Showing papers in "Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations in 2010"

The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes, and Institutions

Abstract: This article explains how the global governance of international migration has evolved as a policy issue on the international agenda over the past decade while noting that there is still no consensus on whether global governance is really required, what type of global governance would be appropriate, and how it should develop. The article reviews a series of policy options that have been proposed to fill the governance gap in international migration; namely, to create a new agency, to designate a lead agency, to bring the International Organization for Migration into the UN system, a coordination model, a leadership model, a World Trade Organization model, and an evolutionary model.

Introduction: International Migration and Global Governance

Abstract: This article serves as the introduction for this special issue of Global Governance on international migration. It presents some of the key facts, figures, concepts, and debates on international migration that appear in the articles that follow, and outlines their main arguments. Five arguments in support of greater international cooperation and more formal processes of global governance on international migration are presented here. First, contemporary international migration is now occurring at unprecedented levels and has a truly global reach. Second, international migration can no longer effectively be managed or controlled by national migration policies, and greater international cooperation is required to achieve national goals in international migration. Third, there are growing numbers of migrants around the world who are vulnerable and exploited, and insufficiently protected by either states or international institutions. Fourth, emerging structural features in the global economy, alongside the effects of climate change, are likely to significantly increase the scale of international migration worldwide, and present new management and protection challenges. Finally, momentum for change is slowly developing. KEYWORDS: international migration, global governance. ********** IN CONTRAST TO MANY OTHER CROSS-BORDER ISSUES OF OUR TIME, SUCH as trade, finance, or the environment, international migration lacks a coherent institutional framework at the global level. There is no UN migration organization; rather there is a network of intergovernmental organizations within and outside the UN that focus on specific aspects of international migration. States remain the principal actors in migration governance, and delegate responsibility to regional organizations or international institutions in only limited circumstances. The legal and normative framework affecting international migrants cannot be found in a single document, but is derived from customary law, a variety of binding global and regional legal instruments, nonbinding agreements, and policy understandings reached by states at the global and regional level. Many elements of this framework are not migration specific, but address broader questions of individual rights, state responsibility, and interstate relations. Only in the area of refugee movements, and more recently migrant smuggling and human trafficking, have a large number of governments agreed to binding international laws and norms, but even in these areas implementation remains a challenge. (1) The reluctance of most states to yield national control over international migration is understandable. Sovereign states have the right--indeed, the responsibility--to determine who enters and remains on their territory. And international migration can also impact on other essential aspects of state sovereignty, including economic competitiveness, national and public security, and social cohesion. In addition, some of the challenges to more effective international cooperation on international migration at times can appear insurmountable. In particular, it pits developed economies that want to protect national labor markets and admit migrant workers on only a selective basis against developing countries with rapidly expanding and youthful populations that demand greater and more unrestricted access to those labor markets. At least some of the responsibility for slow progress in developing more global governance on international migration also lies with existing international institutions that are unable or unwilling to extend their mandates, often enter into competition with one another when they do, and fail to cooperate on even the most basic of issues such as common terminology or shared access to data on migration. What is more, even among advocates for reform, there is little consensus on how far-reaching the changes should be. Ambitions range from more effective regional cooperation, through more coherent global cooperation, to the development of a new legal and normative framework and new institutional arrangements to deliver the reforms. …

Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Abstract: There is growing recognition that the effects of climate change are likely to lead to more migration, both internally and internationally, in the relatively near future. These climate change-induced migrations are likely to pose new challenges to the international system, ranging from an increase in irregular migration, to strains on existing asylum systems, to protection gaps for certain migrants affected. Yet the legal and normative framework, and institutional roles and responsibilities, relating to climate change-induced migration remain poorly developed. This article provides an overview of the interactions between climate change and migration, outlines the current international response, and considers new approaches to the global governance framework. KEYWORDS: climate change, migration, asylum. ********** AS EARLY AS 1990, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) warned that significant levels of migration could occur as a result of changing climatic conditions. (1) The concept of environmental migration proved to be a controversial one, largely because of the difficulty in measuring the extent to which environmental factors compel people to move. Since the 1980s, when the term environmental refugees was coined, experts within the environmental and migration fields have differed in their characterization of the phenomenon. Oli Brown puts those concerned with the interconnections in two groups--alarmists and skeptics. (2) The alarmists see the environment as a principal cause of population movements, emphasize the forced nature of the migration (thus, using the term "refugee"), and often project that hundreds of millions of persons will be affected, frequently without differentiating between those who will move short distances to safer ground versus those who will move thousands of miles to new countries. The skeptics, by contrast, raise questions about the models used to generate estimates of those who will be forced to migrate and emphasize that pull factors in destination locations are often more important than push factors at home in determining whether, where, and in what volume people will migrate. Perhaps not surprisingly, some environmentalists have been particularly alarmist, often using the threat of mass migration as a reason that immediate action should be taken to address climate change and other environmental problems. Migration experts, concerned about a potential backlash against migrants and misuse of terms like "refugee," which is carefully defined in international law, have tended to join the camp of the skeptics. Recognizing the complexity in determining causality, and the broader context in which the environment affects population movements, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has offered the following broad definition of environmental migrants: "Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad." (3) Policymakers have been slow, however, to develop national, regional, or international laws, policies, or organizational responsibilities--that is, a system of governance--to manage environmentally induced migration. This situation derives in part from uncertainties about the actual impacts of the environment, particularly as exacerbated by climate change, on migration. But even where there is a recognition that some form of migration related to environmental change is likely to occur, addressing these movements is hampered by the paucity of policy or institutional responses that are deemed appropriate to these forms of migration. This article begins with a brief discussion of the potential impact of climate change on migration patterns. I continue with an examination of existing capacities to address these forms of movement, discussing gaps in governance. …

The Historical Roots of Cooperation Between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration

Abstract: When studying the institutional aspects of the global governance of refugee issues, scholars almost exclusively put the emphasis on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, largely ignoring other organizations and the relationships established with these institutions. The aim of this article is to help fill this gap in the analysis by focusing on the historical roots of cooperation between UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration. Despite the fact that this relationship has been at times charged with competition and suspicion, it has also been a vital factor in the refugee arena over the past sixty years.

Constituting Global Leadership: Which Countries Need to Be Around the Summit Table for Climate Change and Energy Security?

Abstract: THERE IS A GROWING CONSENSUS THAT THE G8 WILL BE REPLACED BY THE G-20 as the key informal body that meets at the leaders' level. Whether it focuses on setting agendas, breaking deadlocks, or being "friends of reform," there will continue to be controversy regarding its composition. Why? Because there is no axiomatic or correct way to choose the countries to constitute the summit table for global negotiations. (1) Various criteria provide guidance, such as total population, economic weight and power, leadership in science and technology, cultural reach, the capacity to introduce new ideas, and the desire to lead. Regional weight is a possible factor. Capacity and willingness to burden share are other criteria. Internal national credibility and political will are other measures. Given that battles are first won on the domestic front, can a country arrange its own compliance? Some might argue that agreement is easier with other like-minded countries that have the same values, but legitimacy requires the group to be representational as well as effective. For example, a recent paper (2) examined two variables as a guide to a representational and effective [G-20.sup.3]--GDP and population--listing countries that would have more than 2 percent of either global population or world GDP and arguing that those with the most economic activity and largest populations must be included (Table 1). Table 1 and subsequent tables rank countries by the magnitude of the measure being considered and highlight current membership in the G-20. Table 1 GDP or Population Greater Than 2 Percent of Earth's Total 2008 2020 Bangladesh Bangladesh BRAZIL BRAZIL CANADA CHINA CHINA FRANCE FRANCE GERMANY GERMANY INDIA INDIA INDONESIA INDONESIA ITALY ITALY JAPAN JAPAN Nigeria Nigeria Pakistan Pakistan Russia Russia Spain Spain UNITED KINGDOM UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES UNITED STATES Total: 16 Total: 15 GDP:72% GDP:66% Population:65% Population:63% Source: "A Fresh Look Global Governance: Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation." Working Paper, no. 160, 6 February 2009, available at www.cgdv.org/content/publications/detail/ 1421065/. Note: CAPPED country names represent countries in the Group of 20 industrizlized countries. When the representational group consists of countries that are not like-minded, is there any possibility for agreement? If so, which countries need to be around the table? We first assess the potential for agreement among a representational group of countries using results from theories of coalitions, regimes, and consensus. We then review a number of variables that may provide the basis for a country's inclusion in a future G-20 or G-X. The variables selected are indicators or proxies for (1) who caused the climate change/energy security/development problem; (2) who is most affected; and (3) who can do something about it. We conclude with the Chinese concept of "comprehensive national power" to illustrate one attempt to weight several factors and compute an overall index. Is Meaningful Agreement Possible in a Group of 20? In recent G8 meetings, commitments have been made on issues such as the economic crisis, poverty, climate change, development, Africa, global growth and stability, financial markets, investment, innovation, energy efficiency, energy security, clean energy, corruption, modern education systems, infectious diseases, globalization, and international trade. For a variety of reasons, many of the commitments have not been fulfilled, (4) but it is anticipated that a Leadership of Twenty (L-20) council will be able to break deadlocks on several of these important issues. (5) However, because the challenges of reaching a consensus coalition of agreement will be greater with twenty leaders than with eight, we will consider whether or not a meaningful coalition is possible for the former number. …

Strategic Approaches to Reintegration: Lessons Learned from Liberia

Abstract: SIX YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT, EX-COMBATANTS are no longer considered a serious threat to peace and stability in Liberia. Systematic surveys conducted by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) show that there is no national network of ex-combatants, although local groups of ex-combatants still exist in some locations. From a security perspective, the reintegration of ex-combatants has been largely successful in Liberia. This good news is not a coincidence; it is due to six years of sustained effort to reestablish rule of law throughout the country, to rebuild institutions, to promote early recovery, and to reintegrate the former fighting forces as well as other war-affected populations. The government, with support from the United Nations, many bilateral and multilateral partners, and national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), has worked diligently to achieve this. This, however, does not mean that all problems related to reintegration are completely resolved. First, there are some persistent localized networks of ex-combatants. These networks often continue to exist for economic reasons as ex-combatant groups engage in a variety of legal and illegal activities. The involvement of these groups in illegal economic activities and other criminal behavior is a particular concern, which UNMIL is addressing jointly with the government, UN agencies, and various international partners. The second challenge is unemployment, or, more broadly, the lack of livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants as well as for the general population. Ex-combatants have received training, counseling, and career advice, but livelihood opportunities are scarce in a postwar economy, with a very precarious employment situation (85 percent do not earn enough to lift themselves and their families over the one-dollar-a-day poverty line, according to a 2009 International Labour Organization [ILO] study (1)). Faced with a lack of livelihood opportunities, ex-combatants and other high-risk youths sometimes resort to illegal means of income generation, contributing to insecurity and hampering their community reintegration. When a 2008 US Institute for Peace study asked Liberian ex-combatants if they would fight again, two-thirds responded with a categorical "no." The remaining one-third cited poverty and lack of economic opportunity as the main reasons that could make them go back to war. Interestingly, women ex-combatants appeared more ready to fight again for economic reasons than men. Unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities are therefore considered serious security concerns. Since 2003, an array of efforts have been undertaken to reintegrate ex-combatants in Liberia, from classic disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) to strategic monitoring and community-based interventions that aim at promoting alternative livelihoods. This article is considering what those efforts have achieved and what was not achievable, explain why it is time to end targeted assistance to ex-combatants in Liberia, and propose the next steps to be taken. The DDRR Program in Liberia, 2003-2009 An important milestone in UNMIL's mandate occurred on 21 July 2009: the completion of the reintegration component of the official DDRR program, nearly six years after it began. Following a faltering start in December 2003, the disarmament and demobilization component resumed on 15 April 2004, and when it ended on 4 November 2004, over 101,000 persons had been disarmed and demobilized. This number greatly exceeded the initial estimates of 35,000-38,000 ex-combatants, a projection based on the ascribed strength of the warring factions. The jump in the number of DDRR beneficiaries was partly due to a lowering of entrance criteria, namely the amount of weapons to be handed over in order to be eligible for demobilization and reintegration assistance. The relaxing of entrance criteria boosted the number of DDRR beneficiaries, posing a challenge to the planning and implementation of the program. …

Mediation, Political Engagement, and Peacebuilding

Abstract: This article argues that mediation and political engagement by third parties can contribute to peacebuilding by strengthening the political processes in countries exiting civil conflict. Third-party engagement can create the political space within which long-term reconstruction, development, and reconciliation issues can be discussed among national actors. Given that peace agreements are frequently mere cease-fires representing short-term deals among elites, mediation and political engagement can assist the transformation of these deals into long-term commitments and inclusive national politics. Specifically, mediation can contribute to peacebuilding in three ways. First, mediators contribute to peacebuilding by working toward peace agreements that serve as frameworks for the opening up of the political process as opposed to agreements that Jock in detailed, long-term governance models and concentrate power in the hands of the wartime elites. Second, in the period immediately following the signing of peace agreements, mediation helps parties adhere to the agreements and settle any remaining issues. Third, mediation contributes to making transitional governments workable and, as much as possible, ensures that they gradually lead to more inclusive political processes. Keywords: mediation, peacebuilding, peace agreement, transitional governments, political process. ********** MEDIATION IS OFTEN SEEN BY BOTH PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMICS AS A tool relevant to the brokering of peace agreements, but not as relevant to the long-term tasks of implementing agreements and building sustainable peace. There are indeed important differences in the priorities of peacemakers and peacebuilders. Peacebuilding addresses the deep social and political problems facing war-torn countries and requires complex policies and lengthy debates. It includes a range of long-term processes that aim at improving public security and services, building trust among elites and social groups, and constructing legitimate institutions. It therefore goes beyond the cessation of hostilities and requires more than short-term elite deals. Mediation processes, on the other hand, are often, although not always, short lived and aim first and foremost to end the conflict. These processes cannot be expected to shape societies for the long-term, especially when mediators rely on wartime leaders to craft agreements and steer transitional processes forward. However, the division between peacebuilding (implementation) and peacemaking (mediation) is, at least partly, artificial. If we define mediation loosely as political engagement by a third party aiming to assist the resolution of political disputes among parties to a conflict, then we can easily see it is an activity directly relevant to peacebuilding. Fierce political disputes persist after the signing of agreements and peacebuilders routinely use the tool of mediation to assist their resolution. We can especially see mediation as directly relevant to peacebuilding if we define peacebuilding as an essentially political endeavor and if we understand peace agreements as one of several landmarks in a long political process. Mediation's key contribution to long-term peacebuilding is to strengthen the political processes in countries exiting civil conflict. It aims to create the political space within which long-term reconstruction, development, and reconciliation issues can be discussed among national actors. Given that the ultimate aim of peacebuilders is to assist societies to resolve disputes through the political process as opposed to violence, third-party mediation and political engagement form a key peacebuilding tool. By encouraging dialogue among all relevant parties, mediation and political engagement by third parties enable the political process in postconflict countries to tackle long-term issues. Given the importance of robust and progressively inclusive political processes for successful peacebuilding, mediation is a key instrument in the peacebuilder's toolbox. …

Framing Bioinvasion: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Security, Trade, and Global Governance

Abstract: This article introduces the complexities of framing the policy debate over invasive alien species or, more generally, bioinvasion. It suggests that there are six principal framing conceptualizations that have emerged or are gaining steam and credence: biodiversity and conservation; climate change and globalization; human security; “natural national security”; market failure; and the commons and global governance. Although the biodiversity approach dominates the international discourse at present, it presents a partial and hence distorting picture. Over time, as the problem of bioinvasion compounds, the inadequacy of the biodiversity frame will become generally apparent and so the other framings will gain in currency. Ultimately, bioinvasion must be viewed as a policy challenge for global environmental governance and justice. The author concludes by raising the limited possibility of developing an International Convention on Invasive Alien Species.

Addressing the Perils of Peace Operations: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System

Abstract: OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES, WE HAVE SEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS made in international conflict management, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The end of the Cold War has led to the obsolescence of war between major powers, and globalization has increased the interconnectedness and interdependence among people, societies, and countries. However, the longevity and large-scale nature of armed conflicts in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Chad, and Sudan with enormous humanitarian consequences are solemn reminders that international institutions and peacekeeping actions are still unable to meet global challenges with global responses. A rethinking of the role of peacekeeping as an instrument of global crisis response could help to strengthen global governance in peace and security. The call for a global system in peacekeeping has been voiced by the 2009 UN report "A New Partnership Agenda" (New Horizon Report). It argues that international peacekeeping "needs a global system to match the global enterprise it has become." (1) In my view, for such a system to be effective, it needs to rely more so on the broadening partnerships of the UN with various regional organizations while increasing the interface between peacekeeping and peace-building at the same time. In view of the lack of strategic consensus by the Security Council permanent members, such a system cannot be created top down, but rather it needs to be built on peacekeeping practices, norms, and interdependent relations of states and institutions. This essay will briefly look at the important progress that peacekeeping has made over the past twenty years and then explore, in view of a continuous North-South divide and a resurging Westphalian bias, what such a global peacekeeping system could look like. Peacekeeping Evolution and Transformation Following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping became a necessary and ubiquitous tool for conflict management. The demand for peacekeeping has increased significantly since the early 1990s and analysts credit international mediation, crisis management, and peacekeeping for the up to 80 percent decline in total armed conflicts. (2) Peacekeeping underwent important transformations, driven partly by mission failures, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, partly by policy prescriptions of the Brahimi Report that was crafted as a response to these failures. Also, the dark side of globalization transformed the nature of peacekeeping: it facilitated cross-border criminal violence that has fueled shadow economies with the presence of illicit arms and dangerous materials, valuable natural resources, and the trafficking of humans. These "remnants of war" pose a formidable challenge to peacekeeping as they are transnational, often linked to local stakeholders, and nonmilitary in nature. (3) Over the past twenty years, regional organizations have become real players in crisis management, including peacekeeping action. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have developed their own peacekeeping capabilities. A recent report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations (the Prodi Report) looks particularly at the emerging strategic relationship between the UN and the AU. (4) Most peace missions are today carried out as a partnership between two or more institutions. For instance, in 2007, forty of fifty-four peace missions involved some interinstitutional arrangement. (5) Moreover, the transformation of peacekeeping over the past decade has been characterized by an increasing emphasis on the civilian dimension. On the one hand, with civilians becoming deliberate targets or indirect victims of armed violence, the protection of civilians has become an integral, albeit not very effective part of peacekeeping missions. …

Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms

Abstract: To what extent does empirical evidence confirm or question the value of conflict early warning and response for effective practice by regional or ganizations? This article presents a brief overview of existing key EWR mechanisms and analyzes if, and under what conditions, these mecha nisms might be a useful peace and security promotion tool for regional organizations. It looks at three regional and subregional organizations— the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States/Eco nomic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in West Africa, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa that have established such conflict EWR mechanisms. Until now, these tools have not been adequately implemented or fully used. The principal reason for this is not a lack of sufficient EWR data. Instead, re gional organizations often fail to respond in time to prevent an emerg ing violent conflict because of weaknesses of the organization and political disagreements within the organization. KEYWORDS : early warning and response, regional organizations, African Union, Economic Commu nity of West African States, Inter-governmental Authority on Develop ment, peacebuilding. AMONG THE MANY ASPECTS IN THE DEBATE ON BROADER CONCEPTS OF global governance, two largely unrelated desires can be identified: First, re gional organizations are increasingly requested to provide security by engag ing in the prevention of violent conflict and in peacebuilding. 1 Second, since the mid-1990s, conflict early warning and response (EWR) has been con ceived as a means of preventing violent conflict in order to protect people’s lives. 2 Partly on the insistence by and with the assistance of donor organiza tions,someregionalorganizations,especiallyinAfrica,arenowbeginningto use EWR as a peace and security instrument to prevent crises .This comes at atimewhenthemethodologiesofEWRhaveimproved.Afteradecadeanda half of experience, we raise the question in this article whether both of these trends—to implement EWR and for regional organizations to use this tool to prevent conflict—have improved the security of the people. Our research questionsarethefollowing:

The " Monster that we need to Slay"?: Global Governance, the United States, and the International Criminal Court

Abstract: The International Criminal Court is a new mechanism for the global governance of human rights that enjoys broad support from a large number of states. The United States expressed its hostile opposition especially in the early years, claiming that the ICC was harmful to US national interests. This attitude toward the court changed over the years, and a more pragmatic approach toward the ICC is now discernible. The United States had to acknowledge that actions taken in opposition to the ICC began to be harmful to its own national interests and it also realized the national interest utility the court has despite the deep-seated opposition to the concept of supranational sovereignty. This article looks at the reasons for opposition by the United States, its initial hostile position, and changes in the US approach toward the ICC.

Toward a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to Implementation

Abstract: ON 23 JULY 2009, THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENED TO consider the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). What ensued was perhaps one of the liveliest debates that member states had ever seen. For supporters of R2P, however, the debate proved a disappointment as detractors had the opportunity to air familiar grievances and attempt to roll back the delicate consensus reached at the 2005 World Summit.1 Instead of moving the debate forward, the 2009 session ended with the adoption of a rather hollow resolution, which simply stated the Assembly’s intention to continue its consideration of R2P.2 This essay will analyze the General Assembly’s deliberations against the backdrop of three recent works on R2P, each of which constitute significant benchmarks in the ongoing efforts to realize the responsibility to protect. The first, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and for All, by Gareth Evans, provides a compelling account of how to fulfill the promise of R2P from the perspective of someone who has been involved in the R2P process since its inception. The second piece, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, by Alex Bellamy, a leading academic in the field, offers a slightly different understanding of how to carry R2P forward. The final piece, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect—the immediate catalyst for the 2009 General Assembly session—sets out the secretary-general’s vision for translating the responsibility to protect from words into deeds. I will begin this essay by reviewing Gareth Evans’s and Alex Bellamy’s advocacy of the responsibility to protect and then broaden the discussion to consider the issue of R2P misapplication, which has been a key challenge for advocates. I will then assess the efforts of Ban Ki-moon to refocus the debate

The John W. Holmes Lecture: Reinvigorating the International Civil Service

Abstract: "PEOPLE MATTER" IS A CENTRAL CONCLUSION FROM THE UNITED NATIONS Intellectual History Project and the penultimate sentence of the first of seventeen published volumes. (1) Yet critical contributions by individuals who work at the world organization are usually overlooked or downplayed by analysts who stress the politics of 192 member states and the supposedly ironclad constraints placed by them on international secretariats. However, I have devoted considerable professional energy to international administration, both as an analyst and as a civil servant. (2) My proposition is straightforward: the United Nations should rediscover the idealistic roots of the international civil service, make room for creative idea-mongers, and mark out career development paths for a twenty-first century secretariat with greater turnover and younger and more mobile staff. This essay explores the origins of the concept, problems, the logic of reform, and specific improvements. Examples come from the UN's three main areas of activity--peace and security, human rights, and sustainable development. (3) Overwhelming Bureaucracy and Underwhelming Leadership: The "Second UN" If the conceptual UN is unitary, the real organization consists of three linked pieces. The "Second UN" consists of heads of secretariats and staff members who are paid from assessed and voluntary budgets. Inis Claude long ago distinguished it from the arena for state decisionmaking, the "First UN" of member states. The "Third UN" of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), experts, commissions, and academics is a more recent addition to analytical perspectives that first appeared in these pages. (4) The possibility of independently recruited professionals with allegiance to the welfare of the planet, not to their home countries, remains a lofty but contested objective. During World War II, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored conferences to learn from the "great experiment" of the League of Nations (5). One essential item of its legacy, the international civil service, was purposefully included as UN Charter Article 101, calling for "securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity." (6) The Second UN's most visible champion was Dag Hammarskjold, whose speech at Oxford in May 1961, shortly before his calamitous death, spelled out the importance of an autonomous and first-rate staff. He asserted that any erosion or abandonment of "the international civil service ... might, if accepted by the Member nations, well prove to be the Munich of international cooperation." (7) His clarion call did not ignore the reality that the international civil service exists to carry out decisions by member states. But Hammarskjold fervently believed that UN officials could and should pledge allegiance to a larger collective good symbolized by the organization's light-blue-covered laissez-passer rather than the narrowly perceived national interests of the countries that issue national passports in different colors. Setting aside senior UN positions for officials approved by their home countries belies that integrity. Governments seek to ensure that their interests are defended inside secretariats, and many have even relied on officials for intelligence. From the outset, for example, the Security Council's five permanent members have reserved the right to "nominate" (essentially select) nationals to fill the key posts in the secretary-general's cabinet. The influx in the 1950s and 1960s of former colonies as new member states led them to clamor for "their" quota or fair share of the patronage opportunities, following the bad example set by major powers and other member states. The result was downplaying competence and exaggerating national origins as the main criterion for recruitment and promotion. Over the years, efforts to improve gender balance have resulted in other types of claims, as has the age profile of secretariats. …