Showing papers by "Central Economics and Mathematics Institute published in 1994"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors give a theorem describing a structure of any non-manipulable social choice rule on a tree, in particular, any such rule is a median of dictatorial and constant rules.
42 citations
TL;DR: The general method for extracting similar patterns in Markov chain models is presented and it was shown that artificial gene sequences, which initially have been randomly set up along the multiple alignment panels, are aligned according to the hidden triplet phase.
27 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of Chichilnisky rules in the framework of infinite populations is investigated, where the existence depends on a topology on the set of profiles and a group of permutations of the participants.
14 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a discrete random price adjustment process in pure exchange economy with quantity rationing is presented, which is a non-tâtonnement process with trade and consumption out of equilibrium.
6 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a simple model of economics of intellectual goods whose concept and way of modelling have been introduced by V. Makarov (1991), and prove that a competitive equilibrium exists and belongs to a core.
5 citations
3 citations
01 Jan 1994
3 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide several elimination procedures that stem from the methods of voting by veto (Peleg, 1978; Moulin, 1983), which are used to construct direct mechanisms with values in the core of a given blocking (core mechanisms) and to arrive at states that are simultaneously strong Nash equilibria for all core mechanisms.
3 citations
TL;DR: The structure of monotonic additive criteria for comparison of alternatives that result in vectors with fuzzy components is determined and it is shown that these criteria are linear functionals whose domain is the set of support functions of alternatives with level sets.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the TU approach is abandoned in favour of the NTU approach to treat the case of regional reciprocal externalities, where implicit side payments favourably affect the other participants' (expected) choices of strategies with respect to these hidden goals.
Abstract: During emission reductions countries render 'services' to each other by reducing transboundary pollution, which should be recognized as an additional source of benefit. Since transboundary pollution fluxes are often significant, the underestimation of this factor can substantially affect the choice of emission reduction strategies and, eventually, restrain pollution reduction. This factor is a specific feature of the transboundary pollution problem that, in the taxonomy of M~iler (1990), relates to the case of regional reciprocal externalities. Cooperation in the case of regional reciprocal externalities has been often studied, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU). One reason for this is that within this approach side payments are allowed, which theoretically give higher gains to participants as compared to the approach with non-transferable utilities (NTU). Another reason is that the theory of NTU games is not yet sufficiently developed as compared with the theory of TU games. But the standard TU approach to regional environmental regulation shows significant drawbacks. Discussing the analyses of the Canadian-American agreement on the Columbia River by Krutilla (1966, 1968) and of the Mexican-American agreement on the Colorado River by Kneese (1988), M~iler (1990) points out that the countries do not use side payments in the explicit form. Moreover, the amounts of implicit 'side payments' seem to be in contradiction with the criteria of economic benefits, producing an impression of irrationality of the countries' choices (MNer, 1990). In this paper the TU approach is abandoned in favour of the NTU approach to treat the case of regional reciprocal externalities. From the viewpoint of the NTU game, an 'irrational' behaviour of a participant occurs when his preferences involve hidden goals, while his implicit side payments favourably affect the other participants' (expected) choices of strategies with respect to these hidden goals. The NTU approach becomes immune to 'irrational' behaviour if it allows consideration of the participants' utilities reflecting their respective hidden goals through the above mechanism of transposed preferences. Non-transferability of utilities generally means incommensurability of
1 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that for all a ∈ A, U(a) ∈ arg min c ∈ C ρ(a, c), that the point from C which is equivalent to a is the element c which is closest to a with respect to the given metric.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of comparing a single random experiment with a "sufficiently long" sequence of independent replicas of the same experiment and establish conditions under which a statistically stable criterion exists and give its explicit representation.
Abstract: This article is concerned with criteria of choice under uncertainty which are based on long sequences of independent experiments. To state a rule of comparison for such sequences, we first specify it for sequences of certain numbers (say, of certain incomes). Eventually, the problem is reduced to a connection between preferences on sequences ofcertain numbers and thoseon probability distributions. We take into consideration a notion of statistically stable criteria for which choice based on a single random experiment does not disagree with that based on a “sufficiently long” sequence of independent replicas of the same experiment. The main aim of the article is to establish conditions under which a statistically stable criterion exists and to give its explicit representation.