Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1980"

Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders

Abstract: Do the personal characteristics of political leaders affect their governments' foreign policy behavior? The present study examines the impact of 6 personal characteristics of 45 heads of government on the foreign policy behavior of their nations. These characteristics, each of individual interest, interrelate to form two orientations to foreign affairs, and the influence of these orientations on foreign policy behavior is also explored. The results are reported for all 45 heads of government, as well as for those leaders among the 45 with high or low interest in foreign affairs and with little or much training in foreign affairs.

Why Violence SpreadsThe Contagion of International Terrorism

Abstract: This study examines the spread of international terrorism from 1968 to 1974. Using Poisson and negative binomial probability models, a diffusion of international terrorism was found in the first segment of the time period (1968–1971) and contagion as a direct modeling process in the second (1973–1974). Accordingly, the theory of hierarchies in which the diplomatic status of a country predicts its degree of imitability was found to operate among Latin American countries during the second portion of the overall period, but not during the first. An inverse hierarchy is suggested as an explanation for the contagion of violence from Latin America and other third world countries to Western Europe. Autocorrelation functions were used to assess which forms of terrorism were most contagious in which regions.

Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions

Abstract: This research focuses on national role conceptions, which are defined as foreign policy makers' perceptions of their nations' positions in the international system. They include perceptions of the general kinds of decisions, rules, commitments, and long-term functions associated with these international positions. Role conception variables concerned with the perception of status, motivational orientation, and substantive problem area are obtained from a content analysis of speeches by 29 decision makers from 17 nations. Correlational analyses show strong correspondences between role conceptions and four foreign policy behaviors. A multidimensional analysis (MDPREF) uncovers two important factors which are interpreted as “cooperative-competive” and “low status-high status.” The MDPREF results demonstrate that leaders from the same nations had very similar role conceptions. Many similarities are also apparent in the roles expressed by policy makers from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Trade Dependence And Foreign Policy Compliance A Longitudinal Analysis

Abstract: It is widely believed that asymmetrical economic interdependence affords political leverage on foreign policy whereas symmetrical economic transactions generally do not. A more recent impression is that “vulnerability” (as opposed to mere “sensitivity”) dependence identifies those particular asymmetrical economic ties that create political opportunity. We adopt these distinctions to test the proposition that asymmetrical trade vulnerability compromises the foreign policy behavior of the more dependent of two partners. We examine trade and foreign policy relations between the United States and the 25 nations that were trade dependent upon it between 1950 and 1973. Time-series data for trade and selected roll calls of the UN General Assembly permit cross-sectional and longitudinal tests of the underlying political economy proposition. The evidence is consistent with the expectation that the asymmetrical trade vulnerability of the dependent countries leads to their compliance, albeit selective, with U.S. foreign policy preferences. On roll calls not salient to the United States, dependent countries are no more in accord with the United States than are the remaining Assembly members. Our data reinforce the tentative conclusions of two studies that were exclusively cross-sectional. Even so, there is some indication that trade sensitivity has no systematic political repercussions. The last interpretation lends quantitative support to an interdependence thesis that has previously relied upon case study evidence.

Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher: Presidential Address

Abstract: Although everyone is for “more theory,” most of us have rather little understanding of how to get “more theory.” This essay suggests one approach to theory development: thinking in terms of puzzles. To develop the concept of “puzzlement,” three bodies of literature are reviewed, and sets of conflicting evidence are presented as puzzles. The solutions to the puzzles are left to the next generation of IR researchers.

The Search for the “Breaking Point” in VietnamThe Statistics of a Deadly Quarrel

Abstract: American strategies for success in the Vietnam War, derived at least partly from historical experience, were based on the assumption that Communist forces would reach a “breaking point” after suffering enough punishment. In conformity with this strategy, extensive damage was inflicted to the point where it appears the military costs accepted by the Communists, in comparison with population, were virtually unprecendented in modern history. The central question about the war then is: Why were the Vietnamese Communists willing to accept virtually unprecedented losses for a military goal that was far from central to the continued existence of their state? Some aspects of an answer to this question are suggested; the strategy of attrition is assessed in historical comparison; and the question of where the “breaking point” might have been is discussed.

Trade Union Confederations: A Comparative Study of Identity and Strategy

Abstract: Confederations of trade unions are shown to accommodate both their own constituencies and their external social environments. This function is unique, and this mission of mediation is an important source of their organizational self-conception and autonomy. In the pursuit of strategy, trade union confederations play a game of trade-off and break-off with their partners in bargaining, and thus become involved in a sequence of dissociation and rapprochement, especially vis-a-vis ruling political parties—irrespective of ideological commitment. This observation is particularly true for modern industrial countries with “corporatist” leanings. It is exemplified for the case of Britain and West Germany.

Observations on “Why Violence Spreads”

Abstract: The study of terrorism has undergone a number of developments in recent years. One of the most important is the adoption of quantitative methods. Long mired in unproductive arguments over the a priori disadvantages of statistical techniques in studying violence, the field has discovered that terrorist activity is amenable to systematic analysis. With their article "Why violence spreads," Midlarsky et al. (1980) have joined a small but growing group of scholars raising new and stimulating questions about terrorism and the environment in which it occurs. Like all new fields, however, the quantitative study of terrorism is fraught with obstacles. The three looming largest are data reliability, the selection of a level of analysis and universe of discourse, and making the transition from quantitative analysis to substantive argument and explanation.

The Study of International Relations in the United StatesPerspectives of Half a Century

Abstract: The study of international relations is becoming more truly international and is developing new dimensions and new approaches. It is not “an American social science,” although it has been more extensively pursued in the United States than in any other country. There is no distinctive American approach, but a multitude of approaches. The gulf between the scholar and the practitioner is still wide, but there are many “intermediaries.” Dominant trends over half a century and significant contemporary themes, concerns, and contributions are briefly analyzed. The beginning of the 1980s is an appropriate time for an overall review of “the state of the art.” This should be done on a transnational basis. The need for a continuing transnational dialogue on basic methods, approaches, interpretations, and research opportunities and needs is pressing.

Intergovernmental Organizations and Cooperation Among Nations

Abstract: In this article, we examined empirically the levels of cooperative behavior of nations inside and outside of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), across types of IGOs (global, regional, “high politics,” “low politics”) and across types of nations (measured by relative size and level of economic development). We first confirmed the conventional view that foreign policy cooperation inside and outside IGOs is substantially different in each instance, but we also discovered significant differences in cooperation among the various types of IGOs. The low politics and the global IGOs showed particularly high levels of cooperation, but the regional organizations did not. The national attributes of the participating states proved not to be very useful in distinguishing the level of cooperation inside the various IGOs. Instead, knowing the type of intergovernmental organization seems more important in understanding interstate cooperation than knowing the type of state. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed throughout the article.

Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling

Abstract: Global resource scarcity has recently led to a proliferation of nonviolent resource conflicts, with one of the most viable being the direct physical confrontation on the high seas between Greenpeace (a transnational conservationist organization) and the Soviet whaling ships. Focusing on the politics of whaling, this study explores the possibility that conflict between private lobbying groups and nations may be more effective in achieving environmentalist objectives than the more traditional government-to-government negotiations. The limits to the generalizability of this notion are then delineated.

Comment on Mueller

Abstract: The war in Southeast Asia was a competition in resolve between the United States (with its clients in Saigon) and the Vietnamese Communists. In the preceding article John Mueller presents a fine analysis of half of this competition. The worst that could be said is that the result is a bit like the sound of one hand clapping. It is hard to appreciate fully the question of the Communists' breaking point without more explicitly considering America's. My critique, therefore, is marginally supplementary more than contradictory. Mueller's point-that the Communists absorbed great losses in pursuit of a goal that was not vital to national survival-may undervalue North Vietnam's stake in unifying the country. The mystique of union always makes civil wars more brutal and less susceptible to resolution short of complete victory by one side than wars between separate states. If North Vietnam conceived the south as a separate entity it wanted to acquire, rather than as part of itself that it wanted to get back, it might indeed have decided it would rather switch than fight, once it felt the weight of American power. In reality, the goal of unification may have been close to absolute, rather than a relative interest that would decline in proportion to pain. Given the tremendous disparity in the power of the contestants, the key to Hanoi's ultimate success, and the reason Washington reached the breaking point first, must lie in the asymmetry of stakes. U.S. interests were relative. In terms of Realpolitik, American involvement was driven by the containment doctrine, but in this regard Southeast Asia was a tertiary theater. Only the defense of Europe could provoke unlimited American commitment. In terms of idealistic motives, Washington wanted to make Vietnam safe for democracy, but years of paternalistic attempts to create strength and stability in Saigon's governing capacity failed to overcome the fatal fissiparous weakness in the political culture

Cross-Cultural Perception and World War IIAmerican Japanists of the 1940s and Their Images of Japan

Abstract: The decade of the 1940s saw the United States and Japan bitter enemies, reconciled on terms dictated by the United States only after the total subjugation of Japan. The 1940s were also a crucial decade in the development of studies on Japan in the United States. This essay examines that decade's writing on Japan of six Americans—Ruth Benedict, John M. Maki, Edwin O. Reischauer, Charles B. Fahs, John F. Embree, and Helen Mears—and seeks to document the relation between their views of the United States and their views of Japan. The essay suggests that those writers most fully committed at home (to America, to democracy) were those least able to empathize with Japan, and that those somewhat critical of the United States were able to present a less distorted picture of Japan. Thus, the study of writers' domestic commitments emerges as one important guide to the understanding of their views of foreign reality.

Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and InterviewsA Note on Reliability Problems

Abstract: Content analytic procedures for operationalizing 6 personality attributes (Hermann, 1974, 1980) are applied to 92 (1950–1978) interviews with 10 heads of state and government. Focusing on data reliability, a test of temporal consistency is examined. The outcome suggests that the trait scores are not sufficiently consistent across time to be considered highly reliable. Two possible sources of trait score variance (data source and situation) are considered, and data for one source are investigated through an analysis of variance. In general, the findings cast some doubt on the utility of analyzing interviews to obtain measures of foreign policy makers' personality attributes. Further attention must be devoted to the multiple problems of source bias, situational circumstances, and temporal inconsistency.

CommentsOn “Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability Problems”

Abstract: Several issues are not considered by Rasler, Thompson, and Chester in their research note on reliability problems that are highly germane to the concerns they are raising regarding the use of content analysis with interviews as a way of assessing the personal characteristics of political leaders. These issues include: (1) the debate among personality psychologists about the stability of personality traits; (2) the question of how researchers interested in studying the individual characteristics of political leaders can begin to measure such characteristics in leaders who are virtually inaccessible; and (3) the various types of materials that are available for political leaders which can be content analyzed. A discussion of these topics will put the Rasler et al. note into better perspective. For the last decade and a half, there has been a debate among personality psychologists concerning whether, as the title of one of the articles (Alker, 1972) states, "personality [is] situationally specific or intrapsychically consistent." In other words, are there such things as traits, or are all characteristics situation specific, showing great variation across situations? (For a detailed discussion of all sides of this issue, see Alker, 1972; Bem, 1972; Bem and Funder, 1978; Block, 1968; Bowers, 1972; Carlson, 1971; Epstein, 1979; Mischel, 1968, 1969, 1977; Moos, 1969.)

Rules of the Game in International Politics

Abstract: Just as the relationship of the individual to society is defined by a network of norms and values, the relationship of the state to other actors in the international system can be thought of as being governed by a network of permissions and constraints—rules of the game. However, previous attempts to apply norm theory to international politics have faced problems of description and identification. Required is a much more specific typology of rules to account for differences in form and application. The classification suggested here includes, at one end of the continuum, legally binding written agreements, and, at the other end, independently reached self-restraints. In between, on a descending scale of explicitness, come nonbinding written agreements; verbal gentlemen's agreements; the spirit, i.e., the tacit dimension, of formal accords; and purely tacit agreements. Rules of the game work to preserve order by preventing conflict and facilitating cooperation. Elaboration of the idea suggests that there is wide scope for further research application.

The Kissinger Years: Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy

Abstract: Henry Kissinger's memoirs, White House Years , constitute an important addition to the extant literature on the former Secretary of State. This article is concerned with the study of individuals and the ways which can be used to gain “access” to foreign policy makers. Memoirs provide a potentially useful source of data and means of access to high-level decision makers. Kissinger's memoirs are discussed and evaluated as a research tool within the context of previous biographical and psychological/cognitive studies of Kissinger. Three specific areas of comparison—Kissinger's views of Nixon the individual and statesman, Kissinger's approach to bureaucracy, and Kissinger's policy for dealing with the Soviet Union—are used to illustrate the continuity of his belief system and the consistency between his memoirs and previous research on Kissinger.

The Dutch Foreign Policy Elite: A Descriptive Study of Perceptions and Attitudes

Abstract: This study deals with aspects of the foreign policy-making process in a small Western European industrialized democracy: the Netherlands. A group of researchers from several Dutch universities carried out a research project regarding perceptions and attitudes held by members of the Dutch foreign policy elite. Interviews were held with members of the bureaucracy and the parliament (the formal elite) and with leading members of the churches, business, public interest groups, newsmedia and universities, political parties, advisory councils, and labor unions (the informal elite). An analysis is presented of problems of democratic control over foreign policy, as perceived by the elite. The perceptions of the elite of Dutch influence and power in world politics are dealt with, as well as the question whether the Netherlands should be seen as a "small nation" (and with what kind of consequences). Finally, three specific aspects of Dutch foreign policy are discussed: security policy, European unification, and development aid. The study is built in part on previous work, mainly by American authors, that has used the foreign policy- making machinery of the United States as its point of reference. Some of the conclusions of this article could well be used for comparative purposes, especially in the case of countries such as Norway and Sweden, in which similar studies have been conducted.

The Decision To Divide Germany and The Origins of the Cold War

Abstract: The division of Germany between East and West was in itself a sufficient condition for the emergence of what came to be known as the Cold War in Europe. Most of the literature on the origins of the Cold War regards the division of Germany as the consequence of a deepening conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. This article argues that an inability to agree on the future of Germany was not the consequence of this conflict, but its cause, and that this inability to agree was simply the result of the fact that the four former Allies believed the risks associated with letting go of Germany, once it had been divided among their occupation forces, were greater than the risks associated with nonagreement. This conclusion is supported both by a general analysis of the interdependent choice situation posed by the occupation of Germany and by reference to the published diplomatic record. The article also argues that the diplomatic record has been widely misunderstood in several important respects.

Scientific Prediction versus Crystal Ball Gazing: Can the Unknown be Known?

Abstract: Freeman and Job (1979) attempt to provide formal mathematical distinctions between predictions and forecasts in international relations. Serious problems exist, however, in their models. For example, they fail to clearly define “probability” in their models, which creates confusion regarding how, exactly, predictions are distinct from forecasts. Also, in their treatment of actual applications of the models, empirical generalizations are not clearly delineated from definitions and assumptions, further confusing their arguments. In general, no firm basis is given in the article to establish a probability value in their models that is distinct from the unscientific practice of “crystal ball gazing.”

Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads

Abstract: An analysis of the foreign policies of black African states toward industrialized nations in the middle 1960s is employed in a partial test of a theory of the foreign policies of subordinate states in asymmetrical dyads. In this theory, the interaction of two conditions-the state of a nation's economy and the extent of concentration in its linkages with a superordinate power-is used to explain the foreign policy actions of the subordinate state toward the superordinate country. Directed dyads are divided into asymmetrical and nonasymmetrical sets, and the hypotheses are tested over both sets via regression analysis. The findings confirm the importance of structural asymmetry as a scope condition on the theory but offer only limited support for the use of the economic strength and linkage concentration variables in the explanation of foreign policy. The results also reveal that the influence of these two variables on foreign policy is not precisely as stipulated by the theory. For the more developed African states, relative economic strength in combination with highly concentrated linkages is associated, contrary to the theory, with a foreign policy of expanded relations with superordinate partners. For the less-developed states, this combination produces a foreign policy designed to restrict relations within the asymmetrical dyad as predicted by the theory.

Management Science in the USSRThe Role of “Americanizers”

Abstract: Soviet studies of organization and management have evolved, in part, through purposive organizational activities designed to recreate the behavioral patterns of a referent, namely, the United States. This study examines the penetration of a reputedly "closed" societythe USSR-by ideas and methods popularized in American administrative science. In the early 1960s, domestic actors in the Soviet Union (Americanizers) began to use the prestige of the U.S. discipline, usually considered the world's most advanced, as a political resource to enhance their own influence at home. Making substantive adaptation to select U.S. ideas-business games, case methods, optimal decision-making techniques-Americanizers later on would utilize those ideas in socialist theorizing. Their role as agents of change over the past two decades reveals an ongoing policy process which has been augmented significantly through national-international linkages connecting administrative specialists in both countries. In that process, Americanizers have enjoyed certain institutional as well as informal bargaining advantages, including unusual access to the current regime's leadership. Not only do Americanizers play an influential role in policyrelevant matters, but they have undercut orthodox political economy views on administrative questions. Consequently, Americanizers have succeeded in changing the pace and direction of management science in the USSR-the field has at long last entered the mainstream of world developments. And, on the conceptual plane, this study concludes that models and approaches ignoring transnational phenomena can seriously underestimate the permeability of the Soviet system.

Rejoinder to “Observations on ‘Why Violence Spreads’”

Abstract: We certainly appreciate the interest Heyman and Mickolus show in our work and we fully believe that a discourse of this type is necessary for the advancement of knowledge. Most important, we welcome the opportunity to further develop and refine our theory in response to their queries. We will treat their concerns in the order in which they were presented. As we understand it, Heyman and Mickolus raise questions in three areas: (1) the choice of a data base, (2) the level of analysis employed, and (3) the universe of discourse. In the matter of data quality and especially questions of validity and reliability, they are quite proper in their concern about this issue, but in fact historically we had little choice in the matter. At the time this study was begun in the fall of 1976, the only available data on international terrorism were found in the Rand collection and, whatever the obvious problems inherent in this or any other data compilation for that matter, our decision to research the problem systematically foreclosed the issue. The Mickolus data, of course, were collected subsequent to the beginning of our project. We would indeed welcome the opportunity to test our models and findings on another data set, but that is more properly the subject of another article. At the start of their discussion of the findings, there exists an unfortunate confusion in the all-too-common specification of the Poisson as the onli' model of randomness. The Poisson, in fact, is one among many random models of which the Polya distribution and its limiting form, the negative binomial, are additional types.

Zambian Crisis BehaviorRhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Abstract: This study of the behavior of Zambia's decision makers, confronted with the implications of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, forms part of Michael Brecher's International Crisis Behavior Project and employs (with adaptations) his ICB framework. This article analyzes by period the critical situation Zambia faced, particularly as a result of its historical legacy of almost total dependency on Rhodesia for energy supplies and access to the sea for its copper exports. Next, it seeks to measure, by means of a content analysis of official statements, changes in crisis-induced stress over time in terms of the basic elements in Brecher's operational definition of a crisis. The paper then dissects the decision-making process with respect to one decision in one phase of the crisis in terms of the coping mechanisms employed. On the basis of this, certain tentative conclusions on Zambian crisis behavior are outlined. Finally, the attempt is made to set the Zambian case in the perspective of the wider ICB Project and of African foreign policy studies generally.

Comment on MuellerAmerican Misperceptions

Abstract: Professor Muellers article examines one major aspect of American strategy in the Vietnam war, by addressing what was important to our own decision-making process. I am not convinced, however, that it gets at what was fundamentally significant in the conduct of the war from our adversaries' point of view. It is most revealing that, five years after the American defeat, we are offered another example of a persistent flaw in American strategic thinking about the nature of the Vietnam war. I refer to the belief that the United States was engaged in a conflict which could be measured primarily in American dimensions and within our scientific framework when in reality the war strategy that countedpsychologically and politically-was the one designed by the Vietnamese Communists and refined continuously to meet the needs of a complex situation evolving over decades. In Professor Mueller's article we have a brilliant, well-documented analysis of an American football game set forth in terms which we find intellectually compatible. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese Communists' game was of their own choosing. While Professor Mueller's statistics are not irrelevant, the course of the war was decided on grounds closer to the Communist conception of reality and according to rules not susceptible to the precise quantification of which we Americans are so fond. Indeed, reading certain sections of Professor Mueller's analysis, I feel uneasily at home-as if I were returning to those lucid American Embassy Saigon and MACV papers of the 1960s. My basic disagreement springs from Professor Mueller's question regarding the U.S. search for a "breaking point." He questions why the Vietnamese were "willing to accept virtually unprecedented losses for the sake of a military goal that was far from central to their survival as a nation," (emphasis added). This major premise misses the essence of the Vietnam war. It also reflects the fundamental misperception of Ameri-