Showing papers in "International Security in 1978"

On Southern Africa

Abstract: In June 2014 the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) adopted resolution 1/7 Strengthening the Role of the United Nations Environment Programme in Promoting Air Quality. As requested in paragraph 4 and 7 of the resolution, which requested UNEP to develop a report detailing actions taken by governments to promote air quality, this report details some of the major actions being undertaken by governments in Southern Africa to improve air quality.

Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought

Abstract: W are having trouble with Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet thinking about strategy and nuclear war differs in sigificant ways from our own. To the extent one should care about this -and that extent is a matter of debate-we do not like the way the Soviets seem to think. Before 1972, appreciation of differences between Soviet and American strategic thinking was limited to a small number of specialists. Those who held it a matter of high concern for policy were fewer still. Since that time, concern about the nature, origins, and consequences of these differences is considerably more widespread, in large measure as a result of worry about the Soviet strategic arms buildup and the continued frustrations 'of achieving a real breakthrough in SALT. Heightened attention to the way the other side thinks about strategic nuclear power is timely and proper. The nature of the Soviet buildup and some of our own previous choices have locked us out of pure "hardware solutions" to our emerging strategic security problems that are independent of the other side's values and perceptions. Whatever one thinks about the wisdom or folly of the manner in which we have pursued SALT so far, it is desirable that management of the U.S.Soviet strategic relationship have a place for an explicit dialogue. That dialogue should include more attention to strategic concepts than we have seen in past SALT negotiations. Moreover, whatever the role of SALT in the future, the existence of "rough parity" or worse almost by definition means that we cannot limit strategic policy to contending merely with the opponent's forces. In the cause of deterrence, crisis management, and, if need be, war, we must thwart his strategy. That requires understanding that opponent better.

Mutual Deterrence, Parity and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy

Abstract: One of the most controversial - and important - questions underlying debate on Soviet intentions, detente, and strategic arms limitations in particular, has concerned the Soviet view on mutual deterrence. This chapter seeks to illuminate Soviet thinking on the subject, with consideration of the inter-relationship of Soviet ideological beliefs, political imperatives and calculation, military views and doctrine, and their intersection and reconciliation in Soviet policy. The Soviet leaders believe that peaceful coexistence - with continued political and ideological competition-is the preferable alternative to an unrestrained arms race and to recurring high-risk political-military confrontation. Soviet military doctrine continues to be predicated on the assumption that if a general nuclear war should occur, all elements of the armed forces would contribute to waging a decisive struggle aimed at defeating world imperialism.

On Estimating and Imputing Intentions

Abstract: much publicized buildup of Soviet military power suggests a need to clarify approaches to the problem of estimating these intentions. The problem is not simply one of differing judgments of the significance of available data, nor still less one of differing access to information-although in some cases each of these considerations also may arise. Most important is the need to try to understand the perceptions, aims, decisions and actions of the other side, and then to make the attempt for this purpose rather than to serve any other. Ten common fallacies in estimating intentions-in particular, with respect to Soviet military and international political activity-are identified and briefly discussed below, with some illustrative examples (but without any attempt at either a comprehensive listing or an extensive discussion of those examples cited.)

The New Internationalisms

Abstract: A m e r i c a in a New was writing before he went to ’Washington to serve as National Security Advisor to President Carter. The problems and challenges that the United States confronts do indeed seem different from the ones that dominated international politics for three decades after the end of World War 11. But in order to wrestle with those problems and meet those challenges successfully, the new Administration needs to borrow something from the past, namely a domestic consensus for its foreign policy. For almost a quarter century Americans were united in support of resistance to the spread of Communism, by war if necessary, under the leadership of a President with considerable leeway to conduct the nation’s business abroad. The cold war consensus is gone. What has taken its place? How do Americans see international politics? How do they define the requirements for the nation’s security? What constraints does public opinion place upon foreign policy? What do Americans consider their nation’s proper role in this new world? Is there any consensus on anything in our foreign policy? A good deal of evidence on these questions can be found in the 1976 Presidential campaign. The election is not the most obvious place to look; public opinion surveys give a more scientific picture of what people are thinking. But surveys almost invariably show popular inattention and indifference to foreign policy issues. Public opinion tends to crystallize in an election because the campaign takes on the structure of a debate. And political leaders draw their assessments of public opinion more from election campaigns than from polls. They shape their policies with an eye on elections of the past because they expect to run in elections of the future. The fear of being charged with “losing” Viemam especially haunted Democratic officeholders, including the President, in the 1960s because the Republicans had parlayed the charge that the Democrats had “lost” China into a vehicle for electoral success in the early 1950s. In what sense can campaigns be characterized as a debate? The two major-party candidates in a Presidential campaign usually avoid taking controversial stands. They concentrate on “valence” issues, those where everyone is on the same side; they extol peace, abhor corruption, and commit themselves to a policy of con-

Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage

Abstract: Atsconceptions surround the American-Israeli arms relation. As the United States seeks to bridge negotiating gaps between Israel and Arab states, some commentators and Arab leaders maintain that American leverage should be used to force Israeli concessions. In arguing this course of action, they assume that such leverage would be sufficient to obtain concessions. They further maintain that American unwillingness to exert such leverage stems primarily from domestic political constraints.1 Upon close examination the question of leverage is more complicated. This inquiry seeks to determine the extent and efficacy of past American leverage against Israel. It then suggests a modest role for the arms relation in the Carter Administration's attempts to modulate Israeli policy. Despite significant movement toward peace at the Camp David summit, discussion of American leverage is appropriate given the formidable negotiating tasks that lie ahead in implementing the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and constructing treaties with remaining Arab states.

The United States Congress and Nonproliferation

Abstract: As it emerged from a lengthy process of negotiation, compromise, and amendment in the U.S. Congress, the Nonproliferation Act represents an uncertain composite of two very different approaches to the nuclear proliferation problem: 1) the internationalist approach which commits the U.S. to negotiations and international initiatives, relying heavily upon incentives for cooperative effort; and 2) the unilateralist approach, relying heavily on U.S. intervention and control through export restrictions. Unfortunately, despite considerable attention to international cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle, the real heart of the new law lies in its restrictive, unilateralist export control provisions. The law defines four major mechanisms for the control of nuclear exports.2 The first of these codifies and upgrades requirements for newly negotiated Agreements for Cooperation-bilateral intergovernmental agreements which are the basic vehicle of international nuclear commerce with the United States. In accordance with preexisting practice, new Agreements must be submitted for approval to Congress, which may veto by majorities of both chambers within 60 days. In a change from past practice, the second mechanism requires existing Agreements for Cooperation to be renegotiated to comply with the statutory criteria for new Agreements. Third, the Act creates a procedurally bewildering scheme for the issuance of Export Licenses for individual exports of nuclear items and commodities pursuant to Agreements for Cooperation. Finally, the Act establishes procedures for obtaining U.S. assent, which will be required by Agreements for Cooperation

Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Power

Abstract: It was fashionable several years ago to argue that both food and oil could be used as tools for coercion. International security, once defined and preserved by military might, had suddenly been threatened by the uncertain availability of critical economic resources. Nations seemed in a position to struggle for dominance over one another by offering or refusing access to increasingly scarce primary commodities and raw materials. In one view, the most dramatic aspect of this struggle was to occur between producers of food and oil. Food power was ro be arrayed against oil power. The oil-starved industrial countries, some of which exported food, would confront food starved non-industrial countries, some of which exported oil.’ This looming contest between ”agripower” and ”petropower” was not unwelcome to some in the United States who foresaw their own ultimate triumph, with what had come to be called the “food weapon.“ Having earlier identified food as “one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit,” Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz predicted in 1975 that, “In the long run, agripower has to be more important than petropower.” Assistant Secretary of State Thomas 0. Enders warned in November 1974, at the time of the World Food Conference, that U.S. food power was a natural counter to Middle East oil power. He claimed that “The food producers’ monopoly exceeds the oil producers’ monopoly.” Other State Department officials asserted in 1975 that “we could make OPEC look sick if we were just to use what our agriculture gives us.” The Central Intelligence Agency published its speculation that food abundance might allow the United States to regain the primacy in world affairs which it had enjoyed at the close of the Second World War, when it was the only nation to possess nuclear weapons. Lester R. Brown concurred with these official assessments, observing that, “The issue is no longer whether food represents power, but how that power will be used.”a Yesterday’s prophets of food power have today fallen silent. Exportable oil has

SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine

Abstract: The euphoria in some quarters of the American strategic community following the SALT I accords was largely based upon the inference that Soviet agreement to a virtual ABM ban signified fundamental agreement on strategic nuclear doctrine. Many concluded that this provided a hopeful basis for further collaboration in strategic nuclear arms control. Subsequent disillusionment has been triggered by the slow pace of SALT II and the continuing Soviet strategic buildup.1 The result has been a growing pessimism that divergent strategic doctrines preclude significant strategic accommodation. One strain of determined optimism about SALT even argues that reconciliation of nuclear doctrine be placed first on the SALT agenda, as a necessary basis for substantive agreement.2 There are, however, structural and ideological barriers to any explicit reconciliation of nuclear doctrine. Barring the mostthorough-going transformation of the Soviet system, these appear insurmountable. Until 1953, Soviet military thought, like all other significant aspects of Soviet life, was constrained by a primitive Stalinist orthodoxy. In military thought, this orthodoxy did not extend beyond the assertion of the decisiveness of Stalin's so-called permanently operating factors. These were: the stability of the rear; the morale of the armed forces; the quantity and quality of divisions; the equipment of the fighting forces; and the organizational abilities of the commanders.3 Coupled with the asserted superiority of the Soviet social order, based upon the Marxist-Leninist science of society, these factors amounted to a theological assertion that the Soviet Union would prevail in any future conflict. This recipe, expounded by the "greatest military genius of modern times," precluded the possibility that other factors, such as nuclear weapons or the element of surprise, could affect the outcome of war. Not only was this a prescription for avoiding reassessment of the lessons of the Great Patriotic War (in which the "surprise"

Soviet Nuclear Export

Abstract: The United States is now moving towards nonproliferation and nuclear export policies which will directly or tangentially affect the Soviet Union. Policymakers may be assuming that cooperation between the two countries on nuclear matters will be easy, and may be inclined to engage in a degree of mirror-imaging and wishful thinking about Soviet interests. In designing nonproliferation schemes, it is important to understand what the United States can reasonably ask of the other superpower. The Soviet Union has been considerably more consistent and effective than the United-States in promoting policies to prevent nuclear spread; the Soviet nuclear export control approach may suggest certain lessons for the United States.

A German Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

Abstract: A s an aid in understanding the views of a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on U.S. nonproliferation policy, it is useful at the outset to review the energy situation in the FRG, which in many respects is representative of the situation in other European countries. Nuclear energy plays an important part in this country's endeavors to reduce dependence on oil imports, to diversify sources of supply, and to generate electrical power as economically as possible. Two constraints apply: (1) because the FRG has no significant uranium resources at its disposal but is fully dependent upon imports from non-European countries, it must use reactor systems and fuel cycles permitting maximum utilization of fuel; and (2) the disposal of power plant waste, including spent fuel assemblies, must be effected in a permanent and environmentally acceptable manner. The Government, public opinion, and the courts are making their approval of further development of nuclear energy conditional on a satisfactory long-term solution to the waste management problem. This solution, which also satisfies the first of the above constraints, consists of closing the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle by reprocessing the spent fuel assemblies and manufacturing new mixed oxide fuel assemblies for use in light water or fast breeder reactors; that is, the deliberate development of a plutonium economy.1 The German nuclear fuel cycle center, which is in the project planning stage, will satisfy both of the constraints mentioned above and will also do much to serve the aims of nonproliferation. As all systems are concentrated at one site, the transportation of nuclear fuels is minimized; since the plutonium made available by reprocessing is immediately made up into new fuel assemblies, the amount of free, explosive-grade fissile material is kept as small as possible; by recycling into reactors, the plutonium is conveyed to safe and well-protected locations where it is transformed into non-fissile material by nuclear fission; and international surveillance of the nuclear fuel center will ensure timely discovery of any plutonium diversion. Nuclear energy is also one of the Federal Republic's crucial exports. Even in the fossil-fueled sector, the German electrical industry is highly dependent upon exports in order to ensure the full utilization of its engineering and manufacturing

Iranian Defense Expenditures and the Social Crisis

Abstract: I n 1972 President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, looking at Iran as the second largest oil exporter in the world and a rock of stability in a volatile region of increasing importance to the United States, made the decision that whatever the Shah wanted in terms of military armaments (of a non-strategic nature) he could have. The wisdom of that policy was challenged in the Carter Administration, but at the end of two years the outcome of the debate within the Administration about how (if at all) the U.S.-Iranian relationship should be reshaped had still not been decided when the social explosion in Iran took Washington by surprise. The debate focused on an Iran whose fundamental characteristics until the fall of 1978 seemed fixed and familiar: a country that was strong, proud, confident, and yet militaristic, repressive, and self-centered; a price hawk on oil, but a dependable supplier to the United States and Israel; a paranoid and interventionist around the Gulf, but a supporter of conservative pro-Western regimes. For more than a decade both critics and admirers of the Shah’s regime tended to take the benefits of a stable, self-confident Iran for granted; as guarantor of the regional status quo and counterpoise to emerging radical regimes; as secure supplier of oil to all parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict and invisible but palpable presence behind the governments that favored a moderate solution to Middle East problems; as dampener of Soviet ambitions and as dependable ally of Europe and Japan as well as of the United States on most geopolitical issues. But the strains that built up within Iranian society suddenly turned the country’s role from a constant into a variable, from a factor of certainty to an element of extreme uncertainty. In the worst case, of course, those strains might lead to a Qadafi regime with radical orientation (whose arms and oil might fall into the hands of the Soviets) or a traditionalist regime that tried to turn back the clock of modernization. Of more immediate concern are the growing doubts about the Shahs ability (or the ability of any military, civilian, or religious successor) to govern coherently at home or to project a consistent policy abroad. In this setting, the broad goal of decompressing domestic tensions in Iran must take precedence in shaping all aspects of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, including U.S.-Iranian military relations. Over the past two years, the structure of the debate about how to fashion our

Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective

Abstract: Negotiations over the \"mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures\" in Europe started in October 1973. iifter initial agreement on the precise geographic area where reductions are to be made, and on the principle of including associated measures (i.e., constraints on military forces for the purpose of enhancing political confidence), the negotiations in Vienna have made no progress, taking a back seat to more pressing negotiations in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Western negotiators in what the West calls MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reductions) have focused on ground forces, seeking to achieve a parity of strength through asymmetric reductions. Thus NATO proposed in the first phase that the United States would reduce 29,000 men and the Soviets 68,000 men, to include a tank army of 1700 tanks; in the second phase, the ground forces of both sides would be reduced ro a common ceiling of 700,000 (which according to Western data would mean a total reduction of 199,000 for the Pact and 92,000 for NATO). NATO has sought to make this proposal more attractive by stipulating that if the Pact accepted a collective common ceiling as the basis for negotiation, the United States would in addition withdraw 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 nuclearcapable aircraft and 36 Pershing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). The most recent (October 1977) Western proposals waive the requirement that a complete tank army (which are the best equipped, most forward, and most ready Soviet divisions) be withdrawn, substituting instead any 5 Soviet divisions and the equivalent number of personnel and tanks (1500-1700) in these divisions. Warsaw Pact negotiators have sought equal reductions, first a \"symbolic\" reduction of 20,000 men by each side and then equal percentage reductions of ground and air forces and nuclear-delivery systems in Central Europe of 5 percent to be followed by a second 10 percent cut by each side. The Pact proposal emphasizes national subceilings, limits upon the modernization of forces inside the reductions area, and restrictions on new defense arrangements among the parties to the agreement. The Warsaw Pact is thus seeking to freeze by international agreement its present military advantages in Europe. The specific Warsaw Pact goals seem to be to limit the growth of the German Bundeswehr and (paradoxically) to contain the downward volatility of American deployments in Europe. The West's main goal has been political, to hold the line

The All-Volunteer Force: Five Years Later

Abstract: : For the approximately two million young American men who reach military age each year, there is probably no single public policy decision in the past 25 years more important than the termination of the draft in 1973. The importance of this decision, however, goes far beyond the implications for those most immediately affected by the draft's removal. Whether viewed as an instrument of economic and social policy or in terms of its effects on the maintenance of the U.S. defense effort, the draft was a key element of public policy and touched on nearly every aspect of defense management. The advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) accordingly marks the beginning of one of the largest and most important experiments of its type ever conducted. With the exception of a short 18-month hiatus in the draft following World War II, the Armed Services have been forced to rely on true volunteers as their sole source of military manpower for the first time in more than three decades. Never before in modern history has a nation with such global military responsibilities or such an emphasis on defense been without the authority to conscript young men into military service.

The Historian and Battle

Abstract: writer to climb a mountain-Cezanne’s Mont St. Victoire in Provence, as it happened-Winston Churchill, I think, the first statesman to have flown in an airplane, Joseph Conrad the first, and probably the last, major novelist to have gone around Cape Horn under sail. Thus far, no intellectual has gone into space. I suspect that the NASA personnel selection board finds what it probably calls a “negative correlation” between speculative intellectual habits and suitability for deep space missions, and I can certainly see that I would not myself choose as a capsule companion someone whose mind might well be working on problems of the persistence of self or the space-time continuum when we were supposed to be carrying out a docking maneuver. “Later, later,” are the least impatient words I would expect to hear on my lips in the circumstances. But if we do not know and cannot guess who will be the first man to take a reasonable prose style beyond the stratosphere and bring it back again, we do know who was the first historian to take part in a battle; and the answer, as with so many historical firsts, is Thucydides. He undoubtedly took part in a small naval battle in 424 B.C. Thereafter, the accounts of battles to which we can attach the names of historians as participants flow thick and fast until in our own times it sometimes seems difficult to find major historians who cannot make that claim. The great American admiral-professor Samuel Eliot Morrison was said not only to be perfectly content to let it be known that he had been present at many of the major naval battles of the Pacific war, but was not averse to having it be thought that he had actually stood at Nimitz‘s shoulder and even occasionally waved his hand. Battle is unquestionably one of the most popular of all historical subjects, as something to read about, whether the reader can test the accounts by personal experience or not, and as something to describe, even if the writer saw nothing of the events, but especially if he did. As a result, the shelves of history libraries, whether arranged by date or by country, are burdened with books about battles, ‘or with books in which battles figure very largely. It is only in libraries arranged by subject or name that the pacifically inclined reader can escape from the sight, smell, and taste of blood. Many libraries arranged by theme make the possibility of such an escape almost total, lunging from Dewey Decimal number 354 to Dewey Decimal number 356 across the blood-stained 355, as if it carried the risk of infection. I remember as a freshman at Balliol, already seriously infected by an

Arms Control Enters the Gray Area

Abstract: If a Strategic ArmsLimitation Treaty is reached and ratified, ceilings and subceilings will have been placed on the number of launchers from which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could attack each other over intercontinental distances. If the SALT process is then to continue, the reductions in such ceilings and subceilings becomes an obvious goal of further negotiations. Since both national leaders have endorsed reductions in numbers on numerous occasions,’ it is even more likely that this will be a central feature of negotiations when they resume after SALT 11. Yet, progress in reductions could be an illusion if at least a start is not made in bringing weapons of lesser range under control. These are the gray area weapons that can reach targets 400 to 2,000 miles or more distant from the point of launch. For the most part these weapons are concentrated in Europe and the western military districts of the Soviet Union. These gray area weapons unconstrained by either SALT2 or MBFR3 consist of a wide array of medium bombers, fighter-

On Mutual Deterrence

Abstract: 80)-note the largely ignored records of a substantial number of independent black African states. The reader is left with the impression that 56 pages are devoted to saying “I want my side to win.” As Lloyd Etheredge’s new study of the psychological bases of U.S. foreign policy formation ( A World of Men-MIT Press, 1978) indicates, world peace may be more endangered by the personalities of individuals involved in policy formation than by any other source. If Rhodesia is not significant to the U.S., then perhaps the U.S. should follow the normal procedures to recognize the regime that is in effective control of the territory, as was done in Angola. But whatever choices are made, they should be consistent with U.S. policy elsewhere, and informed by the interests of U.S. foreign policy objectives-not by the personal biases of the observers.

An Indian Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

Abstract: Two events of global significance have molded U.S. nonproliferation policies. First, the increase in crude oil prices made nuclear power economical; simultaneously, export of nuclear power plants and nuclear technology became commercially attractive. The dispersal of nuclear power plants is perceived by the United States as creating the technological infrastructure for the weapons option. Second, the Indian nuclear test of May 18, 1974 heightened American anxieties that a proliferation chain-reaction would follow. Although initial official statements were muted, Henry Kissinger stated a year later: "The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew the spectre of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust."1 Early U.S. policies in the post-1974 period focused upon strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) was directed to study alternative fuel cycles for satisfying energy needs without recourse to breeder technology or reactors recycling plutonium. Other strategems were also employed. President Nixon agreed in 1974 to supply nuclear reactors to Egypt and Israel. The intention could have been initially to obtain ingress and, later, control over the Egyptian and Israeli nuclear programs. In 1976, Pakistan was offered the sale of 110 A-7 aircraft to dissuade her from buying a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. Pakistan's conventional capabilities were sought to be thereby enhanced sufficiently to wean her away from acquiring sensitive technology. President Carter assumed office with a strong personal commitment to nonproliferation. This is evident from his nuclear power policy statement on April 7, 1977 in which he perceived "the risk that components of the nuclear power process will be turned to providing atomic weapons." The elements of an American nonproliferation strategy are embodied in the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA 1978). The emphasis therein on denials of sensitive nuclear technologies and materials, and on constraints on nuclear exports through safeguards, is clear. No exports, for instance, of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and sensitive nuclear technologies would be made unless the recipient non-nuclear weapon state accepts IAEA safe-

New Imperatives for the Old Alliance

Abstract: So wrote Robinson Jeffers, a native American poet of the mid-twentieth century. Of course the Alliance's mission is not just the same mission which has been assumed in the past-only to be performed better henceforth. It is that, but more. Nor is it just a military mission-past or future-though such missions remain important. The risks to the survival of freedom are qualitatively different now than in the past, and the impending tests of our vital and legitimate interests will be new and harsh. Thus the threefold task of survival, of meeting harsh tests of legitimate and vital interests, and of leadership in a disorderly world which is increasingly overshadowed by the essentially autarchic, military power of Soviet Russia-all these must be accomplished without actual resort to military force, if at all possible. That task is, broadly stated, the principal new imperative for the Old Alliance. More precisely, the first new imperative is to complete the restructuring of the central military forces of the Alliance in light of the actual strategic nuclear balance. This is a process which has been slow. The second new imperative is to prepare ways to forfend unduly harsh tests of certain vital and legitimate interests which lie beyond the traditional locus of the Alliance. One condition which is not new in the Alliance is that it remains necessary to start with the United States. This is so even if the Western Europeans must now assume a more decisive role in the world beyond Europe and not just in trade and finance. America cannot force a wider role on any European nation, but