Showing papers in "Asian Survey in 1983"

Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes

Abstract: Since the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping in July 1977, the Chinese countryside has been undergoing gradual but consistent change. By 1983, it stood on the verge of major structural reform, highlighted by the reemergence of family farming and the dismantling of the commune system. Although support for these reforms is extensive, serious opposition and differences of opinion exist as well. This article will explore the motivations of those who resist these changes and the problems that have arisen during the implementation of the present policy. It will also suggest the likely path of future reforms in rural China.

Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979-82

Abstract: One of the most pressing concerns of leaders of Third World countries is to increase the efficiency of government administration. Overstaffing, waste, corruption, and inertia are chronic problems in the civil services of much of the developing world, where governments are often the principal employer, salaries are low, and resources are very limited. Chinese administration, no less than the administration of other developing countries, has also suffered from inefficiency and other bureaucratic abuses. Since 1978, China's leaders have once again concluded that economic modernization depends on a rational and efficient bureaucracy. This has led them to propose an ambitious package of administrative reforms, including renewed emphasis on moral education to popularize among cadres the mass line" theory of leadership; vigilant law enforcement to curb corruption and other "bureaucratic" abuses; reorganization of state and party institutions to reduce overstaffing and duplication; and reform of the personnel system to improve recruitment, performance appraisal, and training processes. The recent initiative was preceded by earlier attempts at bureaucratic reform: the "crack troops and simple administration" campaigns of 1941 to 1943; concerted drives to eliminate "bureaucratism, corruption, and waste" during the Three-Anti's Campaign in 1952; an attempt to simplify administrative organizations in 1955; mobilization to eliminate corruption among rural cadres during the Four Clean-Ups Campaign from 1963 to 1965; and drastic simplification of the state machine during the Cultural Revolution

Davids and goliaths: small power- great power security relations in southeast asia

Abstract: IN A WORLD in which territorial aggrandizement and the collection of client states still serve as symbols of power and status, suspicion persists in great power-small power relations. The differing strategic outlooks of these two types of international actors account for much of the volatility in their interactions. Great powers (those with the capability of projecting politico-military and/or economic power globally) are concerned primarily with enhancing their worldwide positions and limiting those of global adversaries, and therefore assess third world states in terms of the contributions they might make to local balances against hostile major opponents. By contrast, small states (those with politico/military/economic capacities confined primarily to their regional locations and whose relationship to the global system is subordinate) are concerned with establishing or maintaining territorial integrity and creating viable polities. Activities of the major powers can enhance these local goals through aid and protection; or they can obstruct them through economic manipulation and politico-military aid to regional adversaries. Opportunities for great power mischief are legion, for many members of the third world are characterized by only partially integrated societies, rival ethnic and religious groups, and artificial borders separating similar ethnic groups on each side. Great powers frequently become involved in these peculiarly third world forms of insecurity in hopes of (or

Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy

Abstract: Being patriots, we do not tolerate any encroachment on China's national dignity or interests.... In the thirty-three years since the founding of our People's Republic, we have shown the world by deeds that China never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power.... Having suffered aggression and oppression for over a century, the Chinese people weill never again allow themselves to be humiliated as they ivere before, nor will they subject other nations to such humiliation. (emphasis added)-Hu Yaobang to the Twelfth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, September 1, 19821

MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN MALAYSIA A Regime Perspective

Abstract: National Organization, the dominant party in the ruling Barisan Nasional), some of the social, economic, and, in particular, political challenges inherent in Malaysia's Islamic revival. The second aim is to analyze the ways in which the national leadership has responded to these challenges and to assess the effectiveness of the strategies adopted to manage the impact of Islamic revival upon the complexities of Malaysian society. Malaysia is governed by a multi-party structure-the Barisan Nasional (National Front)-comprising a number of essentially communal political parties that claim to represent the interests of each of the country's principal ethnic groups.2 This "grand coalition" (which includes parties from East Malaysia) is formed around the undisputed leadership of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Although UMNO is sufficiently powerful to rule without coalition support, it nevertheless prefers the broader participatory system of the Barisan Nasional in the interests of communal stability. Despite its dominant position, UMNO needs to be somewhat sensitive to

Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia

Abstract: Foreign scholars have not been able to agree on the nature of the New Order that has ruled Indonesia since 1966. A major difference of opinion has arisen over the extent to which General Suharto's regime concentrates or disperses power. In some writings, the New Order appears as a single, dominant, and purposeful actor. In others, the regime is pictured as a congeries of distinctive individuals and groups. From a third viewpoint between these extremes, political authority in Indonesia is seen as a hybrid type, neither monistic enough to be totalitarian, nor pluralistic enough to be democratic. My goals in this article are to review this spectrum of perceptions; to introduce the related concept of bureaucratic pluralism; and then, by combining data on military penetration of the higher central bureaucracy with a case study of how bureaucratic actors shape policy, to show how the concept might be used to evaluate the perceptions. My ultimate purpose is to understand better the nature of the New Order.

THE INDIAN MANAGEMENT DILEMMA Economic vs Political Unions

Abstract: The theory that trade unions exist to protect and advance the job interests of working men has dominated the precept and practice of unionism for as long as unions have been in existence. Uneasiness over the crasser forms of "bring-home-the-bacon" unionism has often led labor theorists to claim that there is more to trade unionism than mere money. Perlman argued five decades ago that business unionism would be a misnomer if it were intended to mean a labor movement without ideology, for all unions possessed the idealism of upholding the interests of the collectivity-what he termed "Tom, Dick and Harry idealism."1 More recently, Flanders has stressed the importance of union participation in rule making. For him, the most enduring social achievement of trade unions has been the "creation of a social order in industry embodied in a code of industrial rights."2 If in liberal pluralist theory trade unionism is more than mere money, it is also less than a broad social movement aimed at exterminating the very source of unequal social relationships. The outer limit to union purpose in this theory is set by a method-collective bargaining. It is argued that industrial methods have primacy over political methods because the members' expectations are distinctly more industrial than political.3 Economic unionism-crude forms if possible, refined forms if necessary-undoubtedly suits the interests of management best. "Their [the unions'] purely economic objectives conflict with the capitalist's desire to minimize costs of production ... while any connection between trade unionism and socialist politics is a potential threat to his very existence.... Where unions are willing to confine their objectives within comparatively innocu-

The Police and Political Order in India

Abstract: will demonstrate this thesis by examining three aspects of Indian policing: (1) political direction, (2) police strikes, and (3) violence and crime. Although each of these features has a unique dynamic, which is explained, they are also related. The final section describes this interaction and links it to general factors shaping contemporary Indian political life. For readers unfamiliar with the Indian police system, a bit of description may be helpful. Except for some specialized police not worth mentioning, there is only one police force in India. Police organizations do not have concurrent jurisdictions as in the United States with its national, state, county, and municipal police. The police throughout the country are organized according to a single piece of national legislation. At the same time, operational command is decentralized, being the prerogative of India's states. Thus the bulk of police are state police but are similar to one another in organization, training, command, and rank hierarchy. The national government's police consist only of the small Central Bureau of Investigation, David H. Bayley is Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. This article is based on close study of the Indian police over almost twenty years (see the author's The Police and Political Development in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). More recently, the author gave written and oral testimony to the Indian National Police Commission and toured police facilities throughout India in 1978 and 1980. Many of the conclusions reached in the article are matters of judgment, reflecting the author's personal evaluation of trends. They are based primarily on interviews and observations and some documentary material for the most part not available in the public domain. As a result, sources cannot be cited in the customary manner.

Sino-Indian Border Talks: The View from New Delhi

Abstract: The issue of adverse territorial claims has generated profound discord between India and China for a generation. In consequence, the reinstitution of formal border negotiations in December 1981, after a gap of 21 years, was an event of considerable moment. This article will examine these ongoing boundary demarcation talks from an Indian perspective, focusing on the following issues: the impact of the border dispute on pre-December 1981 foreign and military policy determinations by New Delhi; factors impelling India to recommence border talks; bargaining positions adopted during the course of negotiations; problems likely to impede a resolution of border questions; and the military implications for New Delhi of a successful conclusion to the border discussions.

China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats

Abstract: programs to make all socioeconomic and political structures congruent with the implementation of the "four modernizations." One of the most important components of this post-1978 reform is the effort to "revolutionize" the existing Chinese bureaucracy by promoting the educated, the professionally competent, and the young. For recruitment, appointment, and promotion, the regime promises to use such non-political objective criteria as age, education, and job competency, while publicly criticizing the Maoist practice of exclusively emphasizing political criteria. As Hu Yaobang recognized publicly, it is obvious that the "success of the four modernizations largely depends on whether the existing cadre corps can achieve four transformations-"to be "revolutionized, young, better educated, and professionally competent."' The bureaucratic reform, however, affects most directly the vested interests of 20 million Chinese cadres, the group on which the regime must rely for effective implementation of any policy. To make the matter more complicated, the middle-aged cadres whom the present leadership are trying to promote to key positions may not share the same values and experiences as the elderly top leaders.2 Cadres between 40 and 45 come from the generation that the Cultural Revolution (CR) affected most. Many of them were actively involved in the Cultural Revolution either as low ranking cadres or college students, and this background tarnishes their political reliability in the eyes of the present leaders.

The Executive Committee in the Philippines: Successors, Power Brokers, and Dark Horses

Abstract: According to the Philippine government's National Media Production Center, the Executive Committee "under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister will be a steppingstone for future leadership in the country ... a high-level training ground for future Prime Ministers and Presidents."1 The Executive Committee is necessary, the government suggested at the time the amendment to set up the Committee was under consideration in 1981, because no one person within the ruling KBL (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) was then capable of taking over the national leadership.2 Thus, a group of potential leaders was selected to take charge of the routine operations of running the government under the watchful eye of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.3 The implication is that the committee member who performs best at the helm will have the inside track on succession in the event of President Marcos' sudden demise, resignation, or permanent incapacitation. The Executive Committee was established under Section 3, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, as amended in 1981. The pertinent section reads as follows:

Parliamentary Communism and Agrarian Reform: The Evidence from India's Bengal

Abstract: The Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM) has survived as an important political force in India. Whereas the more clearly proSoviet Communist party of India (CPI) as well as the "Maoist" Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (CPML) have paled into political insignificance, the CPM now rules two of India's 19 states-West Bengal and Tripura-and remains the major opposition party in Kerala. West Bengal is the heart of CPM's power, where India's "parliamentary communists" have steadily increased and consolidated their electoral strength. After various "United Front" experiences, the CPM gained a clear parliamentary majority in 1977. The 1980 elections for the Lok Sabha and those at the state level in 1982 have further confirmed CPM's secure electoral base in West Bengal. This article assesses the recent governing experience of West Bengal's "communist" rulers. What elements of the communist commitment to "revolutionary class war" and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" has the CPM "compromised" in order to succeed electorally and survive politically within the framework of democratic-capitalism? Given the "compromises,"

Resistance coalitions in laos

Abstract: IT IS PERHAPS not surprising that attempts by various resistance groups in Laos to forge a coalition against the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) and Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) forces in that country have gone largely unheralded. Unlike the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), the LPDR derives international legitimacy not only from the socialist bloc, including China, and the nonaligned nations but also from the ASEAN states and the Western powers. There is no contestation over the seating of the LPDR in the U.N. General Assembly. But like Kampuchea, significant sections of the polyethnic communities of Laos have withheld their endorsement of the pro-Hanoi, pro-Soviet LPDR regime while several have entered into resistance alliances with external sponsors. The activities of the resistance in Laos, however, have tended to be overshadowed by developments in Kampuchea, namely, the attempts by the ASEAN states and China to weld together a coalition of anti-Vietnamese coalition forces. The actual formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (hereafter DK) by communist and non-communist factions on July 9, 1982, is not only of consequence for the survival of the resistance movement in Kampuchea but can only give further impetus to its analogue in Laos. Indeed, the degree to which the component factions of the anti-LPDR resistance cohere into a "united front" is largely contingent upon the operational success of the National Army of DK within a broader China-sponsored, Indochina-wide resistance front. At the political level, it will be argued, this front represents a counterpoint to Hanoi's own avowed version of the acceptable relationship of the three Indochi-

The Northeast, the Punjab, and the Regionalization of Indian Politics

Abstract: From the time of India's independence in 1947, cultural politics-whether in the demands for linguistic states, in the controversy over Hindi as the national language, or in the nativism of the "sons of the soil" -have deepened regional identities. Episodic movements have been both the vehicle of politicization and its inevitable result. The government has typically met cultural demands with vacillation and indecision-sometimes by calculated neglect-only to be followed, in the face of prolonged agitation, by a combined response of force and accommodation. Regionalism is rooted in India's cultural and linguistic diversity. Projected in geographic terms, it is at the state level both an ethnic and an economic phenomenon. It is an expression of heightened political consciousness, expanding participation, and increasing competition for scarce resources. Competition by the state is for Central financial allocation and Plan investment; for the individual, it involves access to education and jobs. Economic grievances-expressed in charges of unfairness, discrimination, or Center neglect-may be fused with cultural anxiety over language status and ethnic balance. It is this fusion that gives regionalism its potency. Language and culture, like religion, are at the core of an individual's identity and when politicized take a potentially virulent form. So long as most states were under the Congress party umbrella, conflict between states and Center, among states, and within states could be accommodated within the framework of the party. Today, regionalism increasingly manifests itself through opposition to Congress in regional parties like the AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu, the Akali Dal in the Punjab, and the

The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma

Abstract: THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the ongoing Iraq-Iran war have not only invoked fears of an uncertain future in Southwest Asia but have also injected urgency into Pakistani discussions of an old problem: the question of security in the area. The spotlight, however, was quickly focused on Afghanistan by Pakistan's security planners as the Afghan crisis profoundly and directly threatened Pakistan's security. From its inception, Pakistan has never really enjoyed what can be termed friendly or even correct relations with Afghanistan, mainly because of the Afghani irredentist claim to Pakhtoonistan-the adjoining areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan inhabited by the Pakhtoon community. Before 1976 the Pakhtoonistan issue had reached a crescendo more than once, and Pak-Afghan relations had deteriorated to the point where border closure seemed the only option. However, there was a significant rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1976-78, with President Daud visiting Pakistan twice and Pakistani leaders paying return visits. The outcome was that Kabul dropped its insistence on Pakhtoon self-determination, hostile propaganda in both countries ceased, and an active search for an amiable solution of the Pakhtoonistan dispute was well underway when the Marxist coup took place in Afghanistan in April 1978. Not only did the Marxist takeover immediately reverse the trend, but the birth of a resistance movement and the subsequent violent clashes between the leftist Afghan forces and the resistance groups led to a large-scale influx of refugees into Pakistan. The refugee flow increased rapidly with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Because Pakistan is sandwiched between Soviet-supported Afghanistan and the Soviets' friend India and is faced with a difficult

Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics

Abstract: IN ONE of those strange tricks that history springs on an unsuspecting world, the USSR massively intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979. Occurring at a time when the Janata government in India, which had emphasized "genuine nonalignment" in foreign policy, had spent itself, and elections were imminent, the untimely intervention laid the new Indian government's foreign policy squarely on the line. It is to the credit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the architect of India's foreign policy for more than a decade, that she proved equal to the challenge after nearly three years out of office. The new government in India, in its apparent pro-Sovietism on the issue-and notwithstanding its professions of nonalignment-has stood apart from a great many nonaligned nations and a large part of the third world. Our concern here is to assess to what extent the world view of Indians and their support of Mrs. Gandhi enabled her to take this stand after her return to office in 1980. Even before she was formally reinstated as Prime Minister on January 20, 1980, after her landslide victory, Mrs. Gandhi had taken charge of India's strategy on the Afghan issue. On January 12, she instructed Brajesh Mishra, the Indian envoy at the United Nations, to make the following points in a statement on India's stand: (1) the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan on December 26, 1979, at the request of the Afghan government; (2) while India was against the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country, it had no reason to disbelieve a friendly country like the Soviet Union when it said that it would withdraw troops from Afghanistan when asked to do so by the government in Kabul; (3) India hoped that the Soviet Union would not violate the independence of

The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia: A Mandate for Change?

Abstract: In July 1981 Tun Hussein Onn formally resigned as Prime Minister of Malaysia following a slow recovery from complicated heart surgery. He was succeeded by former UMNO "radical," Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad. Datuk Musa Hitam, another former "radical," was named the Deputy Prime Minister after he defeated party rival Tengku Razaleigh Hamazah in a hard-fought contest for the post of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Deputy President. It was believed that the new administration would seek a fresh mandate from the people well before the mid-1983 constitutional deadline for elections. Election rumors were in the air by the end of 1981,1 so it came as no big surprise when general elections were called for April 1982.2 The campaign period was 15 days, the briefest ever, and as in other post-1969 elections, a ban on rallies was imposed for "security reasons" (e.g., to avoid the inflaming of ethnic emotions).3 For the first time, polling would be on a Thursday instead of the traditional Saturday, in order to accommodate the five Peninsular states who use Friday, the Muslim holy day, as their holiday.4 The ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition of eleven parties (6 Peninsular Malaysia, 2 Sabah, and 3 Sarawak) went into the elections from a position of overwhelming strength,5 and, as in every election since 1955, the question was not "who" would form the government but rather by "how much" would the government be reelected. Elections remain important, however, as a barometer of support for the government and for reaffirming legitimacy.

Afghanistan and the soviet-indian influence relationship

Abstract: BY THE END of the 1970s, relations between the Soviet Union and India had developed to a point of closeness and cooperation few other major power-Third World relationships had achieved. Soviet economic, military, and political support, forthcoming earlier in the 1950s and 1960s, had been accelerated. Moscow could hardly have had a better Third World ally to work with against an expansion of Chinese or American influence or to represent claims of Soviet global power and responsibility (especially in Asia but also with the nonaligned movement and in the Third World generally). For New Delhi, the USSR served as the crucial bulwark against Pakistan and as a counterweight to both China and the United States. Although examples of actual influence, or leverage over behavior, of either one on the other's policies were very limited, the political leaderships of the two countries shared a wide ranging "coincidence of interests," a broad set of perceptions that allowed them to see the world in similar, although not identical, terms. This agreement made for substantial cooperation between India and the Soviet Union on issues of local, regional, and international significance.The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had the potential of disrupting this relationship. Most of the nonaligned world, not to mention Washington and Beijing, expressed sharp opposition to the Soviet move. For India, the introduction of actual Soviet army units into another country, one which had been nonaligned and not part of the Soviet bloc per se, was a situation repugnant to its historic foreign policy principles. How could India maintain its stature in world politics and not oppose Moscow's action? Yet, what would happen to India if it denounced its most important ally? Who would become New Delhi's major

EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-FOOD CONSUMER GOODS IN CHINA Shanghai as an Example

Abstract: Every country concerns itself to some extent with the efficient and equitable distribution of goods to its people. But the policy of capitalist or mixed economy countries is to let manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers compete to provide the goods at the time, place, and price desired by the customer. As a rule, neither government policy nor the distribution process is set up to ensure that people will get the particular goods for a set price or at a given location. Prices are a function of the relative power held by consumers, distribution channels, and producers. Location is a function of customer demand. It is assumed that the discipline of the marketplace will keep the system operating with reasonable efficiency. In a planned economy, of course, a central authority assumes much more responsibility and control over the production, delivery, and the price consumers pay for goods. Government determines the rules for interplay among institutions based on its perceptions of what constitutes the greatest economic and social benefit to the country. This is not to say that the world falls neatly into these groups. Among the world's economies, equity and efficiency are assigned different weights depending on internal and external political and social factors. Just as the government and private sector relationship relate differently in Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, so do the planning, production, and distribution mechanisms in the USSR, East Germany, and China. This article describes how China, whose system is heavily dominated by the question of equity, tries to balance its concern for equity with the need

The Mass Media and Development in Pakistan

Abstract: development, the development role of the mass media in any country can only emerge from the interaction of that society's major social factors. An analysis of these factors in Pakistani society can guide us in determining what corrective measures need to be taken to ensure an optimal role for the mass media in the process of nation building and economic progress. The hypothesis underlying this approach is that no study of the mass media can be conducted in isolation from the rest of the economy, and that an operational evaluation of the performance of individual media by itself cannot offer the long-term insights that are needed to develop the mass media institutions in Pakistan.

Brunei: The ASEAN Connection

Abstract: Although no formal mechanism for accession has yet been announced, it is expected by Brunei and its future partners that the Sultanate will become the sixth member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1984, after it obtains full sovereignty over its external affairs.' The characteristic ASEAN decision-making process of formal and informal consultations (musyawarah) leading to consensus (mufakat) is in full train. Brunei's candidature was announced at the June 1981 annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Manila. Brunei was invited as an "observer" and was represented by the Sultan's brother, Prince Mohammad Bolkiah, who is the Perdana Wazir and probably will be Brunei's first Foreign Minister. In his address to the conference, Prince Mohammad stated that it was the hope of Brunei that the question of its membership in ASEAN could be favorably resolved once independence was achieved.2 If the statements of ASEAN leaders to date are any guide, there would appear to be little doubt that when Brunei makes its application, it will be accepted. In fact, membership in ASEAN may be the sine qua non of Brunei's independence. Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN will mark the first enlargement of the group since the original five (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Brunei is not the only potential member. Sri Lanka has openly campaigned for membership, to the private distress of ASEAN leadership. Although questions of geographic proximity are raised concerning Sri Lanka's would-be ASEAN role, it would seem that other considerations are more significant in determining the generally negative reactions in ASEAN. Papua New Guinea too is associated with ASEAN, but its prospects for full membership, even if it desired, would

Afghanistan in 1982: Still no Solution

Abstract: SEVEN OVERLAPPING "R's" describe the patterns in Afghanistan since the April 1978 coup d'etat: revolution, rhetoric, reforms, repressions, refugees, revolts, and Russians. The year 1982 ended with emphasis on repressions, revolts, refugees, and Russians. The internal struggle for power between the two major leftist parties continued. Parcham (The Banner), favored by the Russians, dominated. A fragmented Khalq (The Masses), its leadership either dead or fled, nursed its wounds. Independent voices in the literati were silenced by the security police, KHAD (Khidmat-i-Ittlelat-i-Daulat, literally State Information Service), founded in September 1981 and modeled on the KGB. The DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) continued to send young Afghans to the USSR for technical training and indoctrination. Many who returned fled to Pakistan with their families. Military police press gangs swept up men of draft age (sometimes overand underage) from tea houses, schools, bazaars, and even homes in an attempt to maintain a troop level of about 30,000. The pre-1978 coup military successfully maintained a draftee strength of 110,000. The desperate central government tried to draft the tribesmen of Paktya Province, exempt since 1929 because of their support of King Mohammad Nadir during the Saqqaoist War. More than 2,000 tribesmen held a three-day peaceful demonstration (October) in Kabul, and were finally dispersed by police. But the government could not enforce the conscription act in tribal areas.

The new law of the sea and development in southeast asia

Abstract: Since the beginning of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1973, nations have worked together under the auspices of the United Nations in an unprecedented collective attempt to develop an "equitable international rule" for a broad range of oceanrelated issues. After years of intensive negotiation and consensus-building, a comprehensive package deal has gradually emerged. Despite the recent major change in the negotiation position of the U.S. and the dissatisfaction of some countries over some specific articles of the new Convention, many of the new or newly defined concepts evolved from UNCLOS III have gained acceptance either through international practice or by unilateral proclamation and enforcement. UNCLOS III finally concluded its negotiations on April 30, 1982. The new Convention was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the more than 140 delegations, including all those from Southeast Asia. Since some of the major concepts deal directly or indirectly with jurisdiction over resources, their enactment will have enormous impact on a country's national development. It is therefore essential, especially for the developing countries, to identify these new concepts and jurisdiction and to examine their effects or possible effects on resources and development if the advantages are to be maximized and the adverse effects mitigated. Because of the transnational nature of the ocean-related issues, conflicts and misunderstanding can easily arise-especially among neighboring countries-over implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the new law of the sea.

Food policy in China: recent efforts to balance supplies and consumption requirements.

Abstract: China's present population is reported to be more than one billion-nearly double the 582 million reported after its 1953 population census. The annual population growth rate, which has been slowly decreasing, is estimated variously to be 1.2%1, 1.9%2, and, most pessimistic, 2.2%.3 Each 1% increase produces a population gain of more than 10 million per year and a static demand for an additional 3.5 million metric tons of food in terms of grain equivalents. "For people [Chinese]," writes a Hong Kong analyst, "the supreme thing is food, food comes first, [and] should never be forgotten."4 In this article China refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the period covered is mainly the 30 years from 1949 through 1979 with emphasis on the relevant events of the late 1970s. Since the most pressing Chinese problem is to provide enough food for its ever-expanding population, either through increased domestic production and/or imports, the government has resorted to a complicated system for regulating and allocating available food supplies among its people, controlling food production and mix, and using food as a weapon of foreign policy and domestic social change. The purpose of this essay is (1) to assess the government's food balancing efforts in terms of nutritional adequacy, and (2) to describe and evaluate certain procedures the government is using to effect a more desirable balance between available food supplies and individual consumption requirements.

Sri Lanka in 1982: A Year of Elections

Abstract: THE YEAR 1982 in Sri Lanka was dominated by elections. The country witnessed within a space of nine weeks two national polls. The first, a presidential election, was held on October 20. The second was a referendum on December 22 designed to obtain a mandate from the electorate to extend the life of the present Parliament by six years to 1989. Both elections were won by the ruling United National Party (UNP), which thereby consolidated its political power for the rest of the decade. This electoral victory gave a mandate to the government to continue both its "Open Economy" policy and the somewhat pro-Western tilt to its nonaligned foreign policy over the next six years.

The Political Economy of Land Reforms in Karnataka, A South Indian State

Abstract: Land reform measures have been in operation in India for nearly three decades, but according to reports have not achieved significant results, particularly with regard to the redistributive objective of land reforms. For instance, an Asian Development Bank study found that "During the 1960's, land reform programmes in India ... were not adequately implemented.... In the 16 Indian States which implemented land ceilings legislation between 1958 and 1971, only 0.99 million hectares had been declared surplus by 1971, representing 0.7 per cent of the net cropped area. Less than 0.49 million hectares had been distributed to poor farm householders and landless workers."' It would be interesting to know why land reforms have not been successful. The explanations offered for this unimpressive performance have been mainly in terms of some vague but catchy phrases like "the vested interest of politicians," "corrupt bureaucracy," "economic and political domination of the landlords," etc. However, these explanations have not been articulated within the framework of an empirical analysis comparable to those which were advanced for justifying land reforms. The purpose of this article is to explain the failure of land reforms and to analyze these explanations within the terms of the politics of group interests. For illustrative purposes we will present the case of Karnataka (formerly Mysore state). According to the Indian Constitution, the state governments are responsible for the formulation and implementation of land reform