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Milken Institute

NonprofitSanta Monica, California, United States
About: Milken Institute is a nonprofit organization based out in Santa Monica, California, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Financial crisis & Medicine. The organization has 166 authors who have published 273 publications receiving 9339 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach according to where government regulates to support political constituency.

1,665 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach according to where government regulates to support political constituency.
Abstract: The authors draw on their new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess different governmental approaches to bank regulation and supervision and evaluate the efficacy of different regulatory and supervisory policies. First, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to support political constituencies. Second, they assess the effect of an extensive array of regulatory and supervisory policies on the development and fragility of the banking sector. These policies include the following: Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce. Regulations on entry by domestic and foreign banks. Regulations on capital adequacy. Design features of deposit insurance systems. Supervisory power, independence, and resources; stringency of loan classification; provisioning standards; diversification guidelines; and powers to take prompt corrective action. Regulations governing information disclosure and fostering private sector monitoring of banks. Government ownership of banks. The results raise a cautionary flag with regard to reform strategies that place excessive reliance on a country's adherence to an extensive checklist of regulatory and supervisory practices that involve direct government oversight of and restrictions on banks. The findings, which are much more consistent with the grabbing-hand view of regulation than with the helping-hand view, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory practices most effective in promoting good performance and stability in the banking sector are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control.

853 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: Barth, Caprio, and Levine as discussed by the authors present and discuss a new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries, based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities.
Abstract: This new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries should better inform advice about bank regulation and supervision and lower the marginal cost of empirical research.International consultants on bank regulation and supervision for developing countries often base their advice on how their home country does things, for lack of information on practice in other countries. Recommendations for reform have tended to be shaped by bias rather than facts.To better inform advice about bank regulation and supervision and to lower the marginal cost of empirical research, Barth, Caprio, and Levine present and discuss a new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries. The data, based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities, are now available to researchers and policymakers around the world.The data cover such aspects of banking as entry requirements, ownership restrictions, capital requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing requirements, characteristics of deposit insurance schemes, loan classification and provisioning requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements, troubled bank resolution actions, and (uniquely) the quality of supervisory personnel and their actions.The database permits users to learn how banks are currently regulated and supervised, and about bank structures and deposit insurance schemes, for a broad cross-section of countries.In addition to describing the data, Barth, Caprio, and Levine show how variables may be grouped and aggregated. They also show some simple correlations among selected variables.In a companion paper ("Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best") studying the relationship between differences in bank regulation and supervision and bank performance and stability, they conclude that:- Countries with policies that promote private monitoring of banks have better bank performance and more stability. Countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes tend to have poorer bank performance and more bank fragility.- Diversification of income streams and loan portfolios - by not restricting bank activities - also tends to improve performance and stability. (This works best when an active securities market exists.) Countries in which banks are encouraged to diversify their portfolios domestically and internationally suffer fewer crises.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group, and the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to compile data on financial regulation and supervision and the advise countries on what works best. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works and What Does Not."

702 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a conceptual framework linking urban form to residential energy use via three causal pathways: electric transmission and distribution losses, energy requirements of different housing stocks, and space heating and cooling requirements associated with urban heat islands.
Abstract: While the impact of urban form on transportation energy use has been studied extensively, its impact on residential energy use has not. This article presents a conceptual framework linking urban form to residential energy use via three causal pathways: electric transmission and distribution losses, energy requirements of different housing stocks, and space heating and cooling requirements associated with urban heat islands. Two of the three can be analyzed with available national data. After we control for other influences, residents of sprawling counties are more likely to live in single-family detached houses than otherwise comparable residents of compact counties and also more likely to live in big houses. Both lead to higher residential energy use. Because of the urban heat island effect, residents of sprawling counties across the nation on average pay a small residential energy penalty relative to residents of compact counties. Implications for urban planning are explored.

596 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning.
Abstract: In this paper and the associated online database, we provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011. The data include and the measures are based upon responses to hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning. The dataset also provides information on the organization of regulatory agencies and the size, structure, and performance of banking systems. Since the underlying surveys are large and complex, we construct summary indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies to facilitate cross-country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.

562 citations


Authors

Showing all 190 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Ross Levine122398108067
William H. Dietz106312114296
John M. Lachin9334180403
Keith A. Crandall7736660001
Patti E. Gravitt6422614646
Lance B. Price541509676
James R. Barth4424512916
Scott R. Evans432126887
Loretta DiPietro4314411310
Rajiv N. Rimal381406705
Carla J. Berg372474819
Tomas Philipson361405854
Robert Cook-Deegan361874842
Melissa A. Napolitano33755113
Jay P. Graham28792847
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
20234
202248
202133
202019
201919
201811