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Showing papers in "Duke law and technology review in 2014"


Journal Article
TL;DR: This Issue Brief argues that virtual compound claims are not abstract ideas and therefore, consistent with patent policy, qualify as patentable subject matter.
Abstract: “Virtual” molecular compounds, created in molecular modeling software, are increasingly useful in the process of rational drug design. When a physical compound is patented, however, virtual use of the compound allows researchers to circumvent the protection granted to the patentee. To acquire protection from unauthorized use of compounds in their virtual form, patentees must directly claim the virtual compound. But Supreme Court decisions such as Bilski v. Kappos and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. call into question whether virtual compound claims are patentable subject matter under § 101. Using the guidance offered by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit, this Issue Brief argues that virtual compound claims are not abstract ideas and therefore, consistent with patent policy, qualify as patentable subject matter.

5 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: Bunker et al. as discussed by the authors analyzed and critiqued the transformative-use doctrine two decades after the U.S. Supreme Court introduced it into copyright law in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.
Abstract: Examining recent judicial opinions, this Article analyzes and critiques the transformative-use doctrine two decades after the U.S. Supreme Court introduced it into copyright law in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. When the Court established the transformativeuse concept, which plays a critical role in fair-use determinations today, its contours were relatively undefined. Drawing on an influential law-review article, the Court described a transformative use as one that adds “new expression, meaning or message.” Unfortunately, the doctrine and its application are increasingly ambiguous, with lower courts developing competing conceptions of transformation. This doctrinal murkiness is particularly disturbing because fair use is a key proxy for First Amendment interests in copyright law. This Article traces the evolution of transformative use, analyzes three key paradigms of transformative use that have gained prominence in the post-Campbell environment, and offers suggestions for a jurisprudence in which transformative use is a less significant component of the fair-use analysis. Copyright © 2014 by Matthew D. Bunker and Clay Calvert. † Reese Phifer Professor of Journalism, College of Communication and Information Sciences, The University of Alabama. Ph.D., University of Florida, 1993; J.D., University of Kansas, 1985. ‡ Professor and Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 93

5 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: St. Eve and Zuckerman as discussed by the authors conducted a survey of federal and state jurors on their use of social media during their jury service and concluded that the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media is the instruction given to the jurors.
Abstract: This Article presents the results of a survey of jurors in federal and state court on their use of social media during their jury service. We began surveying federal jurors in 2011 and reported preliminary results in 2012; since then, we have surveyed several hundred more jurors, including state jurors, for a more complete picture of juror attitudes toward social media. Our results support the growing consensus that jury instructions are the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media. We conclude with a set of recommended best practices for using a social-media instruction. Copyright © 2014 by Hon. Amy J. St. Eve, Hon. Charles P. Burns, and Michael A. Zuckerman. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the courts or the law firm with which they are respectively associated. † United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; Adjunct Professor, Northwestern Law School. †† Circuit Judge, Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; Adjunct Professor, Lewis University. ‡ Associate, Jones Day, Chicago Office. Mr. Zuckerman previously clerked for Judge St. Eve, before which he clerked for U.S. Circuit Judge Eric L. Clay of the Sixth Circuit, and U.S. Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak of the Eastern District of New York. No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 65

3 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine whether the "safe harbor" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) may shield virtual private server providers with customers running BitTorrent clients from potential liability for copyright infringement.
Abstract: By the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. in 2005, Internet users around the globe who engaged in copyright infringement had already turned to newer, alternative forms of peer-to-peer filesharing. One recent development is the “seedbox,” a virtual private server rentable for use to download and upload (“seed”) files through the BitTorrent protocol. Because BitTorrent is widely used for both non-infringing and infringing purposes, the operators of seedboxes and other rentable BitTorrent-capable virtual private servers face the possibility of direct and secondary liability as did the defendants in Grokster and more recent cases like UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC and Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. This Issue Brief examines whether the “safe harbor” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) may shield virtual private server providers with customers running BitTorrent clients from potential liability for copyright infringement. It argues that general virtual private server providers are likely to find refuge in the safe harbor provisions as long as they conscientiously comply with the DMCA. In contrast, virtual private server providers specifically targeting BitTorrent users (“seedbox providers”) are much less likely to receive DMCA safe harbor protection.

2 citations


Journal Article
Abstract: Publishers have spent the last decade and a half struggling against falling prices for digital goods. The recent antitrust case against Apple and the major publishers highlights collusive price fixing as a potential method for resisting depreciation. This Article examines the myriad ways in which digital distribution puts downward pressure on prices, and seeks to determine whether or not collusive price fixing would serve as an appropriate response to such pressure given the goals of the copyright grant. Considering retailer bargaining power, increased access to substitutes, the loss of traditional price discrimination methods, the effects of vertical integration in digital publishing, and the increasing competitiveness of the public domain, I conclude that the resultant downward price pressure might in fact significantly hamper the commodity distribution of digital goods. I remain unconvinced, however, that price fixing is an appropriate solution. The copyright grant affords rights holders commercial opportunities beyond simple commodity distribution. These other methods for commercializing e-goods suggest to me that current pricing trends are not indicative of market failure, but rather of a changing marketplace.

2 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the use of neuroimaging will only have a negligible impact on sentencing outcomes in the criminal justice system, and they also point out that using such images to substantiate claims of diminished capacity and insanity is a viable option for criminal defendants.
Abstract: Advancements in technology have now made it possible for scientists to provide assessments of an individual’s mental state. Through neuroimaging, scientists can create visual images of the brain that depict whether an individual has a mental disorder or other brain defect. The importance of these advancements is particularly evident in the context of criminal law, where defendants are able to dispute their culpability for crimes committed where they lack the capacity to form criminal intent. Thus, in theory, a neuroimage depicting defective brain functioning could demonstrate a defendant’s inability to form the requisite criminal intent. Due to early successes in high-profile cases where advanced neuroimaging was used in this way, many researchers believe that the use of neuroimages to substantiate claims of diminished capacity and insanity is a viable option for criminal defendants. This Issue Brief argues, however, that though the use of neuroimages may have a positive effect on outcomes in theory, in actuality, the use of neuroimages will only have a negligible impact on sentencing outcomes.

2 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined how this "share" feature would fare under the framework laid out by Sony v. Universal and other evolutions in copyright law, and concluded that it would not fare well.
Abstract: Sony has included a “share” button on the next version of their popular PlayStation video game system. This feature is meant to allow players to record and share videos of their gameplay. This service shares similarities with the controversial “record” button that Sony included with its Betamax players over thirty years ago. The Betamax player was the subject of the landmark case Sony v. Universal, a foundational case for the modern application of copyright law to new technology. This Issue Brief examines how this “share” feature would fare under the framework laid out by Sony v. Universal and other evolutions in copyright law.

1 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: The LightSquared debacle as discussed by the authors provides a template for understanding market and non-market failure in radio spectrum allocation, which is a tragedy of the regulatory commons, resulting from a legal or market structure that prevents economic actors from executing socially efficient bargains.
Abstract: The endemic underuse of radio spectrum constitutes a tragedy of the regulatory commons. Like other common interest tragedies, the outcome results from a legal or market structure that prevents economic actors from executing socially efficient bargains. In wireless markets, innovative applications often provoke claims by incumbent radio users that the new traffic will interfere with existing services. Sometimes these concerns are mitigated via market transactions, a la “Coasian bargaining.” Other times, however, solutions cannot be found even when social gains dominate the cost of spillovers. In the recent “LightSquared debacle,” such spectrum allocation failure played out. GPS interests that access frequencies adjacent to the band hosting LightSquared’s new nationwide mobile network complained that the wireless entrant would harm the operation of locational devices. Based on these complaints, regulators then killed LightSquared’s planned 4G network. Conservative estimates placed the prospective 4G consumer gains at least an order of magnitude above GPS losses. “Win win” bargains were theoretically available, fixing GPS vulnerabilities while welcoming the highly valuable wireless innovation. Yet transaction costs — largely caused by policy choices to issue limited and highly fragmented spectrum usage rights (here in the GPS band) — proved prohibitive. This episode provides a template for understanding market and non-market failure in radio spectrum allocation.

1 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: Kennedy as discussed by the authors argues that the majority opinion of the Board misapplied Lafayette Park Hotel's test for whether employer conduct “would reasonably tend to chill employees” from legitimate, protected uses of their §7 rights.
Abstract: Section 7 of the United States’ National Labor Relations Act allows groups of American workers to engage in concerted activity for the purposes of collective bargaining or for “other mutual aid or protection.” This latter protection has been extended in cases such as Lafayette Park Hotel to workers outside the union context. Starting in 2005, the National Labor Relations Board increasingly signaled to employers that concerted activity may take place on social media such as Facebook. However, the Board proper delivered its first written opinion articulating these rules in the 2012 case of Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. There, the Board found the employer in question to have committed multiple unfair labor practices when it fired five employees over a series of Facebook posts due to violating the employer’s zero-tolerance no bullying policy. This article argues that the majority opinion of the Board misapplied Lafayette Park Hotel’s test for whether employer conduct “would reasonably tend to chill employees” from legitimate, protected uses of their §7 rights. This article explains the two largest errors in the Board’s decision: (1) a failure to identify a missing, important element for concerted activity protection under §7, the nexus between employee discussion and contemplated group action, and (2) asserting an “inferred group intent” existed that was “implicitly manifest” which linked the employees’ Facebook posts to contemplated group action protected under §7. Members of the entire Board, as well as other legal scholars writing on this topic, have been guilty at different times of simplifying social media to being like a “virtual water cooler” for the 21st century. The facts in Hispanics United show why this † Duke University School of Law, J.D. and LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, 2014; Iowa State University, B.S. in Accounting and Management, B.S. in English and Philosophy, 2011. Ryan Kennedy would like to thank Dan Bowling, Senior Lecturing Fellow at Duke Law School, for all of his help and insight in preparing this note. No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 183 analogy does not work: rather than a short face-to-face conversation with a finite, known audience in the space of minutes, it was a series of written messages plopped down in sequential order throughout an entire day, written for an audience of unknown size and make-up that may not even include the co-workers it ostensibly addressed. As Hispanics United helps illustrate, the proper handling of employer retaliation on social media remains the sensible application of the established nexus requirement for finding concerted activity.

1 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies in the United States obtain a warrant before tracking the cell phones of suspects and persons of interest, and that the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate to address cell phone tracking.
Abstract: Only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies in the United States obtain a warrant before tracking the cell phones of suspects and persons of interest. This is due, in part, to the fact that courts have struggled to keep pace with a changing technological landscape. Indeed, courts around the country have issued a disparate array of holdings on the issue of warrantless cell phone tracking. This lack of judicial uniformity has led to confusion for both law enforcement agencies and the public alike. In order to protect reasonable expectations of privacy in the twenty-first century, Congress should pass legislation requiring law-enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant based upon probable cause before they can track a cell phone except in a limited set of time-sensitive situations and emergencies. This Issue Brief describes the technology police use to track cell phones, discusses the need for federal legislation, concludes that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate to address cell phone tracking, analyzes two bills dealing with “geolocation information” privacy that legislators have introduced in Congress, and ultimately concludes that one of those bills is superior to the other.