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Showing papers in "Foreign Policy Analysis in 2015"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the relationship between policy change and state narrative continuity is examined, and it is shown that at times of great crises and threats to multiple state securities (physical, social, and ontological), narratives are selectively activated to provide a cognitive bridge that resolves the physical security challenge, while also preserving state ontological security through offering autobiographical continuity, a sense of routine, familiarity, and calm.
Abstract: While the recent IR “narrative turn” has greatly improved our understanding of how narratives influence state policy choices, we need to deepen our understanding of how narratives explain policy change. If state “autobiographies” provide such powerful explanations of why states do what they do, how can they change their policies and practices? To understand the relationship between policy change and state narrative continuity, I build on existing scholarship on narrative analysis and ontological security to examine ways in which state autobiographical narratives are used by political actors to confront state insecurities. My principal argument is that at times of great crises and threats to multiple state securities (physical, social, and ontological), narratives are selectively activated to provide a cognitive bridge between policy change that resolves the physical security challenge, while also preserving state ontological security through offering autobiographical continuity, a sense of routine, familiarity, and calm. I illustrate the argument with an analysis of Serbia's changing foreign policy behavior regarding the disputed status of Kosovo.

195 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that nation-branding processes need to be understood as responding to the need of states and state leaders to enhance both their citizens and the nation's sense of ontological security and self-esteem.
Abstract: Surprisingly, the emergent and increasingly popular phenomenon of nation branding has received only scant attention from International Relations scholars. While most analyses account for the phenomenon by emphasizing the perceived material benefits to be derived from establishing a positive national brand, this article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that nation-branding processes need to be understood as responding to the need of states and state leaders to enhance both their citizens and the nation's sense of ontological security and (self)-esteem. Moreover, this quest for self-esteem and ontological security is unfolding in the context of broader realignments occasioned by the advent of late modernity. While nation branding represents an understandable response to these developments, the article questions the strategy's overall efficacy by highlighting its implications for how national subjectivity is constituted, its notable disciplining elements and its potentially undemocratic implications.

98 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a role theoretical framework for understanding the importance of others' expectations for the role con-ception and enactment of the Self, and elaborates on the interplay of master roles and auxiliary roles in which Others become key shapers of those roles, as well as on how the role interaction between a regional power and the secondary powers is bound to their differing notions of “region, as strategically used by each as part of their foreign policy.
Abstract: This article sets out how secondary powers in South America—that is, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela—see Brazil as a regional power, as well as Brazil's strategy of using its regional powerhood to further its own ambitions of becoming a global power on the international stage. The article assesses the expectations of these three countries, specifically in terms of what kind of roles they attribute to Brazil. Following this empirical interest, the article develops a role theoretical framework for understanding the importance of Others' expectations for the role con-ception and enactment of the Self. The article also elaborates on the interplay of master roles and auxiliary roles in which Others become key shapers of those roles, as well as on how the role interaction between a regional power and the secondary powers is bound to their differing notions of “region,” as strategically used by each as part of their foreign policy.

63 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors developed a model of role contestation and role selection that draws on existing knowledge of foreign policy creation resulting from competition between governing elites and opposition, multi-party coalitions, cabinet dynamics, and bureaucratic politics.
Abstract: One of the shortcomings of foreign policy role theory is its tendency to black-box the state. Role theorists often assume a national role conception, without paying too much attention to the domestic political processes regarding how a role is selected to represent the state out of a number of potential competing roles. We develop a model of role contestation and role selection that draws on existing knowledge of foreign policy creation resulting from competition between governing elites and opposition, multi-party coalitions, cabinet dynamics, and bureaucratic politics. We incorporate expectations from role theory to explain how conflict over role selection may be resolved. The model is examined in light of several cases in immediate post-war Germany. We find that government and opposition dynamics are the primary sources of contestation over NRCs in our cases, some evidence for bureaucratic politics, and little evidence that coalition politics was at play. Finally, there were few instances in which role conflict resolution mechanisms were used.

58 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Pinar Ipek1
TL;DR: In this paper, a constructivist account for policy change that emphasizes not only ideas but also material interests as exogenous factors constituted within domestic structures is proposed, and empirical analysis in the case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency reveals important evidence demonstrating the influence of shared normative values, mostly constituted by the foreign policy elite's intersubjective understanding of Turkey's historical roots and cultural ties in the region.
Abstract: Constructivism in the International Relations literature mainly focuses on the constitutive interaction between international norms and state actions. Few studies explore when ideas at the domestic level matter in foreign policy change. I propose a constructivist account for policy change that emphasizes not only ideas but also material interests as exogenous factors constituted within domestic structures. My empirical analysis in the case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency reveals important evidence demonstrating the influence of (i) shared normative values, mostly constituted by the foreign policy elite's intersubjective understanding of Turkey's historical roots and cultural ties in the region and (ii) material interests, favored through the “trading state” and framed by the convergence of principled and causal beliefs on policy change. Ideas matter in foreign policymaking when a set of contingent conditions is satisfied: (i) A small group of recognized foreign policy elite has shared normative beliefs and (ii) an enabling political environment exists, particularly a majority government facilitating foreign policy appointments to key positions so that a window of opportunity is provided for policy entrepreneurship.

41 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the number of signals that states and IOs send to coup states from 1950 to 2011 and find that coups against democracies and wealthy states draw more attention.
Abstract: With ten attempts since 2010, coups d’etat are surprisingly common events with vital implications for a state’s political development. Aside from being disruptive internally, coups influence interstate relationships. Though coups have important consequences, we know little about how the international community responds to these upheavals. This paper explores what drives global actors to react to coups. Our theory differentiates between normative concerns (for example, protection of democracy) and material interests (for example, protection of oil exports) as potential determinants of international responses to coups. We argue that coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction. Using newly collected data, we explore the number of signals that states and IOs send to coup states from 1950 to 2011. The analyses reveal that coups against democracies and wealthy states draw more attention. States react when democracies are challenged by coups, while IOs react to coups in Africa and coups during the post-Cold War period. We surprisingly find that heavy traders and oil-rich states do not necessarily receive more reaction, suggesting that international actors are more driven by normative concerns than material interests when reacting to coups.

30 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the domestic political environment played a key role in enabling the adoption of soft balancing in Moldova's foreign policy, and provide a theoretical answer for the puzzle of the country's pro-Western turn in 2003.
Abstract: “Soft balancing” has emerged as a way to reconcile realist theory with the lack of hard balancing behavior against US hegemony. Scholars continue, however, to disagree on the concept's utility and causes. Consistent with its realist roots, scholars have primarily focused on power imbalance and external threat to security as causes of soft balancing. This article analyzes Moldova's major foreign policy shift in the mid-2000s. It argues that this was a clear example of soft balancing and that it adds several important insights into the causes of soft balancing. While the power imbalance and external threat from Russia were persistent throughout Moldova's post-independence history, the country only adopted a soft balancing strategy once Russia posed a threat to the internal stability of the government and changes in EU policy created a permissive international environment for the strategy. Moreover, we argue that the domestic political environment played a key role in enabling the adoption of this strategy. This article therefore diversifies the analysis of the causes of soft balancing and provides a theoretical answer for the puzzle of Moldova's pro-Western turn in 2003.

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that sanctions obligations imposed by smaller-sized institutions are more effective at preventing their members from becoming extensive trade-based sanctions busters than those imposed by larger ones.
Abstract: When international institutions obligate their members to impose economic sanctions against a target state, how much do those sanctions obligations actually impact their members' behavior? To date, the consensus view has treated all international institutions as if they are equally capable of making multilateral sanctioning efforts more effective. Building upon the enforcement theory of sanctions cooperation, we instead theorize that the ability of international institutions to constrain their members from engaging in spoiler behaviors degrades the larger they are. We hypothesize that sanctions obligations imposed by smaller-sized institutions are more effective at preventing their members from becoming extensive trade-based sanctions busters than those imposed by larger ones. We test our hypothesis via a quantitative analysis of how the involvement of five different international institutions in sanctioning efforts influenced their members' likelihoods of sanctions-busting. We find that only the smaller-sized institutions we examine appear capable of constraining their members from undercutting sanctioning efforts. Notably, we find no evidence that the United Nations' sanctions actually prevent its members from sanctions-busting.

22 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that scientists are most influential when they can leverage their recognized expertise by strategically co-opting institutionalized channels of advice, which is most likely to occur in issue areas of high complexity and ambiguity when key policy makers are dependent upon scientists for their counsel.
Abstract: What accounts for the variation in the influence of scientists in the policy-making process? Why is it that scientists sometimes appear to exercise significant autonomy in shaping policy agendas, while at other times very little? Scientists are most influential, this paper contends, when they can leverage their recognized expertise by strategically co-opting institutionalized channels of advice. This is most likely to occur in issue areas of high complexity and ambiguity when key policy makers are dependent upon scientists for their counsel. Policy entrepreneurs within competing scientific communities, prevented from accessing key decision makers, wait until windows of opportunity open to undermine the credibility of the incumbent experts, gain access to political leaders, and refocus the policy agenda. This theory is developed and tested through a case-study analysis of the nuclear test-ban debate during the Eisenhower administration from 1954 to 1958. The findings of this paper underscore the need to treat foreign policy decision making as a series of strategic interactions between multiple actors with a broader capacity to influence the policy-making process than traditionally conceived. By doing so, scholars can better understand variations in government decision making across time and issue area, providing important insights into the role of experts in a wide range of public policy domains.

22 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the influence of democracy and territory on the occurrence of armed conflict and concluded that the pacifying effect of democracy stands up for both territorial dyads and non-territorial ones in spite of the imperatives toward militarization created by territorial conflict.
Abstract: Democracy and territory are two of the most important factors that affect conflict and war. Yet no research design looks directly at a possible interaction between these two variables to influence occurrence of armed conflict. This study seeks to answer the following question: “How do two democracies behave when a contentious issue such as territory arises as the source of conflict between them?” Results based on Militarized Interstate Dispute data from 1920 to 1996 produce the conclusion that the pacifying effect of democracy stands up for both territorial dyads and non-territorial ones in spite of the imperatives toward militarization created by territorial conflict. However, territory of high salience still appears to increase the likelihood of armed conflict between two democracies.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article used a gravity model to evaluate the effects of directed diplomatic relations and alliances on bilateral export volatility, and found that the establishment of diplomatic relations or alliances can significantly reduce trade volatility.
Abstract: Trade volatility can do serious harm to a country's economic and political stability. Research suggests that international trade agreements can reduce such volatility by reinforcing extant trade commitments, improving transparency, promoting policy convergence, and strengthening investor confidence. Drawing on this logic, we posit that international political ties can also produce notable reductions in export volatility. Specifically, we argue that diplomatic missions and military alliances signal lower discount rates, increase political transparency, and enhance issue linkages among trading partners. These enhancements in turn work to stabilize trade flows. To test this argument, we use a gravity model to evaluate the effects of directed diplomatic relations and alliances on bilateral export volatility. Controlling for confounding variables and exploring a wide array of model specifications, we find that the establishment of diplomatic relations or alliances can significantly reduce trade volatility.

Journal ArticleDOI
Ellen Gutterman1
TL;DR: The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) is having an unprecedented moment. In 2010, corporations paid $1.8 billion in FCPA fines, penalties and disgorgements, the most ever recorded in this controversial Act's history and half of all criminal-division penalties at the Justice Department as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) is having an unprecedented moment. In 2010, corporations paid $1.8 billion in FCPA fines, penalties, and disgorgements—the most ever recorded in this controversial Act's history and half of all criminal-division penalties at the Justice Department. While this recent pattern of enforcement is itself interesting, a deeper puzzle lies in the origins and early trajectory of the FCPA. Throughout the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, major US business groups opposed its unilateral ban on transnational bribery and lobbied the government to repeal this costly constraint on American businesses operating overseas. Yet, despite a decade of pressure from otherwise powerful groups, the government failed to respond to business demands amidst strategic trade concerns about the FCPA. Why? The paper applies a Constructivist lens, together with concepts from the theory of legal reasoning, to analyze the early history of the FCPA and explain its continued significance in US foreign economic policy. Anti-corruption norm resonance and the pressure publicly to justify norm-transgressing practices made foreign corrupt practices by American businesses “easier done than said.”

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that winning Olympic medals and hosting the Olympics have significant impacts on states' status rankings and raise a cautionary note about the complex foreign policy choices faced by states as they may pursue additional status.
Abstract: Status and the relative ranking of states in international politics seem to be salient concerns for most foreign policymakers.2 Yet, the literature on how status rankings are attributed to states remains as scarce as research on the strategies utilized by states to maintain or enhance the status they are attributed. While there is more research conducted on both status attribution and status competition regarding major powers and rising powers,3 little systematic attention has focused on the larger population of states in international politics.4 One of the latest contributions to this literature is an analysis of successful competition in the summer Olympics as a state status-seeking strategy (Rhamey and Early 2013). The authors find that winning Olympic medals and hosting the Olympics have significant impacts on states' status rankings. We do not question these results and, in fact, applaud the effort to map out one strategy of status enhancement. However, we raise a cautionary note about the complex foreign policy choices faced by states as they may pursue additional status. Within the toolbox of policymakers, there are a variety of policies with which to pursue the same objective in international politics, be it status enhancement or other goals. Typically, this interchangeability of strategies has been referred to in the literature as foreign policy substitutability (Most and Starr 1984; Morgan and Palmer 2000; Palmer and Bhandari 2000). If in fact there are numerous policy options available for seeking enhanced status, then these policies should be examined—and evaluated—using a comparative policy perspective in order to determine whether or not they are substitutable and possibly complementary policies. The notions of substitutability and complementarity should be salient for both policymakers and researchers. For policymakers, substitutability provides flexibility in choosing policies that may have variable costs, effects, and consequences. Establishing complementarity …

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess the predictive ability of purported causal factors of piracy using evaluative statistical tools such as receiver-operating characteristic plots, out-of-sample predictions, and outlier analysis.
Abstract: This paper extends systematic analyses of maritime piracy by verifying the robustness of empirical results and examining the forecasting ability of empirical models. Recent research by Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010) finds that statistically significant relationships frequently offer poor guidance when it comes to anticipating the inception of civil war. We assess the predictive ability of purported causal factors of piracy using evaluative statistical tools such as receiver-operating characteristic plots, out-of-sample predictions, and outlier analysis. Statistical results for in-sample and out-of-sample tests show that while factors such as military capacity, population size, coastline length, and trade volumes are statistically related to piracy, state fragility has by far the strongest predictive effect despite only being moderately statistically significant in the models. Outlier analysis demonstrates that while several countries experience higher numbers of piracy incidents than predicted, empirical models are generally robust to the presence of outliers. For policymakers, the findings suggest that counter-piracy efforts focused on capacity-building measures have the greatest potential for reducing the piracy threat.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use power transition theory to show that trust and relative political capabilities are essential to build a stable Union and that the slowdown of integration is not simply a regional problem with serious consequences for the economic stability of Europe.
Abstract: Today, financial crisis once again threatens the unity among member states and future of the European Union. The magnitude of the problem is so grave that observers and analysts have concluded a big decision must be made regarding fiscal union (thus political union) to save EMU. “Is this really the end of the road for Eurozone?” Using Power Transition theory, our analysis shows that trust and relative political capabilities are essential to build a stable Union. While it is clear that the center of global politics is shifting away from Europe and the United States to the Asian giants—the transition from West to East can be effectively planned so that the future units are satisfied with each other rather than distrustful, dissatisfied, and contentious. The slowdown of integration is not simply a regional problem with serious consequences for the economic stability of Europe. Far more importantly, our analysis suggests that the process of integration that has reduced tensions within a region previously characterized by major wars may be declining and that this in and of itself could reset the stage not only for regional confrontations but increase the likelihood that global wars may once more be considered as means to solve disputes. The European Union cannot afford to move from the cooperative contest to a confrontational one where solutions are arrived at by force rather than reason. Therefore, the challenge for European leaders is to resolve the current crisis in the EMU and build upon it a reinvigorated union that once more provides a path for complete regional integration.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel's decision-making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah and shows that the air power and quagmire analogies contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.
Abstract: This paper assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel's decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah. Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the “air power superiority” analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the “Lebanese quagmire” analogy which drew on Israel's own traumatic experience of Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these analogies by the Israeli political–military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that leaders with affordable access to sovereign credit have often overcome this constraint by raising revenue on credit markets, and argue that these leaders have greater autonomy to pursue an aggressive foreign policy if they so desire.
Abstract: Liberal theory claims that the constraint taxpayers impose on military expenditure is an important mechanism through which democracy and international commerce help prevent conflict. However, leaders with affordable access to sovereign credit have often overcome this constraint by raising revenue on credit markets. By minimizing or deferring the economic burden imposed on taxpayers and the macroeconomic stress associated with alternative financing strategies, I argue that these leaders have greater autonomy to pursue an aggressive foreign policy if they so desire. Leaders that lack creditor confidence risk increased political opposition and removal from office if hostilities generate macroeconomic stress or disturb the domestic fiscal balance. They also face a higher likelihood of defeat or retreat, and the subsequent political consequences, if they pursue conflict without sufficient resources. Estimates of a heteroskedastic probit model support this hypothesis and indicate that creditworthy states initiate conflict with a greater mean probability and greater variance than their noncreditworthy counterparts.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article provided the first global analysis of the determinants of state reparations awards to victims of mass human rights violations (HRVs) committed during political violence and found that countries that used other types of transitional justice mechanisms are more likely to actually pay reparations to victims than are other governments.
Abstract: Governments often award reparations to victims of mass human rights violations (HRVs) committed during political violence. Although international law requires that governments compensate victims of such violations, some states award reparations while others do not. This paper provides the first global analysis of the determinants of state reparations awards to victims of HRVs. Analyses consider the effects of multiple factors on reparations awards, whether a country has used other types of transitional justice mechanisms, economic development, and regime type. Spatial and rare events logit analyses on a new database for all countries between 1969 and 2006 suggest that wealthy, democratic countries as well as governments that already employ other transitional justice mechanisms are more likely to actually pay reparations to victims than are other governments.

Journal ArticleDOI
Su-Mi Lee1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors employ stakeholder analysis based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to examine two coalitions of US foreign policy during the postwar and early Cold War periods.
Abstract: This research employs stakeholder analysis based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to examine two coalitions of US foreign policy during the postwar and early Cold War periods. It defines the proponents of the Yalta axioms and the proponents of the Riga axioms as two purposive groups based on ideological positions. By identifying the stakeholders, their strategic bases, their belief systems (with respect to the Soviet Union), and their policies and resources, this research demonstrates how each coalition formed and competed with the other. More importantly, it offers a way to understand the seemingly inconsistent policy positions of Kennan and Bohlen that supported the Riga axioms at one time and opposed them at another time. By so doing, this research demonstrates the utility of the ACF in examining foreign policies.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that diversionary incentives should be associated with a greater likelihood of being the target of disputes, though the conditions under which the result obtains are restrictive and they do not yet have strong evidence that the rally effect motivates domestically vulnerable leaders to become engaged in international conflict.
Abstract: We do not yet have strong evidence that the rally effect motivates domestically vulnerable leaders to become engaged in international conflict. We draw upon mechanism design to argue that, if anything, diversionary incentives should be associated with a greater likelihood of being the target of disputes, though the conditions under which the result obtains are restrictive. Our analysis of all dyad-months involving the United States and its rivals for the period from 1956–1996 yields suggestive evidence of the unconventional behavior anticipated by our model, while failing to find evidence of patterns anticipated by either traditional diversionary accounts or strategic conflict avoidance. These results suggest that if we are to better understand international conflict by focusing on diversionary incentives, which may not be very useful, we should focus on the behavior described by our formal model rather than that anticipated by either traditional diversionary accounts or strategic conflict avoidance.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article applied the concept of a foreign policy ideology in understanding conflict preferences in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, and found that a Foreign Policy ideology has a strong influence on preferences in both conflicts, but that this influence is determined by the context of the interventions.
Abstract: Existing research has shown that individuals have a fairly defined and consistent ideology when it comes to foreign policy. However, exploring how a foreign policy ideology influences more specific policy preferences is largely understudied. I apply this concept of a foreign policy ideology in understanding conflict preferences in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya. Results demonstrate that a foreign policy ideology has a strong influence on preferences in both conflicts, but that this influence is determined by the context of the interventions. This effect of a foreign policy ideology is even greater, at times, than that of the more traditional explanations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results of a psycho-physical magnitude scaling survey of 158 students from two universities where the students scaled CAMEO categories for conflict and cooperation are reported, providing empirically based scale values for CAMEO.
Abstract: Event data is the preferred method of characterizing directed-dyadic behavior through time and is a very versatile approach able to handle both state and nonstate actors. By scaling and aggregating values on a conflict and cooperation continuum, event data can provide a net measure of conflict between two parties for a set time interval. The CAMEO coding scheme was created to address structural flaws in the WEIS coding scheme and to handle better the post-Cold War environment. However, no systematic study has been completed for assigning fixed-weight conflict–cooperation scale values to the newer coding scheme, leaving an ad hoc transliteration of Goldstein scale values for WEIS as the best option. This paper reports the results of a psycho-physical magnitude scaling survey of 158 students from two universities where the students scaled CAMEO categories for conflict and cooperation. In addition to providing empirically based scale values for CAMEO, the paper also tests whether or not conflict and cooperation exist on a single continuum and whether or not a gender difference exists in perceptions of conflict and cooperation.

Journal ArticleDOI
Paul Fritz1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a framework of coercive socialization and conduct a plausibility probe of the theory by detailing the imposition strategies the United States utilized to transform the Federal Republic of Germany into a reliable democratic partner after World War II.
Abstract: Democratic victors hoping to protect war gains by forcing the vanquished to be free must not only overcome the problems associated with imposed democracy but also ensure continued influence over and interests in the newly democratic state. To secure this dual imperative, I argue victors must coercively socialize the vanquished state. I create a framework of coercive socialization and conduct a plausibility probe of the theory by detailing the imposition strategies the United States utilized to transform the Federal Republic of Germany into a reliable democratic partner after World War II. The findings suggest imposing democracy to ensure peace and secure interests is likely to succeed only under even more limited conditions than recent scholarship on imposed democracy allows and also lend insight into why the US effort to impose democracy on Iraq is unlikely to provide the benefits policymakers sought.

Journal ArticleDOI
Gary Winslett1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors address how transnational groups affect the security relationship between the states they reside in and argue that this is determined by the differential threat perceptions of the host states.
Abstract: This article addresses how transnational groups affect the security relationship between the states they reside in. I argue that this is determined by the differential threat perceptions of the host states. If the host states both consider the group to be a threat, the group is a shared problem and policy toward the group becomes an arena for cooperation for the two states. However, if one state views the group as a threat and the other does not, policy toward the group becomes an arena for conflict between them. I test this hypothesis with a comparative case study analysis of Turkey's relationships with the United States, Syria, and Iran vis-a-vis the Kurds after the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explored possible theories of international economic policy coordination, and then proceeds to test these theories through a qualitative analysis of four EU member states and their preferences and experiences during the financial market crisis period of Fall/Winter 2008-2009.
Abstract: This article explores possible theories of international economic policy coordination, and then proceeds to test these theories through a qualitative analysis of four EU member states – Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands – and their preferences and experiences during the financial market crisis period of Fall/Winter 2008–2009. Both institutional and basic realist theories for coordination preferences are evaluated for explanatory power against the case of the 2008 financial crisis and are found lacking. Instead, this analysis finds that a comparative foreign policy theory of political constraints – institutional design, political polarization, and leader time horizons – emerges as the best fit for explaining the divergence in foreign policies among these EU member states.