Showing papers in "Hague Journal on The Rule of Law in 2021"

Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action

Abstract: To reinstate what amounts to a “Soviet-style justice system”, Polish authorities have repeatedly and deliberately violated the Polish Constitution and EU law. Rather than comprehensively detailing these repeated violations, this article focuses on the EU dimension of Poland’s rule of law breakdown. Using the activation of the Rule of Law Framework by the European Commission on 13 January 2016 as a starting point, this article offers a critical five-year assessment of EU’s (in)action starting with an overview of the extent to which virtually all of the multiple problematical issues identified early on by the Commission have yet to be addressed by Polish authorities by January 2021. Regarding the Commission and the Council’s (in)action, this article argues that the Commission has systematically acted in a too little too late fashion while the Council has systematically failed to meaningfully act, with the inaction of these two EU institutions amounting, at times, to dereliction of duties. By contrast, the Court of Justice has forcefully defended judicial independence whenever an infringement case was lodged with it by the Commission. The Court of Justice’s record in preliminary ruling cases is more mixed due, in part, to the Court’s apprehension to undermine the principle of mutual trust. The article ends with a list of key lessons and recommendations which reflect the EU’s few successes and many failures highlighted in this article. It is submitted inter alia that more statements, dialogue and reports are not going to help contain, let alone solve Poland’s rule of law crisis. It is indeed no longer a crisis the EU is facing but a total breakdown in the rule of law in Poland which, in turn, represents a threat to the interconnected legal order that underpins the EU.

The EU Rule of Law Initiative Towards the Western Balkans

Abstract: The EU adopted a new enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans countries in 2018, provided a time frame for Serbia and Montenegro potentially to join the Union by 2025, and outlined the next steps for accession for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. In March 2020, the EU gave the green light to the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, and also introduced a new reformed ‘accession talks’ framework. The strengthening of the rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime are the cornerstones of the EU-Western Balkans strategy of 2018 and the new accession talks framework of 2020. This article examines the latest enlargement policy developments in 2018–2020 by conceptualising how the EU promotes the rule of law in the Western Balkans thorough its new enlargement policy package. Furthermore, the article offers an in-depth analysis of the case of Albania, where the EU has experimented with some of its latest enlargement-policy ideas in regard to the rule of law. The article also offers some proposals and insights on how the EU rule of law initiative of 2018 can be improved, in order to become more transformative in strengthening the rule of law in countries of the Western Balkans.

The Rule of Law Conditionality Under Regulation No 2092/2020—Is it all About the Money?

Abstract: Some say that the Union is built by moving from crisis to crisis. Crises in the last decade which affected the Union and its citizens concerned, inter alia, public finance (the financial crisis, 2008), migration (2014), public health (the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020) and the rule of law crisis (2018). This paper focus on the latter. It has been noted that some Member States have been happy to receive the benefits of EU membership, specifically the financial ones, while their commitment to European values, including the rule of law (Article 2 TEU), has been lacking. Since many instruments applied by EU institutions to improve this situation have proved rather insufficient, halting transfers of EU funds to these recalcitrant Member States has been touted as the way that might solve this crisis. Accordingly, a draft regulation was put on the table that authorised the EU institutions to suspend EU funds if a Member State is found to be in breach of the rule of law. This draft aimed to make the transfer of EU funds to the Member States conditional upon their continuous respect for the rule of law (and therefore became known as ‘the rule of law conditionality’). This paper comments on this draft as first proposed by the Commission in 2018 (Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union budget in the event of generalized gaps in the rule of law in the Member States [COM (2018) 324 final).], amended in 2019 by the European Parliament [European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States (COM(2018)0324–C8-0178/2018–2018/0136(COD)); https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/seance_pleniere/textes_adoptes/provisoire/2019/04-04/0349/P8_TA-PROV(2019)0349_EN.pdf . A draft version of these provisions was presented in von Bogdandy and Łacny (Suspension of EU funds for breaching the rule of law - µ a dose of tough love needed? European Policy Analysis 2020, No 2, p. 1–15, https://sieps.se/en/publications/2020/suspension-of-eu-funds/ , 2020).], and finally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council as Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [Hungary and Poland voted against it and it is expected that its validity will be challenged before the CJEU via an action for annulment (Article 263 TFEU).] (henceforth called ‘Regulation 2020/2092′). This Regulation, containing 29 recitals in the preamble and 10 articles, entered into force on 1 January 2021 (Article 10 Regulation 2020/2092.). In the conclusions of the European Council meeting in December 2020 it was however accepted that it will be applied only in relation to budgetary commitments starting under the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027, including Next Generation EU [Conclusions of the European Council meeting, 10 and 11 December 2020, para I (2) (k) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47296/1011-12-20-euco-conclusions-en.pdf .]. This paper provides the legal characteristics of rule of law conditionality established under Regulation 2020/2092 and aims to determine whether financial incentives can restore compliance with the rule of law in Member States. Or in other words, is it all about the money?

Achmea versus the Rule of Law: CJEU’s Dogmatic Dismissal of Investors’ Rights in Backsliding Member States of the European Union

Abstract: We demonstrate that the CJEU’s Achmea judgment has resulted in significantly more damage beyond the termination of intra-EU BITs. It made the application of EU law difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it has opened the floodgate to deficient judicial protection in the face of structural backsliding of the rule of law in some EU Member States. While the motives of the CJEU and by extension the European Commission to safeguard their ultimate control over the internal market by exclusively relying on the preliminary ruling system of integrated European judiciary may be understandable, they cannot serve as a credible justification for the long-term consequences of disempowering investors in the name of an ideological stance regarding EU judiciary, which cannot work in the backsliding Member States, where the ‘integration of the EU’s judiciary’ could stand for the absence of independent adjudication. Consequently, the Achmea judgment and post-Achmea developments such as the recently signed Termination Agreement to terminate the intra-EU BITs have been leading to significant—possibly irreparable in the short- to medium-term—lowering of the procedural and substantive protection standards for European investors in times when they are in need of more rather than less protection.

Deepening Democracy? Promises and challenges of Chile’s Road to a New Constitution

Abstract: As a response to mass mobilizations against the political and social status quo, a multiparty agreement activated a process to replace the constitution in Chile, three decades after the country’s transition to democracy. I argue that this process has three features that are not only desirable on normative grounds but also shared by successful episodes of constitutional replacement in democratic regimes: the drafting of the new text in an assembly bound by preexisting rules, inclusive mechanisms of representation and decision making, and direct citizen involvement. These features, in interaction with the popular repudiation of the elite-biased institutions inherited from the Pinochet era, might lead to a new constitutional arrangement that deepens democratization by expanding citizen rights, strengthening executive constraints, and removing restrictions on majority rule. Yet the realization of the full democratic potential of this constitutional change depends on the still uncertain ability of constitution makers to compromise on a text that is not only seen as legitimate among ordinary citizens but also promotes coherent goals, effective institutions, and good governance.

Reconstructing Legitimacy After Crisis: The Chilean Path to a New Constitution

Abstract: Social movements have contested the elitist character of Chilean political institutions in the streets for the past two decades. Citizens have distanced themselves from conventional participation, and turnout rates dropped dramatically. Protesting against unequal treatment and demanding “dignity,” the social uprising in 2019 in Chile consisted of massive protests marked by large-scale demonstrations and violent riots alike. Lasting many weeks, the protest-driven crisis opened up the opportunity for a constitutional change. Political elites agreed on a referendum on a new constitution to channel heterogeneous demands put forward by leaderless and inorganic protests and demonstrations. This critical juncture brought about by the social uprising set in motion institutional change that, confirming theoretical expectations, entirely departs from the status quo. Furthermore, amidst a profound representation crisis, social organizations pushed for reforms in the electoral system to select conventional delegates to restore confidence and legitimacy in representative institutions. Based on evidence that diversity in elective bodies boosts perceptions of legitimacy, proposals included gender parity in both nominations and results, the possibility for independent candidates to run in lists, and reserved seats for indigenous peoples. The result was a constitutional assembly with 50% of women, delegates from ten indigenous peoples, and many independent candidates elected. Time will tell if this constitutional assembly manages to rebuild Chileans’ trust in politics.

Rule of Law and Political Representation

Abstract: How do the rule of law and political representation relate to each other? I answer this question, hitherto neglected by rule-of-law scholars, taking my cue from Joseph Raz’s revision of his conception of the rule of law and by relying on a distinction between preferences and interests, which pervades discussions of political representation. I argue that political representatives’ attention to their constituents’ preferences, and not just their interests, is a necessary feature of a conception of representation that expresses a robust allegiance to the rule of law. More specifically, that such allegiance is better honoured when representatives are responsive to preferences warranted by public interests. I offer two groups of rule-of-law reasons for that claim. First, because respect for preferences by representatives facilitates the conditions for the law to be obeyed. Second, respect for those preferences through the justification of the representatives’ collective decisions allows for accountability and for non-arbitrary creation and application of the law. I finish addressing a threefold objection to my reliance on preferences as objects that representatives should consider when making their decisions.

Winds of Change: Comparing the Early Phases of Constitutional Redrafting in Chile and Venezuela

Abstract: This article compares the early phases of the constitutional redrafting processes in Venezuela (1999) and currently in Chile (2021), seeking to identify key factors that help explain the radical constitutional-redrafting path that was followed in Venezuela, versus the more moderate, consensual and rule-bounded transformation underway in Chile. We pay particular attention to the presence of Hugo Chavez as leader of a populist project in Venezuela—an important factor absent in today’s Chile—whilst also taking into account a host of other important considerations that situate these countries’ diverse experiences in their respective socio-political contexts. These factors include the existence of unaddressed historical and social grievances leading to the reform; frustrated efforts at overhauling state institutions or the constitutional text; disparate institutional frameworks to channel reform demands, and different decisions made by the ruling political elites, among other considerations. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive and nuanced comparison that not only helps to understand each case better, but also to think critically about the complex reasons that lead to constitutional redrafting in troubled democracies, with a view to inform our debates on this topic beyond Chile and Venezuela.

Post-communist Chief Justices in Slovakia: From Transmission Belts to Semi-autonomous Actors?

Abstract: The aim of this article is to conceptualize the role of Central European (CE) chief justices and explore whether they have managed to become autonomous actors after the fall of communism. We do so by focusing on Slovakia, which was the first country in Central Europe that experienced a semi-authoritarian regime in the mid-1990s, adopted a Euro-model of the judicial council during the EU accession, and features a formally powerful Chief Justice. Based on the analysis of the turnover in Slovak Chief Justices since the 1990s, we argue that Slovak Chief Justices have not become fully autonomous actors, despite the Euro-model of the judicial council and EU membership, as Slovak politicians still consider the position of the Chief Justice strategically important and are willing and able to interfere with them. More specifically, selection of the Chief Justice has become an arena for political battle between external pressures from the politicians and oligarchs and internal sectoral interests from within the judiciary. So far, Slovak political leaders always managed to install their own Chief Justice informally, although they have been challenged by coalitions formed among representatives of the judiciary. This has had severe repercussions for the rule of law in Slovakia, especially during the era of Chief Justice Stefan Harabin. Beyond Slovakia, recent examples of ousting and dismissing chief justices in Hungary and Poland, even if sometimes blocked, show that also in other CE countries some political leaders consider chief justices an important element of their strategy to contain the judiciary and to rule by law. In order to understand this wide-scale problem, we identify seven factors that affect the role of the Chief Justice in the post-communist Europe. This set of factors should encourage others to study Chief Justices from comparative perspective.

Chile’s ‘Procedurally Regulated’ Constitution-Making Process

Abstract: After tracing the social, intellectual, and political origins of Chile’s demand for a new Constitution (which started in circumscribed circles as early as the late 1990s, but got momentum towards the end of the 2000s), this article describes the semi-sovereign democracy established by the Constitution of 1980, a feature designed by its framers to prevent the dismantling of the particularly radical version of neoliberal economics left in place by the military regime. Then, the piece analyses how the Constitutional Court’s conservative jurisprudence contributed to make clear to most Chileans the link between an increasingly unpopular economic model and the constitutional status quo, something which, in turn, led President Bachelet to attempt to introduce a new charter in her second administration (an effort which failed due to the refusal of the conservative parties to replace a fundamental law that was, in fact, largely biased towards their political and economic ideas). The second half of the article is devoted to analyse the way in which the social uprising of October–December 2019 transformed the old demand for a new Constitution into a critically important institutional way to channel what at the time seemed to be a potentially catastrophic social and political crisis. Noting the—rather impressive—capacity of the political party system to agree on the path towards a new charter, the article then argues that Chile’s highly regulated constitution-making process represents an instance of what Colon-Rios (2020) calls a ‘procedurally regulated’ one, that is, one where an existing constitution is amended to authorize its complete replacement according to the procedures it establishes, but leaving the constituent body leeway to autonomously decide on the content of the new charter. While in tension with traditional understandings of the exercise of the constituent power in cases of complete constitutional change, this feature of Chile’s ongoing constitution-making process represents a promising path to introduce a new Constitution in a manner that promotes the rule of law.

European Judicial Supervision of the Rule of Law: The Protection of the Independence of National Judges by the CJEU and the ECtHR

Abstract: While an independent judiciary is considered an indispensable component of the rule of law, attacks of the domestic political power on the independence of the judicial branch are observed today in several European States. The European judges (CJUE, ECtHR) appear to be the “last soldier standing” in the defense of judicial independence and they have in no case remained indifferent. This contribution contains an analysis of the dynamic approaches that the CJEU and the ECtHR have adopted in order to reinforce the guarantees of independence that domestic judges enjoy under European Law (EU and ECHR law). An emphasis is put on the international judicial function of these Courts as protective and promoting judicial independence at the national level, arguing that both Courts assumed their role as guarantors of the common European value of the rule of law through a proactive stance, without going, however, to the extremes. Furthermore, the paper provides an examination on the fact that the European Courts have adopted measures in order to assure the effectiveness of the European guarantees of judicial independence. A particular focus is put on the protection through interim measures as a means of assuring an effective protection of the independence of national judges. Considering a comparative analysis, the issue of the ECtHR’s potential in this regard is hereby tackled, notably after the recent evolution in the case-law of the CJEU.

How Political Narratives Affect the Self-Enforcing Nature of Interim Constitutions

Abstract: This essay seeks to contribute to the literature that asks how interim constitutions can become self-enforcing norms capable of producing a successful constitution-making process. It uses the Chilean constitution-making process as an example to theorize on how the political narratives associated with the November 2019 Agreement, which sets the framework for constitutional change, can influence its self-enforcing capacity. The authors identify and reconstruct the two prevailing normative theories underlying the Chilean constitution-making process: the evolutive and the revolutionary narratives. These present themselves in both radical and moderate versions. While evolutive ideas emphasize institutional continuity, consensus-building, and an incrementalist approach to constitutional change, revolutionary arguments rely on the constituent power theory and push for a profound social transformation that can break with the past. Even though these narratives are in tension with each other in many respects, they have both influenced the design of the rules of the constitution-making process. The authors claim that the self-enforcing capacity of the interim constitution partly depends on whether, and to what extent, the moderate versions of these narratives succeed or prevail in the political discourse.