Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1971"
TL;DR: In this article, a preprint of an article published in International Studies Quarterly, published by Oxford University Press, is presented, where the authors present a set of preprints of the article.
Abstract: This is a preprint of an article published in International Studies Quarterly, published by Oxford University Press.
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TL;DR: For instance, this article argued that the United States' foreign policy is a product of both domestic and external factors; it is based on rational, calculated motives to an indeterminate degree and on non-rational, often spontaneous, motives to a similarly unknown degree; and it is neither totally predictable nor hopelessly whimsical, neither perfectly constant nor endlessly fluctuating.
Abstract: Understanding the process of Soviet foreign policy-making can sometimes be a frustrating challenge. The impatient observer who prefers generalizations or polemics to the painstaking and often dull task of analyzing policy will not readily find the answers he is seeking. Those who seek a handy typecast explaining Soviet foreign policy as that of a classic imperialist nation (or, conversely, that of a satiated, status-quo power) will suffer from a misconception born of oversimplification. Those who attempt to explain the USSR's policy as a direct product of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology will only confuse motivation with rationalization. There is no simple approach which will immediately enlighten the policy-making process. Soviet foreign policy, like that of most other nation-states, is a product of both domestic and external factors; it is based on rational, calculated motives to an indeterminate degree and on nonrational, often spontaneous, motives to a similarly indeterminate degree; it is neither totally predictable nor hopelessly whimsical, neither perfectly constant nor endlessly fluctuating.
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TL;DR: A survey of the elements of political and strategic forecasting can be found in this article, where a cardinal criterion is that forecasting is an architectonic art and that the fundamental elements involved are all mutually interrelated and interdependent.
Abstract: ion from the emerging strategic environment. This is to say that both technical and political elements enter into the strategic equation. Uncertainty as to their future relative weights has been at the heart of strategic insecurity. As Hans Speier (1969: 73) has said, "There exists no doctrine of the peacetime exploitation of military power comparable to military doctrines on the employment of military forces in war. That gap remains to be filled." Once strategy was the servant of politics. Now strategic thinking and forecasting must incorporate the political consequences of strategic designs. The Logic of Forecasting From our survey of the elements of political and strategic forecasting there emerges a conclusion that is also a cardinal criterion: forecasting is an architectonic art. The fundamental elements involved-political, strategic, and technical-are all mutually interrelated and interdependent. By way of conclusion to his historical study of strategic thinking, Michael Howard says (1969: 32): "Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from this survey is the extent to which the quality of strategic thinking in the nuclear age is related to an understanding of international relations, on the one hand, and of weapons technology on the other. ..." "Increasingly," he goes on to observe (1969: 32), "the three fields overlap." Much the same point is made by Arthur Lee Burns (1968: 66). "Perhaps economics, military studies, politics internal and external, and the study of scientific and technological development will come to be thought of as forming a single constellation concerned with the investigation of rational decision and its implications under conditions of radical uncertainty." A somewhat more substantive, but essentially similar, judgment is that of J. David Singer (1969: 5-6), who This content downloaded from 207.46.13.166 on Mon, 11 Apr 2016 14:48:45 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms [348] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY says that "intra-national and inter-national events all impinge on one another in a cyclical and ongoing process within which the self-aggravating propensities usually exceed the self-correcting ones by an unacceptably large amount." Singer is surely right about the past. Systemic compulsions have been fatal to international order. Now we have no excuse not to be on our
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TL;DR: The authors assess empirically the extent to which this presupposition of traditional verbal theory is congruent with an analysis of decision-making in one international arena (the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly) devoted to shaping legal norms for the world community.
Abstract: A dominant presupposition of many writers on international relations and international law is that the world's legal order is essentially a reflection of the structure of the international system and the interests of the main actors in that system (see, for example, Coplin, 1960, 1965: 615-634; Falk, 1966: 172-187; Hoffmann, 1966: 134-166; Kaplan and Katzenbach, 1961; Lissitzyn, 1963). This paper will attempt to assess empirically the extent to which this presupposition of traditional verbal theory is congruent with an analysis of decisionmaking in one international arena (the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly) devoted to shaping legal norms for the world community. In so doing, this paper is intended as a modest contribution to the efforts of those international law scholars who are seeking to make the study of international law a "science of observation" (Alger, 1963: 37). In order to make any headway in this direction, a first requirement is that the concepts indicated in traditional verbal theory have clear empirical referents. Although international relations literature is copiously strewn with references to the ''structure of the international system," the meaning of this
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the relationship between universal international organizations dedicated to the maintenance of peace and security and the systemic contexts within which these operate, and argue that changes in the political context within which the organization exists and functions account for the difference between the United Nations of 1946 and that of today.
Abstract: This essay focuses attention on an area that has been largely neglected in the theoretical literature on international organizations: the relationships between universal international organizations dedicated to the maintenance of peace and security and the systemic contexts within which these operate. Of all the variables affecting the behavior of such organizations, the systemic forces which envelop them are clearly the most crucial. In fact, it has become banal to assert that the successes or failures of international organizations stem not so much from their formal-legal covenants as from changing configurations and distributions of power, systemic issues and forces, and the attitudes and resources of member-states. As Inis Claude ( 1967: viii) put it in discussing the United Nations: "Changes in the political context within which the organization exists and functions-not the relatively minor changes that have been made in the Charter-account for the difference between the United Nations of 1946 and that of today."
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TL;DR: For instance, the authors describes the growth of international relations as a discipline between the two world wars, and argues that the human mind begins to exercise itself in some fresh field, an initial stage occurs in which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyze facts and means weak or nonexistent.
Abstract: E. H. Carr (1958: 5) has suggested that "when the human mind begins to exercise itself in some fresh field, an initial stage occurs in which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyze facts and means weak or nonexistent." Whatever the validity of this statement in the development of other disciplines, it describes the growth of international relations, especially in its formative years, as a discipline between the two world wars (Thompson, 1960; Fox, 1968: 1-35). Although the study of international relations has always had a normative element, and the study of causes and resolution of conflict has been of continuing concern to students of international relations, the focus both of teaching and research has shifted, especially since World War II. The study of international relations has passed through three stages which may be characterized as utopian, realist, and behavioral or, stated differently, normative, empirical-normative, and
3 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that international relations scholars are not focusing on a crucial aspect of international phenomena, that perhaps the nature of the beast prevents us from doing this, and some possible reasons for this deficiency will be suggested.
Abstract: James Rosenau (1967) has suggested that international relations scholars should devote more of their time to playing their respective "games" in their respective ballparks than to taking potshots at others playing other games in other parks. This is a well timed criticism. The last decade has witnessed much intramural squabbling, and this article should not be viewed as simply another international relations scholar once again falling into this easy trap. The focus here is not the question of how to study international relations (which was Rosenau's focus), but what it is that we are studying. It will be argued that we are not focusing on a crucial aspect of international phenomena, that perhaps the nature of the beast prevents us from doing this, and some possible reasons for this deficiency will be suggested. Finally, we will suggest that the practitioners of international relations, the diplomats involved in the day-to-day international bargaining, are in some ways more concerned about this aspect than are international relations scholars.
TL;DR: Despite an enormous amount of attention by political scientists over the last couple of decades, fundamental confusions persist about the nature of the Atlantic Community and its utility as a unit of political analysis as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Despite an enormous amount of attention by political scientists over the last couple of decades, fundamental confusions persist about the nature of the Atlantic Community and its utility as a unit of political analysis. We have learned a great deal about the foreign policy priorities of the nations of the North Atlantic area; we have a considerable understanding of the capacities of regional and subregional institutions; and we also have vast quantities of transactional and attitudinal data bearing on the emergence of a North Atlantic economy and society. But the problem that remains is how to put it all together-and whether and why it might be worth the trouble. The pieces are difficult to fit together primarily because they have been collected for different purposes, and, therefore, tell distinct if related stories. Moreover, much of this research was informed by world views and aspirations that may no longer be relevant or entirely adequate. While we, therefore, know a good deal about the properties of the North Atlantic area, it is necessary to distinguish the transitory from the long-term trends; to be sensitive to the limitations of the available data; and to remain open to the possibility that we may have to
TL;DR: In the case of the former Soviet Union, a dominant political and military position for the Soviet Union was formalized in the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (see Ambroz, 1969), which has existed since the bloc's inception following World War II.
Abstract: Studies of the relations among the countries of the Soviet bloc have directed much attention toward changes over time in the extent of bloc "integration." However, these studies have seldom incorporated the concepts of more general theoretical treatments of integration or used the various empirical indicators developed. One reason for this is that the broader studies have, for the most part, concentrated upon situations substantially different from those in the Soviet bloc. Since much of the theoretical application of work on integration has focused on Western Europe, many of the theoretical propositions deal with integrative processes among relatively equal sovereign states. In the Soviet bloc, on the other hand, an almost totally dominant political and military position for the Soviet Union, formalized in the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (see Ambroz, 1969), has existed since the bloc's inception following World War II. In addition, much of the empirical evidence upon which the more general studies rest is either not available or not as relevant in the case
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed usable indices for a select group of alliances and regional systems operating in the early 1960s, based on a survey of the literature on alliances, regional systems, and the process of integration.
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to develop usable indices for a select group of alliances and regional systems operating in the early 1960s.1 Those following the literature on alliances, regional systems, and the process of integration know that it is a sizable array. Considerable space, in some journals, such as International Organization, is devoted to reporting the most recent structural or functional innovations in various organizations such as OAS. To be aware, then, of all the facts concerning contemporary alliances and regional systems is a challenging enterprise. In addition, several journals, including the one mentioned above, carry basically historical pieces which may develop a variety of
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the efforts des meilleures tetes de l'Europe constituaient un capital immense de savoir utilisable, the tradition naive de la politique historique de convoitise et d'armiere-pensees se poursuivait, and cet esprit de Petits-Europeens livrait, par une sorte de trahison, a ceux-memes qu'on entendait dominer, les methodes and les instruments de puissance.
Abstract: Il n y aura rien eu de plus sot dans toute l'histoire que la concurrence europ&enne en matiere politique et economique, comparee, combinee et confrontee avec l'unite et l'alliance europeenne en matiere scientifique. Pendant que les efforts des meilleures tetes de l'Europe constituaient un capital immense de savoir utilisable, la tradition naive de la politique historique de convoitise et d'armiere-pensees se poursuivait, et cet esprit de Petits-Europeens livrait, par une sorte de trahison, a ceux-memes qu'on entendait dominer, les methodes et les instruments de puissance.