Showing papers by "University of Mannheim published in 1969"

Logical probability, mathematical statistics, and the problem of induction

Abstract: In this paper I want to discuss some basic problems of inductive logic, i.e. of the attempt to solve the problem of induction by means of a calculus of logical probability. I shall try to throw some light upon these problems by contrasting inductive logic, based on logical probability, and working with undefined samples of observations, with mathematical statistics, based on statistical probability, and working with representative random samples.

Nonviolent conflict resolution in democratic systems : Switzerland

Abstract: Switzerland is one of the few democracies that has regulated its political conflicts for a long time with very little violence. If we operationalize the degree of political violence by the number of deaths from domestic group violence per million population, Switzerland has the value zero for the period studied by the authors of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Russett et al., 1964). That is, from 1950 to 1962 nobody was killed in Switzerland for political reasons. Since 1962 the value has remained at zero; even the worldwide student unrest of recent years has been articulated in Switzerland with relatively little violence. This paper takes the case of Switzerland to test some hypotheses about the conditions for nonviolent patterns of conflict resolution in democratic systems. Most hypotheses that we have found in the literature are not particularly concerned with political nonviolence but rather with democratic stability. Nevertheless, since political nonviolence is usually considered to be one element of democratic stability (see, for instance, Wildenmann and Kaase, 1968), hypotheses about the conditions of democratic stability have also to be valid for the conditions of political nonviolence. Using the case of Switzerland to test such hypotheses requires, first, a description of the case itself. For this description we developed a system analysis model based especially on the works of Deutsch (1966) and Easton (1965). To fill this frame of reference we studied, by the method of participant observation, the following three decision-making processes: (1) The decision of the Swiss Confederation to give financial aid to the cantonal universities. (2) The decision of the Aargau Canton to found a new university. (3) The decision of the Liberal Party (Freisinnig-denwkratische Partei) about the program for a federal election. Besides these three case studies we undertook four survey studies about the political behavior of the citizens of Switzerland. Finally, we used for our description, insofar as possible, the whole literature about the Swiss political system. We abstracted from our data a total of 149 general observations about that political system. Space forbids enumerating all these observations here, or even giving the detailed description from which the observations were derived. (See Steiner, forthcoming.) The following observations will serve as an illustration:

Risk taking in the context of intergroup negotiation1

Abstract: Pairs of three-person male groups, working separately, came to unanimous decisions on preferred risk levels for one-half of the items in the choice-dilemmas procedure. All Ss had ***previously filled out the full 12-item questionnaire. Each group elected a representative to defend the group's interests (high commitment). An alternate (medium commitment) was also selected. The remaining S constituted the nonrepresentative (low commitment). Each S in one of the groups was then matched with his status equivalent in the other group. These dyads negotiated agreements for the six items where there was a previous reference-group position (“fixed”) and for the six items where there were only prior individual positions (“open”). For both fixed and open items, nonrepresentatives and alternates manifested risky shifts in their joint decisions, whereas representatives reached decisions through averaging. These results implied that high levels of commitment in the context of intergroup negotiation can disrupt the valuational processes underlying the risky shift in the standard intragroup situation.

IV. The production of children as a problem of utilitarian ethics

Abstract: It is shown that the basic postulate of utilitarianism does not work when we must decide whether a person should be brought into existence. Utilitarianism must be supplemented by further axioms. Those proposed lead to the consequence that as far as the potential child's utility is concerned, it is morally preferable not to produce children at all. This consequence is accepted. It is still recommended when parents’ utility is taken into account.

Wirtschaftsstruktur und Preisniveau

Abstract: In den bisherigen Kapiteln wurden Wirtschaftssubjekte, Strome und Bestande in der Regel zu grosen Einheiten zusammengefast: Der Aggregationsgrad der Analyse war hoch. In diesem Kapitel wird die Struktur einiger wichtiger Aggregate naher untersucht. Dazu gehoren die Verteilung der Erwerbstatigen und der dauerhaften Produktionsmittel auf Wirtschaftszweige und die Verteilung des Einkommens und des Vermogens auf Personengruppen. Auserdem werden einige wichtige Beziehungen zwischen Faktoreinsatz und Produktionsergebnis wie Arbeitsproduktivitat und Kapitalkoeffizient erlautert, und in Teil IV wird die Konstruktion von Preis- und Mengenindizes gezeigt.

Negotiation by leaders in the presence of their delegates and by delegates in the presence of their leaders1

Abstract: Following a preliminary testing session for assessing individual risk preferences on the choice-dilemmas task, subjects (8 at a time) were constituted as 4 leader-delegate dyads with status randomly assigned. Dyads reached joint decisions on half of the choice-dilemmas items. Subjects were then recombined as all-leader and all-delegate groups. For half of these combinations, leaders were discussants and delegates were observers; roles were reversed for the other half. The discussants' task was to negotiate a consensus on all of the choice-dilemmas items. Delegate discussants relative to leader discussants consulted more with their former dyadic partner and more often failed to achieve consensus (deadlock). Magnitude of risky shift did not differ significantly between leader and delegate discussants. However, delegate observers advocated higher risk levels than their leader discussants, whereas delegate discussants and leader observers did not differ in risk preferences. Discussant-observer discrepancies in risk preference were consistent with differences in decision satisfaction. On the whole, the presence of observers seems to increase “loss of face” motivation in leaders and fears of sanction for deviation in delegates.

Die Weiterbildung betrieblicher Führungskräfte an Universitäten

Abstract: Weiter oben wurde bereits detailliert dargestellt, das man in den USA im Bereich der Management-Ausbildung von der Erkenntnis ausgeht, das es bei dem heute festzustellenden raschen Fortschritt in Wissenschaft und Praxis und infolge der dadurch ausgelosten Veranderungen nicht mehr moglich ist, einem Studenten wahrend seiner Universitatsausbildung alles zu vermitteln, was er in seinem spateren Beruf braucht. Aus dieser Erkenntnis hat man, wie gezeigt, folgende Konsequenzen gezogen: 1. Erlernte Fakten und das Wissen um Institutionen und Techniken sind nur bedingt verwertbar, da dieses Wissen zu schnell veraltet. Stattdessen ist eine moglichst breit angelegte Grundlage zu geben und die Fahigkeit zu vermitteln, selbstandig und exakt zu denken, Probleme zu erkennen und zu losen und exakt fundierte, zielgerichtete Entscheidungen zu treffen. 2. Die Weiterbildung im Anschlus an die Universitatsausbildung, das „Training an the Job“, besitzt erhebliche Bedeutung, und ein Ziel der Universitatsausbildung mus es sein, dem Studenten die Fahigkeit mitzugeben, sich in seiner Stellung selbst weiterzubilden. Dies geschieht dadurch, das man den Studenten in der Methodik des wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens schult und ihn durch moglichst fruhe Teilnahme an der Forschung von Anfang an daran gewohnt, seine Aufgaben und Ziele mit den Methoden der wissenschaftlichen Analyse anzugehen, aus den erzielten Ergebnissen zu lernen und Schlusfolgerungen zu ziehen. 3. Da der Praktiker durch das „Training an the Job“ immer nur den Teil der Entwicklung erlernen kann, der mit seiner beruflichen Tatigkeit in Zusammenhang steht, ist ihm nicht die Moglichkeit gegeben, die wissenschaftliche und technische Entwicklung in ihrer Gesamtheit zu verfolgen. Allein das Herausfinden der wirklich relevanten Literatur aus der Fulle der Publikationen stellt fur den Praktiker ein unlosbares Problem dar. Es fehlt ihm meist auch die Moglichkeit zu prufen, ob nicht seinen Fahigkeiten und Interessen entsprechend der Wechsel in einen neu entstandenen Tatigkeitsbereich vorteilhaft ware.

Pessimism‐optimism and risk taking in individual and group contexts1

Abstract: Choice-dilemmas items were administered with the customary risk-taking (R) format (minimal acceptable odds to warrant recommendation of the desirable risky alternative) and with a pessimism-optimism (P) format (estimation of the actual “real-world” probability of success of the desirable risky alternative). Following individual testing to establish baseline levels, subjects were randomly assigned to either an R-P or P-R treatment. In the former, discussion to consensus was focused on the R dimension, and subsequent P judgments were made privately; in the latter, discussion to consensus was focused on the P dimension, and subsequent R judgments were made privately. Results indicated that the link between R and P was asymmetrical. The risky shift was produced only when discussion was oriented along the R dimension. In contrast, pessimistic shifts were obtained following both R and P discussions. Group-induced pessimism was attributed to pooling or heightened realization of the “things that might go wrong” in pursuing a risky course of action.