A framework for action planning, called ideomotor theory, suggests that actions are represented by their perceivable effects. Thus, any activation of the effect image, either endogenously or exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action. We review contemporary studies relating to ideomotor theory in which researchers have investigated various manipulations of action effects and how those effects acquire discriminative control over the actions. Evidence indicates that the knowledge about the relation between response and effect is still a critical component even when other factors, such as stimulus-response or response-response relations, are controlled. When consistent tone effects are provided after responses are made, performance in serial-reaction tasks is better than when the effects are random. Methodology in which acquisition and test stages are used with choice-reaction tasks shows that an action is automatically associated with its effect bilaterally and that anticipation of the effect facilitates action. Ideomotor phenomena include stimulus-response compatibility, in which the perceptual feature of the stimulus activates its corresponding action code when the stimulus itself resembles the effect codes. For this reason, other stimulus-driven action facilitation such as ideomotor action and imitation are treated as ideomotor phenomena and are reviewed. Ideomotor theory also implies that ongoing action affects perception of concurrent events, a topic which we review briefly. Issues concerning ideomotor theory are identified and evaluated. We categorize the range of ideomotor explanations into several groups by whether intermediate steps are assumed to complete sensorimotor transformation or not and by whether a general theoretical framework or a more restricted one is provided by the account.

A review of contemporary ideomotor theory.

Memory is fleeting. New material rapidly obliterates previous material. How, then, can the brain deal successfully with the continual deluge of linguistic input? We argue that, to deal with this "Now-or-Never" bottleneck, the brain must compress and recode linguistic input as rapidly as possible. This observation has strong implications for the nature of language processing: (1) the language system must "eagerly" recode and compress linguistic input; (2) as the bottleneck recurs at each new representational level, the language system must build a multilevel linguistic representation; and (3) the language system must deploy all available information predictively to ensure that local linguistic ambiguities are dealt with "Right-First-Time"; once the original input is lost, there is no way for the language system to recover. This is "Chunk-and-Pass" processing. Similarly, language learning must also occur in the here and now, which implies that language acquisition is learning to process, rather than inducing, a grammar. Moreover, this perspective provides a cognitive foundation for grammaticalization and other aspects of language change. Chunk-and-Pass processing also helps explain a variety of core properties of language, including its multilevel representational structure and duality of patterning. This approach promises to create a direct relationship between psycholinguistics and linguistic theory. More generally, we outline a framework within which to integrate often disconnected inquiries into language processing, language acquisition, and language change and evolution.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X1500031X

The Now-or-Never bottleneck: A fundamental constraint on language.

Sensory processing of action effects has been shown to differ from that of externally triggered stimuli, with respect both to the perceived timing of their occurrence (intentional binding) and to their intensity (sensory attenuation). These phenomena are normally attributed to forward action models, such that when action prediction is consistent with changes in our environment, our experience of these effects is altered. Although much progress has been made in recent years in understanding sensory attenuation and intentional binding, a number of important questions regarding the precise nature of the predictive mechanisms involved remain unanswered. Moreover, these mechanisms are often not discussed in empirical papers, and a comprehensive review of these issues is yet to appear. This review attempts to fill this void. We systematically investigated the role of temporal prediction, temporal control, identity prediction, and motor prediction in previous published reports of sensory attenuation and intentional binding. By isolating the individual processes that have previously been contrasted and incorporating these experiments with research in the related fields of temporal attention and stimulus expectation, we assessed the degree to which existing data provide evidence for the role of forward action models in these phenomena. We further propose a number of avenues for future research, which may help to better determine the role of motor prediction in processing of voluntary action effects, as well as to improve understanding of how these phenomena might fit within a general predictive processing framework. Furthermore, our analysis has important implications for understanding disorders of agency in schizophrenia.

Mechanisms of intentional binding and sensory attenuation: The role of temporal prediction, temporal control, identity prediction, and motor prediction.

The theory of embodied cognition can provide HCI practitioners and theorists with new ideas about interaction and new principles for better designs. I support this claim with four ideas about cognition: (1) interacting with tools changes the way we think and perceive -- tools, when manipulated, are soon absorbed into the body schema, and this absorption leads to fundamental changes in the way we perceive and conceive of our environments; (2) we think with our bodies not just with our brains; (3) we know more by doing than by seeing -- there are times when physically performing an activity is better than watching someone else perform the activity, even though our motor resonance system fires strongly during other person observation; (4) there are times when we literally think with things. These four ideas have major implications for interaction design, especially the design of tangible, physical, context aware, and telepresence systems.

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Embodied cognition and the magical future of interaction design

The human species is more reliant on cultural adaptation than any other species, but it is unclear how observational learning can give rise to the faithful transmission of cultural adaptations. One possibility is that teaching facilitates accurate social transmission by narrowing the range of inferences that learners make. However, there is wide disagreement about how to define teaching, and how to interpret the empirical evidence for teaching across cultures and species. In this article I argue that disputes about the nature and prevalence of teaching across human societies and nonhuman animals are based on a number of deep-rooted theoretical differences between fields, as well as on important differences in how teaching is defined. To reconcile these disparate bodies of research, I review the three major approaches to the study of teaching – mentalistic, culture-based, and functionalist – and outline the research questions about teaching that each addresses. I then argue for a new, integrated framework that differentiates between teaching types according to the specific adaptive problems that each type solves, and apply this framework to restructure current empirical evidence on teaching in humans and nonhuman animals. This integrative framework generates novel insights, with broad implications for the study of the evolution of teaching, including the roles of cognitive constraints and cooperative dilemmas in how and when teaching evolves. Finally, I propose an explanation for why some types of teaching are uniquely human, and discuss new directions for research motivated by this framework.

How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other animals.

Testing boundary conditions of the ideomotor hypothesis using a delayed response task

It has been argued that the psychological refractory period (PRP) effect is eliminated with two ideomotor compatible tasks when instructions stress fast and simultaneous responding. Three experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis. In all experiments, Task 1 required spatially compatible manual responses (left or right) to the direction of an arrow, and Task 2 required saying the name of the auditory letter A or B. In Experiments 1 and 3, the manual responses were keypresses made with the left and right hands, whereas in Experiment 2 they were left–right toggle-switch movements made with the dominant hand. Instructions that stressed response speed reduced reaction time and increased error rate compared to standard instructions to respond fast and accurately, but did not eliminate the PRP effect on Task 2 reaction time. These results imply that, even when response speed is emphasized, ideomotor compatible tasks do not bypass response selection.

Is the psychological refractory period effect for ideomotor compatible tasks eliminated by speed-stress instructions?

Are spatial responses to visuospatial stimuli and spoken responses to auditory letters ideomotor-compatible tasks? Examination of set-size effects on dual-task interference.

Yun Kyoung Shin

Papers

A review of contemporary ideomotor theory.

Testing boundary conditions of the ideomotor hypothesis using a delayed response task

Is the psychological refractory period effect for ideomotor compatible tasks eliminated by speed-stress instructions?

Are spatial responses to visuospatial stimuli and spoken responses to auditory letters ideomotor-compatible tasks? Examination of set-size effects on dual-task interference.

Evidence for distinct steps in response preparation from a delayed response paradigm.