Analytic Philosophy 

About: Analytic Philosophy is an academic journal published by Wiley. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Computer science & Metaphysics. It has an ISSN identifier of 2153-9596. Over the lifetime, 314 publications have been published receiving 2042 citations.

What did you call me? slurs as prohibited words

Abstract: Recent literature in the philosophy of language and linguistics divides the explanatory landscape into two broad camps: content-based and non-contentbased, with the consensus being that (uses of) slurs express negative attitudes toward their targets. Content-based theorists adopt different strategies for implementing this view, but all agree that slurs (or their uses) communicate offensive content. In this essay, we will challenge the consensus and defend a non-contentbased view. According to us, slurs are prohibited not on account of offensive content they manage to get across, but rather because of relevant edicts surrounding their prohibition. We will argue that Prohibitionism, a term we coined, accounts for all the relevant data, namely, both variation in degrees of offense among slurs and their nonoffensive uses, better than the content-based competitors. We will proceed as follows: First, we will present our positive view and address specific issues that arise for it. Next, we will defend our view from objections, possible and actual. And finally, we will compare Prohibitionism with certain alternatives and show why we believe it to be superior. Before we dive in, several clarifications are in order. bs_bs_banner

Slurs and stereotypes

Abstract: A number of theorists have recently advocated semantic analyses of slurring terms that advance a common source of slurs’ offensiveness: stereotypes of the group to which the slur is standardly applied. A stereotype semantics of slurs (SSS) takes (nonappropriated) uses of slurring terms to semantically encode and express or conventionally implicate stereotypes of the group that is referenced by the slur’s neutral counterpart. So, for example, on an SSS, “S is a Nigger” expresses or implicates that S is lazy, stupid, dangerous; “S is a Kike” expresses or implicates that S is a greedy, penny-pinching schemer. Though oversimplified, these examples display how an SSS explains slurs’ offensiveness—in terms of the offensiveness of properties included in stereotypes. Lynn Tirrell, Tim Williamson, Christopher Hom, Adam Croom, and Liz Camp have each proposed some variety of SSS. While stereotype views differ in various crucial respects, all can be seen as motivated by at least some of the following considerations. First, uses of slurs bring stereotypes of the referenced group to mind almost effortlessly. Second, slurs are widely regarded as extraordinarily pernicious, far more so than many other pejoratives like “jerk” or “idiot”—harming their target’s self-conception and self-worth, often in ways that are common to the social group as a whole. Stereotypes seem to be a natural explanation of this effect. Third, and correlatively, slurring terms are strongly taboo in society, much more so than other pejoratives like “jerk,” “asshole,” and even “fucker.” While many of these are taboo in various contexts, societal taboos against using slurs seem stronger and differently rooted, so an SSS appears to account for why slurs are more strongly prohibited. Fourth, some slurs seem to be more heinous, more offensive, than others. “Nigger” is said to be more offensive than “honkey” and “limey.” By appealing to stereotypes, proponents of SSS possess a compelling explanation of slurs’ “derogatory variation.” Stereotypes of Caucasians or the French are

Moral and Semantic Innocence

Abstract: Moral Innocence is a term meant to describe that facts like the following obtain: that no Jews are kikes, that there are no kikes, but that there are Jews. It is the view, to be more prosaic, that the world we live in contains no such things as kikes, niggers, or chinks, but that it does contain Jews, African-Americans, and Chinese. These facts are the contents of the thoughts that no Jews are kikes, that there are no kikes, but that there are Jews; the thoughts that are expressed by the sentences:

It's Not What You Said, It's the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures

Abstract: In this paper, I defend against a number of criticisms an account of slurs, according to which the same semantic content is expressed in the use of a slur (e.g. 'chink') as is expressed in the use of its neutral counterpart (e.g. 'Chinese'), while in addition the use of a slur conventionally implicates a negative, derogatory attitude. Along the way, I criticise competing accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of slurs, namely, Hom's 'combinatorial externalism' and Anderson and Lepore's 'prohibitionism'.