Franklin & Marshall College

Abstract: Humans express a wide array of ideal mate preferences. Around the world, people desire romantic partners who are intelligent, healthy, kind, physically attractive, wealthy, and more. In order for these ideal preferences to guide the choice of actual romantic partners, human mating psychology must possess a means to integrate information across these many preference dimensions into summaries of the overall mate value of their potential mates. Here we explore the computational design of this mate preference integration process using a large sample of n = 14,487 people from 45 countries around the world. We combine this large cross-cultural sample with agent-based models to compare eight hypothesized models of human mating markets. Across cultures, people higher in mate value appear to experience greater power of choice on the mating market in that they set higher ideal standards, better fulfill their preferences in choice, and pair with higher mate value partners. Furthermore, we find that this cross-culturally universal pattern of mate choice is most consistent with a Euclidean model of mate preference integration.

Abstract: While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, "shored up" and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. "Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher," Chemero writes in his preface, adding, "I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything." With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought.

Abstract: Recent and emerging technology permits psychologists today to recruit and test participants in more ways than ever before. But to what extent can behavioral scientists trust these varied methods to yield reasonably equivalent results? Here, we took a behavioral, face-to-face task and converted it to an online test. We compared the online responses of participants recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and via social media postings on Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit. We also recruited a standard sample of students on a college campus and tested them in person, not via computer interface. The demographics of the three samples differed, with MTurk participants being significantly more socio-economically and ethnically diverse, yet the test results across the three samples were almost indistinguishable. We conclude that for some behavioral tests, online recruitment and testing can be a valid-and sometimes even superior-partner to in-person data collection.

Abstract: Two experiments with adult subjects investigated the effects of a person's positive affective state on his or her subsequent helpfulness to others. \"Feeling good\" was induced by having received cookies while studying in a library (Study I) and by having found a dime in the coin return of a public telephone while making a call (Study II). In Study I, where the dependent measure involved volunteering in reply to a student's request, a distinction was made between specific willingness to help and general willingness to engage in any subsequent activity. In Study II, the dependent measure was whether subjects spontaneously helped to pick up papers that were dropped in front of them. On the basis of previous research, it was predicted that subjects who were thus made to \"feel good\" would be more helpful than control subjects. Results support the predictions.

Abstract: A theory of affordances is outlined according to which affordances are relations between the abilities of animals and features of the environment. As relations, affordances are both real and perceivable but are not properties of either the environment or the animal. I argue that this theory has advantages over extant theories of affordances and briefly discuss the relations among affordances and niches, perceivers, and events.