Showing papers in "International Security in 1981"

The Countervailing Strategy

Abstract: The fundamental — and unchanged — strategic objective of the United States is to deter aggression that could lead to nuclear war. To achieve strategic nuclear deterrence, three requirements must be met:

Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front

Abstract: I n response to the Reagan Administration’s plan to ‘ increase defense spending significantly, a highly visible group of critics has emerged which argues that spending greater amounts of money is not the answer to American problems. According to these critics, the shortcomings in America’s defense posture are largely the consequence of overly sophisticated weaponry and flawed doctrine. The most prominent example of this latter deficiency is NATO’s strategy of forward defense, which is designed to engage the attacking Warsaw Pact forces in large-scale battles of attrition along the inter-German border. The critics maintain that this strategy will lead to ruin and that therefore NATO should adopt a fundamentally different approach-a maneuver-oriented defense. Since this argument has received widespread public attention while attracting

On Fighting a Nuclear War

Abstract: The first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making this statement is not for the moment concerned about who will win the next war in which atomic bombs have been used. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’

Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent

Abstract: I t is difficult to imagine a region at once so vital economically and so volatile politically as the Persian Gulf today. To its economic importance, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 was, for many, the first rude awakening. Since then, a stormy sequence of events has underlined its political instability. The Iranian revolution, the fall of the Shah, and the bitter ordeal of the hostages were, for many Americans, a shocking demonstration of that fact; the seizure of the Great Mosque at Mecca and the Iraq-Iran War, part of its grim and continuing confirmation. Concurrent with these stark realizations, the West saw Soviet foreign policy enter a particularly adventurist phase, one in which regional instabilities-in Angola, in Ethiopia, and in South Yemen-were made targets of military opportunity. The possibility that a crumbling order in the Gulf would present the Soviets with even more attractive opportunities was lost on a very few. And when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the West's worst fears suddenly seemed ominously at hand. Jolted by the alarming convergence of events, former President Carter threw down the gauntlet, warning in his 1980 State of the Union Address that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region-will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."' Today, few would deny the claim of former CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner that ". . . the most demanding need for military force in the region would be to oppose a direct thrust by the Soviets into Iran." 2 Indeed, this contingency, under the Carter Doctrine has served as a principal basis for planning of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF).

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity

Abstract: By the mid-1970s, the United States had made all three decisions. It decided to avoid, if it could, the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs), and in 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty limiting ABMs to very low, nominal levels and banning the deployment of other forms of ballistic missile defence. The purpose of the present discussion is to illustrate the analytical manner in which the deployment of the M-X has been related to the objective of crisis stability. The primary purpose of the treaty was to provide a means for codifying parity in the number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and this was done by counting silos, submarine launch tubes, and certain kinds of bombers. This chapter is an edited version of a transcript of a lecture given to the Conference on the Development of Strategic Thinking in the 1970s: Prospects for the 1980s.

A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force

Abstract: A l t h o u g h it is widely believed that the United States needs a Rapid Deployment Force, no one has defined the purposes that an RDF can be expected to serve. Much has been written about the design of the Force: the speed with which it should be able to move, and the troops and equipment it should be able to deploy. Little has been written, however, about the problem of devising a strategy for its use. Design considerations will dictate strategy unless a promising strategy is first devised. If design dictates strategy, Americans may find themselves with a Rapid Deployment Force both over-built and ill-suited to its tasks. As a new U.S. presidential administration takes over the task of developing such capability, it should ask itself two questions. What ends does the United States want an RDF to serve? What, then, is the best strategy for its use?

Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf

Abstract: l hile the United States has been aware of its vital stakes in the oil-rich Persian Gulf for some time, American concern about the vulnerability of the U.S. position in that region is more recent. Historically, the internal stability of the region was of little concern because the area was controlled by conservative monarchies with small and relatively docile populations. Also, the general security of the region seemed assured by the British, who acted as the arbiters of local disputes and the guardians against external threats. When the British withdrew from East of Suez in 1971, the United States sought a new formula for regional security and settled on a twin pillar approach, depending on the Iranians and to a lesser extent the Saudis to guarantee regional stability and security. With the collapse of one of these pillars and the shakiness exhibited in the other (which was in any case never a military power), Americans became aware of the need to find a new basis for regional security. Adding urgency to this search was the growing shadow Soviet power cast over the area. Improved Soviet ability to project power, the erosion of "Northern Tier" barriers to Soviet access to the region, the Soviet foothold along the periphery of the area, and the growing Soviet naval presence in the south, all fundamentally affected the security calculus of the local states and made Americans far more concerned about the Soviet threat in an already shaky, yet critical region. Not surprisingly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served to crystallize American concerns about, and commitment to, countering Soviet threats in the Persian Gulf. Though there are threats to U.S. interests in the region that are internally generated and may be independent of the Soviets-the current war between Iran and Iraq being a case in point-the purpose of this essay is to discuss the somewhat more narrow theme of Soviet threats to the Persian Gulf.

The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society

Abstract: T h e r e is more to SOviet militarism than an open-ended accumulation of military power and a growing reliance on force as a principal foreign policy instrument. In the Soviet Union militarism begins at home. It is rooted in the Russian historical tradition, in the very structure of Soviet society and politics today, as well as in the interests and the mindset of the ruling elite. But an appreciation of the utility of force to protect one's security is not evidence in and of itself of a militaristic orientation. Nor is the use (or even the abuse) of power something unique to the Soviet or to the Russian experience. In his authoritative work, A Histo y of Militarism, Alfred Vagts makes a crucial distinction between what he calls the military way and the militaristic way. From his standpoint:

The Western Alliance: Drift or Harmony?

Abstract: I A number of factors have led, in the past couple of years, to an acute sense of crisis among the members of the Atlantic Alliance and to heightened tensions within it.' Of those, the recent report of the Directors of the American, French, German and British Councils or Institutes of International Relations constitutes an excellent survey.2 Clearly, the three fundamental considerations are: a new awareness of the fact that the world has become a single strategic stage, and that the security of the members of the Alliance can be threatened by events occurring outside its geographic area, especially in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region; the unfavorable evolution of the military balance in Europe, because of the relentless modernization of Soviet conventional forces and of the development of new Soviet middle-range nuclear weapon systems that are both mobile and highly precise; and the collapse of the SovietAmerican detente. In this essay, I will concentrate on what I deem essential: the different reactions to these events within the Alliance, and the causes of these divergences. I will then suggest certain ways to restore harmony.

Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability

Abstract: T h e Western alliance cannot afford a surprise attack. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not have a cushion of material superiority in standing forces that could counteract the effects of major Warsaw Pact success in the first week of battle; the West‘s material superiority in mobilization potential could only be relevant, if ever, in a prolonged conventional war, which is possible only if defeat is forestalled at the outset. Nor does NATO have great strategic depth which can compensate for initial enemy breakthroughs. The Wehrrnacht had to march 600 miles to get to the gates of Moscow; the Soviet Army, which is much more mechanized than Hitler’s was, needs to traverse only a third of that distance to get to the Rhine. Increased destructiveness of modern conventional weapons also means that the initial phases of war will be even more criticial, and nuclear parity places a higher premium on successful conventional defense. The side that strikes first against an unready opponent will have a substantial edge. Most analyses of the surprise attack problem define it in terms of warning: how to improve intelligence collection and analysis to detect Warsaw Pact mobilization in its early phases. If history teaches anything, however, it is that warning in itself is often not sufficient to protect a victim from surprise. There are powerful psychological and political incentives for decision-makers to misinterpret warning or delay the necessary response. NATO’s potential susceptibility to surprise is as much a political problem as an operational one.

A Palestinian Entity

Abstract: For those who look to the Middle East for an imminent resolution to the Palestinian question, there would seem to be little hope. Israeli Prime Minister Begin's settlement policy, the adamant Palestinian-state-or-nothing stance of the PLO, the stubbornness of the Arab rejectionist front, American vacillation, and Jordanian reluctance to enter the Camp David negotiations-all are reasonable causes for pessimism. The solution to this difficult question of Palestinian autonomy, however, may exist. The framework for an autonomous Palestinian entity is now firmly in place. The precise boundaries, the extent of jurisdiction, and day-to-day administrative functions-including internal security-of such a Palestinian entity must be defined in the context of ongoing negotiations. The answers to these questions will take shape as a function of the dynamics-internal and external-of the area, and of the policies of the United States and Israeli leaderships. The creation of an autonomous Palestinian entity will, in my view, occur with the active participation and partnership of Jordan. Jordan's assumption of this critical role is founded, not on the present public postures and actions of King Hussein's Hashemite regime, but on the track record of the Hashemite monarchy over the past 60 years. What is argued here is that an autonomous Palestinian entity in a confederate Arab state of Jordan will take precedence over the stubborn dream of an independent Palestinian state. This development will be the result of six decades of closely intertwined relationships between Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian aspirations.

The Human Face of Deterrence

Abstract: 1 I n the days when the British Royal Marines were divided into the Red Marines and the Blue Marines-the Royal Marine Light Infantry and the Royal Marine Artillery-the nimble-footed Reds, who spent their time training for landing-party duty against Slavers or Boxers or disturbers in general of the great Queen’s peace, had a favorite story about the ponderous, shell-heaving Blues, whose duty kept them confined to battleship turrets afloat and/or barbettes and casemates ashore. It was not a story to be told in earshot of the Blues, whose muscular development normally equalled that of that legendary naval figure, the threebadge stoker; but it was worth telling all the more for the spice of danger the telling entailed. It was about an ancient Blue, long retired from his Whitworth hundred-ton muzzle loader into a comfortable billet and a coastguardsman’s cottage on the South coast. Digesting dinner one Sunday afternoon, full of beer and beef rammed home with a pot of brick-red tea, he was sitting in front of a good blaze of government coal in the kitchen range, with the cat on his lap and the paper on his nose, when he fell into a gentle sleep. As the afternoon wore on, the newspaper slipped from his fingers, slid down his legs, touched the open grate and burst into flames. Luckily at that moment, some errand brought his wife into the kitchen and she, clapping him on the shoulder, yelled “Fire.” The old Blue leapt to his feet, opened the oven door, threw the cat inside, turned the handle, stamped to attention and shouted “Number One Gun Ready.” Knowing what we do today about behavioral conditioning, the story might not even be thought a joke. Oblivious to danger, the old Blue had, in the heat of emergency, responded exactly as he had been taught to the word of command. What more could one ask of a private soldier? And what better illustration could there be of the value of drill? That much misunderstoodby civilians much-mocked-ingredient of military life is not an end in itself, even if on the gravel of Horse Guards Parade it seems to become so. It is, on the contrary, the best method yet discovered to ensure that human beings will stand their ground and handle their weapons when every reflex of selfprotection is screaming at muscle and bone to run away or freeze into inactivity. Much else, of course, reinforces the effect of drill, notably that John Keegan

Energy and the Soviet Bloc

Abstract: I w h a t are the implications of Soviet energy problems for Soviet-American relations? American minds, when first confronted with that question four years ago, understandably leapt first to the Persian Gulf. Now more recent reports appear somewhat less alarming, and so we have a change for more leisurely reflection.2 The Soviet energy problem is more, afterall, than simply a shortage of oil; the other major Soviet energy sources are a concern too (each in its own way). It is more than a crisis of production; issues of consumption, distribution, and substitution of fuels are key elements also. And it is more than a simple problem of penury; for in a couple of decades the Soviet Union could have the most securely abundant energy resources of any major industrial power-if it pays the price, that is, in scarce capital, hard currency, and forgone alternative~.~ In short, the Soviet energy problem is likely to be a

America's Palestinian Predicament: Fallacies and Possibilities

Abstract: A few years ago, a prestigious group of Americans, including a number of prominent American Jews who would later be identified with both the Carter and Reagan Administrations, held regular meetings in Washington and concluded that American interests in the Middle East urgently required a “workable, fair, and enduring settlement” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. ”Comprehensive settlement” became the popular euphemism for the consensus reached by this group, a consensus which became the blueprint for the early efforts of the Carter Administration. Known as the “Brookings Report,” this remarkably prescient document’s primary virtue was that, beyond the consensus, it outlined a feasible, overall political solution to the Arab-Israeli quagmire. It was admittedly a solution to be implemented in cautious stages. Yet the Brookings approach was more a critique than an endorsement of the Kissingerian step-by-step procedures, for it insisted that the contours of an overall settlement were to be agreed upon in advance of the implementation process. The Arab states and most especially the Palestinians were to be expected during the process to credibly prove their willingness to recognize and coexist with Israel; while Israel was to ”agree to withdraw to the June 5, 1967, line with only modifications as might be mutually accepted” and to agree to ”the principle of Palestinian self-determination and some generally accepted means . . . of putting that principle into practice.”

Is There Life After Death for SALT

Abstract: The SALT I "Freeze" Agreement was signed in 1972. It expired by its terms in 1977. Four years later, those terms, for the most part, are still being observed. The SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979. The effort to ratify it faltered later that year and stopped in the fall of 1980, when we elected a President who opposed its ratification. But a year after most politicians and pundits pronounced SALT II dead, its terms also, for the most part, are still being observed. It is even possible that de facto observation may continue for the full duration of the SALT II Treaty, which would have expired at the end of 1985. Of course, there are legal difficulties with the posture of observing a treaty that has expired or not been ratified. Both sides have been careful to preserve the proprieties by proclaiming their own freedom of action, and by stating, in a lower key, no more than their "present intentions" to continue observing, assuming that the other side does also. In the United States, our separation of powers complicates the legal situation even further, and the Executive's statements do not bind the Congress. But the fact is that two years after SALT II was signed, and with the prospects for early ratification somewhere between low and invisible, the United States and the Soviet Union continue to abide by its terms, as well as those of the SALT I freeze on offensive launchers, now four years in its grave. Only the dismantling requirements of SALT II have gone by the boards-a pity because their impact would have been exclusively on the Soviets. Even so, we may well see each side doing some dismantlement for its own reasons. Why is there life after death for SALT? This article proposes to examine why this has come to pass, and where we can go from here.

The Present As Prologue: Europe and Theater Nuclear Modernization

Abstract: formal Alliance decision, controversy still surrounds NATO’s plan for new long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) deployments. The controversy focuses both on the substance and the process involved. Proponents, in Washington as elsewhere, see the decision as an Alliance success, and the process as a model for future decision-making. The Alliance has now demonstrated it can meet new Soviet challenges; the exhaustive consultation procedures did lead to a genuinely informed NATO consensus despite the inherent political risks. Although not designed to match Soviet LRTNF capabilities, ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing 11s do provide a new element in the overall East-West military balance. And there has been due, measured common attention to the problems both of reinforcing American strategic linkage, and of pursuing opportunities for EastWest limitations on LRTNF deployments. For a number of observers, particularly in the continental European states, however, the claims for success are far less persuasive. The issues and uncertainties raised by the LRTNF debate remain and appear fundamental to future Alliance decision-making, on further nuclear modernization as on broader security issues. At the simplest levels are questions concerning the military effectiveness of the weapon systems themselves, especially the 464 GLCMs. In addition, the tradeoffs to be calculated in an era throughout the West of constrained resources for defense must be considered. More important are the domestic

Correspondence: Perspectives on Fighting Nuclear War

Abstract: There is so much that is sane and sensible in Michael Howard's article, "On Fighting a Nuclear War," that I believe a brief public dialogue may be fruitful. This is not one of those all too frequent occasions when representatives of radically opposed schools of thought attack cardboard figures and talk past each other. I cannot do justice to the richness of Professor Howard's article in the space of a letter, but I do hope to suggest that he and some, at least, of the more "war-fighting" minded strategists, are not that far apart. Since I was identified several times in the article as an advocate of policies of which Professor Howard (and the late Bernard Brodie) disapproves, I must assume that my views have some representative character. First, I would like to identify some important common ground. I agree with Professor Howard (and Bernard Brodie) that: nuclear war would be so terrible as virtually to warrant description as an obscenity; a policy of firm containment of the Soviet Union is necessary; credible (as opposed to incredible) threats should be posed; war, if it must be waged, must be waged only for clear political objectives that are in balance with the military means applied; a policy of strategic (inter alia) nuclear deterrence is a regrettable necessity; and, finally, that the Soviet system is manifesting many very serious internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities. On all of that we can agree. Where I find Professor Howard's (and Bernard Brodie's) analysis to be deficient is that it appears to stop when the buttons are pushed. At the very point where we need strategic thinking most, no recommendations are discernible. Of course it is preferable to deter war rather than to wage it; that is not at issue. But what is the connection between prospective prowess in the conduct of war and preor early intra-war deterrent effect? Furthermore, what should we do if war occurs? Perhaps an East-West war can be deterred, or prevented by policies aimed at political stabilization, indefinitely. But what if it cannot be so deterred? What advice would Professor Howard proffer to American SIOP planners?