Showing papers in "International Journal in 2012"

The Arab Spring: Opportunities and Implications

Abstract: The so-called Arab Spring is one of the most significant sets of events in the Arab Middle East since the end of World War Two. It is likely to unfold over several more years and feature significant realignments within and among all of the countries of the region. It will also dramatically affect relations between regional countries and extra-regional powers with interests in the Middle East.At the outset, any article that seeks to understand the situation and what it may mean must begin with recognition of the fact that the "experts" all missed the Arab Spring. Thus, explanations of why this happened and prognostications on where it might be going must be undertaken with humility. As with other momentous events, such as the end of the Cold War, experts failed to anticipate when and how the Arab Spring might happen, even though they knew something was fundamentally rotten with most regional regimes. Why was it such a surprise? To some extent, the problem has to do with the very nature of experts and of "expertise." By definition, experts become deeply steeped in the nuances and intricacies of the present order. They become very good at seeing the trees but often lose sight of the forest, and particularly those events that may cause the forest to be suddenly cut down. Rapid, paradigm-shifting events are rare and one can generally, and especially if one is an expert, come up with a myriad of good reasons why they are not likely to happen at any given moment. Such expert prognostications are generally correct, but when they are not, the experts are caught flat-footed.1As one interviewee suggested, one could liken the western analysis of what has happened in the region to at least some aspects of the financial crisis. Subprime mortgages were not sustainable over the longer term; everyone knew this. But in the immediate and year-to-year term, it was in no one's interest to stop or correct the situation or even to allow information to flow to investors who might alert them to the dangers they faced. In the Middle East and north Africa, one saw much the same situation. The model of governance was going to fail at some point. The drivers were not a surprise: these have been well known for some time. Everyone has known that the combination of authoritarian regimes, the rhetoric of democracy, and a high number of relatively educated but unemployed and powerless youth is a recipe for trouble. What surprised everyone, as in the financial crisis, was the trigger for the events, the rapidity of developments, and the connections between events in one country and those in others.It was generally acknowledged by interviewees that the Arab Spring has launched a set of changes in motion that will fundamentally alter the region's course. But it is also true that one needs to take a cautious approach to predicting where this will go. There have been uprisings in the region in the past that have, at least as yet, come to little or nothing in terms of stimulating long-term systemic change. Lebanon in 2005 and Tehran in 2009 are examples. Moreover, we do not as yet know where the countries that have experienced recent change will go. In both Egypt and Tunisia, we have seen changes of the top echelons of the governing regimes, but we have not yet seen fundamental regime change in the sense of the sweeping away of the wider elites and the systems of government and economic control that they have created. Only in Libya does this seem to have happened - at least thus far. Syria remains very much in play. Just as we missed the Arab Spring, so too we must recognize that no one really knows where it is going.This article will explore three main questions: what is happening and why; who the main players are and what they want; and what the implications are for the west.WHAT IS HAPPENING AND WHY?My interviewees attempted to identify the countries that are most at risk of rapid destabilization and the reasons for this. …

Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Values, and Mechanisms

Abstract: The expansion and the new directions of Turkish foreign policy over the last decade have generated a lively debate in domestic and foreign policy circles, among diplomats, analysts, academics, journalists, and businesspeople, and in civil society. The debate revolves around the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy agenda against the backdrop of major shifts in regional and global power structures. Various questions, some well informed and others rather rhetorical, are posed to assess Turkey's standing in global politics.Are Turkey's recent engagements in multiple regions a new phenomenon generated and sustained by the ruling Justice and Development party's (AKP's) domestic agenda? Is Turkey's newfound interest in the Middle East and the larger Muslim world a result of the "Islamization" of Turkey, as some critics claim? Has Turkey given up on the European Union and thus its traditional alliance with the west? Also, has Turkey found a balance between "actor" and "structure," i.e., does the current foreign policy amount to more than the individual, self-proclaimed initiatives of successive AKP governments? Finally, is Turkey a model for the Arab world? These questions require a proper analysis of the major changes that have taken place in Turkey's own domestic scene, its surrounding regions, and the global order in the first decade of the 2ist century. In an age of increasing interdependence, local and global dynamics affect each other and bring about new synergies. Turkey's adjustment to the post-Cold War world and the challenges of globalization has taken various forms, ranging from a heightened sense of insecurity and new types of nationalism to embracing globalization and exploring new diplomatic and economic tools. While Europe and the US generally treated Turkey as a military ally under NATO during much of the Cold War, the new realities of volatile globalization and multiple modernities have both enabled and forced Turkey to reinvent itself as a new political, economic, and diplomatic power.1 In addition to pursuing EU membership as a strategic goal, even though not much progress has been made since 2005, Turkey has been diversifying its foreign policy agenda in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and engaging in multiple regional issues. Turkey is also rising as a soft power with a strong economy, a young population, and new cultural ties with the peoples of the Middle East and the Balkans.2To understand why and how Turkish foreign policy is transforming, I shall examine three interrelated issues. The first is the reasons behind the new dynamism in Turkey's foreign policy thinking and action. The elements that drive Turkey's new strategic thinking and modes of action need to be explained within the larger context of the new geostrategic environment in which Turkey has found itself in the 2ist century. The second is the overarching goals and principles of the new mindset that has propelled Turkey into new areas of expansion, engagement, risk-taking, and influence. These goals and principles display both change and continuity and shape Turkey's new ventures on a number of regional and global issues. The third is the instruments and mechanisms that Turkey employs in realizing its foreign policy goals. The successive AKP governments since 2002 have implemented a number of policies, including developing stronger bilateral relations, lifting visa requirements, establishing high strategic councils, and increasing Turkey's mediation efforts.My main argument is that while adjusting itself to the ever-changing dynamics of 21st-century globalization, Turkey operates from a broad foreign policy perspective that combines elements of constructivist and realist approaches to global politics and international relations. Turkey projects its sense of identity and history into its regional and global engagements, seeks to pursue a value-based and principled foreign policy, and responds to the hard realities of power struggles and national interest. …

Building on What's Already There: Valuing the Local in International Peacebuilding

Abstract: Twenty years have passed since the release of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's influential "An agenda for peace." The publication of this document coincided with a rapid expansion in United Nations -mandated complex humanitarian interventions, as well as with new efforts to apply postconflict peacebuilding as an operative framework for restoring peace and wellbeing to societies fractured by armed conflict. The present anniversary provides an opportunity not just for retrospective thinking about the impact of past international peacebuilding efforts, but also for prospective thinking about how the next 20 years might be more dynamic and sustainably effective.The advent of peacebuilding as an evolving practice supported by the United Nations has created new opportunities for coordinating constructive responses to protracted conflict. Given its aspiration to develop instrumentalities for addressing root causes of violence and establishing foundations for stable peace, peacebuilding represents a significant development in thinking about problems of human insecurity, and helps to shape collective intentionality in ways that support lasting solutions. Nonetheless, deficits and challenges in contemporary peace practices must be faced squarely if we are to define a new or renewed peacebuilding agenda for the decades ahead. Increased international capacity to mitigate organized violence and provide relief to suffering populations has not yet been matched with a corresponding ability to make peace stick or to avoid the dangers and pitfalls associated with large-scale external intervention in fragmented and frague societies. Activities undertaken in the name of peacebuilding have often marginalized local actors, proceeded in ways that did not adequately respond to local expectations and needs, and at times replaced one set of problems with another. In many cases, efforts to "transplant" peace through international peacebuilding efforts yield disappointing results - a temporary reduction in armed violence, but not a robust and deeply rooted process of reconstruction and social transformation.In light of these challenges, there is a need to acknowledge local agency and empowerment as one of the foremost challenges of contemporary peacebuilding practice. If a special commission were to rewrite "An agenda for peace" to incorporate lessons from the last 20 years of peacebuilding experience, its authors would be well advised to "localize peace" - that is, to partner with local actors to tap indigenous peace resources and energize context- specific peace processes - as a central goal of 21st century peacebuilding efforts.FROM GALTUNG TO BOUTROS-GHALI AND BEYONDPeacebuilding is a subject and activity that predates the work of the United Nations' sixth secretary-general, but that was nonetheless substantially influenced by his contributions. In its early uses, the term "peacebuilding" held currency almost exclusively among academic specialists in the enterprise known as peace research. Though the peace research tradition is seldom credited for its impact on Boutros Boutros-Ghali' s formulation, the intellectual fingerprints of peace scholars are readily apparent. An early usage of the term peacebuilding can be found in the writings of Johan Gaining, who conceptualized it as one of three approaches to peace, alongside peacekeeping and peacemaking. Like Boutros-Ghali, Galtung contrasts peacebuilding with both peacekeeping and peacemaking. He describes peacekeeping as a "dissociative" path to peace: "the antagonists are ktipt away from each other under mutual threats of considerable punishment if they transgress, particularly if they transgress into each other's territory."1 In contrast, Galtung designates peacemaking as "the conflict resolution approach" and peacebuilding as "the associative approach."2 Critical of traditional approaches to keeping the peace through threat and coercion, Galtung offers a qualified endorsement of the conflict resolution approach - provided it is not merely an effort to paper over deep inequalities and divisions - and presents a case for peacebuilding as a process of change that seeks to redress global as well as intra-national structural violence by building nonexploitative structures and infrastructures of peace. …

Turkey and the Arab Spring

Abstract: Turkey's neighbourhood has been volatile and is coming to shape the broader parameters of Turkey's foreign policy. While its location has offered opportunities and threats, especially during the Cold War, the recent drastic transformations in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood are again prompting major changes in its foreign policy priorities. In the last year or so, not only has the Arab Spring disrupted the long-established regional order in the Middle East and North Africa, but the hegemonic decline of the United States has presented Turkey with both opportunities and threats.In the newly unfolding global strategic environment, which Zbigniew Brzezinski has called "global turmoil," the most significant systemic trend has been the hegemonic decline that has created room for maneuver for other regional powers.1 Hegemonic decline allows a new order to develop in areas that were previously kept stable by the hegemon. Turkey's regional activism and the Arab Spring are occurring simultaneously in this broader geopolitical context. On the one hand, this hegemonic decline gives Turkey an unprecedented amount of freedom and autonomy in its regional bid for influence. On the other hand, the instability and ambiguity created by the popular uprisings in the Arab world have created challenges. In short, once again opportunities and threats coexist for Turkey. To meet these challenges, Turkey has come under pressure to revise its "zero problems with neighbours" policy. In this new era, with US hegemonic decline as the background, Turkey's struggle to sustain its activism remains at the fore.In this article, we analyze the new context of Turkey's foreign policy activism. We argue that despite Turkey's initial difficulties in coping with the transformations in its environment and its partial failure to realize its ambitions, it has been adapting its foreign policy to the new realities and is becoming an effective actor. Although ambiguities do exist, a role for Turkey as an influential regional power is within its grasp.THE ARAB SPRING2The greater Middle East, including North Africa, has long been a subject of interest, due to its chronic problems with repressive regimes, incomplete state structures, and institutionalized corruption. This grim state of affairs appeared to be the destiny of the Arab people, who were apparently living with a "learned helplessness" under authoritarian regimes. However, following the first spark in Tunisia, which toppled its regime, and in defiance of Orientalist accounts, Arabs began to believe that popular will could lead to change in their part of the world. What we have been witnessing, from Tunisia to Egypt and from Libya to Syria, is unprecedented in the sense that Arabs are now claiming their own destiny in a quest for dignity for the Arab individual.As Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu has argued, this is about the future of a region that has lagged historically behind the rest of the world.3 To a large extent, this was not the result of the Arabs' own will, but rather was the result of external factors. Following the First World War, Arab countries, including Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, were under the mandate of western powers. After the Second World War, they had to cope with decolonization while the rest of the world was experiencing waves of democratization. The following Cold War period was a seemingly stable era during which history was frozen in the Middle East and North Africa. While eastern Europe and east Asia started to democratize in the aftermath of the Cold War, the artificial - if not virtual - stability in the Arab world survived thanks to such concerns as oil, Israel's security, and the maintenance of the status quo based on pro-western monarchic rulers. Furthermore, in the last decade, the "war on terror" had the effect of strengthening authoritarian regimes in the region, which was coupled with the traditional setbacks of rentier states that were not accountable to the people. …

Typological Study of Traditional Mosque Ornamentation in Malaysia – Prospect of Traditional Ornament in Urban Mosque

Abstract: Since the admission of Islam onto the Malay World in 16 century, the Malay culture began to grow in line with the teachings of Islam as a guide of life. Mosque become a symbol of Muslim communities, as well as the cultural values that have been adapted represent the maturity and readiness of Malay Muslim in manifest a lifestyle tradition into the community. Refinement of ornament that used to take from Hindu-Buddhist beliefs before were adopted and refined to the Islamic values based on the teachings of al-Quran and as-Sunnah delivered a certain message to convey a meaning to the observer. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the typology and classification of ornaments in Malaysia’s traditional mosque as a channel to the community towards understanding of the identity and also the framework of design thinking in ornaments particularly to the urban mosques in Malaysia. Keywords—Aesthetic, Malay Traditional Mosque, Ornamentation, Symbolism

A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-11

Abstract: In a July 2011 wide-ranging interview with Madean's magazine, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, still glowing from his majority election victory, offered a stark confession. "Since becoming prime minister [in 2006]," he said, "the thing that's probably struck me most in terms of my previous expectations - I don't even know what my expectations were - is not just how important foreign affairs/foreign relations is, but in fact that it's become almost everything."1 Six weeks later, a report in the National Post revealed that the government planned to act on Harper's new understanding of the significance of world affairs: "Once considered an afterthought by a prime minister preoccupied with winning a majority," wrote Tobi Cohen, "international relations have moved to centre for the Conservatives, who have undertaken a quiet but sweeping re-examination of federal foreign policy."2This essay addresses two questions that should be central to Ottawa's review: first, what might have motivated the government's actions on the international stage between 2006 and2on? And, second, was this motivation consistent with Canadian national interests? To date, analysts have offered three answers to question one. The first two are consistent with the content of a debate over the possibility of a distinct Conservative foreign policy that was published in a volume of Canada Among Nations shortly after Harper's first election victory in 2006. Conservative partisans argued that there was indeed a distinctly Conservative approach to international relations - characterized by a combination of compassion, realism, engagement, focus, and global leadership. Opposing them were those who maintained that the strategic constraints imposed upon Ottawa both domestically and internationally limited the flexibility of any ruling party to effect significant change in foreign policy, no matter its partisan leanings. The only real difference that a new government could make was at the rhetorical level.3Both suggestions are profoundly conservative: neither anticipates, nor allows for, broad divergences from the authors' general understandings of Canada's foreign policy history. And while analysts from both camps might point to specific rhetoric and decisions from the last five years that support their interpretations, considering the activist nature of the Harper regime (not to mention the prime minister's comments in Maclean's), neither theory is ultimately satisfying. Kim Richard Nossal, a professor of political studies at Queen's University, has offered a more plausible assessment. To him, Canadian foreign policy between 2006 and 2011 was driven more by a partisan desire "to make the Conservatives the dominant political party in Canada," than it was by dear thinking about world affairs.11 But if the government of Stephen Harper's approach to international relations was designed primarily to erase any memory of Canada's allegedly Liberal (internationalist) past, why did Ottawa not reject the national security policy of 2004? Why did it not distance itself from the never-popular Afghanistan mission, or Paul Martin's efforts to increase the focus of Canada's development assistance program? Further examination will demonstrate that Nossal's explanation is yet more compelling if one defines Liberal foreign policy as the practices manifested most clearly during an exceptional period of Canadian conduct in world affairs, when the national diplomatic personality was shaped primarily by a single Liberal member of parliament - Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Conservative foreign policy between 2006 and 2OII might therefore be most effectively characterized as an effort to eradicate one individual's, as opposed to one party's, legacy.To determine whether such an approach to world affairs was consistent with Canada's national interests, an issue that has yet to be dealt with by scholarly analysts in significant detail, one must take into consideration what the Harper government's global outlook attempted to replace. …

Turkey-Russia Energy Relations: The Limits of Forging Cooperation through Economic Interdependence

Abstract: As 2OII drew to an end, Turkey took major steps in the ongoing race between rival pipeline projects that seek to supply natural gas to European markets. It first signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan for the construction of the Trans-Anatolia pipeline that will carry Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe through its territory and means an additional line for its imports from Azerbaijan. Though this unexpected development might thwart specific pipeline projects such as Nabucco, supported by European energy companies, overall, the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish project is likely to contribute to the southern corridor promoted by the EU as a way to bolster its energy security by building alternative natural gas pipelines from the Caspian basin. Only a few days later, Turkey, in an unexpected move, reached an agreement with Russia that will allow the construction of part of Gazprom's ambitious South Stream pipeline in Turkey's territorial waters in the Black Sea. South Stream aims to consolidate Gazprom's dominant position in the European markets and is seen as Gazprom's most lethal weapon to forestall competition from EU-backed projects - and is therefore a rival.In the iggos, in contrast, Turkey largely positioned itself against Russia, when arguably the new great game over the development and transportation of the Caspian basin and central Asian reserves was about to start. Having coordinated its energy policies with the east-west corridor supported by the western powers, Turkey took an active role in projects that aimed to bypass Russian-controlled transportation lines and bolster the economic and political independence of the new states in the region. The rivalry among various oil-and-gas pipelines advocated by the United States and EU on the one hand and Russia on the other continued throughout the last decade. Turkey remained committed to projects backed by western powers but increasingly developed a more cooperative relationship with Russia's rival projects; it also rendered itself dependent on Moscow for its soaring energy needs.The multifaceted energy relations between Turkey and Russia offer a crucial case to study the changing priorities of Turkish foreign policy and the limits of this transformation. Turkey has adopted cooperative policies based on positive-sum logic and downplayed competitive negative-sum calculations. With this new approach to international relations, Turkey seeks to use interdependencies forged through economic exchanges as a tool to dampen political disputes and induce positive transformation in the behaviour of its partners. The transformation of Turkish- Russian relations from adversity to managed competition and the current phase of multidimensional partnership owes a great deal to the economic interdependence imparted most crucially by energy cooperation. Turkey's pursuit of a more independent approach vis-a-vis the west and its forging of closer economic and political relations with its northern neighbour Russia are a testament to the success of its new foreign policy vision, which also values cooperation with its immediate neighbours. As this article will argue, Russia's failure to deliver on Turkey's expectations in both energy and neighbourhood issues exposes the limitations of this new approach. The return to competitive dynamics after the parties reached a historic grand bargain in energy cooperation in 2009 clearly reveals the boundaries of Turkey's positive-sum approach to energy cooperation with Russia.DYNAMICS OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN ENERGY RELATIONS: BETWEEN RIVALRY AND DEPENDENCEEnergy relations between Russia and Turkey exhibit interesting patterns, reflecting Turkey's various roles in energy markets. In recent years, Turkey's energy policies have been based on two interrelated roles as a consumer and as a transportation corridor aspirant. First, since it is a net importer of hydrocarbons, which form a disproportionally major share of its energy mix, Turkey is under constant pressure to ensure access to reliable energy sources at affordable costs. …

Agenda for Peace or Budget for War?: Evaluating the Economic Impact of International Intervention in Somalia

Abstract: In 1992 United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali drafted his landmark report, "An agenda for peace," which boldly reasserted the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and proposed a set of recommendations on how the UN could respond to new international security threats posed by secessionism, ethnic conflict, and civil war. The report envisioned a collective international effort aimed at reducing human suffering, upholding human rights, and resolving the underlying causes of violent conflict between and within states.The mandate was vast "An agenda for peace" conceptualized peacebuilding as large-scale, well-financed, long-term, internationally led interventions in conflict-affected states, which "may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting both formal and informal processes of political participation."1 Over the past two decades the international community has invested significant financial, military, and civilian resources into complex, multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives designed to rescue states from internal strife and political failure.However, as I show in the case of Somalia, these international interventions can sunder the very state they seek to resurrect. In a civil war, large-scale international interventions infuse enormous sums of money into the informal economy, making local security providers stronger and more financially independent of their domestic constituencies. In this way, the introduction of significant resources into the informal economy affects the relationship between warlords and their subjects, often increasing both the level of predation against the populace and the duration of conflict. International interventions also transform the informal economy so that spoiler activity becomes more lucrative than peacebuilding. By warping the informal economy, international interventions can therefore have devastating state-destroying effects by arresting domestic processes of state formation and perpetuating internal armed conflict.Faced with the serious regional and international security threats presented by failed states, the international community has invested hundreds of billions of dollars into complex, multidimensional nationbuilding initiatives designed to centralize political power and reconstruct domestic national institutions. Though well intentioned, I argue here that this sweeping agenda can actually inadvertently undermine the domestic processes of political order-making that occur naturally within failed states, thus increasing predatory violence and prolonging civil war.Somalia provides an excellent case study of how large-scale international intervention affects the informal economy and perpetuates state failure. After the state collapsed in 1991, Somalia fell into a brutal civil war and suffered a famine that sparked international outcry and prompted a multilateral international intervention. As the United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) arrived on the beaches of the capital city of Mogadishu, Somalia became the first practical test of Boutros-Ghali's agenda for peace. From 1992-95, the UN operation in Somalia evolved from a limited humanitarian assistance mission to a heavily politicized military intervention aimed at restoring peace and political stability to the country. UNOSOM failed in this expanded mission. As the last of the international forces withdrew from Somalia in 1995, the UN intervention left a legacy of criminality and warlord power that perpetuated the civil war for another decade.The international operation in Somalia was a multibillion dollar initiative. According to UN department of peacekeeping operations reports, the UN spent a total of $1. …

The Challenge of Burden-Sharing

Abstract: Historically associated with transatlantic discords about the Atlantic alliance, burden-sharing is a term that comes and goes on the policy agenda.1 Last year, Robert Gates made the headlines when he chastised most of his European counterparts for not shouldering enough of the burden in the NATO -led operation in Libya. Evoking the spectre of a "two-tiered alliance" made up of those "willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership... but don't want to share the risks and the costs," the outgoing US defence secretary warned, "[t]he blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US congress - and in the American body politic writ large - to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense."2 A few months earlier, Gates had made similar comments, this time about what he saw as the Europeans' over-eagerness to pull out of Afghanistan, where their troops make up less than a third of the total forces deployed. In a way, Gates had a point. In the last io years, the US's share of total NATO spending has indeed jumped from 50 percent to 75 percent, in no small part because of America's own formidable increase in military expenditures after 11 September 2001.Accusations of free-riding have marred transatlantic relations ever since the creation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949. Then as now, the rhetoric of burden- sharing has served as a useful rhetorical weapon to blame those who were seen as not contributing enough to the cause. Each time, however, Washington's call has fallen on deaf ears, at least in public. In private, European and Canadian officials highlight other contributions they think they are making to NATO operations, for example in the shape of development aid or considerable troop casualties in Afghanistan. They mention UN peacekeeping missions, such as in Lebanon, where the US is not involved. Cynics admit that they never really bought much into the military adventures into which the US threw them, and that the US itself did not seem to believe much in the Libya mission. The reality, French foreign minister Alain Juppe retorted to Gates, is that it is the Europeans who "think the Americans aren't doing enough."3The evolution of the transatlantic debate suggests two things. First, burden-sharing is about more than NATO. One cannot just look at defence spending at a time when humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation, and the fight against climate change can all be considered contributions of a sort to collective security.4 Disentangling what counts as a contribution to which public good is no easy thing. Second, burden-sharing is a contested political concept. Statesmen and diplomats do not speak the abstract language of public choice, with its "non-excludable" and "non-rival" goods. Rather, they talk about "being fair," "doing what you can," and "making a real contribution." In other words, they speak the normative language of justice rather than the utilitarian language of economics.Rather than attempting to prove who's right and who's wrong, our research agenda is to reconstruct the practical logic of the claims that bedevil global governance. Our starting point is that we have to understand the logic of burden- sharing a lot better before we start pointing fingers at other countries and congratulating our own. In our ongoing project, we look at how government elites construe the good of collective security, the different contribution strategies that they develop, and the domestic and international constraints and opportunities that they face in implementing such strategies. We address each of these issues in turn.WHAT IS GOOD?The first question that comes to mind is how to define "the good." In a broad sense, international security is assumed to be a collective good. …

Canada and the Americas: Making a Difference?

Abstract: Canada's minister of state for the Americas and consular affairs, Diane Ablonczy, opened the December 2011 ministerial dialogue on the Americas with the questions, "How is Canada doing in the Americas? How can we do better?"1 The contributions to this special issue of International Journal propose to frame some answers to these questions.The contributors to this issue assess the record of Canada's involvement in four areas of inter-American cooperation: democracy and human rights, security, trade and development, and the special case of Cuba. In each instance, the authors undertake a critical examination of Canada's engagement in the region since joining the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990 and, more particularly, following Canada's launch of the new strategy of engagement in 2007. They then put forward some ideas that may help strengthen the impact of Canadian foreign policy in a region that has undergone considerable changes over the last twenty years. The special issue closes with two comparative articles, one comparing Ottawa's Americas policy with that of the United States, the other analyzing that policy with reference to the general evolution of Canadian external relations.Our introduction is divided into three parts. The first recalls the context of Canada's interactions with the hemisphere since Ottawa "discovered" the Americas in 1990. The second part presents the seven contributions to this volume, emphasizing how they illuminate Canada's recent engagement in the region. Finally, we examine more closely the current environment of inter- American relations, particularly in terms ofthat environment's effect on Canada's influence on the inter-American agenda and, more generally, Canada's role in the hemisphere.THE AMERICAS IN CONTEXT SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WARUntil the end of the 1980s Canada's relations with the Americas essentially amounted to its partnership with the United States. Although Canadian businessmen and missionaries had travelled to Latin America and the Caribbean many decades before, diplomatic contacts started only during World War Two, and for a long time, relations with countries south of the Rio Grande remained sparse.Ottawa's decision to join the OAS in 1990 was a signal meant to assure Latin American and Caribbean countries that Canada, no longer satisfied with maintaining only commercial relations in the region, sought fullfledged membership in the hemispheric community. Given the limited size of the Americas constituency in Canada at the time, this decision was not the result of domestic pressure. Nor was it due to economic interests, as trade and investment with the region, except for the Canada-US relationship, were minimal. The decision was motivated primarily by what was happening in the region and the world during the latter half of the 1980s. Canada's trade environment was perceived to be increasingly threatening. Multilateral trade negotiations were becoming much more difficult, as illustrated by the slow progress of the Uruguay round, while world trade was felt to be progressively constrained by trade blocs. At the same time, the regional scene was changing rapidly, with democratic regimes replacing dictatorships all over Latin America and protectionist policies giving way to greater openness toward the world economy.2 It was thus easier to sell stronger involvement in hemispheric affairs to the Canadian public.After joining the OAS, Ottawa structured its strategy toward the Americas around three main objectives: promoting democracy, working toward economic prosperity, and increasing security. Some commentators have argued that this initial engagement was followed by "a long siesta until 2007."3 We believe, on the contrary, that for more than a decade Canadian diplomats actively pursued a well-focused strategy supporting the orientations established by the summits of the Americas and the multilateral organizations charged with implementing decisions made at the summits. …

The Domestic Context of New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Does Religion Matter?

Abstract: The novelty of Turkish foreign policy is currently on everybody's lips. With catchwords such as "soft power," "activism," or the assumption of a new "eastern orientation," media pundits and scholars alike discuss the transformation of Ankara's neighbourhood policy for which the minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, has coined the slogan of "zero-problem policy" with Turkey's neighbours. There is no doubt that in comparison with the rather hands-off approach toward the Middle East that was a core element of the foreign policies of Turkey's Kemalist political elite, under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan the country has made its immediate and more distant neighbourhood a field of foreign policy activism. To a certain extent, Davutoglu's slogan has turned the Kemalist perception of encirclement upside-down: for some time the ring of enemies was replaced by a circle of friends. That this approach to the Middle East is equally onesided, however, has been shown by the deteriorating relationship with Israel, the tension with Iran over the installation of NATO's early warning radar system, and the difficulties in dealing with the often puzzling realities of the "Arab spring." Apparently it is impossible to avoid problems with neighbours who have severe conflicts among themselves as well as with their own populations.In describing the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy, the scholarly debate refers to such diverse processes as the Europeanization, the Middle Easternization, or even the Arabization of Turkish politics.1 The cultural references of these labels suggest that we cannot understand foreign policies through the prisms of the realist tradition alone. To be sure, states, their power relations in the international system, and their respective national interests matter, but so do worldviews and ideas. To paraphrase Max Weber's famous statement, foreign policies are the expression of state interests, but ideas often play the switchman with regard to the way those interests are pursued.2 In this way, national interests, geopolitics, and ideas mesh in the making of foreign policy. Moreover, the ideas and interests of foreign policymakers are closely linked to factors of domestic politics. Foreign policy is not insulated from society but inseparably knitted into the often erratic relationship between state institutions, political elites, and people.3 Seen from that perspective, for instance, Erdogan's foreign policies have been closely linked to his parly's home constituencies and the political struggle against Turkey's Kemalist establishment, and in particular the powerful role that the armed forces have played in Turkish politics. Advocating soft power and zero problems in foreign relations, therefore, could also be interpreted as a strategy to reduce the military's influence on Turkish politics in both the domestic and international realms. International and domestic politics are essentially interdependent factors in the process of foreign policymaking, demanding a varied and multileveled approach for the analysis of foreign policy behaviour.Taking these theoretical insights as its point of departure, this article investigates the domestic context of Turkish foreign policy from a particular angle. In light of the suspicions of numerous observers that the Freedom and Justice party (AKP) government ultimately is driven by a religious agenda, I ask to what extent religion influences Turkey's new foreign policy behaviour. Should we understand the shifts in contemporary Turkish foreign policy as manifestations of Islamist ideology? Do religious ideas play the crucial switchman in the foreign policymaking of the AKP? I will argue that the foreign policies of the AKP to date have not really deviated from historical patterns of political decision-making in the Turkish republic. Various governments have used Islam as a symbolic resource and the AKP government's approach, similarly, is in line with this instrumental use of religion. …

The Difficult Integration of Muslims into Québec since 9/11: International or Local Dynamics?

Abstract: In countries of immigration it is often assumed, and sometimes quite clearly demonstrated, that the events of n September 2001 and their aftermath had a negative impact on ethnic relations, especially with regard to the perception and treatment of Muslims, who often represent a significant minority population, particularly in Europe. Most analysts agree, though, that these phenomena were not created by the post-9/11 wave of islamophobia, but thrived on the fertile ground of a problematic historical relationship with the Muslim world, which dates back to the Crusades and was nourished by colonialism.1Given Canada's commitment to permanent settlement and multiculturalism, the relatively low percentage of Muslims in its overall migratory flux, as well as a near absence of historical antagonistic relations with the Muslim world, one might expect a relatively low negative impact of post-9/11 Muslim relations in Canada. One could rightly argue that Canada is not immune to the indirect influence of orientalism and the colonial and post-colonial "casting of the other." Nevertheless, the absence of a legacy of unresolved contentious historical issues, such as the legacy of France and Algeria, is a significant advantage for Canada. Thus, one can wonder to what extent 9/11 had an impact on ethnic relations in Canada. Another interesting question is the complex interplay of internal and international dynamics in Canada. As the popular saying goes, "all politics is local," even when politics follows international trends.In this article I focus on the special case of Quebec, the only Frenchspeaking province of Canada, which also constitutes the main core of a "French-Canadian nation" recently recognized by the federal government. The Quebec case is interesting in many aspects. Quebec has the unique character of a "would-be" European nation in North America. In addition, competing conceptions of citizenship (i.e., communitarian and republican) mark Quebec more so than the rest of Canada. On the other hand, Quebec, the second largest immigrant-receiving province of Canada, is also representative of wider Canadian cultural dynamics, or at least, in a country as diverse as Canada, no less representative than are other provinces.This article is divided into three parts. I first discuss the Quebec case of immigration and ethnic relations in Canada as both a special case and a broadly applicable example. I then turn to an assessment of the integration of Muslims into Quebec since 2001, focussing on the main characteristics of Muslim immigrants, their perceptions by the host population, the challenges they face, especially in terms of economic integration, and the reactions of their elites and leaders. Finally, I reflect on the local, national, and international factors that made difficult the decade Muslims in Quebec experienced from 2001 to 2011.IS THE QUEBEC CASE SPECIAL?Quebec is known internationally for its cultural production and its perennial political debate over sovereignty, both of which are unique to the province. In matters of immigration and ethnic relations, though, especially from a European standpoint, Quebec's shared characteristics with the rest of Canada are obvious.2 Whether nationalists recognize it or not, Quebec is a settler's society built and constantly redefined by migratory waves, with the peculiarity that the first colonial power to hold it was usurped by another. In the 19th and 20th centuries, immigrants came mostly from Europe because, officially, "visible" minorities (i.e., non- European) were not encouraged to migrate. From the 1960s onwards, with the adoption of a less discriminatory federal immigration policy, this pattern slowly changed, and by the end of the 1970s, non-western immigrants dominated migratory fluxes.In the wake of the neo-nationalism movement of this period, Quebec society also became stronglyinterested in immigration, changingits discourse from la survivance (i. …

Canada and the Arctic Council

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONThe Arctic Council is a high-level, mainly intergovernmental forum for cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic states,1 indigenous groups, and interested parties of two issue areas, sustainable development in the Arctic and the protection and study of the frague Arctic ecosystem. The council is poorly understood and little advertised. And while it cannot enact binding legislation (except among the member states) or discuss issues of military security, these supposed "weaknesses" have actually helped to forge consensus in other important issue areas.Canada will assume the two-year rotating position of chair of the council after 15 May 2013, following Sweden's second ministerial meeting to be held in Kiruna, Sweden. The US will follow as chair in 2015. This paper seeks to outline the role of the Arctic Council and the role of its chair. This article also explores the products and outputs of the council and the perennial challenges it faces. Finally, it suggests the possible issue areas on which Canada and the US may wish to concentrate during their terms, focusing on the contribution Canada can make especially in the areas of human health and development as Canada shepherds the start of the second decade of Arctic Council business.THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: WHAT IS IT?The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by means of the Ottawa Declaration. The council's mandate broadened a pre-existing cooperative and environmentally-focused declaration on the protection of the Arctic environment signed in 1991. The Arctic environmental protection strategy,2 a Finnish initiative with considerable Canadian contribution,3 established four environmental working groups and a sustainable development task force. The eight Arctic states,4 observers, and Arctic indigenous groups sent experts to assist the working groups with their studies and projects. Recommendations and scientific reports were written on a range of Arctic environmental issues, including universal issues, such as the impact of pollution on fragile Arctic ecosystems and more focused studies on statespecific issues, such as the impacts of nuclear waste in Russia's Arctic.Canada advocated the transformation of the Arctic environmental protection strategy into an organization that would include the existing strategy working groups and their programs, but would also address a broader range of Arctic issues. Thus, the mandate of the Arctic Council includes "common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic..."5 Excluded, however, are "matters related to military security." In addition, and most significantly, Arctic indigenous groups were given privileged membership to ensure that their voices were included in discussions. As a result, the Arctic Council has various levels of membership - a practice developed in the Arctic environmental protection strategy. Those with voting privileges and the ability to determine policy and to make project-related decisions include the eight Arctic Member States - all of which were members of the Arctic environmental protection strategy.The indigenous groups are afforded the status of "permanent participants," a role more significant than usually afforded them at the UN and other multilateral meetings (Koivurova and Heinamaki 2006). While permanent participants do not have a vote, their status is meant to ensure their full consultation prior to the forming of decisions based on consensus. The six permanent participants are the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council, and the Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North. Arctic states and permanent participants may participate in all meetings and activities of the Arctic Council and may be represented by a head of delegation (referred to as the senior Arctic official) and such other representatives as each Arctic state and permanent participant deems necessary. …

Canada and the Inter-American Human Rights System: Time to Become a Full Player

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONWhen Canada became a Member of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990, most of Latin America was at a crossroad in a post-cold war transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies. The Canadian government played a fundamental role in the creation and development of the organization's unit for the promotion of democracy, as well as of other similar initiatives, in this period. This mark of leadership would have an important impact on the organization later on, including regarding the adoption of the 2001 Inter- American Democratic Charter, which attests to the importance of human rights for democracy and vice-versa. In fact, the promotion of democratic processes and the consolidation of democratic institutions, as well as the promotion and protection of human rights, are certainly among the OAS's most significant successes in the institution's recent history.1By joining the OAS,2 Canada also joined the inter-American human rights system. While Canada has certainly been an important ally of the system, it has often been criticized for its timid membership. This article will discuss Canada's policy towards the OAS human rights regime, touching upon the regime's successes and weaknesses. It will also try to contextualize the discussion in light of Canada's broader policy towards human rights and Latin America.THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMThe inter-American system of protection of human rights is generally considered to be composed of the norms and institutions created by the OAS to promote and protect human rights within the hemisphere. The main normative instruments dealing with human rights are the OAS charter, several human rights treaties, including the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as of other instruments, including the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.3The inter-American commission on human rights, composed of seven elected independent experts (commissioners), is the principal organ of the OAS charged with ensuring the protection of human rights in the hemisphere. It also serves as a consultative organ of the organization on this matter. It promotes human rights in the region, formulates recommendations to member states, observes human rights situations, including via in loco visits. It publishes reports on thematic issues or the human rights situation in a specific country, etc. In recent years, the commission's main activity has been to process petitions lodged against member states by individuals and groups alleging violations of inter- American human rights norms. (In order to do so, complainants must first exhaust domestic remedies nationally, or be unable to do so). The inter-American commission on human rights can refer cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and, in serious and urgent cases that may cause irreparable harm to persons, it can adopt precautionary measures. The commission reports annually to the OAS general assembly.The Inter- American Court of Human Rights, composed of seven elected independent judges, rules on contentious cases between the commission and member states regarding allegations of violations of the rights contained in the inter- American instruments that grant it jurisdiction to do so. To be subject to the court's jurisdiction, a state must first have ratified the convention and expressly recognized the jurisdiction of the court. The court can issue an order or judgment, which is binding for states as a matter of public international law. The court can also adopt advisory opinions regarding the interpretation of the convention, or any other instrument related to human rights in the Americas, at the request of the commission or any member state. The court can also be consulted by member states regarding the compatibility of one of its laws with the convention. In serious and urgent cases, the court can also adopt provisional measures. The court reports annually to the OAS general assembly. …

Transnational Advocacy Networks and Moral Commitment: The Free Tibet Campaign Meets the Chinese State

Abstract: The tale of transnational civil society, as told by a large and growing body of scholarly literature, is typically one of nonstate actors remaking world politics by upsetting conventional notions of power in the international system. Armed with little more than the strength of their convictions, global networks of activists, NGOs, scientists, and technical experts play the fon to unrestrained national interests, acting out of conscience for those issues that either fall beyond the boundaries of state concern or that states choose to ignore. Relying on persuasion and framing rather than disruption and protest, these "transnational advocacy networks" transform national interests by developing, diffusing, and monitoring compliance with norms.1Transnational advocacy networks not only champion norms, but are the very embodiment of them. According to Peter Katzenstein, "norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having 'constitutive effects' that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity."2 Understood this way, norms provide a principled basis for advocacy network formation, aiding in the creation of identities and preferences without which transnational advocacy becomes impossible to sustain. Thus, to the extent that the networks manage to sustain themselves and even influence national priorities, the normative commitments underpinning their formation and mobilization are treated as fairly static. Indeed, as continuous, concerted collective action across international boundaries - and in the face of the overwhelming material advantages of states - demands unwavering devotion to shared principles and goals, an assumption of moral incorruptibility lies at the very heart of the conventional definition of transnational advocacy networks.While the cornerstone of the literature on transnational networks is that they socialize states to certain norms of behaviour and not the other way around, this article outlines an alternative causal process in which the moral commitments of advocacy networks are reshaped through interaction with the target government. Tracing the campaign for a "free Tibet" in its decades-long struggle against the People's Republic of China, it shows how, as a result of Chinese intransigence on the issue of Tibetan statehood, the original meaning and mission of the transnational campaign for Tibetan independence has been replaced by a greater emphasis on adequate cultural representation and inclusion for Tibetans within a quasi-federal or multinational China. In addition to suggesting that the moral fabric of which the networks are made may in fact be more pliable than previously thought, this argument highlights the importance of taking seriously the possible pitfalls or tradeoffs involved in seeking to influence strong national governments, especially insular autocracies like China.The first section below describes what transnational advocacy networks do and how they do it from the standpoint of international relations scholarship. Of particular importance to this literature is the way in which materially powerful states are socialized to advocacy network preferences and the assumption of fixed moral commitments in accomplishing that end. Arguing that existing theories are insufficiently flexible to accommodate the potential for network principles to change or evolve through interaction with states, the bulk of the article is then given over to its empirical centrepiece, a case study of the transnational campaign for Tibetan sovereignty and its engagement with China. This narrative reveals a reversal of conventional causal roles such that national interests appear as a catalyst and not a consequence of network characteristics, including changes to the fundamental principles and goals from which the network identity originally derived.TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY AND NATIONAL INTERESTSAs Harrison White has argued, all social networks are inherently "network[s] of meanings. …

For Whom, from What?: Canada's Arctic Policy and the Narrowing of Human Security

Abstract: Since its inception in the iggos, human security has become a significant, perhaps defining, aspect of Canadian foreign policy. Canada is credited with propagating a unique approach to human security by exercising international leadership on multiple high-profile policy initiatives. Many observers have noted that human security provides the most consistent unifying framework for Canadian foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era. Some have gone further, suggesting it is the "central pillar," "political leitmotif," or "ethical guide" of Canada's global engagement over the past two decades.1 Though debates continue over the significance, efficacy, and desirability of incorporating human security into Canadian foreign policy - many in the pages of International Journal - there is general agreement that it has been central to Canada's post-Cold War global role, and that many foreign policy successes in that time have been prominently labelled human security achievements.The generally positive response to Canada's human security agenda does, however, obscure conceptual and practical challenges that attend how Canada has defined and approached human security. Unlike holistic human security frameworks employed by other actors, the Canadian approach is characterized by a focus on the prevention of violent harms to foreign human subjects. By marginalizing the socioeconomic and intersubjective dimensions of human wellbeing that are central to holistic human security, the Canadian approach ignores the radical reconceptualization of security that forms the core of human security studies. Moreover, by emphasizing the definitive role of violence, the Canadian conceptualization privileges the state and its institutions because of the former's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within modern politics. A definitional emphasis on violence results in a practical emphasis on states, displacing people from the analytical centre of human security. In practice, therefore, the Canadian approach retains a state-centrism and conceptual narrowness that undermine employing people as the referent objects of security analysis.Why does the Canadian approach abandon the radicalism of holistic human security, and what are the implications for conditions of human (in)security on the ground? Examining Canada's current Arctic policy, I argue that the Canadian approach supports elitist and state-centric security discourse and practice while minimizing the emancipatory potential inherent in holistic human security. It does this by viewing human security as a central plank of foreign, not domestic, policy, and by employing a violence-centric definition that excludes from the scope of its analysis the most pressing insecurities in the Canadian north. The result is the marginalization of hazards that most affect the people who actually inhabit the region in favour of statist, militarized representations of insecurity generated by southern Canadian policymakers. In the context of the Canadian Arctic, narrow human security also reproduces structural relations of dominance and subordination between the federal and territorial orders of government, while failing to mitigate - indeed, contributing to - conditions of insecurity for northern peoples and communities. Current Arctic policy thus exemplifies a preference for militarism and legalism similar to that found in the Canadian approach to human security.This article surveys the conceptual development of human security and its incorporation into Canadian foreign policy. It traces the narrowing of Canada's human security agenda from 1996-2006, providing a critical account of the factors behind the Canadian approach to human security.The implications of a narrow human security agenda are examined in light of three areas of federal policy: trade, climate change, and aboriginal governance. The conceptual and practical significance of Canada's narrow human security approach is then demonstrated by analyzing three central documents of the federal government's policy towards the Arctic: the "Canada first defence strategy," "Canada's northern strategy," and "Canada's Arctic foreign policy. …

Turkey's Neighbourhood Policy and EU Membership: Squaring the Circle of Turkish Foreign Policy

Abstract: Across its neighbourhood and in policy areas as diverse as security, trade, energy, and migration, Turkish foreign policy has fundamentally transformed since the end of the Cold War. In some cases, such as Turkish policies in the Balkans or in the field of trade and migration, the change has been incremental. In other areas, such as in the Middle East and in the realm of security policy, the shift has been more abrupt and visible. But the transformation of Turkey's neighbourhood policies is undeniable. This article recounts the major transformations in Turkey's regional policies over the last decade, to Turkey's north and south, and across policy areas such as trade, visas, and security. It highlights the principal achievements as well as the pending challenges and flashpoints. The purpose of this account to assess European perceptions of, and reactions to, Turkey's neighbourhood policies, with an eye to drawing out the implications for Turkey's tortured accession path to the European Union.Turkey's strategic significance has traditionally been among the key determinants of its relationship with the EU. Over the decades, Turkey has been hailed in Europe, the US, and in Turkey itself as a bridge, a buffer, and a model state in its region. These perceptions have profoundly affected its relationship with the EU.1 In view of this, this article assesses how Turkey's regional activism in the 2ist century has been perceived in Europe and how such perceptions have affected Turkey's EU accession path.TURKErS REGIONAL POLICIES: SUCCESSES, FAILURES AND FLASHPOINTSExternal and internal drivers of Turkey's regional policiesThe transformation in Turkey's foreign policy can be read as a mix of external geopolitical as well as internal political, economic, and societal changes. Externally, the end of the Cold War, the ensuing 1990-91 Gulf War, the 2003 war in Iraq, and the 2011 Arab Spring have induced Turkey to engage more actively in its neighbourhood, both to the north and south.2 To the north, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia immersed Turkey in the geopolitical dynamics of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and central Asia, largely in concert with the United States and Europe. Turkey's participation in NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the repositioning of Turkey as an energy hub, manifested first by the US drive to realize the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and since then by Turkey's prominence in competing pipeline projects (from Nabucco to South Stream) are testimony to this fact.3 To the south, whereas the 1990-91 Gulf War triggered a renewed emphasis on Turkish-American strategic cooperation, it also ushered in Turkish assertiveness in the Middle East, which manifested itself through heightened tensions with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.4 The 2003 war in Iraq unleashed an opposing set of dynamics between Turkey and its southern neighbours, inducing greater cooperation between Turkey and the Arab Middle East as well as Iran.5Since then, and particularly in light of the Arab Spring in 2011, the nature of Turkey's cooperative ties with its southern neighbours has been partly revised. The Arab Spring has revealed the inherent tension between the normative and realpolitik dimensions of Turkish foreign policy. When norms have dovetailed with interests, Turkey has been forthright in its support for democracy. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was the first western leader to call for Hosni Mubarak's resignation in a televised speech on al Jazeera in February 2011, and President Abdullah GuI was the first head of state to meet with the Egyptian supreme council in Egypt soon thereafter. In Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey was unambiguously on the side of democracy. As the Arab Spring progressed, realpolitik came to the fore. In Libya, Turkey was initially opposed to NATO's intervention to enforce a no-fly zone, participated exclusively in the humanitarian dimension of the ensuing intervention, and continued to pursue diplomatic efforts to propose a negotiated ceasefire between Muammar Gaddafi and the rebels. …

The Geopolitical Meaning of a Contemporary Visual Arts Upsurge on the Canada-US Border

Abstract: WHY SEEK A VISUAL UNDERSTANDING OF BORDERS?Their common border can be seen as a synecdoche of the complex relations between Canada and the United States: not only is it the longest border in the world (at 8,891 kilometres - 5,061 kilometres on land and 3,830 kilometres at sea), but it also represents a line where strong and soft politics and geopolitics converge. One can say that the border not only divides the two states but reflects their relations. Until recently, the border was considered one of the most "benign" the world - an exceptional label, considering the border's length.' For over two centuries, political divisions between the two countries, inherited in part from a colonial divide in the east but also from the outcome of frontier competition in the west, did not represent an obstacle to everyday life in the border regions. In fact, various economic activities have benefitted from houses built on the line in order to evade taxation, to the more complex industrial systems, such as that of the automobile industry in the Great Lakes region. These activities have led to the consolidation of a number of cross-border regions, enhanced by NAFTA, which are witnesses to both the vitality and variety of interactions along the line.2Culture is generally viewed as one of the many components of a regional dynamic: the border between Canada and the United States has a history of cultural hybridity, which appears so self-evident that the border has been much less studied than that separating the US from Mexico.3 This cultural similarity is due as much to proximity as to a relatively peaceful history (no war has opposed the two countries on their homelands since the AngloAmerican conflict of 1812-1814) and a common European, Anglo-dominated origin, which (with the exception of Quebec) leaves Canada and the US with a shared language. Yet the construction of complex sets of values resulting from nation-building on both sides of the line has led to cultural differentiation (although First Nations territorialities still partly straddle the line). In fact, culture in the border regions can be a good indicator of border changes between the countries.In spite of the closeness of cultural identities in the border regions, group differentiation has occurred over the divide and can be noted through the material expression of ideas. It has been said that on borders, culture "mitigates constantly to enable interaction while maintaining sovereignty."4 Furthermore, considering that culture consists of "differing arrays of power that organize society in this way, and not that," cultural analysis can provide insight into the societal effects of a border system.5The changes that have recently affected the Canada-US border are symptomatic of post-9/11 bilateral relations, as well as indicators of more general geopolitical trends. In a context of boundary enhancement that has restricted passage in regions that used to be highly integrated, new kinds of artistic expression are emerging that attest to significant cultural change. Artistic activities are generally granted to be a central component of cultural dynamics. In this paper I examine the emergence of contemporary art production in the borderlands between Canada and the United States since 9/11. I treat this emergence as a marker of cultural responses to the securitization processes of the past decade, choosing visual arts (paintings, photographs, videos, and performances) because these forms in particular lend themselves to depictions of spatiality and geography. The purpose of the research project on which this article is based was to discover whether a general aesthetic tendency can be observed in borderlands, which are becoming one of the main loci of contemporary visual artistic activity, and whether the art in these border regions comments on "rebordering" - changes in the regulations and understood definitions of borders.6Considering the difficulty of analyzing this tremendously long borderline in an exhaustive way, I chose to concentrate on both of its extremities, basing field work in the Quebec-Vermont region, as well as in the British Columbia- Washington State Cascadia. …

Turkish-Japanese Relations: Turning Romanticism into Rationality

Abstract: The last few years have witnessed a dramatic transformation in Turkish foreign policy, from an introverted approach with limited involvement in regional and global affairs to an activist approach and eagerness to assume an assertive role. Coupled with its expanded wealth and supported by the consolidation of state power, Turkey has found itself better positioned to more effectively implement its foreign policy objective of asserting itself as a "central country."1 A growing number of studies examine the new activism of Turkish foreign policy in nonwestern neighbourhoods, especially in the Middle East, Balkans, central Asia, and the Caucasus. However, how the new Turkish foreign policy asserts itself beyond these immediate neighbourhoods has scarcely been studied. The aim of this article is to scrutinize the multidimensional and global aspects of Turkish foreign policy in the specific case of Turkish- Japanese relations. The central question that drives this inquiry is the extent to which Turkey has formed a clearly articulated global strategy to undergird its evolving relations with Japan. Turkey- Japan relations offer a useful case study to examine Turkey's global agenda. With Japan, Turkey has had the longest and most-established relations in Asia. Moreover, a consistent pattern in the bilateral relationship can be observed and both countries have a history of partnership in global institutions.Historically, Japan has occupied a peculiar place in the vision and discourse of Turkish foreign policy elites. While Turkey's relations with its regional neighbours and other great powers in the world have carried a more realist or pragmatic character, its foreign policymakers have approached distant Japan with a degree of sentimentality. The phrase coined by the researchers of Turkish-Japanese relations to explain this sentimentality, "romanticism," will be used in this study as well.2The dominance of a discourse of romanticism in diplomatic language and also in informal accounts of Turkey- Japan relations can be traced from the onset of their initial contacts through the present. Today, this romantic rhetoric is reinforced with historic narratives of rescue, solidarity, and support, and by a sense of mutual empathy as victims of natural disasters.3 These narratives are accompanied by a vague and undefined sense of "commonness," which references various similarities in culture, common social and paternal values, and occasional claims of common ancestry. These so-called similarities can range from political ideational factors - both countries were late modernizers, westernized outside the west, and did so at times when they were in conflict with the west - to rather inconsequential and even trifling "cultural similarities," such as removing one's shoes when entering someone's house."1 However these narratives are old, dating back to Ottoman times when the challenges both countries faced first created this sense of commonness among the elites of each country.5This study claims that surges in Turkey's interest in Japan - and the rest of Asia, for that matter - have come at times when Turkey has decided to adopt a multifaceted and multidimensional foreign policy, generally as a result of a change in its relations with the west, or when there has been a domestic discussion on the redefinition of its identity between the west and east.6 One can observe such predicaments during the time of Abdulhamid II, in a much more subtle way during the premiership of Turgut Ozal, and more recently as a result of the multidimensional policies of the current minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu.This article, thus, contends that together with the heavy use of emotional references, rational calculations have also accompanied Turkish-Japanese relations. The imagined identities of similarities and narratives of solidarity have placed Turkish-Japanese relations in a social context that has made it easier for these countries to perceive each other as suitable partners in the contemporary world and have facilitated harmonious cooperative behaviour, especially in global platforms. …

Reducing Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: What Role for Canada?

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONPoverty and persistent inequality in income distribution remain a key concern in Latin America The recent financial and economic crisis has retriggered a debate on the mechanisms and policies required to improve the socioeconomic situation in this region characterized by the worst income distribution in the worldDuring the last decade, Latin American countries have overcome several important crises: the emerging countries crisis in 2002, followed by the financial crisis that began in the United States Currently, the focus is on a third crisis, or the second part of the financial crisis - the European sovereign debt crisis Despite the magnitude of these crises, Latin American countries have proven to have more solid economies than they had before the period from 2002 to 20I2 Although strong and sustained economic growth has in some way reduced poverty, it has been less effective in reducing income inequality Latin American countries are renowned for having the highest income inequality in the world in the past four decades Ten out of the fifteen countries with the highest levels of inequality are in Latin America and the Caribbean Significant and persistent inequality, accompanied by low social mobility, has led the region to fall into an inequality trap1This article examines what has been and could be the Canada's contribution to address these challenges The first section describes the economic outlook of Latin American countries facing the economic crisis and its impact on social indicators such as poverty and income inequality The second section provides a descriptive overview of Canadian development assistance to the region in the last ten years The third section reviews Ottawa's recent strategy of economic engagement in the region Finally, we discuss a potential role for Canada to contribute to inclusive growth, ie, economic development that encompasses poverty reduction and lesser inequality in the regionPOVERTY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGEThe development of more equal societies is potentially one of the most radical challenges for any country,2 particularly for Latin America The region has the worst income distribution indicators in the world3 The study of social and economic inequalities in Latin America has attracted great attention from academic researchers, international organizations, and policy makers There is some agreement that inequality in the region is historically rooted in the colonial era, which cemented racial and socio-economic divides As a recent report by the UN's economic commission for Latin America and the Caribbean observes, the colonial period was succeeded by republican regimes that perpetuated those assymetries; and finally, "the pattern of development and modernization helped to perpetuate socio-economic divides based on race, ethnic origin, gender and social class The productive structure and the education system helped to ingrain and reproduce inequality"4There is evidence that neoliberal models have increased or at least maintained levels of inequality Hoffman and Centeno refer to Latin America as the inverted continent in which the resources assignation and opportunities are highly concentrated5 The region remains the worst in the world in terms of income distribution, even though Latin America has increased its overall income in recent years Between 1980 and 2010, the income per-capita has increased, although it varies significantly depending on the indicator used, ie, whether the figure is based on purchasing-power parity or not Based on purchasing-power parity figures, it has moved from US$2,680 in 1980 to US$9,119 in 2010Moreover, we observe great variation of level of inequality from one country to another During the period from 2000 to 2009, nine countries were above the Latin American average, and these countries included with a high per-capita income, such as Chile, as well as countries with extremely low incomes, such as Haiti and Bolivia …

The Special Case of Cuba

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONCuba is special, an anomaly in the hemisphere. The most infamous reason for Cuba's outlying status is that this country of n million has had a hostile relationship with the United States for over five decades. For much of this time, Havana was isolated by many other states in the region. Cuba's relationship with Canada is unique in this regard since the ties between Havana and Ottawa were never severed. This bilateral relationship remained distinct despite pressure from Washington and changes of Canadian government. Canada, meanwhile, has maintained its close allegiance with the United States and has attempted at various times to use its friendship with both states to bring the two sides together. Canada has also advocated Cuba's inclusion in the region's international organizations.Given the recent changes within Cuba and the modifications to US policy made by President Barack Obama, this article asks whether Canadian intervention makes sense at this time. The article first reviews the context of the relationship by outlining the changes underway in Cuba and highlighting the place of Cuba in the hemisphere. In doing so it challenges the myth that Cuba is an excluded state, not a full member of the inter- American political system. It also addresses the current status of the conflict and the adjustments to policy toward Havana made by the Obama administration.Second, the article reviews the relationship between Canada and Cuba and reflects on whether Canada is able to enhance the chances of rapprochement between Cuba and the United States or between Cuba and the Organization of American States (OAS). It suggests that while there might have been a window of opportunity for some form of Canadian mediation a few years ago, that window is now closed for a number of key reasons. To begin with, there is no political will in the United States to pursue further normalization with Cuba, and there is no need for Canada to bring either side to the table. Havana and Washington are already talking about a series of issues. Furthermore, although the Canada-Cuba relationship remains on a solid footing, Ottawa has not given priority to the relationship with Havana. Senior Canadian officials are unlikely to raise the issue of Cuba with their American counterparts.Moreover, since coming to power in 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has generally either ignored or criticized Cuba, largely supporting the US vis-a-vis Havana. Even if Ottawa displayed a more-amicable attitude toward Havana, Canada is not positioned to take on a mediating role given the new direction of Canadian foreign policy. This article concludes that there is little room for Canada to play a mediating role between the United States and Cuba or between the OAS and Cuba in the near future.CUBA IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURENo other small state has been the centre of as much international scholarly attention as Cuba. Although most of the foreign literature on Cuba is written by Americans and is focused on Cuba's relationship with the United States, a number of key works have addressed Canada's relationship with Cuba. Most of the literature has stressed the cordial nature of the bilateral relationship. John Kirk, Peter McKenna, and Julia Sagebien's Back in Business: CanadaCuba Relations Afier 50 Years (1995) and Kirk and McKenna's CanadaCuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbor Policy (1997) reflect the generally collegial nature of the relationship during the Chretien era.1 Robert Wright's bestselling, Three Nights in Havana: Pierre Trudeau, Fidel Castro and the Cold War World (2007) addressed the complex personal relationship between Pierre Trudeau and Fidel Castro and revealed new insights into the bilateral relationship. My book, Perceptions of Cuba: Canadian and American Policies in Comparative Perspective (2010) stressed the unique aspects of Canada's policy and compared that policy to American relations with the island.2 Edited volumes, such as those by Heather Nicol (1999), Sahadeo Basdeo and Heather Nicol (2002), and Michele Zebich-Knos and Heather Nicol (2005), also set out to compare the Canadian and American approaches and generally stress the relative camaraderie of the Ottawa-Havana connection. …

A Pan-African View of a New Agenda for Peace:

Abstract: What positions would African governments take if a proposal for a new agenda for peace were tabled at the United Nations for discussion and possible adoption in 2012? This article posits that most African states would work collectively through African Union (AU) channels for the inclusion of a number of new peace and security ideas. Their demands would revolve around four peace and security pillars: an ubuntu understanding of sovereignty; an acceptance of elements of the responsibility to protect (R2P); a shift towards a human-security-oriented view of peace; and, finally, a new set of doctrines on postwar reconstruction. These suggestions are within the realm of possibility in part because they form the basis of shared African Union members' understanding of peace and security in Africa and because, since the turn of the century, African governments have handled major UNrelated subjects through the institutional mechanism of the AU. The four peacebuilding innovations that have emerged at the interstate level in Africa since the publication of "An agenda for peace" in 1992 are the backbone of a new continental African peace and security architecture.In this essay I will examine the ubuntu view of sovereignty and the institutional and legal changes AU members have made as a result of the adoption of the ubuntu concept. I then unpack R2P ideas AU member states have legalized and institutionalized in the African international system. In the third section, I explore the evolution of AU members' view of security, suggesting that it has shifted from state-centric and military security towards human security. I use the last section to examine the postwar reconstruction ideas that have emerged in Africa since the publication of "An agenda for peace" in 1992. Each section suggests specific positions and possible requests African governments might advance if a new agenda for peace were discussed in 2012.THE UBUNTU UNDERSTANDING OF SOVEREIGNTYOne of the things African states as a collective might put forward in any negotiation of new UN doctrines on peace and security will be a new definition of sovereignty to replace the state-centric and conservative way sovereignty is conceptualized in the "Agenda for peace." The original document was absolutely clear that the "foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State."1 It urged the international community "to respect the sovereignty of the State" in "situations of internal crisis." In a new document, however, African governments may introduce a new understanding of sovereignty and intervention that seeks to protect African states from military intervention by non-African states while leaving room for African states to intervene collectively in each others' internal affairs with or without the consent of the target country. The intervention can take different forms, including mediation, as in the case of Kenya in 2008; suspension from participation in activities of African international organizations, as in the case of Mauritania in 2009; rebuke and suspension of AU membership, as in the case of Cote d'Ivoire in 2011; and, as a last resort, military intervention, as in the case of Comoros Island in 2008. Conditions for military intervention are detailed in article 4(h) of the constitutive act of the AU. It gives the AU the right to intervene in the affairs of a member- state in order to "prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." These threshold conditions provided by the AU, as Maxi Schoeman pointed out, "go 'beyond' the provision made for intervention in the internal affairs of a country in the UN Charter."2 Indeed, Thomas G. Weiss has suggested that the AU has set thresholds for intervention lower than those outlined in any other international legal code.3The acceptance of conditional sovereignty in Africa's international subsystem is predicated on ubuntu's view of persons, states, and sovereignty.4 Ubuntu, defined as a world view or philosophy that sees entities in relational terms, is considered the connecting thread of the people of the Bantu language group, one of the four main linguistic groups in Africa. …

Is Ottawa following Washington's Lead in Foreign Policy?

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONIs Canada's foreign policy aligned with that of the United States? This question frequently comes up in foreign policy circles and was recently raised during the popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. Some observers have maintained that Ottawa's policy with regard to the "Arab Spring" followed that of Washington.1 This criticism is in keeping with the perception that, since coming to power in February 2006, the Harper government has strategically aligned Canada's policies more closely with those of the United States.2 Some positions of the Harper government, in particular with respect to the Kyoto Protocol, the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and the North American security perimeter, have reinforced this idea.3The question of Canada's foreign policy alignment with the United States has also been the subject of much debate within the academic community. Some see such an alignment as the best strategy for enhancing Canada's national interests.4 Others feel that it is detrimental to the country.5 Beyond impressions and normative debates concerning the values and strategies that should guide foreign policy in Canada, there is a need to empirically and systematically assess whether the existence of such an alignment is indeed supported by fact. This article presents a study of the responses of Canada and the United States to the popular uprisings and revolutions that marked Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2010-2011. These crises, which helped define the Arab Spring, are the only ones to which Canadian and US diplomatic responses had ended at the time this article was written and which therefore lent themselves to a complete analysis of events.By conducting a chronological and a content analysis, this study examines all the official statements (statements, news releases, and remarks) issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Canada (PMO), the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the White House, and the US Department of State regarding these crises. In all, 67 statements are analyzed.6 The analysis shows two recurring patterns in the way Canada responded to the Arab Spring. First, the Harper government generally issued its statements after the Obama administration had stated its point of view. Second, once Washington had made its positions known, Ottawa adopted the same stance. These findings suggest that Canada's statements were most of the time aligned with those of the United States and sometimes fashioned in cooperation with Washington. However, this apparent alignment of Canada only represents one part of the story, since our study shows that the Harper government did not always emphasize the same themes, values, and principles as the US while responding to these foreign crises. For instance, Ottawa was consistently more concerned with the issue of stability than Washington. The Harper government also put more emphasis on the need to protect the State of Israel during the Egyptian uprising than did the Obama administration. Finally, the study indicates that the White House was particularly concerned with multilateralism in the resolution of these crises, while Canada has not shown the same interest in a multilateral approach.ALIGNMENT AND CONVERGENCEWhat exactly do we mean by alignment? Steven David explains that alignment occurs when one state "brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state."7 For David, this behaviour is usually motivated by a relationship of dependence of one state on another. Gordon Mace brings additional clarification to this concept by opposing it with that of convergence. He explains that alignment can be said to have occurred when "only one actor has modified its position to bring it in line with that of another." However, when "each actor modifies an initial position X and adopts a new position Y," this can be described as convergence.8 Convergence results therefore from coordination among governments to arrive at a common position. …

The False Promise of Peacebuilding

Abstract: Four years after the signing of the 2001 Bonn agreement, which sought to re-establish a state in Afghanistan, American officials voiced unqualified optimism about the country's future. James Dobbins, the former US special envoy, claimed that the agreement had moved Afghanistan toward its intended goal of a more peaceful and inclusive democracy. "The Bonn agreement," he said, "has been a remarkably successful road map toward Afghanistan's political evolution, in which all of its benchmarks have been met more or less on schedule." Outside of the country, Russia, India, Pakistan, and even Iran were praised for their willingness to provide support to the new government. "The word 'democracy' was actually introduced into the Bonn talks on the recommendation of the Iranian delegation," stated Dobbins.1In the aftermath of the Taliban's fall, efforts had been made to reconstruct Afghanistan the right way. Important in this respect was the international community's endeavour to engage in a consultative grassroots process as a means of building a more democratic state. Afghanistan's loyajirga drew on hundreds of local representatives who together arrived at the formation of a transitional government. The post-Taliban era also promised new hope for Afghan women. For the first time since the Taliban assumed control in 1996, girls would be educated, women's rights would be guaranteed, and women would be full participants in Afghanistan's governing process. Given the stakes involved, no expense was spared in creating a bulwark against future instability or renewed civil war. Indeed, in the 10 years since the invasion began, donors have allocated over $500 billion to rein in the Taliban and set Afghanistan on a path to long-term peace.And yet, in 2012, Afghanistan's political situation remains precarious and there is increasing pessimism that the country can be rescued from either state collapse or a return of the Taliban. AUS military report that was leaked in January 2012 indicated that the Taliban remained confident that they will be able to retake control of Kabul once foreign troops have departed in 2013. "Many Afghans are already bracing themselves for an eventual return of the Taliban," the report indicated. While the Afghan government "continues to declare its willingness to fight. .many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory."2More alarming, a published UN report states that after five years of steady increases in civilian deaths, 2011 was the most deadly year for Afghan civilians. "A decade after it began," the report concludes, "the armed conflict in Afghanistan again incurred a greater human cost in 2011 than in previous years."3 Even the effort to advance the cause of Afghanistan's women appeared to have stalled. In another major report published in November 2011, entitled "A long way to go," the UN declared that while it "sees growing implementation of the [elimination of violence against women] law as encouraging, the low numbers of complaints and cases prosecuted make it dear that the Government has not yet applied the law to the vast majority of cases of violence against women."4As for democratic governance, it is evident that Afghanistan has succumbed to the power of regional strongmen and corruption. In some cases, thanks in part to working relationships with their American backers, these warlords have grown more powerful than Afghanistan's provincial authorities and have usurped government functions of security and economic assistance from elected officials.5 According to Marina Ottaway, "far from circumventing the warlords," the political process in Afghanistan has "resulted in many of them manipulating the foya Jirga and gaining positions of power." She concludes that "[t]he warlords' continued influence is the greatest obstacle both to the consolidation of military power in the hands of the central government and the emergence of a democratic state. …

Review: The Triumph of the Dark European International History 1933-1939THE TRIUMPH OF THE DARK European International History 1933-1939SteinerZara S.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 1248 pp, US $65.00 (cloth) ISBN 978-0199212002

Abstract: THE TRIUMPH OF THE DARK European International History 1933-1939 Zara S Steiner Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 1248 pp, US$6500 (cloth) ISBN 978-0199212002With the second and final volume of her study of European international politics between 1919 and 1939, Zara Steiner has completed what is now the touchstone for several generations and beyond of international historians, international relations specialists, and the wider reading public interested in the period between the two world wars of the 20th century Together with the first volume, this study is an immediate classic - one based on 20 years of research and, before that, a distinguished scholarly record and accumulation of knowledge stretching back to the late 1950s Demonstrating the same deft analytical hand that dissected the vagaries of European international history from the Paris peace conference to the collapse of the Weimar republic, a command of English and foreign language sources, and lucid prose, Steiner provides an exegesis that neither preaches about nor excuses the generation of statesmen, politicians, military leaders, diplomats, and journalists who dominated Europe and hold responsibility for the outbreak of a second world war in 1939 In the first volume of her study, she argued that by the end of the 1920s, the problems spawned by the First World War were resolved and continental stability had emerged from the chaos of war and revolution This process was then undermined by the "hinge years" of the Great Depression, beginning in late 1929 when the disruption of the international economy, the concomitant undermining of democratic government, and the rise of radical prescriptions to meet the apparent failure of capitalism and democratic governance emergedIn this context, the central figure of this book is Adolf Hitler, the German chancellor after January 1933, supreme German leader after August 1934, and fountainhead of National Socialist ideology Steiner's initial chapter, "Brown dawn," looks closely at the Nazi revolution and the end of the quest for disarmament She sees Hitler's ideology as nourishing the roots of a foreign policy designed to make Germany supreme in Europe and laying the basis for an eventual struggle with the United States to make Germany the sole world power: territorial expansion to the east, whereby the newly created "successor states," including German- speaking Austria, would have to be brought within the Reich; the complete destruction of Nazidom's ideological enemy, Bolshevik Russia; and cleansing Europe of its subhuman races, especially the Jews Through his dark social Darwinian lens, Hitler looked for the means and opportunity to achieve his foreign policy goalsOpportunism is central here In his influential 1961 book, The Origins of the Second World War, the revisionist AJ P Taylor argued that Hitler did not follow a diplomatic blueprint but was pragmatic in foreign policy: announcing German rearmament in 1935, remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936, forcing the annexation of Austria in March 1938, detaching the German-speaking Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia six months later, occupying the Czechoslovak rump in March 1939, and initiating the Polish crisis in September 1939 In contrast, Steiner shows clearly that while Hitler was opportunistic, he was an opportunist who knew where he was going He gambled on inaction by the other great powers, took risks, and proved daring in exploiting the openings given to him He took the initiative and the other powers' leaders reactedIn Steiner's estimation, these responses were crucial to the origins of the Second World War Engaged in a pyrrhic competition among themselves, all the successor states except Czechoslovakia gradually moved into the German orbit because the new Bolshevik Russian threat differed little from the old tsarist one In Italy, Benito Mussolini found common ground with Hitler after the Italian conquest of Abyssinia in May 1936 and led his country away from London and Paris, which had temporarily united with Rome in a vain effort to contain Germany …

Still the Fire-Proof House?: An Analysis of Canada's Cyber Security Strategy

Abstract: The popular media is dominated by stories of cyber insecurity, from massive dumps of diplomatic cables on Wikileaks to Chinese cyber spy rings or, most recently, the cyber attack on the French government. Indeed, a flood of policies have emerged in recent years to deal with the problem, among them Canada's cyber security strategy. Canada has been traditionally described as a fire-proof house based on its advantageous geographic situation, however the globalized nature of Cyberspace is eroding this conventional wisdom. The purpose of this article is to critically assess the literature on cyber terrorism and cyber espionage, the threats they pose at both state and international levels, and possible responses to them. The article provides evaluative criteria with which to analyze Canada's cyber security strategy and to inform policy recommendations moving forward. I contend that although the security strategy outlines concrete steps for prevention, real-time response, and law enforcement on a domestic level, it fails to recognize the importance of the international diplomatic and policy cooperation required to deal with the hyper-globalized, highly international suite of threats in cyberspace.The article is divided into four sections: the first section provides terms of reference and conducts a detailed review of the scholarly and government literature on cyber terrorism and espionage. The second reviews the literature with respect to the response to these cyber threats, situates them in the global system, and examines how the international diplomatic community is coping. The third section applies the evaluative criteria that emerge from the literature to Canada's cyber security strategy, and the fourth provides policy recommendations.TERMS OF REFERENCE AND LITERATURE REVIEWFor the purposes of this article, cyber terrorism is defined as "computer-tocomputer attacks intended to cause significant damage in order to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population."1 Cyber espionage is defined as the use of Cyberspace by governments to illicitly procure classified information.The security landscape in the digital age is vastly different from traditional Cold War conceptions of it. Globalization has ushered in new and uncharted realm for observers of security studies and policy makers alike. Ironically, the "technologies that form the basic fabric of the Internet [also create]... the 'soft underbelly" of vulnerabilities that enables cyber crime and espionage to advance to unprecedented levels."2 In this new arena, "hardware and software determine the landscape of the battlefield, not mountains, valleys, or waterways."3 Cyber terrorism and cyber espionage are fuelled by the interconnectedness and interdependency of Cyberspace and the globalized world at large and consequently display considerable complexity in the methods by which they operate and the vulnerabilities they expose.CYBER TERRORISMCyber terrorism has received much scholarly attention over the past decade. Even "before 9/11 there had been great angst about the possibilities of cyber terrorism."4 This comes as no surprise; the combination of the two "scary" concepts conjures powerful imagery. In the post-g/n world counterterrorism has continued to dominate the literature. Cyber terrorists use Cyberspace in two distinct yet complementary ways: first, to facilitate and maximize organizational and operational efficiency, and second, to provide the offensive capacity to carry out cyber-attacks. Most significantly, Cyberspace allows terrorist organizations to disseminate propaganda and recruitment information with little operational exposure. Moreover, scholars cite intelligence, communication, training, and fundraising as key ways that terrorists use Cyberspace.Cyberspace has also provided terrorists with new, highly effective, offensive capabilities. The most common form of these capabilities is called distributed denial of service, where "attackers overwhelm websites and servers by bombarding them with data, or 'traffic'" through a number of surrogate, or "zombie," computers that they have infected with malicious code. …

Canada's Engagement with the Americas in Comparative Perspective: Between Declaratory Thickness and Operational Thinness

Abstract: Recent Canadian prime ministers have embraced the hemisphere of the Americas, albeit in a differentiated and uneven fashion. Brian Mulroney is commonly credited with "discovering" the Americas largely through the decision to finally join the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1989.1 Jean Chretien pushed the "more amigos the better" approach through support for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the summit of the Americas process, and the targeting of Team Canada activities in the region.2 Paul Martin is largely linked to the formation of the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership, designed to facilitate discussion of future economic arrangements for the creation of a single North American market for goods and services and shared strategies for securitizing the continent against potential terrorist attacks; however, Martin's international policy statement emphasized, among a variety of other objectives, the need to improve bilateral relations with "emerging powers" such as Brazil.3 And his government re-designed development policy to favor some smaller countries in the Americas. The government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been even more ambitious, announcing during the 2007 G8 summit in Germany that Canadian foreign policy was to have a renewed focus on the Americas. Signs that the promise of this declared engagement was to be followed up in practice were encouraged by two high profile prime ministerial trips to the Americas in 2007 and 2011.4This theme of personalized attention, while significant, is not to exaggerate the importance of the Americas in Canadian foreign policy. Despite the upgrade, the hemisphere remains subordinated to the main game, the Canada-US relationship, with its myriad of networks and special qualities, including complexes, sensitivities, and the attraction of the proximate US market. Nor, notwithstanding the higher profile, do the Americas have the intensity of other geographic focal points. In terms of geopolitical concerns, the hemisphere has lagged well behind Canada's contribution to the Afghanistan mission and arguably its enhanced focus on the Arctic. As in the past, the security dimension - as least in classic hard terms - remains a crucial "missing link" in Canadian foreign policy towards the Americas.5 But if the Canadian turn towards the Americas should not be stretched too far, neither should it be dismissed as unimportant. If still modest in weight of deliverables,6 the Americas have been fully embedded in Canadian diplomatic thinking and practice. Past habits of avoidance or minimalization of the region have been discarded. The Americas have moved into the geographical and functional mainstream in terms of both identity and interests. While there are still huge gaps and potential pitfalls for further embedding the relationship, some of the constraints imposed on Canada's relationship with other regions (Europe and Asia-Pacific) are absent in the Americas.DISCARDING OLD HABITSThe reversal of past habits should not be downplayed. After all, previously Canada was anything but engaged with the Americas. The region was seen as both too complicated and too unimportant to embrace. At a general level, an explicit expression of regionalism was avoided in Canadian foreign policy, with multilateralism dominant as the diplomatic approach through the post-1945 era.7 A privileged status was given to the tenets of universalism through the United Nations, or alternatively cross-regional organizations including NATO, the Commonwealth, and later on, the Francophonie. What feelings of regional consciousness instilled into Canadian policy makers was reserved for approaches towards the Atlantic Community, connections "not easily or unproblematically translated into concrete schemes for regional perspectives."8 From a middle power diplomatic perspective, any more intense forms of regionalism presented difficulties in that they posed a serious challenge to Canada's traditional mode of statecraft for two interrelated reasons. …

A new agenda for peace: 20 years later

Abstract: 20 years laterThis year, 2012, marks the 20th anniversary of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's seminal "An agenda for peace." Penned in response to a request by the United Nations security council to prepare and circulate an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping," the 1992 document took advantage of a unique moment in history. The end of the Cold War provided fresh resolve among security council members to fulfil "the Purposes and Principles of the Charter [of the UN]" and presented new opportunities for building sustainable peace.1 Alongside recommendations for more thorough and activist preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, the agenda for peace added a fourth tool, postconflict peacebuilding, to the international toolkit. This issue focuses principally on this fourth tool.Over the past 20 years, there has been much development in the practice and study of peacebuilding.2 The meaning of peacebuilding and its application on the ground have lengthened in time, broadened in scope, and deepened in engagement. Peacebuilding has become institutionalized within the UN and the broader international community, and peacebuilding endeavours have shown successes in their ability to respond to violent conflict and prevent its recurrence. But there have also been challenges and even failures in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding has had to contend with the aftermath of September 11 and the falls of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Most recently, peacebuilding must be envisioned in the context of the 2011 Arab Spring. 2012 thus presents an opportune moment to revisit "An agenda for peace."This issue stems from a workshop held at the University of Toronto in October 2011. The workshop brought together peacebuilding practitioners, including a UN fieldworker based in the Middle East and a member of the peacebuilding commission working in west Africa, alongside scholars engaged in peacebuilding work, to reflect upon the state of peacebuilding today - nearly 20 years after "An agenda for peace" was published - and to move forward the possibility of a new agenda for peace. The seven articles that follow consider critically the goals of "An agenda for peace" and evaluate peacebuilding successes and failures. In this introduction, we consider what the last 20 years have taught us about peacebuilding, focusing on several lessons for moving the peacebuilding agenda forward into the next decades.This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we define peacebuilding. In the second, we survey peacebuilding since 1992 from an optimistic perspective. In the third, we don pessimists' lenses and present a more negative account of peacebuilding over the past 20 years. In the fourth section, we suggest how the lessons learned from the past two decades may inform a new agenda for peace.WHAT IS PEACEBUILDING?"An agenda for peace" defines postconflict peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (para. 21) and which "will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (para. 55). Peacebuilding, as Boutros-Ghali saw it, aimed "to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression" (para. 15). In other words, the idea of peacebuilding was to help states move from a merely negative peace - the absence of violence - to a positive peace marked by the deeper social, political, and economic features that help make a society work. We acknowledge that peacebuilding means many different things to different people, including the authors in this special issue. Ian Spears' contribution, for instance, considers peacebuilding as any action taken in the pursuit of peace, including those that fall under the "agenda for peace" rubrics of peacekeeping and peacemaking. …

The Pitfalls of Peacebuilding from Below Governance Promotion and Local Political Processes in Postconflict Lebanon

Abstract: One of the important themes in Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda for peace" was the connection between democratic practices at all levels of society and the emergence of true peace and security. If the ultimate goal of peacebuilding strategies is to build strong states characterized by autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy, institutionalizing citizen participation at grassroots levels can push each of these goals forward. It can act as a check on elite efforts to capture the peacebuilding processes, enhance the access of state officials to local conditions and knowledge, and, ultimately, provide the state with a broader base of social and political support. Finally, as "An agenda for peace" stressed, the promotion of democratic institutions in postconflict societies can also provide a means of enhancing the empowerment of the unorganized, the poor, and the marginalized.1 It is also clear, however, that immediate post-civil war contexts, together with the pacts and peace agreements that emanate from them, work in a contrary direction - privileging elite power, accumulation, and status. Even where citizen involvement is included in locally generated peacebuilding strategies, it is often a constrained involvement, limited to symbolic rather than empowered participation. The question that this article addresses is to what degree external actors can counter these elite-privileging dominant trends.The first decade of Lebanon's postconflict period provides a fascinating period and context within which to investigate this question. Despite its 15-year civil conflict, between 1975 and 1990, that saw the collapse of the country's power-sharing agreement among its numerous Christian and Muslim communities, the emergence of multiple and externally supported armed sectarian factions, and the devastating military interventions of both Syria and Israel, Lebanon has actually had a long tradition of functioning democratic institutions, ones reestablished in the postwar era. It has a constitution that formally guarantees the rights of individuals; an electoral system that ensures the inclusive representation of all major religious communities; and a commitment embedded in the Ta' if accord of 1989 - a set of constitutional amendments that established the political parameters for the postconflict period - to the promotion of social and economic rights of Lebanese citizens. Yet Lebanon's postwar record of protecting the social, civil, and political rights of its citizens has been problematic. Despite democratic political procedures, for example, substantive political participation in postwar decision-making has been extremely narrow, restricted to the particularistic, elite-based, and coercive shadow networks that underline and penetrate the Lebanese polity.2 Its performance with respect to the promotion of socioeconomic rights has been suspect, with vast capital expenditures earmarked for infrastructure and declining expenditures for social development, a combination that has contributed to unprecedented rates of corruption, increased income inequality, and growing rates of poverty.3This article provides a critical examination of donor efforts to tilt the balance of power in favour of greater social participation in Lebanon's initial postconflict decade. The article will begin with a brief overview of the Lebanese political field, focusing on the shadow processes and actors that have reconsolidated their formal power in the postwar era. This will be followed by a brief overview of the relevant literature of inclusive peacebuilding. The heart of the article will then compare two sets of governance promotion initiatives - the first two emanating from local civil society actors themselves in the fields of environment and disability, and the latter two spearheaded by foreign donors in the fields of community development and grassroots conservation. The main argument flowing from the analysis of these four projects will be that donor-initiated peacebuilding strategies, while professing an interest in promoting broad-based, participatory governance processes in postconflict Lebanon, have been more likely, for reasons to be examined below, to facilitate the consolidation and reproduction of elitebased political power. …

Wishful Thinking: Democracy Promotion in the Americas under Harper

Abstract: Since the Mulroney government oriented Canada decisively toward the Americas by joining the Organization of American States in 1990, democracy promotion in the region has been an important activity, at least rhetorically, of both Conservative and Liberal governments.' This has never been more so than with the present Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who signaled early on that democracy support would be both a key priority for its foreign policy and, more specifically, for Canada's reengagement with the Americas.Various scholars have observed that, historically, Canada's performance has been inconsistent in the advancement of democracy in the Americas and in policy toward the region in general.2 In the broader terms of Canadian hemispheric policy, after a flurry of government activity in areas such as trade, democracy promotion, human rights, and human security during the 1990s, Canada seemed to enter a period of relative disengagement with the Americas during the new millennium, especially following the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations at the Mar del Plata summit of the Americas in 2005.Despite great fanfare to the contrary, inconsistency has been the case yet again with the Harper government. Although good work is being done on the ground by dedicated Canadian officials, Canadian engagement is a far cry from the grandiose promises made in 2007 and 2008 to create a new democracy foundation, make democracy promotion a distinct and pivotal area of policy and programming across government, and make the Americas one of the government's top foreign policy priorities. Why is there a persistent pattern of Canadian underperformance on the democracy promotion front, in particular in the western hemisphere? Through an evaluation of the Harper government record, in this article I suggest that there is something wrong with the social construction of this issue area as a national interest. I argue that poor agency and policy framing have wrongly rendered democracy promotion and its Americas context "soft" foreign policy interests.The following analysis is divided into four parts. First, I review the various explanations given in the academic literature for Canada's uneven policy performance on democracy promotion and on the Americas in general. I emphasize the potential usefulness of an analytical approach that emphasizes the social construction of democracy promotion in Latin America and the Caribbean as a national interest. In a second section 1 evaluate the rhetoric, versus the reality, of democracy promotion in the western hemisphere under the Harper government. Third, I attribute the Harper government's weak policy performance to difficulties in framing the Canadian advancement of democracy in the region as a national priority. In a concluding section I stress the need for a revisionist exercise to attune Canadian policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean to Canada's national interests.ADVANCING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS: IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?Various authors have noted that Canada has an inconsistent record when it comes to both democracy promotion and a broader commitment to the Americas. George MacLean observes that despite rhetoric, Canada's involvement in the western hemisphere has historically been "fickle" and characterized more by "fits and starts" than any coherent and sustained policy approach.3 Jean Daudelin speaks of the "volatility" of Canada's policy in the Americas and reminds us that roughly every twenty years, Canada rediscovers the Americas.4 A review of the pertinent literature suggests that the ups and downs of Canada's democracy promotion and Americas policy framework are linked to limits in its hemispheric interests, including challenges to its trade-driven agenda, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and a lack of region-wide security concerns. As Daudelin and MacLean argue, despite all the hype to the contrary, Canada still does not have strong vested interests in the region, and accordingly, there are not any significant repercussions to reneging on its policy commitments. …