Fuzzing Method Based on Selection Mutation of Partition Weight Table for 5G Core Network NGAP Protocol

Service-Oriented FMIPv6 Framework for Efficient Handovers in 4G Networks

Decentralized Resource Allocation Based on Multihop Equilibrium for OFDM-Relay Networks