Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1986"

Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict. Two schools of thought exist on this issue: some prominent writers suggest that interdependence produces greater international conflict, while others suggest that it produces a decline in conflict. These arguments are reviewed and empirically tested here. Previous empirical studies bearing on this issue are found to use inadequate measures and biased samples. More comprehensive analyses presented here suggest that interdependence can have mixed consequences. Several measures of interdependence that embody its costly aspects are found to be positively associated with conflict, implying that interdependence produces increased international conflict. However, when these measures are controlled for, another key measure is found to be inversely related to conflict. This suggests that both schools of thought may be correct: while the costly aspects of interdependence seem to produce greater international conflict, its beneficial aspects appear to produce a decline in conflict. In recent years, international interdependence has emerged as an important phenomenon in world poiitics and a popular concept in the international relations literature. International issues as diverse as trade embargoes, environmental degradation, nuclear arms races, and the transmission of inflation have been grouped together under the rubric of interdependence. Early writers on interdependence, such as Cooper (1968), focused mainly on the problems it creates for domestic and foreign economic policymaking. More recently, a number of studies have appeared that examine the implications of interdependence for international politics. The most influential of these has been Keohane and Nye (1977). However, other than a few studies that examine whether interdependence is increasing or declining worldwide, I no broad, comparative analyses of the impact of interdependence on international politics

Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination

Abstract: Most studies of trade sanctions examine the success of sanctions at forcing the target country to change its policies. This article analyzes the success of sanctions in terms of a broader set of goals: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. I examine 19 sanctions cases using different evaluatory criteria for each goal. Three results emerge from the analysis. First, sanctions generally fail when the goal is compliance, subversion, or deterrence, but they have a great appeal as international and domestic symbols. Second, sanctions often reinforce the target's behavior and forfeit the initiator's future economic leverage over the target. Third, the goals of international and domestic symbolism usually undermine the goals of compliance and subversion.

On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence

Abstract: A reconceptualization of Holsti and Rosenau's three-headed eagle is proposed which locates the categories of Americans' foreign policy beliefs they posit along two empirically derived attitude dimensions described as cooperative and militant internationalism. The reconceptualization incorporates differences between unilateralist and multilateralist preferences, argued by Holsti and Rosenau to presage a fourth head on the eagle. Drawing on the quadrennial foreign policy surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the hypothesized emergence of unilateralist and multilateralist preferences is probed empirically, and comparisons across time and between elites and masses are made based on the typology of Americans' foreign policy beliefs derived from the two internationalism dimensions, as described by the labels accommodationists, hardliners, internationalists, and isolationists.

Interorganization Theory and International Organization

Abstract: This article explores the applicability of a conceptual framework derived from interorganization theory and network analysis to the study of international organization. The framework emphasizes the pivotal role of linking-pin organizations and of boundary-role personnel within these organizations in transnational networks. A set of issue-specific and organization-specific factors accounting for variance in network structure and performance are tentatively identified, and a number of working hypotheses are formulated. The framework is applied to one case study of a recent international aviation issue with political implications, the so-called Show Cause Order-an attempt by the US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to challenge the fare-coordinating role of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) prescribed by the postwar international aviation regime. (Less)

Organizational Routines and the Causes of War

Abstract: This study identifies the theoretical linkages by which rigid organizational routines of the military may contribute to the outbreak of war, and examines the analytical problems involved in making such inferences. It is argued that military routines have an impact on the outbreak of war only in combination with other systemic, organizational, bureaucratic, and psychological variables. The failure to recognize the independent role of other variables in inducing rigid adherence to existing military plans, as well as the danger of spurious inferences, results in incomplete explanations and the attribution of excessive causal weight to organizational routines themnselves. Systemic variables determining 'military necessity' are particularly important. The greater the extent to which military necessity influences both the development of contingency plans and their rigid implementation in a crisis, the less the causal weight that can be attributed to the nature of the plans themselves. The less rigid the plans really are in terms of military necessity, the greater their causal importance and that of other variables, Military routines and interests can also contribute to the outbreak of war through their role in the development of military doctrine and war plans. These theoretical linkages are illustrated by an analysis of the military mobilization and war plans for World War I.

Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade

Abstract: Recent emphases on reciprocity, bilateralism, retaliation, and regulatory restrictions (e.g., pollution, health, and safety standards) in US trade policy have been viewed as serious threats to the liberalization of international trade which characterized the post-World War II period. This paper explores a different interpretation, arguing that the bilateralism, reciprocity, and regulatory standards which have been viewed as moves toward protectionism can also be seen as mechanisms for dealing with the enforcement problem inherent in trade agreements in the presence of costly negotiation, costly enforcement, and strong protectionist constituencies. Trade policy among large economies has aspects resembling a ‘prisoners' dilemma’ because each country has an incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior by reneging on its commitments to liberalization. In the absence of effective third-party enforcement, a ‘self-enforcing agreement’, which through its terms automatically imposes substantial costs on any party guilty of noncompliance, may be one viable means of enforcement. Reciprocity, bilateralism, and regulatory standards can serve to facilitate self-enforcing agreements.

Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings

Abstract: In performing judgment, inference and choice functions in the foreign policy decisionmaking process, decisionmakers acting as practical-intuitive historians rely on a variety of procedures. These include: rules of thumb, heuristics, propositional knowledge structures and non-propositional structures of a more schematic nature. These procedures draw, among other sources, on the decisionmakers' subjective information and comprehension of events, situations and personalities from one's own nation's history or foreign nations' histories, and are applied to current tasks. This study attempts to introduce a systematic theoretical analysis of how decisionmakers use these historical analogies, metaphors and extrapolations. The main questions discussed are: What are the functions the use of history serves? How are past, present and future compared? What motivates the use of history? And what are the typical shortcomings of using history as expressed in potential biases and errors? The study concludes with a number of prescriptive suggestions for controlling the risks of abusing history.

Consensus Lost. Consensus Regained?: Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders, 1976–1980

Abstract: To what extent there was a foreign policy consensus in the United States during the two decades following World War II continues to be debated. But most students of American foreign policy agree that the war in Vietnam fostered a situation reminiscent of the 1930s when there was little agreement on such basic issues as the nature of the international system, America's national interests and the most likely threats to them, and the appropriate strategies to promote those interests. Many of the ‘axioms’ that guided policy through the initial decades of the postwar era were, after Vietnam, the subject of often intense debate. However, data on the persistence of cleavages, beyond the period immediately following the conquest of South Vietnam, are much scantier. The underlying issue in this paper is that of persistence versus change. Did the patterns of American leadership beliefs a year after the end of Vietnam persist through 1980?; and did the ideological, occupational, and other correlates of foreign policy beliefs change during these four years? Answers to these questions are sought in data from two nationwide surveys of American leaders in 1976 (N = 2,282) and 1980 (N = 2,502). The years 1976–1980 were marked by turbulence at home and abroad. Expectations that the end of the Vietnam and Watergate episodes would provide a period of healing proved to be overly optimistic. It was thus a period during which one might well have expected substantial changes in the content and structure of foreign policy beliefs. Indeed, claims of a convergence of beliefs were in ample supply as leaders in both political parties proclaimed the existence of a post-Vietnam foreign policy consensus. The data presented here, however, offer little evidence of change during the four years ending in 1980, much less of a new consensus.

The Electoral System and Constituency-oriented Activity in the European Parliament

Abstract: A common system of election to the European Parliament is called for in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, but this clause has never been implemented. Most proposals for a common system abolish the single-member districts of the British MEPs. This may have some important consequences for the future development of the European Parliament as an institution. The literature on constituency service and the perceptions of representatives suggests that representatives from single-member districts should have a stronger constituency orientation and electoral connection than representatives from multi-member districts. The attitudes and behavior of British and French MEPs are used to test this assertion. The evidence presented indicates that British MEPs are more constituency oriented, have a stronger electoral connection, and participate in constituency-oriented activities more frequently than the French. If the behavior of the French MEPs is any indication of the responsiveness of MEPs in general, the European Parliament may not be very responsive to the needs of their Euro-constituents. In the future, a common electoral system may decrease this responsiveness even more as the incentive to engage in constituency-oriented activities also decreases.

Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom

Abstract: Although the theory of deterrence is widely accepted, many of the important propositions derived from the general argument have yet to be tested against the record of interstate conflict. The research reported here tests four propositions that relate to hypothesized differences between deterrence and compellence. Based on the results from an analysis of 135 international conflicts, I conclude that conventional wisdom regarding these assumed differences is faulty in some significant respects. Specifically, I find that deterrence of immediate threats is usually no ‘easier’ than compellence, and that compellence is not ‘reckless’ behavior in the sense that rash decisions are made.

World Power and the Strategic Trap of Territorial Commitments

Abstract: Long cycle theorizing argues that systemic leadership depends upon the creation and maintenance of a global network of bases to support sea, and later aerospace, based capabilities of global reach. Control over, and responsibility for, extensive amounts of territory tends to be counterproductive to the extent that territorial commitments drain attention and resources from the global network. After briefly illustrating the existence of this strategic dilemma in the 16th and 17th centuries, we concentrate on the empirical relationship between onsets of British imperial warfare and the ratio of navy to army budgets between 1671 and 1913. As anticipated, the longitudinal relationship between imperial warfare, an indirect indicator of expanding territorial commitments, and the budgetary primacy of sea-power concerns is found to be negative and statistically significant. We interpret this finding to be supportive of the view that expanding territorial commitments can constitute a strategic trap for system leaders, and as such, a partial explanation for the decline of their ability to function as leaders. We conclude with some suggestions about how this historical problem may relate to the contemporary foreign policy problems of the current system leader, the United States.

Assumptions and Dilemmas in the Study of Americans' Foreign Policy Beliefs: A Caveat

Abstract: The preceding contributions to this Symposium have focused on the substantive interpretation of evidence regarding stability and change in Americans' foreign policy beliefs. The purpose of this essay is to further this dialogue by focusing on the methodological and epistemological issues involved generally in the study of foreign policy beliefs. The salient assumptions underlying the approach to inquiry taken by the Holsti–Rosenau and Wittkopf projects are identified, and the obstacles to understanding and threats to valid inference posed by these assumptions are illuminated. After highlighting some cautionary principles surrounding the interpretation of research findings, the essay concludes with a series of prescriptions for subsequent research in this area of investigation.

A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War

Abstract: This study puts forward a theoretical framework which is suggested to explain the onset of systemic war and its absence during long periods of systemic continuity. The basis of this framework is an international structure, called the hierarchical equilibrium, which consists of: (a) two or more alliances (or other loose hierarchies such as loosely knit empires) of varying size and composition but clearly including a great power and a number of small powers within each; and (b) a relatively large number of small powers not formally associated with any of the great powers. A set of stochastic equilibrium equations is associated with the theory and was tested for the period 1816–1964 using Correlates of War dispute data. The equations were obeyed in the 19th century and post-World War II period, but not in the intervals approaching both World Wars, thus suggesting the ability of the framework to distinguish between essentially peaceful periods and those which are prone to the onset of systemic war.

The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy

Abstract: incidents of gunboat diplomacy ranging from 1946 to 1978, this article empirically tests the hypotheses and statistically evaluates them. The results indicate that the most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim. During the early part of the 1980s the world has experienced a remilitarization of international relations. The emphasis has been on the use of physical coercion as a means of achieving objectives, as confrontations in the Falklands, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Iran and Iraq painfully illustrate. The pendulum seems to have swung away from detente and the dominance of the economic North-South split, back to the Cold War and the supremacy of the military East-West split. Despite the presence of some full-scale wars during this period, states have exhibited a marked preference for applications of limited military force. The Reagan administration has led the way in this regard, and an excerpt from an April 1984 speech by Secretary of State George Shultz (1984: 18) explains the underlying rationale:

The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?

Abstract: Researchers' values, personal moods of optimism and pessimism, and an overabundance of data and information vitally affect theoretical and empirical work in international relations. A consequence is the difficulty of creating reasonably reliable portraits or maps of the world and of trends therein. This is the problem of multiple realities. The essay demonstrates how data can be used to construct an optimistic portrayal of the achievements of developing nations, and of the declining incidence of some kinds of wars. The overall picture that emerges varies significantly from most contemporary analyses of the development and war problematics, studies that emphasize a generally worsening situation. With some important qualifications, the human community has made significant progress in a relatively short period of time. Our storehouse of knowledge about these trends has increased in many ways, but moods and multiple realities continue to frustrate the search for genuinely reliable knowledge.

The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders: Some Further Thoughts on Theory and Method

Abstract: Thomas Ferguson, Charles Kegley, and Eugene Wittkopf have contributed three useful and challenging essays to this symposium. Between them they have raised a set of important questions. Wittkopf is concerned with classifying and interpreting data on public and leadership opinions, and his own extensive research on the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys provides him with a strong base for comparison, constructive criticism, and prescription. From a somewhat different and broader perspective, Ferguson is also concerned with the issue of inference. Kegley's long essay is a challenge to all scholars who are engaged in any type of survey research; whether or not one accepts all of his observations, they are not trivial and therefore he has performed a useful service in bringing them to our attention. In short, with relatively little overlap, the three essays have raised significant questions about our project in ways that should be of interest to other students of American foreign policy. Although it is not included in the present symposium, we might also cite the useful critique in a recent paper by William Chittick (1986), which draws upon data from his own elite survey. Although his data yielded the same three clusters of beliefs that emerged from our 1976 and 1980 studies, he also presents evidence that additional dimensions are necessary to describe adequately the foreign policy views of American leaders. Because an adequate response to all the points raised in these interesting essays would require far more time and space than is available, we will only select a few points for emphasis. Wittkopf's essay proposes an alternative way of categorizing and interpreting the leadership survey data, drawing upon his extensive analyses of the CCFR data as well as our suggestion (Wittkopf's Table 1) about the possible emergence of a significant unilateral-multilateral dimension of opinion. His thesis is sufficiently persuasive that we are now in the process of trying to replicate his analyses as precisely as possible, although an exact replication won't be possible because there is only a partial overlap in

Level of Processing of Exports: New Estimates for 73 Less-developed Countries in 1970 and 1980

Abstract: A large body of literature in political science, sociology, and development economics asserts that specialization in the export of unprocessed goods hinders a nation's economic development. However, attempts to test that thesis empirically have been thwarted by the absence of a good measure of export processing. In this paper we introduce such a measure and use it to provide estimates of export processing for 73 (LDCs) in 1970 and 1980.

Compensation or Opportunity? The Effects of International Recessions upon Direct Foreign Investment and Growth in Third World States, 1970–1978

Abstract: This research investigates the effects of international recessions upon the role of direct foreign investment in underdeveloped countries. Arguments for two schools of thought are examined: (1) the opportunity school, which regards recessions as presenting poor countries with a chance to reduce the role of foreign investment in their societies; and (2) the compensation school, which sees economic disturbances as leading multinational corporations to use underdeveloped states to offset the problems posed by the recession. The results from the analysis indicate that recessions only are used as a moment of opportunity under the very limited circumstances found when the underdeveloped host state has a high total stock of investments in mining that are predominantly from a home state perceived as domineering in its relations with the host state. Attempts at compensation were found to center around the protection of valuable Third World markets and sources of raw materials. No evidence was found indicating that foreign investors increase their repatriation of profits, nor was there any effect by foreign investment on growth during a recession.

The Right Consensus?: Holsti and Rosenau's New Foreign Policy Belief Surveys

Abstract: This article is a (friendly) criticism of recent writings by Holsti and Rosenau on the foreign policy views of American elites. It argues that their own data show a marked shift to the right by business, lawyers, and some other occupational groups during the late 1970s. It raises some questions about the adequacy of Holsti and Rosenau's questionnaire design and scaling procedures, and it rejects their suggestion that the experience of the Vietnam War explains later divisions among American elites.

Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest-group Theory and Foreign-policy Implications

Abstract: This study analyzes congressmen's voting behavior with regard to the ‘Fair Practices in Automotive Product Act (HR 5133)’, commonly known as the local content legislation, which was introduced to the 97th US Congress. Among other things, we conducted a quantitative analysis involving four independent variables: congressmen's party affiliation, their closeness to labor, the unemployment rate in their home states, and their seniority in Congress. As a result, congressmen's closeness to labor was found to be more important than their party affiliation, or the other two variables, in explaining their vote on local content. On further investigation, we have arrived at a new understanding of congressional politics, namely that labor's trade impact is possibly maximized on measures unlikely to become law, and that congressmen often support such measures to send signals to domestic constituencies and to foreign governments. The study goes on to discuss the negative implications of such congressional ‘signalling’ for US—Japanese relations, thereby underscoring the need to examine congressional politics in the context of alliance politics and the declining US hegemony in an interdependent world.

Technological Innovation and Cooperation in Arms Races

Abstract: Cooperation in the form of either tacit or formal agreements is a relatively rare event in both contemporary and historical arms races. Yet, analysts of most arms races suggest that all the participants usually can benefit from mutual cooperation. In this analysis, arms races are represented as Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games of finite but uncertain length. Based on this plausible formulation, the conditions when mutual and/or unilateral tacit cooperation is ‘rational’, in a game theoretic expected payoff sense, are examined. Then the dynamic effects of technological innovation and formal arms control agreements on the payoff structure of the IPD game are introduced. Given these new conditions, the possibilities for cooperation are reexamined. This initial exploration permits a number of tentative conclusions about the conditions under which it is rational to cooperate, and why cooperation is so difficult to achieve in arms races.

Realignment in ITOs: A Closer Look

Abstract: In a previous paper, Berkowitz (1983) applied expected utility theory to obtain necessary but not sufficient conditions for decisions by International Treaty Organization (ITO) members to ‘confirm’ their membership or ‘defect’. Unfortunately, in his test of the theory, Berkowitz included only nations which took positive action to confirm or defect. Non-realigners (nations choosing neither to confirm nor to defect) were not included. We show that the inclusion of such non-realigners is essential even for a test of necessary but not sufficient conditions. We then replicate Berkowitz's analysis, including a sample of decisions by ITO members not to realign. The results significantly modify Berkowitz's original findings by allowing us to distinguish the significances of the individual variables (which Berkowitz was unable to do). We find that changes in the potential realigner's utility for its current allies' issue positions is the single most important contributor to the decision to realign. We also find that power considerations appear to be insignificant as regards this decision.