Showing papers in "Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume in 1981"
TL;DR: For instance, the authors argued that the fact that some works come to us without explicitly stated authorship does not license the inference that we must treat all works as anonymous, and the question of failed intentions is an interesting one, but it is not something Sharpe can make much use of.
Abstract: 1 I go along with Sharpe and others (e.g. Stein Olsen, The Structure of Literary Understanding, 1978) in thinking of interpreting as one among several critical activities. Interpretation may but need not lead up to evaluatiQn whilst evaluation always presupposes interpretation. A line cannot always be drawn in critical practice, but there are obvious cases of interpretative judgements (e.g. that The Turn of the Screw is a ghost story and not a story about a neurotic) as against evaluation ones (e.g. that The Turn of the Screw is great despite certain flaws of construction-or because of unresolvable ambiguities.) For a divergent view separating interpretation from criticism on the ground that these tw6 activities have different objects, see E. D. Hirsch, Jr. "Objective Interpretation", PMLA, 1960, reprinted in On Literary Intention, ed. D. Newton-de-Molina, 1976. 2 Anonymous works certainly demand great care in the construal of intended meanings, but such construal is not in principle impossible; The fact therefore that some works come to us without explicitly stated authorship does not license the inference that we must treat all works as anonymous. Further, the question of failed intentions is an interesting one, but it is not something Sharpe can make much use of. Consider e.g. a critic's misconstrual of unintentional humour as satire. 3 Cf. Anthony Savile, "The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art", PAS, LXIX, 1968-69. 4 For Wollheim's distinction vis-a.-vis Goodman's between "multiple" and "single" arts and the ensuing type-token problems (which I have deliberately avoided discussing so as to keep to issues actually raised by Sharpe's paper), see his "Are the criteria of identity for works of art aesthetically relevant?" in Art and Its Objects, second edition, 1980. 5 The terms "inner" and "outer horizon" should not be understood in the sense in which E. D. Hirsch, Jr. uses them in Validity in Interpretation, 1967. I have borrowed them from the Husserlian context without commitment to their doctrinal homeground. 6 The inner horizon contracts or expands only, of course, in the sense that our view of it does. The fact that a mist obscures a landscape does not mean that it doesn't have the features that would be seen in broad daylight. LOGIC, FORM AND MATTER
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TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that it is possible to adopt the equality rule as an authoritative limitation upon rights of control over holdings, and that every person might choose to exercise their ownership rights as owners in such a way that the inequality rule is not violated.
Abstract: I. It cannot be required both that persons be equal (within limits) respecting their holdings' and that they shall be owners of those holdings, enjoying the freedoms appropriate for owners. For suppose2 an initial distribution of holdings (Di) over a population PI ... Pn in which each person is owner of his equal share. Then under DI each of PI . .. Pn is equal with each of the others in that (i) each owns holdings equal to those of any one of the others, and (ii) each enjoys the equal status of being one who may receive, hold and transfer property. (If some of PI . . . Pn were not allowed to become owners, (ii) would be violated.) If each person owns his share, then each has various rights of control over it, including the right to consume it, destroy it, and so forth.3 Central for the present point, they include the exclusive right to determine who next shall enjoy these rights of control. The next owner of that share, so determined, will have a similar right, and so on. If Pi .. . Pn now exercise their rights of control over their respective shares any subsequent distribution will be in keeping with everyone's rights.4 Suppose it is required that at any time after Dr no person may have holdings greater than his initial share (S)+N, nor less than S-N (the 'equality rule'). There is conflict between each person being free to determine the next owner of his S and the equality rule. If each of PI . .. Pn is free to determine the next owner of his S it cannot be that he is also not free to do so in a way conflicting with the equality rule. It may be replied that PI ... Pn could choose to adopt the equality rule. This is ambiguous as between (a) choose to exercise their rights as owners in such a way that the equality rule is not violated, and (b) choose (e.g. through a democratic mechanism) to adopt the equality rule as an authoritative limitation upon rights of control over holdings. Re (a): It is possible that every person might choose to exercise his ownership rights over his S so that the equality rule is
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TL;DR: The authors defend this solution against some standard traditional sceptical arguments concerning induction, and against falsificationist criticisms, and also defend it against a new species of scepticism, about the rationality of acting so as to maximize one's own expected utility function, due to David Miller.
Abstract: The practical problem of induction is that of how to modify preexisting expectations about the future in the light of incoming evidence. There is nothing in Hume's arguments to prevent there being a uniquely rational recipe for doing this. The Bayesians claim to have found such a recipe in Bayesian Conditionalization. Bayesian personalists claim that the rationality of this recipe solves the practical problem of induction, which arises in everyday life, and in statistical and scientific inference, and quite possibly the sceptical problem as well. I defend this solution against some standard traditional sceptical arguments concerning induction, and against falsificationist criticisms. I also defend it against a new species of scepticism, about the rationality of acting so as to maximize one's own expected utility function, due to David Miller.
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