Showing papers in "Asian Perspective in 2007"

The brics countries (brazil, russia, india, and china) as analytical category: mirage or insight?

Abstract: American hegemony has passed its peak. The twentyfirst century will see a more multipolar international system. Yet Western European countries may not be the United States’ main foils in upcoming decades. Four new poles of the international system are now known in the business and financial press as the “BRICs economies” (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Does the concept of “the BRICs” also have meaning within a rigorous political science framework? From the perspective of neoclassical economics, the category’s justification is surprising ly weak. In contrast, a political or economic realist’s framing instructs the United States to focus on states that are increasing their relative material capabilities, as each of the four is. Finally, within a liberal institutionalist’s model, the BRICs are a compelling set, yet one with a deep cleavage between two subgroups: large emerging powers likely to remain authoritarian or revert to that state, and states that are securely democratic.

China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments*

Abstract: This article demonstrates that prospects for emission reduction are not realistic under the current policy environment, and China is unlikely to take on commitments in the near future The major determinants of and actors involved in China's climate change policy are discussed, relating these to China's stance in global climate change negotiations Energy is seen as the key to economic development and is one of the main causes for China's unwillingness to take on emission reduction commitments Vulnerability to climate change is an emerging issue in China, and could contribute to elevating the climate change issue on China's domestic agenda in the future Global climate change is still seen as a remote matter by the country's policy makers, and remains a foreign-policy issue International pressure has not been able to change Beijing's stance of no commitments, although China is now an active participant in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which has become a way to apply an international mechanism on domestic problems and one of the channels that China itself prefers to use in its climate-change efforts Key words: China, environmental protection-East Asia, sustainable development Introduction China is a key country in the international climate regime for two reasons First, it is important in the global climate-change game due to its status as the world's second largest emitter of greenhouse gases after the United States China's emissions are increasing steadily Second, its status and influence in the G-77 of Third World states give it prominence in climate negotiations As the world's largest developing country with an influential voice in the United Nations, China is set to play an important role in leading the developing world in the future climate regime How then will China contribute to efforts to reduce global emissions? When will it take on emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol? In recent years, some optimism has been detected as China has engaged in dialogue in the negotiations 1 Beijing's stance has, however, not changed: It still holds that the developed countries must take the main responsibility for past greenhouse gas emissions Therefore, I argue in this article that China is unlikely to take on commitments in the near future I will demonstrate that prospects for emission reduction are not realistic under the current policy environment for several reasons Moreover, the article discusses whether China is likely to leave the Kyoto Protocol altogether and pursue other alternative channels to reduce its emissions2 I begin by analyzing the reasons why China continues to resist mandatory reductions-ie, the major determinants for China's climate change policy-relating these to the country's stance in the global climate change negotiations The article discusses the main actors involved in and responsible for China's climate change policy, and how their dominance influences China's climate change policy China's climate policy is determined by both domestic and international considerations Key domestic interests in this regard are economic development, energy issues, and perceived vulnerability Understanding the domestic factors of China's climate policy has the potential to enhance and lead to more productive negotiations China's stance in international negotiations is also influenced by foreign policy, where major issues are sovereignty, equity, and international image The country's international standing and its wish to be seen as a respected member of the international community are important factors These international and domestic issues will be discussed in the sections below We will see how developments relate to both domestic and international climate policy by examining China's involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) China is expected to become a major recipient of CDM investments Due to the country's coal-based energy, there is great potential for projects in energy efficiency, energy conservation, fuel switching, and renewable energy …

The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions

Abstract: The East China Sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas located near large markets. But the development of oil and gas in much of the area has been prevented for decades by conflicting claims to boundaries and islets in the area by China, Taiwan, and Japan. Competition between China and Japan for gas resources in the East China Sea is intensifying and hampering improved relations. However, conflict is not inevitable. A compromise-joint development-is motivated by the realization that a positive China-Japan relationship is simply too important to be destroyed by these disputes. Although both agree in principle on joint development, the two sides have different interpretations of what joint development means or implies, and what area should be jointly developed. The article spells out three basic agreements in principle that are necessary before details of any solution can be negotiated. The alternative to a solution is continued mutual suspicion, unstable relations, unmanaged and undeveloped resources, and an increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, fueling nationalist sentiments and resultant political conflict. Key words: territorial disputes, China-Japan relations, East Asian security Introduction Disputes over small islands and ocean space are usually ancillary at most to more fundamental geopolitical dialectics. However, in certain situations of big-power rivalry and competition for scarce petroleum resources, such issues may become the tail that wags the dog of international relations. The intensifying competition between China and Japan for gas resources in the East China Sea could become just such a situation. The East China Sea is thought to contain up to 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent. It is one of the last unexplored highpotential resource areas located near large markets. The development of oil and gas in much of the area has been prevented for decades by conflicting and overlapping claims to boundaries in the area by China, Taiwan, and Japan. Indeed, the Japanese government has until now refused to let companies explore and develop the resources in the area because it feared that these acts would adversely affect its relations and negotiations with China on boundaries. But China has been drilling ever closer to the "median" line between undisputed territory of both countries that has been unilaterally declared as the boundary by Japan, and is now producing gas from the Chunxiao field situated just on its side of that line. Tokyo has officially protested the drilling because it fears China will siphon off gas from its side of the "boundary" and is now considering allowing Teikoku Oil Company to drill on Japan's side of it. Just the possibility of such drilling by Teikoku has been fiercely protested by Beijing, which claims most of the East China Sea continental shelf. Conflict is not inevitable. China's June 2004 proposal to jointly develop the hydrocarbon resources of the East China Sea is an opportunity to cap rising tension, and at long last harvest the resources in the disputed area. This article describes and analyses the context of the dispute and relevant recent developments as well as the conflicting claims and related issues, and then proposes a range of possible conflict-avoidance measures and ultimate solutions. The Strategic Setting The East China Sea is a strategic area for China, Japan, and the United States.1 In the north it guards the entrance to the Tsushima Strait which leads to the Sea of Japan. On its south sits Taiwan, a main bone of contention between China and the United States. Moreover, China sees Japan as part of a U.S. attempt to contain China and is particularly incensed with Japan's pledged logistical and intelligence support of the United States in the event of a clash with China over Taiwan. It also is concerned with Japan's growing nationalism and assertiveness and fears it may culminate in a revival of Japanese militarism. …

Brazil: To Be or Not to Be a BRIC?

Abstract: Brazil will gain a place as a significant player in the multipolar international system taking shape since the end of the cold war simply on the basis of its economic size and material capabilities. However, its potential to influence international outcomes is likely to be determined more by the capacity of the country's elites to identify and harness qualitative assets associated with its stable and democratic governance than by any hard-power assets. Brazil is the quintessential soft-power BRIC. Among the four BRICs, Brazil is the only one positioned to become a potential environmental power in a world increasingly preoccupied with global warming. Key words: Brazil, BRICs, international relations, economic development Introduction Brazil will very likely be a major power by the middle of the twenty-first century, albeit not one of the world's top three. Along with its fellow BRICs countries (Russia, India, and China), as early as 2040 Brazil may overshadow the traditional major powers of Western Europe in terms of its relative material capabilities within the global system.1 Yet unlike China, Russia, or India, Brazil's future political alliances are significantly predetermined: It will be a Western power, closely linked to the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, Brazil's power projection is fundamentally one of soft power and largely depends on the quality of the democratic institutions it has adopted since the return of civilian rule in 1985, institutions that, in the eyes of Brazilians themselves, confer legitimacy on the country's recent diplomatic assertiveness. Brazil's policy makers already actively participate in and shape international institutions at both the regional and global levels. Curiously, Brazil may achieve major-power status almost accidentally. Despite the country's long history of dreaming of being a great power, relatively few Brazilian policy makers and opinion leaders yet have fully thought through the implications of playing an influential role on the global stage. One possibility is for Brazil to position itself as the emerging environmental power. As owner of the world's last major tropical rainforest, one of the largest renewable reserves of fresh water,2 the planet's most diverse stock of biodiversity, the best energy matrix among major countries, and the most successful industrial-scale production of renewable fuels, Brazil has the assets to play such a role, if it adopts policies to preserve those assets and use them as political tools in a world increasingly preoccupied with climate change. The Material Capabilities of a BRIC Is Brazil legitimately included within the set of large emerging powers christened "the BRICs" countries? Brazil possesses, or will possess by early in the twenty-first century, the minimum material capabilities to be considered as a second-tier major power, analogous to the position of France or Italy today. This claim at first appears unfounded, in that Brazil is not a world military power, even to the level of the major Western European states or its fellow BRICs. In terms of military expenditures, Brazil ranks only among the top twenty countries. Its estimated $13.4-billion expenditure in 2006 puts Brazil on a par with Australia, Canada, Spain, and Israel. It falls below the next highest group of South Korea, India, Italy, Russia, and Germany, each of which spent between $20 and $30 billion in 2006. And Brazil is well below Japan, China, France, and Britain, which expended $40 to $50 billion on their militaries. The United States stands alone, having spent $528.7 billion in 2006.3 Of course Brazil has little reason for a large military, as it easily dominates its continent and neighborhood. For example, if we take military expenditure as a very rough measure of military power, then Brazil is approximately three times as powerful as Colombia, four times as dangerous as Mexico, and has more than seven times the strength of either Venezuela or Argentina. …

A critique of the china threat theory: a systematic analysis

Abstract: Proponents of the "China threat" theory argue that it is inconceivable for China to have a peaceful rise; a superpower China will inevitably be a threat to the United States. This article analyzes the military and economic aspects of the "China threat" theory from theoretical, methodological, and strategic points of view. The theory's flaws are in its assumptions, which this article tackles by providing counter examples as well as by highlighting external and internal problems facing China that can complicate its rise to great-power status. In addition, the "China threat" theory is based on linear projection and imperfect historical analogies that are as misleading conceptually as they are strategically counterproductive to Sino-American strategic relations. This, of course, is not to argue that China poses no threat; it is, however, to suggest that the nature of any threat is far more nuanced than the "China threat" theorists claim it to be. Key words: East Asian Security, U.S.-China relations Introduction China's rise has been viewed with uncertainty and anxiousness in the West. Its rapid economic growth, military modernization, and in recent years a surge in energy demand have made many in the United States talk about a "China threat." Policy makers, strategic thinkers, academics, and pundits have started exploring strategies of "containing" China, and rejecting the concept of "peaceful rise."1 There are many reasons for such fears. Robert Kagan, for example, has used history to argue that China's rise will not be peaceful. He has asserted: "The history of rising powers . . . and their attempted 'management' by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power."2 Others have expressed the threat from a rising China in starker terms. Bill Gertz, for example, has argued that "The People's Republic of China is the most serious national security threat the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable future . . . The reason Americans should take the threat from China so seriously is that it puts at risk the very national existence of the United States."3 The U.S. government has been more nuanced and reserved about the perceived threat from China, but it has also sounded the alarms. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for example, asserted that "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages."4 Of course, different administrations have had different attitudes toward the "China threat." President George W. Bush's administration, however, made it clear that-unlike the Clinton administration- it saw China as a strategic competitor. The following quote from Condoleezza Rice-then a foreign policy adviser to then-Governor George W. Bush-is telling. Arguing against the Clinton administration's policy of engagement of China, Rice wrote: Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia- Pacific region. This means that China is not a "status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. …

Aliens among Brothers? the Status and Perception of North Korean Refugees in South Korea*

Abstract: The recent dramatic increase of North Korean refugees in South Korea (called saeteomin, new settlers) has attracted the attention of scholars as well as practitioners not only because of their impact on South Korea and its citizens but, more significantly, because of their unique experiences there. They have encountered various hardships in South Korean society, including economic difficulties, maladjustment to schools, and emotional distance or isolation. This article attempts to illuminate and analyze the status of the North Korean refugees and their perceptions and emotions with respect to South Koreans. Key words: North Korean refugees, human rights-East Asia, Korean unification Introduction According to the Ministry of Unification of South Korea, the number of North Korean refugees has reached 9,706 as of 2006. Many of them made arduous treks as long as 6,000 miles from North Korea across China/Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries to get to South Korea. When the 400 North Koreans currently being investigated and educated at the Hanawon1 and the 500 North Koreans under protection of South Korean embassies and consulates in Thailand and Mongolia for their entry into South Korea are added together,2 the current refugee total is more than 10,000. How well have these saeteomin settled down in South Korean society? Are they respected by or living in harmony with South Koreans? Or have they become second-class citizens who form a new minority group in South Korean society? A 2003 survey by the Korea Institute for National Unifica- tion (KINU) shows that 60.5 percent of saeteomin respondents are satisfied with their overall life in South Korea whereas only 6.7 percent of them are not satisfied.3 The 2005 study by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (DCNKHR) on saeteomin settlement conditions indicates that the percentage of "satisfied" respondents (28.4 percent) is about four times higher than that of "unsatisfied" respondents (6.6 percent).4 However, it is possible that they measure their satisfaction based on a comparison between their life in South Korea and the hardships they survived in North Korea and the countries they stayed in en route to South Korea.5 This measure of satisfaction does not explain how successfully they have settled into South Korean society nor their integration with South Koreans. In this article, we examine the status of saeteomin in South Korea and their perception of South Koreans. For the purpose of analysis, we employ the three categories of "making money in South Korea," "studying in South Korea," and "interacting with South Koreans." For comparison, we will address South Koreans' perception and attitude regarding saeteomin in their society. Making Money in South Korea Making money in South Korea is very important and urgent for North Korean refugees. Many of them arrived in South Korea with the expectation of economic betterment and a hope for freedom. However, the 2003 KINU survey showed that the largest number of respondents (28.8 percent) indicated that they most needed "economic betterment."6 Also, in the 2005 study of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, the largest number of respondents (22.7 percent) indicated that "economic difficulties" are the most difficult obstacle in their life in South Korea.7 In the same study, only 5.1 percent considered themselves middle-class (or above) residents. Many identified themselves as middle-low class (9.9 percent), lower class (57.3 percent), or as living in abject poverty (27.5 percent). These data reveal that a sub- stantial number of saeteomin feel relative (though not absolute) deprivation in South Korea.8 Actually, in 2005, the average monthly income per capita for the South Korean population was approximately 1,390,000 won (about $1,482).9 About 77 percent of surveyed saeteomin said their total monthly income, including wages, government subsidies and nongovernment financial aid, was less than 1,000,000 won (about $1,066). …

China: globalization and the emergence of a new status quo power?

Abstract: The remarkable economic growth of China in the past two decades has generated both admiration and concern. As an “undemocratic capitalist” country, Beijing’s grand strategy and true intentions once it becomes stronger are under scrutiny by the rest of the world. This article examines how economic globalization has transformed China’s national policy preferences. It explores China’s foreign economic policy and recent activism in regional and multilateral settings, and within geographic regions that China had minimal contact with as recently as ten years ago. China’s resource endowments combined with its rapid and highly globalized growth have shaped its trade profile. The article suggests that, regardless of China’s grand strategy or future intentions, its policy options have been deeply constrained by its highly globalized economy.

Russia: great power image versus economic reality

Abstract: Russia’s vision of itself has largely coalesced around that of a unique regional power, with the natural resources, glorious history, and will power to be a major player in a future multipolar world. As seen by most Russians, under the guidance of President Vladimir Putin, Russia has become an economically powerful actor with an important and independent voice on the international stage, including rebuilding historic economic alliances with states described as rogues by the United States and forming a strategic partnership with China. Some have seen the challenges to the West combined with Russia’s close relationship with China as a threat to the United States; but this threat should not be overblown. As China continues to assert itself and eventually challenges Russia’s declared dominance of Central Asian resources, the two states may well clash.

Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia’s Worldview and Foreign Policy

Abstract: This article explores the definition, origins, and meaning of Indonesia's worldview for contemporary international relations. It finds that Indonesian perceptions of the country's world role and the realities of its capacities are in tension. Apparent sharp breaks in foreign policy from one regime to the next mask underlying continuities in the country's view of the world and Indonesia's place in it. By virtue of its size, location, history, principled behavior, and rich culture, Indonesia is entitled to a leadership role in the region and the world. For Soekarno, the father of the nation, this was political-revolutionary. For Soeharto, this was economic. For contemporary presidents, the inspiration to leadership still exists, even if the capacity to lead is not always present. Key words: Indonesia, foreign policy in East Asia, democracy -East Asia Introduction: Indonesia's Worldview Indonesia, stung by political and economic instability, separatism, as well as natural disasters, has in recent years been perhaps the easiest large nation to ignore in foreign policy. Under former president Soeharto (1966-1998), the country was once an Asian "tiger," but, since the dictator's overthrow, Indonesia has seemed to lurch from one crisis, even tragedy, to the next. It is little wonder that the country does not punch to its notional weight, or to its national ambitions, in contemporary international relations. This article explores the definition, origins, and meaning of Indonesia's worldview for contemporary international relations. A nation's worldview is the dominant perception of the nature of the world system and its place in that system.1 Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (elected in 2004) called Indonesia's foreign-policy worldview its "international identity."2 Indonesian views of the nature of the global system are consistent throughout the country's contemporary history, despite seemingly drastic changes of leadership. International relations are seen as dominated by the large, developed nations that design institutions and act exclusively in their own self-interest. This view provides a lens through which to view world developments and is consistent from the time of the radical Soekarno (president from 1949-1966) to the cautious but ambitious Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Unlike the power-hungry large powers, Indonesia is generally imagined- from the Indonesian perspective-as a benevolent expositor of peace and the interests of the developing world. This view is held despite Indonesia's own occasional "big stick" foreign-policy moves. The finding here is that Indonesian perceptions of the coun- try's world role and the realities of its capacities are in some tension. The country aspires to leadership-leaders even feel entitled to it by virtue of their perception of the nation's size, resources, strategic location, history, and other factors-yet the country's turbulent politics and economics, even the vagaries of nature, have combined to weaken its world role. The Historical Development of Indonesia's Worldview Independence Indonesia's worldview primarily originates in the country's nationalism, crafted in the struggle against colonialism and for national consolidation. The view is heavily influenced by a Marxist analysis of power relations among nations-that the rich do for themselves, while garbing their actions in universal principles. This cynical view might seem inspired by realism as well; however, this would not be accurate. Indonesians appear to perceive one standard of behavior by the rich nations of the West (crass, self-serving, and hypocritical) and another more principled stand for Indonesia and many other nations of the developing world. A realist would likely see the two as more similar in motivation, differing only in capability. The worldview has been created and propagated by Indonesian leaders, the foreign policy and military establishments, and the educated public (university lecturers, civil society activists, and newspaper columnists, among others). …

Japan's Oda at the Crossroads: Disbursement Patterns of Japan's Development Assistance to Southeast Asia

Abstract: The article examines the recent changes in Japan's official development assistance (ODA) to Southeast Asia in response to domestic and international challenges after the cold war. It argues that Japan is in a position where it has to choose between "spending" and "earning" strategies in the disbursement of aid. Influenced by external and internal developments, Japan has tilted toward a "spending" approach over the last decade. Due to a limited ODA budget, Japan has to optimize the use of aid and disburse it more strategically. Also significant is the noticeable across-the-board increase in the grant allocation to Southeast Asia and Vietnam's emergence as a major recipient. Key words: foreign aid in Asia, Japan, ASEAN Introduction On several occasions, Japan has utilized its official development assistance (ODA) to confront issues and problems both at home and abroad. Japan's record as an aid donor dates back to the period of reparations in the 1950s. Indeed, Japan has come a long way from being a capital supplier of a few million dollars to being one of the largest sources of official development assistance, with billions of dollars at its disposal. Since the first disbursal, Japan's ODA has helped accomplish many of the country's foreign-policy objectives. Apart from reparations and export promotion, the Japanese have also used aid as a form of investment, a confidence-building measure, a solution for bilateral problems, a manifestation of economic power and global leadership, and a tool for buying power and influence in various international organizations. For many years, the conventional notion has been that Japan's aid disbursement is oriented toward its geoeconomic interests. In the 1980s, observers noted the lack of "philosophy" in Japanese aid, while some Japanese scholars struggled to justify the close alignment of Japan's aid with U.S. strategic interests. A more coherent direction in aid disbursement began to take shape in the early 1990s in response to domestic and international challenges. The end of the cold war, for instance, provided more leeway to Japan's conduct of its foreign policy, which meant flexibility in aid disbursement beyond U.S. strategic considerations. Several studies also noted the improvement of Japan's aid in the 1990s in terms of its quality and characteristics. Since the 1990s, Japan's disbursement of aid has diverged into two paths. One track follows the traditional geoeconomic orientation, the other more humanitarian goals. Hook and Zhang attributed the divergence to Japan's bureaucratic rivalry, particularly between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI), over the management of aid.1 The METI promotes the mercantilist uses of aid that advance Japan's economic interests while the MFA emphasizes the political uses of aid in ways commensurate with Japan's post-cold war regional and global responsibilities. The Hook and Zhang study, however, maintained that the actual disbursement of aid in the 1990s followed the METI rather than the MFA discourse and dismissed the latter as merely rhetoric. On the other hand, Katada examined the domestic and international forces behind the development of Japan's two- track aid approach.2 He averred that domestic institutional constraints and budgetary limitations have made the divergence possible. Certain international factors such as Japan's membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have improved the quality of Japan's aid, particularly the untying of its aid and the allocation of more grants. As human security began to emerge as an important issue in the post-cold war era, in 1998 Japan's MFA incorporated the concept in its international cooperation and declared that Japan would strive to make the 21st century a "human-centered" century.3 Following this announcement, the government of Japan and the United Nations Secretariat established the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS). …

Reconciling colonial memories in Korea and Japan

Abstract: The Republic of Korea and Japan share a tumultuous history, but arguably no period has caused greater trauma in bilateral relations than the twentieth century. After Japan’s four-decade long colonial occupation of Korea, the two countries took two decades just to establish diplomatic relations. Subsequent interactions have remained seriously compromised by the memory of colonialism. This article reviews the tensions behind the tempestuous bilateral relationship, focusing on the depiction of Japan’s wartime past in school textbooks. We advance three suggestions for reconciliation: viewing reconciliation not as the restoration of a harmonious pre-conflict order, but as an ongoing, incomplete process; expanding promising bilateral dialogues; and accepting that there will always be differences between Korea and Japan, most notably with regard to representations of the past. Rather than being an inevitable source of conflict, these differences should contribute to an ongoing process of negotiation between the two neighbors.

India and china: from trade to peace?

Abstract: Since the late 1950s, relations between India and China have been fraught with tension and conflict. Yet the two countries have recently enjoyed a significant improvement in bilateral relations. In this article, we explore potential economic reasons for this rapprochement. We set out three possible mechanisms by which commercial interdependence could lead states toward peace, and then examine their operation in the India-China case. We conclude that the most likely explanation for the relational change is the concerted effort in both countries to be seen as responsible participants in the global economy. Thus, general economic prudence, rather than any specific bilateral factor, may be having a positive effect on the India-China relationship.

Building blocks or a bric wall? fitting u.s. foreign policy to the shifting distribution of power

Abstract: The U.S. confronts the difficult task of managing change peacefully as the BRICs' economic rise redistributes power in the international system. I consider the insights from four approaches within international relations-Realism, Institutionalism, Constructivism and Liberalism-to draw out possible policy advice. While the first two offer useful thinking, their policies are in fact quite risky and difficult to implement. Constructivism, too, offers insights, but theories from this approach do not articulate practical policy guidance. Liberals direct our attention to the domestic sources of state preferences, suggesting not only how to influence future systemic change, but also identifying ways to make Realist or Institutionalist policies towards the BRICs more applicable and effective. Key words: U.S. foreign policy, international relations, BRICs America's "unipolar moment" has already endured longer than many dared anticipate, but policy decisions appear to be hastening its end. The Bush administration has responded to a variety of challenges-some expected, some not-with a series of high-risk responses. Although there currently appear to be few attempts to balance U.S. power, the seeds for future counter- alliances have surely been sown. Moreover, everyone recognizes that power will eventually be redistributed in the international system, presenting the status quo powers with one of the greatest challenges in international politics: managing change peacefully.1 By all accounts, four countries merit special attention, for they are already regional powers, and have the potential to become players with global political and economic reach: Brazil, Russia, India and China, collectively referred to as the BRICs. How can the United States manage this change? Can the United States integrate these powers into a shared order, using the BRICs to build a better future? Or will they band together to overthrow the status quo, confronting the United States with a "BRIC wall"? The BRICs' Relations with the United States Several pieces of evidence indicate the United States needs to pay special attention to the BRICs over the next several decades. Most importantly, economic trends suggest these countries will eventually rise in power capabilities. Remarkably, the BRICs' combined GDP has been projected to pass that of the G6 within forty years, with China's GDP being larger than that of the United States.2 While striking, several qualifications should be raised as we interpret such projections. Even with this growth, the GDP per capita of any one of the BRICs would remain low compared to that of the United States, for instance. Such differences matter, for it suggests these countries' economies would complement the American economy rather than directly rival it. Also, these projections are based on the BRICs' recent economic performance, plus assumptions about each one's internal demo- graphic, political, and economic stability. These countries will undoubtedly face serious obstacles sustaining high growth rates over four decades. Even if each of the BRICs could maintain their economic trajectory in coming years, that success could undermine stability by creating demands for political change. For argument's sake, the analysis below assumes the BRICs will handle these challenges, continuing their economic growth- what then can the United States do to shape international outcomes as the distribution of power undergoes this radical shift? Today, all four BRICs have deep economic ties with the United States. These ties give the U.S. some economic leverage over all four (even over China, despite the mass media's reading of the two's trade relations). Trade statistics reporting America's worst bilateral trade imbalances for 2006 place China at the top of the list; Russia ranked 13th, India 18th, and Brazil 26th.3 First, note that the content of trade fits with each countries' comparative advantage. In the case of China, a major source of goods flowing into the American economy, the United States imports labor-intensive light manufactures. …

Japan’s Proactive Foreign Policy and the Rise of the BRICs

Abstract: Within the past decade or so, Japan's foreign policy has become more proactive and assertive than it was during the cold war, placing greater emphasis on non-economic sources of power. Changing bilateral relations with all four BRICs are both causes and consequences of this newly assertive foreign policy stance. Japan's relationship with China is both the most important and the most complicated of the four. At the core of complexity is Japan's deep ambivalence about whether to treat China's economic rise as a threat or an opportunity. Japanese policy has consequently veered between engagement and confrontation, with the paradoxical result that while bilateral trade has exploded, diplomatic relations are the worst in memory. Japan's relations with Russia display a similar if less pronounced ambivalence. Largely as a consequence of heightened concerns about the threats from China and Russia, Japanese policy makers have begun to see the potential of both India and Brazil as useful counterweights, a view that coincides with the newly-articulated "values diplomacy" that stresses the importance of shared democratic values. However, India and Brazil remain relatively unimportant trading partners for Japan. Key words: Japan, foreign policy, international relations, BRICs Introduction For much of the cold war, Japan's foreign policy was guided by the "Yoshida Doctrine" of pacifism, deference to and security dependence on the United States, and a nonconfrontational diplomatic style.1 Within the past decade or so, however, Japan's foreign policy has become more proactive and assertive, placing greater emphasis on noneconomic sources of power, both "hard" military strength and "soft" diplomatic and cultural assets. Scholars attribute this shift from "reactive state" to "reluctant realist" to many causes. Globally, the end of the cold war meant that unquestioning U.S. protection could no longer be taken for granted. Regionally, new challenges include a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and the nuclearization of the India-Pakistan standoff, as well as increased threats from North Korea. Domestically, economic stagnation increased Japan's sense of vulnerability and provoked rising nationalism even as the pacifist left collapsed. Changing bilateral relations with all four BRICs are both causes and consequences of this newly assertive foreign policy stance. Changing relations with China and to a far lesser extent Russia did much to provoke the policy shift, while relations with India and Brazil are being transformed by it. Japan's relationship with China is both the most important and the most complicated of the four. At the core of the complexity is Japan's deep ambivalence about whether to treat China's economic rise as a threat or an opportunity and, if the former, whether the main threat stems from China's economic and military power or from the regional instability that would follow an economic or political collapse. Japanese policy has consequently veered between engagement and confrontation, with the paradoxical result that while bilateral trade has exploded-China is now Japan's largest trading partner-diplomatic relations are the worst in memory. Japan's relations with Russia display a similar if less pronounced ambivalence. Russia's energy resources and economic vibrancy are increasingly attractive to Japanese corporations, and trade is rapidly increasing, but longstanding territo- rial disputes and mutual distrust mar the relationship. Largely as a consequence of heightened concerns about China, Japanese policy makers have begun to see the potential of both India and Brazil as useful counter-weights. Japan enlisted both as allies in the bid to win permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Closer relations were also part of the recent Foreign Minister Taro Aso's "Values Diplomacy" which, as part of Japan's contribution to the "War on Terror," stressed shared values of democracy and human rights. …

New dynamics of sino-japanese relations

Abstract: Sino-Japanese relations entered a new phase when Japan's new prime minister, Abe Shinzo decided to make his first foreign trip to China, thus breaking the ice on the bilateral summit that was suspended for five years under the leadership of Koizumi Junichiro. This article examines the domestic and international context of such a shift in Japan's China policy during Koizumi's final year in office and Abe's initial tenure from the fall of 2006 to the spring of 2007. It argues that Abe, although making a decisive shift from Koizumi's confrontational approach with China, has been pursuing a "double movement" strategy with China: positive engagement with Beijing for shared interests and active preparation for containing the rise of China. It offers three recommendations for strengthening the positive momentum and suppressing the negative elements in managing the Japan-China relationship. Key words: China-Japan relations, East Asian politics, territorial disputes Introduction Despite the North Korean nuclear crisis looming large, Japan-China relations remain the central issue of long-term security concerns in East Asia. A stable and positive relationship between Tokyo and Beijing enhances regional stability while a Sino-Japanese confrontation worsens the prospect for regional cooperation. In recent years, Japan's economic relations with China have continued to grow. Trade and economic ties between the two countries are the closest in history. Yet under the leadership of the former prime minister, Koizumi Junichiro, from 2001 to 2005 Japan's political relations with China deteriorated. Popular opinion toward each other in both countries also turned more negative.1 The controversy surrounding Koizumi's insistence on annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are buried among the war dead, stirred up nationalism in both countries. A large-scale, officially tolerated (at the initial stage) anti-Japanese demonstration occurred in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major Chinese cities in the spring of 2005.2 The angry outburst of Chinese youth toward what they perceived as Japan's whitewash of past aggressions sent shock waves throughout Japan. As an unintended consequence, the event forced the Japanese public to begin a domestic debate on whether Japan has truly reflected on its history. The United States, Australia, and other countries in the region also began to pay attention to the situation because they view the worsening of China-Japan relations as threatening to their own interests in East Asia. By the summer of 2006, pressure intensified for Koizumi and Japan's next prime minister to stop going to Yasukuni. Abe Shinzo, on becoming prime minister in September 2006, decided to change Koizumi's confrontational policies by immediately visiting China and South Korea. In this article, I examine the recent changes and new developments in Japan-China relations. First, I put the latest changes in Sino-Japanese relations in the context of changing realities in the late Koizumi period. Second, I examine the China policies of the Abe cabinet and their implications. Finally, I make a few recommendations for further improvements of bilateral relations. Fighting the Past: The Single Issue in Sino-Japanese Relations under Koizumi Koizumi came to power in 2001, paying annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine throughout his time in office. Despite severe criticism from Beijing, Seoul, and other countries, Koizumi did not change his mind, resulting in the suspension of a summit with China for most of his tenure as prime minister. Yasukuni became the single issue that hindered a healthy relationship between Japan and its neighbors.3 However, by mid-2006, there were positive signs that Sino-Japanese relations were improving- an indication that both senior Chinese leaders and their Japanese counterparts were willing to look beyond Koizumi. A Turn of the Tide Political relations between China and Japan were at low ebb for much of the five years since Koizumi began his pilgrimages to Yasukuni. …

Managing Security in Asean-China Relations: Liberal Peace of Hegemonic Stability*

Abstract: The management of security and ultimately order building in ASEAN-China relations are loosely embedded in a declaratory process of community formation. While this process has generated generally beneficial soft institutions in economic and other policy areas, the current state of relative regional peace is primarily attributable to China's emerging role as a hegemonic stabilizer. The PRC increasingly sets the rules and organizes a growing network of security-relevant relationships in both traditional and non-traditional security fields. Just as in the cases of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, the up-and-coming Pax Sinica is characterized by the creation and enforcement of rules that are profitable to the dominant state at the center of the security order. At the same time the policies of China as a hegemonic power on the horizon also bring security benefits to the states in its zone of influence. Key words: China, ASEAN, East Asian security Introduction: Social Constructivism versus Neorealism In November 2000 political leaders of the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed to strengthen economic cooperation and uttered the words "free trade" for the first time. Since then academic analysis of relations between Southeast Asia and China has developed a strong emphasis on the proposed China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA).1 Under the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation, which was officially announced and signed in November 2002, ASEAN and China envision the liberalization of 99 percent of their bilateral trade in stages: by 2010 for the ASEAN-6 and China; and 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.2 The Liberal-Peace and Social-Constructivist Arguments While most recent analyses deal almost exclusively with the economic implications of CAFTA, a sizable number of academic observers highlight the fact that the scope of the free-trade proposal goes beyond trade facilitation and tariff reduction.3 According to this view, CAFTA is only one of various examples in China-ASEAN relations of regional security coming into play even in the absence of an explicit political discourse on security between the two sides. In other words, the intensified building of economic institutions in Sino-Southeast Asian relations is expected to facilitate regional stability and security. States that trade with each other are less likely to go to war against each other. This liberal-peace hypothesis is of course almost as old as the study of international relations itself, and the ASEAN-China example seems to be just another empirical case to prove it. From this perspective, growing economic interdependence reduces the negative effects of anarchy and ultimately transforms the nature of international politics, moving it toward a "trading world." Interdependence, not insecurity resulting from anarchy, structures the behavior of states in the international system.4 The most popular incarnation of the liberal-peace argument in the study of Asian security follows Karl W. Deutsch's early work on the building of security communities. According to Deutsch, historical evidence suggests that stable and peaceful inter-state relations are the result of quantitatively and qualitatively increased transnational activities in multiple areas (such as cross-border trade, investments, telecommunications, and travel) and related intergovernmental institution building. If cross-border transactions continue to increase they will eventually reach a level of institutionalization at which military conflict between states becomes highly unlikely. At this point a pluralistic security community has emerged, characterized by the general absence of war as a possible means of problem solving in intermember relations. Instead, states "will settle their disputes in some other way."5 A rich (and growing) body of literature, not to mention countless master's and doctoral theses, identifies ASEAN as a pluralistic security community given the organization's four decade-long track record of having managed relations among member states in (mostly) nonconfrontational ways. …

Chinese and Japanese Public Opinion: Searching for Moral Security*

Abstract: Japanese and Chinese hold strikingly similar opinions of each other-both are negative. Since the normalization of Japan's postwar relations with China in 1978, opinion surveys document a clear deterioration of goodwill after nearly two decades of relatively good relations. This trend has accelerated over the past ten years. Most noticeable is how much the decline of trust coincides with a rise of internal socio-economic anxieties in both countries. The central governments are faltering in their ability to provide social stability and cohesion-a sense of safety and material well-being-while establishing a sense of national identity. We argue that current Sino-Japanese tensions reflect more each country's domestic stresses than they do disagreements over history, any inherent geostrategic competition, or regional economic rivalry. Restoration, or the establishment of prosperity, social certainty, and "moral security" in both countries, is necessary before China and Japan can have any meaningful resolution of their historical and geopolitical issues. Key words: China-Japan relations, East Asian security Introduction Japanese and Chinese hold strikingly similar opinions of each other-both are negative. Since the normalization of Japan's postwar relations with China in 1978, opinion surveys document a clear deterioration of goodwill after nearly two decades of relatively good relations. This trend has accelerated over the past ten years. Most noticeable is how much the decline of trust coincides with a rise of internal socioeconomic anxieties in both countries. The two countries, at first, appear perfect opposites. One is a managed, mature capitalist democracy and the other a developing market economy overseen by a communist oligarchy. However, there are also many similarities. Both are ancient societies forged into nation-states by foreign ideologies. Both have citizens with weak national identities and leaderships that aspire to build stronger ones. Both are confronting inward-looking, individualist trends that distance their citizens from state authority. Both societies are struggling with expanding personal responsibilities after a period of rigid conformity. Both economies are grappling with the dislocations caused by free-market capitalism after years of state planning and guaranteed employment. In short, both China and Japan have witnessed a decade of social change brought about by rapidly transforming economies in an era of acultural globalization. China and Japan now share a unique period in their nation building. The central governments are faltering in their ability to provide social stability and cohesion-a sense of safety and material well-being. Security is being defined by making Chineseness or Japaneseness a civil rather than an ethnic quality. It is the "national" in national security with which both societies are grappling. Current Sino-Japanese tensions reflect more each country's domestic stresses than they do any inherent regional strategic competition. We conclude that restoration, or the establishment of prosperity and social certainty in both countries, is necessary before China and Japan can have any meaningful resolution of their historical and geopolitical issues. Our view is that their potential regional rivalry is less important than their internal social stability. The Overall Relationship: Shared Disdain Positive Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward the other have declined measurably since 1978, when the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. Whereas over 60 percent of Japanese surveyed in the late 1970s felt positively toward China, an equally negative view was presented by 2006. This reversal of goodwill is the same for the Chinese toward Japan. Japan For Japan, three important public opinion surveys mark this decline over time. Japan's Cabinet Office, the quasi-governmental Japanese newswire Jiji Press, and the U. …

China, Multinational Corporations, and Globalization: Beijing and Microsoft Battle over the Opening of China's Gates

Abstract: There are two perspectives on the relationship between states and multinational corporations (MNCs). One, the "state in command" perspective, sees states as dominant, with globalization only worsening the situation. The other-the "MNCs in command" view-sees MNCs as all-powerful as a result of their assets. Globalization from that perspective is not necessarily bad and may actually empower states against multinational firms. China's dealings with Microsoft Corporation from the early 1990s to the present show that neither perspective is accurate. China got some of what it wanted while Microsoft got some of what it wanted. In lieu of these approaches, a third model is offered here-a modified bargaining power perspective that focuses on the balance of needs, alliances, and the institutional environment as important factors shaping the bargaining dynamic between China and multinational enterprises. A case study of the China-Microsoft model demonstrates the usefulness of the model. Key words: China, globalization, economic development in Asia Introduction Multinational corporations (MNCs) are one of the most visible facets of contemporary globalization. In 1970, there were 7,000 MNCs worldwide. Thirty years later the number had soared to more than 60,000. As of 1999, the 1,000 largest MNCs were responsible for 80 percent of world industrial output while the world's top 100 MNCs accounted for 4.3 percent of world GDP.1 China is no stranger to these trends. Between 2004 and 2006 alone, the number of foreign-funded enterprises in China jumped from almost 470,000 to more than 500,000. Moreover, MNCs have assumed an increasingly prominent role in China's economy. They employ almost 24 million people, represent nearly ninety of China's 200 largest exporters, and dominate numerous market segments such as soft drinks.2 In the view of some, today's MNCs have great power.3 This is because they can use their massive revenues, control over distribution channels, and addictive brands to force countries to open their markets, limit their support for local firms, and embrace international accords they might otherwise reject. According to this school of thought (the "MNCs in command" camp), globalization has only worsened matters by increasing the mobility of MNCs. The "states in command" camp rejects such claims.4 It retorts that states remain quite powerful as a result of their political, military, and economic endowments, their powers as sovereigns, and their influence over international governmental organizations (IGOs). As for globalization, states-in-command adherents argue that it does not prima facie empower MNCs. Indeed, it may actually weaken them, for example by providing governments with alternative sources of capital and technology. The China-Microsoft case from the early 1990s to the present challenges both of these schools of thought. Contrary to what the MNCs-in-command perspective would lead us to expect, China pushed Microsoft, one of the world's most prestigious and successful software companies, into numerous joint ventures (JVs) with Chinese firms as well as several large-scale purchasing deals with Chinese vendors. Moreover, the Chinese government forced Microsoft to make hundreds of millions of "investments" in education, training, and research. As well, China insufficiently responded to Microsoft's desires for much reduced piracy of its products. In opposition to the states-incommand perspective, however, Microsoft struck deals worth billions of dollars with Chinese personal computer (PC) manufacturers and won numerous contracts from Chinese government entities. Beyond this, Microsoft refused to offer discounted versions of its products in China. And the Chinese government failed in its quest to nurture local firms that could offer meaningful alternatives to Microsoft's dominant programs. The two dominant camps fail to illuminate the China- Microsoft case because they excessively stress the endowments of China and Microsoft and ignore the actual need that the two parties have for these resources. …

America at the Taiwan Strait: Five Scenarios*

Abstract: Degrees of freedom for national U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait can be parsed by estimating the future likelihoods and time order of uncertain events-such as Taiwan independence, Chinese liberalization, truce, a Chinese attack, and U.S. choices-and not just by applying the standard paradigms of international relations theory (e.g., realist, liberal, constructivist). Ordered time scenarios can explore all sizes of collectivity, and they can take account of actors' contexts as well as their self-identifications. This article finds evidence that American policy is less "ambiguous" than officials discreetly describe it. The United States is now defending Taiwanese liberalism as Chinese, and Beijing elites also might decide to liberalize if they avoid holding direct national elections before they do more to separate domestic powers. U.S. policy can prevent a later Sino-American war if it can influence the time order of specifiable contingencies. Key words: U.S. foreign policy in Asia, U.S.-China relations, Taiwan Three standard international relations paradigms, called realist, liberal, and constructivist, are often used in analyses of policy. This essay suggests that another way of thinking, to take more specific account of both normative intentions and unintended situations at the relevant range of "levels of analysis" (global, governmental, factional, and individual), is to conceive of these issues in terms of time scenarios. Searching for "the future character of the U.S.-China relationship," Aaron Friedberg writes that "most experts have opinions about this question but, if pressed, few would claim to be sure."1 He considers realist, liberal, and constructivist accounts, pointing out that either "optimist" or "pessimist" conclusions on future Sino-American amity or conflict can be organized by any of these three paradigms. Thomas Christensen also shows that ideas about this issue can be organized under either optimist "positive-sum" or pessimist "zero-sum" perspectives.2 Americans, depending on their own optimist or pessimist predilections, welcome China's "peaceful development" or worry about China's "rise" as the strongest authoritarian state. Such general paradigms have become conventional, but they can be usefully complemented and specified by more attention to sequences of politics in time. Years ago, Allen Whiting wrote an essay about "IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie" in which he looked at the accuracy of previous U.S. officials' predictions of Chinese foreign behavior. Guesses had been made on the basis of knowledge either about global power structure or about specific situations in China. Whiting found no clear pattern of later policy success for either way of thinking.3 A recent analysis by Banning Garrett suggests that "globalization" will force the United States and China, despite their differences, to get along with each other.4 But another recent analysis by Robert Ross finds that the influence of just a single individual, Chen Shui-bian, explains more about cross-Strait diplomacy than more general theories.5 Paradigms at a high level of abstraction are neither more nor less reliably effective than those further down the "ladder" of generality. Specific ironies abound across the Taiwan Strait. China's ruling party wants to prevent Taiwan's secession, but unification by any available means (peaceful or forceful) would currently damage CCP rule. Taiwanese, if Beijing ever offered them a fair truce, might most legitimately approve it by referendum. The United States, whose Realpolitik compass when navigating the Taiwan Strait is democracy, suggests defects in its own democracy when pressing Taiwan to buy expensive but useless arms. If the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to choose its national leaders by direct elections, without first establishing separations of power so that the government were more selfconstrained, an elected demagogue might well start a patriotic war over Taiwan. …

The Yomiuri Project and Its Results

Abstract: In 2006 the Yomiuri Shimbun, the largest daily paper in Japan, completed a year-long campaign to clarify Japanese leaders' responsibility for World War II. Such an undertaking is rare in Japan. The campaign raised five questions: Why did Japan extend the lines of battle? Why did Japan go to war with the United States in spite of the extremely slim prospects for victory? What foolishness caused the Japanese military to employ suicide aircraft attacks? Were sufficient efforts made to bring the war to an end? And, what problems were there with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East? Our project team suggested answers to these questions and clarified who should be held responsible for the war. Throughout the project, we criticized Japan's brutal militarism. At the same time, we made clear our view that those leaders who initiated the war betrayed Japan's national interest. I believe that this project will be a cornerstone for future honest dialogue between Japan and its neighbors. Key words: Japan, World War II, history of East Asia Introduction: The Yomiuri Project The Yomiuri Shimbun, with a circulation of 10 million, is the largest daily paper in Japan. It is also known for its conservative political position. So it was a great surprise for both rightists and leftists that we started in August 2005 a year-long campaign to clarify Japanese leaders' responsibility for World War II. We finished our project in August 2006. Based on those newspaper articles, we published a pair of Japanese-language books. We have also published an English version, a book entitled From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible? The Chinese version of the book is scheduled to be published by the end of 2007. Some people say that Yomiuri has shifted left from its traditional position at right of center in terms of the history issue. However, if you check our editorials over the past ten years carefully, you will realize that our basic position on the history issue has not changed. Over this time we have raised many questions about the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Tribunal. At the same time, we have consistently criticized Japanese militarism. The following article is a typical example. Japan should calmly scrutinize the regrettable aspects of its history. Criticism of the Tokyo Tribunal should not lead to a theory that accepts Japan's wartime aggression in East Asia or to the revival of the historical view that the Emperor is a living god who should rule the nation based on Shintoism. For example, the decision to annex Korea was legal from Japan's standpoint based on the international situation at that time, the region's historical background and the approval granted by other major powers. But it is also a fact that for the Korean people, the annexation was forced upon them under the threat of Japanese military power. As for China, Japan must accept the fact that its actions there, on the whole, constituted an act of aggression, although this could certainly be debated in a number of specific cases. The war Japan waged against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in Asia eventually resulted in independence for the Asian nations, although Japan did not start the war solely to gain their independence. Despite these facts, looking at Japan as the sole villain is too biased a viewpoint from which to judge Japan's history.1 The Five Questions and Answers Our most recent project, though, has been to criticize those Japanese leaders who caused the war. The Yomiuri Shimbun's campaign was an initiative of our editor-in-chief, Watanabe Tsuneo. Having survived the war as a private, he was struck by how cruel and inhuman Japanese militarism was. He still cannot erase the hatred he feels toward those military leaders who dragged our nation into a series of disastrous wars. He is now 80 years old. …

The China Factor in the Hong Kong Public’s Changing Perceptions of “One Country, Two Systems”

Abstract: This article depicts changes in the public's perceptions in Hong Kong of the implementation of the "one country, two systems" policy following the handover in 1997 and discusses the role of the China factor in shaping such perceptions. It finds that the Hong Kong people's rating of "one country, two systems" was quite positive in the first two years after the handover, but the rating started to fall after April 1999 and reached its record low in April 2004. Although the rating has since risen somewhat, the Hong Kong public has not regained all the confidence it previously had in the policy. Beijing's Hong Kong policy is the most powerful variable shaping the public's perceptions of the "one country, two systems" policy, followed by trust in the Hong Kong government, the government's performance in mainland-Hong Kong relations, and the government's political performance. Since all four variables are largely politically related, it seems that the public's perceptions of "one country, two systems" have largely been shaped by political affairs related to maintaining Hong Kong as a highly autonomous system in the "one country, two systems" plan. Key words: Hong Kong, China, East Asian politics Introduction Nine years have passed since Hong Kong was handed over to China by Britain on July 1, 1997 and became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under Chinese sovereignty. According to the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-constitution, the SAR is to be governed under the principle of "one country, two systems." Under this arrangement, the socialist system and policies of mainland China will not be practiced in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong's pre-handover capitalist system and way of life are to remain unchanged for fifty years.1 The Basic Law also promises a high degree of autonomy to the SAR and a gradual and orderly progress toward full democracy.2 However, despite these promises, the anti-communist mentality of Hong Kong people and their long-held mistrust of Beijing naturally meant that, initially, they lacked confidence in Beijing's policy of "one country, two systems."3 In addition, the last days of the run-up to the handover were clouded by a struggle between the Chinese and British governments over the future political arrangements for Hong Kong.4 Seeking to protect their interests, Hong Kong people were also drawn into the struggle.5 As a result, on the eve of the handover in 1997, there was a great deal of skepticism locally and in the international community over Beijing's commitment to the "one country, two systems" arrangement. Although the sociopolitical situation in Hong Kong in the first few months after the handover turned out to be unexpectedly stable,6 the SAR soon suffered the blows and challenges of a rapidly deteriorating economy triggered by the Asian financial crisis and the bursting of the local real estate bubble. In addition, during this period the new SAR government headed by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa continued to experience rising public discontent over its frequent policy and executive errors and over the political conservatism it shared with Beijing in responding to calls for a faster pace of local democratization and other political issues.7 The accumulation of public discontent eventually exploded in a massive demonstration on July 1, 2003 involving more than half a million people protesting against the SAR government and demanding greater democracy. The incident attracted much international attention and strained people's confidence in the "one country, two systems" arrangement.8 It also heightened Beijing's sense of political crisis with regard to Hong Kong, prompting it to employ both economic and political measures to stabilize the political situation in the SAR and to appease the people of Hong Kong.9 These measures included permitting a sharp increase in the number of mainland tourists allowed to visit Hong Kong (the Individual Travel Scheme); the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland (CEPA), which gives Hong Kong better access to the China market; and the eventual removal in March 2005 of the unpopular Tung Chee-hwa. …

Japanese Assessments of China’s Military Development

Abstract: Introduction It is a fact that China has increasingly modernized its military power. This, in conjunction with China's rising economic power, is new to history. It is hence natural that Japan, both as a regional great power and as an ally of the United States, heeds close attention to this new reality. The objective here is to review from various perspectives how Japan assesses the modernization of the Chinese military. The commentary takes account of public opinion polls, official interpretation by the government, and experts' opinions. It should be noted that in Japan, it is something of a social taboo openly to discuss military- or security-related issues. When it comes to evaluating how China might react in certain circumstances, the Japanese government has had reservations about taking an official position on China's military might. Even scholarly research in Japan on the Chinese military is not welcome. Most experts on the China military are in fact historians. No community of specialists exists in Japan where government intelligence officers and scholars get involved and build ties. This commentary thus is among the first steps toward bringing together Japanese assessments of and reactions to China's military development. Public Opinion on China The reality is that no public opinion polls have been conducted specifically with respect to China's military. Instead, the Cabinet Office under the prime minister takes polls on diplomacy, which include citizens' affinity toward major countries. Historically, the Japanese tend to feel "close" to China, as polls typically showed more than 60 percent expressing that view. But the figure plummeted with the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and took a further descending path after 2003. At the end of 2005, the rating of those having a favorable view toward China dropped to only 32.4 percent, while those not having a favorable view reached 63.4 percent (see Figure 1). Although tension over bilateral relations has relaxed since the resignation of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in 2006, it is clear that the overall impression of China among average Japanese has sunk dramatically. One poll did specifically ask about a threat from China. According to the joint opinion polls conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallop in November 2005, 73 percent of the respondents said that their government's relationship with China is "bad," another 72 percent said they "do not trust China," and still another 76 percent indicated that they "feel threatened by China." By contrast, 62 percent of the respondents said they think of the Japan-U.S. alliance as "useful."1 Even more revealing was a 2006 Yomiuri Shimbun opinion poll (see Table 1) in which 44 percent of those polled saw China as a security threat to Japan. Only North Korea was rated as a greater threat. People were also asked to "name the country that, economically and politically, you think will become the most influential in Asia." An overwhelming 56.7 percent of the Japanese respondents chose China. The United States ranked next. Opinion polls such as the one by the Yomiuri Shimbun/Gallop have suggested that a difficult Japanese-Chinese relationship, accompanied by China's economic and military growth, added to the view of China as a threat. Here the term "threat" is probably synonymous with a "concern" or "fear." Yet this view is not entirely groundless; it reflects such realities as China's economic development, military modernization without a sign of democratization, and moves insensitive toward Japan. Japanese politicians, like average citizens, no longer hesitate to express their own harsh opinions of China. Some even take a very strong position of opposing certain Chinese actions. For instance, Maehara Seiji, then head of the Democratic Party of Japan, said in a December 2005 talk at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies that "it is hard to deny that China has grown at a rapid pace not only economically but militarily as well. …

Failing to Protect: Food Shortages and Prison Camps in North Korea*

Abstract: This article has three purposes: first, to lay out two of the areas of most serious human rights concern regarding North Korea, namely, the chronic food shortage crisis afflicting the country and the prison camp system; second, to characterize the main aspects of the problem; and third, to present recommendations on what should be done. The information comes directly from three reports of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (USCHRNK). Key words: North Korea, human rights-East Asia North Korea's Food Shortage Problem The notion of famine conjures up disturbing images of emaciated people and wasting, listless children. Confronted with the devastating impact of inadequate caloric intake on the human body, one's understandable impulse is to think of famine in terms of physical shortages of food supplies. Yet in the contemporary world, the sources of food insecurity increasingly can be traced not to natural causes but to human ones. Today there is no reason for anyone to starve as a result of weather conditions, food shortages, or even failures in distribution. Global food supplies are adequate. Information on weather patterns and crop conditions is now readily available, providing an effective early warning system for potential shortfalls and crises. Global markets for basic grains are well developed and highly integrated, and the world community has developed a well-institutionalized system of humanitarian assistance. A series of international covenants have made explicit the commitment to a world without hunger. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrined the right to adequate food. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) elaborated this commitment as "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger." At the 1996 World Food Summit, official delegations from 185 countries, including representatives from the governments of the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea), reaffirmed "the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free of hunger."1 When initially articulated, these rights looked more like pious wishes than achievable objectives. But an effective set of global institutions is now capable of making these political commitments viable by soliciting food contributions and delivering emergency assistance to populations facing distress from natural disasters and economic dislocation. With effective institutions and adequate physical supplies, the occurrence of famine increasingly signals not the lack of food or capacity, but some fundamental political or governance failure. Natural conditions are no longer our primary adversaries; humans are. The case of North Korea, where a chronic food emergency is well into its second decade, is an egregious example of this phenomenon. Although estimates vary widely, a famine in the mid- 1990s killed as many as one million North Koreans, or roughly five percent of the population. Millions more were left to contend with broken lives and personal misery. Particularly worrisome are the long-term effects-including irreversible ones-on the human development of infants and children. When the food crisis began, access to food came through a public distribution system (PDS) controlled by the regime, and entitlements were a function of political status. As the socialist economy crumbled and markets developed in response to the state's inability to fulfill its obligations under the old social compact, the character of the crisis changed. Current shortages bear closer resemblance to food emergencies in market and transition economies, where access to food is determined by one's capacity to command resources in the marketplace. This type of emergency is no less severe, but poses different challenges to outside donors. The world community responded to this tragedy with considerable generosity, committing more than $2 billion in food aid to the country over the past decade. …

Who is responsible? The Yomiuri Project and the Legacy of the Asia-Pacific War in Japan

Abstract: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE? THE YOMIURI PROJECT AND THE LEGACY OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC WAR IN JAPAN* James E Auer ed, From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible?, Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006, ISBN 4-643-06012-3 Debating War History and Responsibility in Japan When, in mid-2005, Japan's Yomiuri newspaper began to publish a series of articles on the question of "war responsibility," the event attracted nationwide and even international interest Now the newspaper series has become a book, published in a two-volume version in Japanese and in a one-volume abridged English translation entitled From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible? There can be no doubt that these publications mark an important moment in the long and vexed history of East Asia's "history wars"-the ongoing conflicts between Japan and its neighbors (particularly China and both Koreas) about memory of and responsibility for Japan's twentieth-century military expansion in Asia and the Pacific To assess the significance and impact of the Yomiuri project, though, it is important to see it in the context of history writing in Japan and of contemporary Northeast Asian international relations Before beginning to assess the content of the Englishlanguage volume, therefore, it is worth emphasizing what is not new about this work There is nothing novel or unusual in Japanese historians or journalists publicly debating the problem of war responsibility They have been doing so, with much passion and soul-searching, for more than sixty years During a recent visit to Tokyo, a Japanese colleague showed me the cover of a journal he had unearthed from the early 1950s, published by a group affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party The cover featured a striking cartoon of Emperor Hirohito standing atop a mountain of skulls Such graphic imagery is certainly highly risque in the Japanese political context, where a miasma of taboo still surrounds critical comment on the person of the emperor It is almost impossible to imagine any major journal agreeing to publish such an image But its presence on the cover of this long-forgotten small-circulation magazine provides a stark reminder of the fact that questions of war responsibility, including those of the responsibility of Emperor Hirohito himself, have been ongoing topics of heated discussion in Japan Indeed, for historians of twentieth-century Japan, a key task has been the search for an understanding of the processes that led to the "Manchurian Incident," the war in China, Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and Japan's disastrous defeat in war One of the most influential early attempts to address this conundrum was the best-selling paperback Showashi (A History of Showa-Showa being the reign of the Emperor Hirohito), published in 1955, which sold more than 100,000 copies in the six weeks following its publication The book generated a prolonged public controversy now remembered in Japan as the "Showashi Debate" Written by the eminent Marxian historians Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and Fujiwara Akira, Showashi's approach was very different from that of the current Yomiuri volume It sought, not so much to judge personal war guilt, as to define the underlying social and economic forces that led to war1 The popular success of Showashi is a reminder of the powerful influence that Marxism exerted on postwar Japanese intellectual (though not political) life However, searching criticisms of war responsibility were of course not confined to Marxists Critical liberal intellectuals such as Maruyama Masao made profound contributions to the debate-Maruyama's work focusing particularly on the aspects of Japanese social structure and patterns of thought that had created fertile ground for the rise of militarism2 In the 1950s and 1960s, war responsibility was debated not only in academic works, but also in massively popular novels and films such as Gomikawa Jumpei's Ningen no Joken (The Human Condition), which appeared in novel, movie, and manga form, and included graphic representations of acts of brutality committed by members of the Japanese armed forces in China …

Ten Years of Knowledge Partnership with North Korea

Abstract: This article analyzes broadly defined economics-related knowledge partnership (KP) between North Korea and the international community. Knowledge partnership with North Korea was prominent during 2001-2004 but decreased drastically after 2005 due to the heightening of tension over the North Korean nuclear issue. Some organizations, however, have been very successful in continuing their KP programs. Based on an examination of ninety-one KP projects during 1997-2006, this article outlines the trends in knowledge partnership with North Korea, and suggests dos and don'ts in this important initiative. Key words: North Korea, NGO programs, economic development in East Asia Introduction Since the February 13, 2007 agreement on North Korea's nuclear issues, expectation has mounted for the Democratic Peo- ple's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) to adopt a more open and decentralized economic model. Indeed, Pyongyang attempted to shift in such a direction before the nuclear issue rose to prominence. The first meaningful sign after 2000 was the DPRK's application for membership in the Asian Development Bank (ABD) in May 2000.1 After the June 15th Joint Declaration of the inter-Korean summit meeting in 2000, North Korean chairman Kim Jong Il visited Shanghai in January 2001, and stressed the importance of "a new way of thinking and attitude in the 21st century to enhance national competitiveness."2 There followed the announcement on July 1, 2002 of the New Economic Management Measures, which were largely hailed as a striking transformation in policy by North Korea. A couple of months later, the DPRK went as far as to announce the Shinuiju Special Administrative Zone, which the leadership envisioned to be similar to Hong Kong. Regrettably, the second nuclear crisis, which began in October 2002, signaled a stop to this trend. Since then, North Korea's policy transformation has not evolved significantly. However, the February 2007 nuclear agreement-though only a beginning in what is likely to be a long process-is expected to revive this dormant initiative. North Korea is well aware of the fact that economic development is the most urgent item on its national agenda. As the official Rodong Sinmun announced at the start of 2007, "We will have to concentrate all our national energy on solving economic problems." How should the international community prepare for the possible near-term economic policy change in North Korea? The answer to this question is economic knowledge partnership (KP) with the DPRK.3 To ensure the economic transformation and the sustainable development of North Korea, the importance of human resource development cannot be overemphasized. As suggested to former socialist countries, "economic transition also calls for a process of retraining many professionals to enable them to work in the market environment."4 Therefore, KP is expected to benefit not only the North, but also the rest of the world since it provides the world opportunities to learn about North Korea, a country that we still know very little about. North Korea has also been active in working with the international community to acquire knowledge necessary for its economic transition and development. For example, in 1997 fifteen economic officials from the DPRK were dispatched to Shanghai, China for training, a program supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In February 1998 when the World Bank visited North Korea, the North even asked for help from the bank to establish an Economic Research Institute for International Finance.5 Though not an official request, it indicated the North's thirst for knowledge of market economies. The need for this kind of knowledge partnership with the DPRK is not a new revelation, as many specialists have called for it before.6 Earlier studies have acknowledged KP's role in the economic development of the country,7 and its positive effect on improving relations between divided countries. …

Controversies over North Korean Human Rights in South Korean Society

Abstract: This article examines, on the basis of international human rights norms, the controversies that exist in South Korean society with respect to North Korean human rights issues. The article looks at current human rights conditions in North Korea; the root causes of these human rights concerns; the conditions faced by "displaced persons"; the problems associated with planned defection; reactions to the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act passed by the U.S. Congress; and the direction that should be taken to improve human rights conditions in the country. We can only expect a continuation of debate within South Korean society on these issues until a fundamental point of agreement is reached, one that can serve as a rational and practical basis for improving the human rights situation in North Korea. Key words: North Korea, human rights-East Asia, South Korea Introduction Issues regarding North Korea and its policies have always been under the spotlight in South Korean society. It should perhaps be of no surprise that such issues are being discussed ever more frequently as Korea's economy further advances and its democracy continues to mature. Since the end of the cold war, international concern over nuclear weapons development and human rights conditions in North Korea has grown steadily. Undoubtedly, South Korea's role in persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and improve the living conditions of North Korean citizens is paramount as South Korea works to build a solid foundation for an eventual peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. In order to succeed, the people of South Korea need to reach a fundamental agreement on the issues at hand. From this agreement, the government needs to develop and employ policies that have the support of the international community and South Korean people. Within South Korean society, many different opinions exist on the North Korean nuclear issue. Similarly, political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and media outlets show little agreement on the issue of human rights in North Korea. The lack of public consensus on these issues is not the problem; rather, the problem is the hostility displayed between groups that hold opposing views, which extends to their unwillingness to listen to different opinions on the issues. Conflict and a lack of trust persist when what South Korea truly needs at this time is diversity and creativity. This article examines, based on international human rights norms, the controversies that exist in South Korean society with respect to North Korean human rights issues. The issues under examination are as follows: the current human rights situation in North Korea; the root causes of these human rights concerns; the conditions faced by displaced persons; the problems associated with planned defections; the reactions to the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 passed by the U.S. Congress; and the most desirable direction to take in order to improve the human rights situation in North Korea. The Current Human Rights Situation in North Korea Few would object to the observation that the quality of life in North Korea is remarkably poor when held up to the standards set by various human rights conventions and other nations. To date, North Korea has entered into four international human rights conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). From the late 1990s until recently, North Korea has also submitted ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC and CEDAW reports to the corresponding committees, and followed examination procedures in the face of international calls to improve its human rights situation. North Korea has also made some efforts to improve the living conditions of its people. …

JAPAN'S CHANGING SECURITY NORMS AND PERCEPTIONS SINCE THE 1990s

Abstract: Changes in Japanese security policy and institutions over the past decade and a half nullify cultural and institutionalist views of Japan's postwar pacifism. The boundary of the Self-Defense Force (SDF)'s activity-which had been understood exclusively as defending Japan's own territorial integrity-was expanded to UN peacekeeping activities in the early 1990s, and through a series of policy and institutional changes was expanded further to rear support for U.S. troops in regional contingencies and antiterrorist actions. These changes have been accompanied by significant shifts in Japanese attitudes on defense and security issues. Despite the public's fear of entrapment in war through the alliance relationship with the United States, most Japanese believe that Japan needs to strengthen its defense capability through closer military ties with its alliance partner, and that it is better to revise the peace constitution in order to legitimize the SDF and provide it with military flexibility. Key words: Japan, East Asian security, U.S.-Japan relations Dominant Views Postwar Japanese security norms and institutions generally have been regarded as being consistently pacifist. Based on his public opinion survey analysis from 1945 to 1984, for example, Bobrow maintained that Japanese security perceptions had been passive, with the nation relying on its alliance with the United States and pursuing military minimalism with no clear principles. 1 Since the end of World War II, the Japanese have embraced peace as the integral part of postwar democracy.2 Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that this resulted from socialization by a hegemonic power, the United States. During the post-World War II occupation, the United States was able to force the acquiescence of Germany and Japan through diffusion of a set of normative ideals of democratization and demilitarization and the internal reconstruction upholding these ideals.3 Both culturalists and institutionalists in the field of international relations argue for the continuity of Japanese security norms and the maintenance of Japan's postwar security policy, which allow only for a basic defense capability. Katzenstein finds that Japan has indeed kept to its passive and peace-oriented security policy, despite changes in material relations following the end of the cold war, precisely due to the consolidated anti-military culture. He points out that the anti-military culture has effectively limited Japanese government's security policy options, helped by Japanese procedural norms respecting a vocal minority such as radical pacifists.4 Berger also emphasizes that anti-military sentiments still bind post-cold war leaders of Japan and Germany so that, most recently, neither country could opt for participation in the coalition forces during the Gulf War despite belief in its desirability.5 Institutionalists take the general public policy structure to be more accountable for the continuity of security policy in Japan. Katzenstein and Okawara point out that bureaucratic control of the Japanese military and the decision-making process of public policy prioritizing economics have prevented the centralization of security policy and its autonomy. In addition, social isolation of the military and its lack of legitimacy in society make defense and security policy much weaker.6 Risse-Kappen classifies the Japanese security policy process as "quasi-corporatist," where major policy groups participate through institutionalized channels rather than seek broader political coalition.7 These groups tend to be much weaker, however, compared to those in other policy areas. Calder says defense policy remains an orphan in Japanese distributive politics since there are no visible interest groups representing defense policy and politicians specialized in defense issues generally do not draw popular support.8 Gradual but Substantial Changes in Japan's Security Policy The aforementioned arguments rightly point to the importance of identity, norms, and institutions in shaping national interest and security policy. …

Politics, Culture, and Scholarly Responsibility in China: Toward a Culturally Sensitive Analytical Approach*

Abstract: The relationship between knowledge and power has always been acutely problematic, particularly in the study of international relations. Inspired by an address by Ann Tickner, this article urges the need to develop culturally sensitive approaches to the question of scholarly responsibility in the realm of power in different historical, cultural, social, and intellectual contexts. Taking international relations scholarship in China as an example, I suggest that the expanding political space and the weakness of critical scholarship in China, combined with a historically induced intellectual predicament and inherited cultural legacies, constitute a useful analytical framework for making sense of Chinese understandings of scholarly responsibility. This framework also helps to understand the perpetual agony of Chinese intellectuals in coming to terms with the turbulent relations between knowledge and power in China today. Key words: China, sociopolitical development Introduction: The Proper Role of Scholars The role and function of intellectuals and how the intellectual confronts the question of power and authority have seen some perennial debates. In his 1993 Reith Lectures, Edward Said argued that the intellectual is obliged to speak truth to power. One of the principal intellectual activities in the twentieth century, in his words, "is the questioning, not to say undermining of authority."1 For Noam Chomsky, intellectuals and academics should aspire to be moral agents, not servants of power.2 Other cultural, social, and political traditions have historically embedded the tricky relationship between knowledge and power. While the Russian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century developed a strong sense of responsibility for the fate of Mother Russia and an adversarial relationship with the political establishment, Confucian literati as "action intellectuals deeply immersed in 'managing the world' (jingshi) of economics, politics and society" remained an integrated mainstay of Imperial Chinese political and bureaucratic establishments from the Han (206 BC-220 AD) to the Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.3 What unites Confucian literati, the Russian intelligentsia, and modern (Western) intellectuals, however, is their ultimate concern for the improvement of human condition and their perceived role as being the conscience of the society. In the discipline of international relations, the question of an appropriate relationship between knowledge and power and between scholarly responsibility and the policy arena has been repeatedly raised and long debated. Wary of the visible tie between the scholarly world and the world of power, which "puts academics and researchers not only in the corridors but also the kitchens of power" in the United States, Stanley Hoffmann warned three decades ago that the discipline of international relations in the United States must guard itself "from the glide into policy science."4 Two decades later, this time in Britain, Willliam Wallace issued a call to "consider the appropriate degree of detachment or of engagement which academics in International Relations should practise towards the policy arena." He argued for a balance between the two extremes of total cooption into the policy-making arena and the passionate detachment from it.5 The spirited debates that ensued only highlighted the uncompromising disagreements among British international relations (IR) scholars on scholarly responsibility in the realm of knowledge and power, a question that remains perpetually controversial.6 Ann Tickner, president of the International Studies Association in 2006, recently articulated the disquiet about the uneasy relationship between knowledge and power in the United States. Concerned about the shrinking space for political dissent and increasing intolerance of other world views after the 9/11 attacks, Tickner asserted that many international relations scholars are profoundly uneasy about the direction of U. …

Reconciliation between China and Japan: The Key Link to Security Cooperation in East Asia

Abstract: The emerging power of China-be it "peaceful rise" or "China threat"-has been analyzed repeatedly by experts. But to date little has been concluded about America's precipitous relative decline, both in its hard and so-called "soft" power. The policy failures and disastrous initiatives of the George W. Bush administration have yet to be tallied up strategically. More important for Asia is the need to investigate the critically significant juncture between the two patterns: China's rise and the U.S. decline. That relationship, no matter how difficult it is to measure in material terms, has begun to reshape strategic relations around the world, and especially in East Asia. It is the major strategic transformative event of 2007, the Year of the Pig. The crux of that structural shift in global power in East Asia has emerged in China's relations with Japan, America's most important Asian ally. It is there that the future of the region will very likely be decided. Will it be cooperation or confrontation? The stakes are high. Leaders in Beijing and Tokyo, responding to the changing strategic environment, will decide whether to make a future together as the key major powers in an East Asian Community or else to take sides in a renewed cold war between the United States and China. Crises over North Korea as a nuclearweapons power, Taiwan, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, or a possible Japanese decision to "go nuclear" will test their willingness to work together for the future of a peaceful and increasingly prosperous East Asia. In August 2006 at the Australian National University, we convened an international workshop on "Reconciliation between China and Japan: A Search for Solutions," funded by the Department of International Relations in the Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies and the International Centre of Excellence in Asia-Pacific Studies.1 Twenty-one scholars from Australia, Japan, China, the United States, and several other countries participated. The ANU workshop was the first part of a continuing, collaborative project on historical reconciliation and cooperative security in East Asia. A second workshop, to be hosted by Amitav Acharya at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, will be convened later this year.2 The purpose of the ANU workshop was to prompt discussion and debate about the best ways to encourage reconciliation between Japan and China. Our objective was to produce concrete and realistic policy proposals for enhancing security cooperation between the two Asian powers, especially with respect to their participation in the Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue and in the potential East Asian Community. Among sovereign states, it is always easier for governments to lapse into confrontation or even conflict than to work together to achieve mutual benefit. To cooperate requires conscientious design, constant attention, and committed care by all parties. In the proposed design for an East Asian Community, for example, none of the countries in the region, including Australia, wants to have to choose between China and Japan. They want to build viable security institutions that include both Asian powers. The analogy often mentioned is that, just as a security community in Europe required cooperation between Germany and France, so the East Asian Community will need to be built on security cooperation between China and Japan. When Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro was in office, Japanese-Chinese economic relations continued to improve while their political-strategic relations grew worse-what has often been called "cold politics and hot economics." Analysts of the contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship have discussed with insight the nature of the bilateral problems (e.g., disputes about history and territory; geopolitical rivalry; Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; competition for scarce energy resources; anti- Japanese demonstrations in China; and China's opposition to Japan's hopes for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council), but there has been little in the literature so far about how these conflicts might be resolved or at least ameliorated. …

Korean foreign policy and the rise of the brics countries

Abstract: In 2003 two emerging markets' investment analysts predicted that four rapidly developing countries-Brazil, Russia, India, and China, collectively the "BRICs economies"-by 2050 would have eclipsed most of the currently richest countries in the world. This article examines the impact of their rise in relation to Korea's foreign policy. Strategically and economically, the apparent power shift seems to have led Korea to doubt the validity and viability of the traditional U.S.-Korea relationship based largely on an asymmetrical military alliance. For example, it is China, not the United States, that has consistently played a crucial role in the Six-Party Talks established to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. China also has been Korea's largest trading partner since 2005, while Russia has abundant natural resources vital to Korea's energy security. Although the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement signed on April 2007 may help resuscitate bilateral relations, increasing interdependence between Korea and the BRICs, especially China, will make some type of realignment of the Korea-U.S. relationship necessary. Key words: Korea, foreign policy, international relations, BRICs Introduction In 2001, a Goldman Sachs report first introduced the term "BRICs countries," referring to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.1 The label was a marketing gimmick. The report's main aim was to identify "an engine of new demand growth and spending power." It drew attention from investors, because it gave a concrete guide to where to invest after the series of financial crises of the late 1990s and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.2 For a different reason, policy makers as well as academics expressed their interest in the report, highlighting the prediction that the four countries together would have bigger economies than the G-6 countries (the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy) within the next fifty years.3 This might have far-reaching implications for world politics and economics. The official Chinese newspaper, People's Daily (Beijing), put it like this: The rise of the BRICs is also changing the world order. This is happening not only because of the BRICs' robust economic growth, but also because of their role as an initiator and motivator of the new international order. The four countries advocate the democratization of international relations, oppose hegemony, and call for respect for global diversification. As developing nations, they have had the opportunity to learn from others and offset their own weaknesses.4 Of course, it is not certain that the BRICs countries will be working together to balance the U.S. global hegemony. Despite the People's Daily's emphasis on their common position, these countries do not demonstrate much joint solidarity. Nevertheless, the growth of the BRICs poses important challenges to both regional and global balance of power. Moreover, in the economic realm, the high-performing economies of some of these countries already have become a new engine of global economic growth. This article examines the impact of the rise of the BRICs on Korea's foreign policy, particularly with respect to its future economic security.5 What will be the consequences of the rise of the BRICs for the future global balance of power? Will the BRICs countries constitute a bloc to counterbalance against the United States? Finally, how might these changes impact Korean diplomacy? We first examine the economic implications of the rise of the BRICs countries for Korea, then scrutinize the strategic implications. We conclude with a summary and policy implications. The Economics of the BRICs Countries: Conflicting or Complementary for Korea? Korean Concerns Korea's geoeconomic position is unique. "As a middle power, Korea is situated at the crossroads of four great powers (China, Japan, Russia, and the United States), each of which considers itself in the top rank and entitled to regional leadership. …