Showing papers in "Journal of International Affairs in 2011"

Can One Laptop Per Child Save the World’s Poor

Abstract: The One Laptop per Child (OLPC) program is one of the most ambitious educational reform initiatives the world has ever seen. The program has developed a radically new low-cost laptop computer and aggressively promoted its plans to put the computer in the hands of hundreds of millions of children around the world, including in the most impoverished nations. Though fewer than 2 million Of OLPC's XO computers have been distributed as of this writing, the initiative has caught the attention of world leaders, influenced developments in the global computer industry and sparked controversy and debate about the best way to improve the lot of the world's poor. With six years having passed since Nicholas Negroponte first unveiled the idea, this paper appraises the program's progress and impact and, in so doing, takes afresh look at OLPC's assumptions. The paper reviews the theoretical underpinnings Of OLPC, analyzes the program's development and summarizes the current state of OLPC deployments around the world. The analysis reveals that provision of individual laptops is a utopian vision for the children in the poorest countries, whose educational and social futures could be more effectively improved if the same investments were instead made on more sustainable and proven interventions. Middle- and high-income countries may have a stronger rationale for providing individual laptops to children, but will still want to eschew OLPC's technocentric vision. In summary, OLPC represents the latest in a long line of technologically utopian development schemes that have unsuccessfully attempted to solve complex social problems with overly simplistic solutions. ********** The One Laptop per Child (OLPC)program is one of the most ambitious educational reform initiatives to date. The program has developed a radically new low-cost laptop computer and aggressively promoted its plans to put laptops in the hands of millions of children around the world, including those in the most impoverished nations. The program's founder and chairman, Nicholas Negroponte, has argued that children can use this new computer to not only teach themselves, but also their family members. (1) This paper argues that the premises and approach of OLPC articulated by Negroponte are fundamentally flawed. The poorest countries targeted by OLPC cannot afford laptop computers for all their children and would be better off building schools, training teachers, developing curricula, providing books and subsidizing attendance. Middle- and high-income countries may benefit from educational use of laptops. However, this can only happen if they devote substantial effort and funding to the kinds of infrastructure development, teacher training, curriculum development, assessment reform and formative evaluation necessary for school laptop programs to work. Unlike Negroponte's approach of simply handing computers to children and walking away, there needs to be large-scale integrated education improvement efforts. (2) OLPC's VISION OCPC's vision is strongly shaped by Negroponte's background and views. Having been the founder of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Media Lab and an initial investor in Wired magazine, he is not bashful about asserting his idealistic views on the transformative power of new technologies. As he wrote in an influential 1995 book, "like a force of nature, the digital age cannot be denied or stopped." (3) The OLPC program represents a marriage of Negroponte's digital utopianism and the constructionist learning theory of Seymour Papert, Negroponte's longtime colleague at MIT. Papert views learning as highly dependent on students constructing ideas and individual laptop computers as essential for carrying out such construction in today's world. He argues that having several students share a computer is as inadvisable as having multiple students share a single pencil. (4) In the OLPC program, Negroponte, Papert and others sought to develop and distribute a low-cost "children's machine" that would empower youth to learn without, or in spite of, their schools and teachers. …

State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability

Abstract: The contemporary literature on authoritarian durability focuses more on democratic-looking institutions such as parties, elections and parliaments than the institution in which authoritarian regimes are most importantly embedded: the state itself. This article argues that state power is the most powerful weapon in the authoritarian arsenal After clarifying the regime-state distinction and explaining why regime durability involves more than just duration, we discuss four "infrastructural mechanisms" through which authoritarian regimes stabilize and sustain their rule: (1) coercing rivals, (2) extracting revenues, (3) registering citizens and (4) cultivating dependence. Since state apparatuses are the institutions best geared for performing these tasks, their effectiveness underpins authoritarian durability in a way that no other institution can duplicate. And since state power is shaped by long-term historical forces, future studies should adopt the kind of historical perspective more often seen in leading studies of postcolonial economic development than of authoritarian durability. ********** "You should no more confuse the state with its government than you would confuse a fine Jaguar automobile with the person who drives it." Professor Robert Frykenberg (1) States and regimes are perennial yet largely parallel obsessions in political science. (2) When scholars study the state, they commit to exploring the extent rather than the form of government. (3) Specialists on regimes undertake the inverse commitment, asking how and why the state's power is constrained rather than extended and expanded. One conversation centers on whether and why regimes are democratic or authoritarian, while the other asks whether and why states are capable or incapable of effective governance. In this article we aim to bridge these parallel conversations by arguing that state power is the strongest institutional foundation for authoritarian regimes' staying power. (4) The intellectual division of labor between studies of regimes and states is both essential and unfortunate. Professor Frykenberg's pithy formulation distinguishing states from the governments that run them (or in authoritarian settings, the regimes that run them) proves useful for understanding why. (5) The separation is essential because states and regimes are analytically distinct, but unfortunate because states and regimes are empirically intertwined. Though all metaphors have their limits, we find the notion of the state as a kind of machinery that is linked but not reducible to the actors who operate it helpful in three respects. First, states are apparatuses that vary considerably in their power to undertake political tasks and accomplish political ends. Where states exhibit substantial "infrastructural power," or the capacity "to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm," the regimes that run them are the most immediate beneficiaries. (6) Where states look more like jalopies than Jaguars, the regimes that command them find themselves in an entirely different world when trying to assert control and establish domination. Second, regime leaders are not usually the original architects of the states they operate. Drivers may customize, repair or "soup up" their cars, but they rarely build them from scratch or convert them into something that dramatically outperforms the original model. State apparatuses are typically inherited rather than originally constructed by the regimes that run them, particularly in the postcolonial world. A strong state is the best historical foundation for a durable authoritarian regime, not vice versa. Third, even the strongest state apparatus cannot entirely protect a regime from catastrophic "operator error." Though states are institutions with considerable historical momentum, they must still be led by fallible human agents. Ironically, highly capable state apparatuses may be especially vulnerable to regime incompetence, since bad leadership is more damaging when the machinery responds readily to unwise top-down commands. …

Zimbabwe's Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism

Abstract: Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe survives because a coalition of political and military elites stands ready and willing to employ violence to execute the Machiavellian vision of President Robert Mugabe and perpetuate his control of the state. Several variables reinforce the durability of this regime--chief among them the mass out-migration and the large inflow of remittances that has decimated the middle class and dampened the political voice of those who remain in the country. Beginning in 2000, Zimbabwe's authoritarianism became militarized with the overt intrusion of the security sector into the political arena, a process that reached its peak before the June 2008 presidential runoff election. The electoral dimension of its authoritarianism stems from the fact that the regime unfailingly holds elections in search of popular legitimacy but then manipulates them for its own ends. This article dissects Zimbabwe's militarized form of electoral authoritarianism with specific reference to the 2008 reign of terror. It concludes that the factor that best explains the regime is the symbiosis between the party and the security sector, with Mugabe providing the glue that binds them together in pursuit of regime survival ********** Many one-party and dominant-party regimes survived the demise of the Soviet era despite the broad sweep of modern political democratization. Among the survivors was Zimbabwe. (1) This article focuses on the case of Zimbabwe with specific reference to the country's elections in 2008 and the factors that played critical roles in the maintenance of the political regime. It argues that the security factor looms larger than other explanations, but also brings into the equation variables that work to cushion the regime but that are not intrinsic to it. EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON OF AUTHORITARIAN DURABILITY Authoritarian durability is not a new political phenomenon, nor is it a dying one. The euphoria generated by the collapse of many seemingly robust one-party and dominant-party regimes overshadowed the preceding interest in studies of authoritarianism to a point where "the end of the twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of studies of democracy and democratization." (2) Thomas Carothers notes that a dominant characteristic in the last quarter of the twentieth century was the "simultaneous movement in at least several countries in each region away from dictatorial rule toward more liberal and often more democratic governance." (3) Indeed, the implosion of the Soviet Union led some scholars to triumphantly declare "the end of history" and the global victory of liberal democracy. For instance, Francis Fukuyama declared that we had reached "the end point of man kind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." (4) But end-of-history triumphalism was quickly dampened by the return of history when authoritarianism found ways of mutating under new conditions. Instead of brutally suppressing liberal-democratic institutions, dictators manipulated them. Thus, Carothers observes that "the widely hailed wave of democratization that washed over the [sub-Saharan African] region in the early 1990s has ended up producing many dominantpower systems." (5) Andreas Schedler concurs, detecting "the startling spread of multiparty elections without democracy," and explains: The new stars in the constellation of nondemocratic governance are "electoral authoritarian" regimes, which conduct regular multiparty elections at all levels of government yet violate basic democratic standards in serious and systematic ways." What happened? This question has confounded many and lies at the core of the puzzle about the resilience of authoritarianism in its many subtypes, especially in the era of democratization. Several schools of interpretation have emerged to account for this puzzle. …

State Institutions and the Survival of Dictatorships

Abstract: Nominally democratic institutions such as political parties and legislatures are common in dictatorships, which rely on them to maintain control of the state. Parties and legislatures provide a means through which dictatorships co-opt potential opponents, distribute rents to supporters and mitigate elite conflicts. Indeed, regimes with these institutions have longer tenures than those without them. Using evidence from postwar dictatorships, this study demonstrates that parties and legislatures also enhance the ability of authoritarian regimes to withstand leadership transitions. Transfers of power are inherently destabilizing. Yet we find that dictatorships with parties and legislatures are far less likely to be associated with instability because these institutions insulate regimes from the disruptive effects of unconstitutional leadership transfers. ********** Dictatorships are commonly perceived as repressive regimes in which power lies in the hands of a single individual, not with political institutions. Though this is true of some dictatorships, for much of the authoritarian world the reality is far more complex. Many authoritarian regimes grant partial political rights to their citizens, incorporate some level of power sharing between leaders and elites and rely on other strategies beyond repression for their survival. (1) Perhaps most surprising is the frequency with which dictatorships incorporate nominally democratic institutions, such as political parties and legislatures, into the regime apparatus. Indeed, legislatures and political parties serve important functions in both democracies and dictatorships, but before turning to this discussion, it is important to clarify what we mean by political parties and legislatures. We define political parties as organized groups with roughly similar objectives and views that seek to influence policy through the process of getting candidates elected to public office. (2) Political parties in democracies represent the citizenry, help aggregate interests, channel public opinion and educate and socialize voters. Though political parties in dictatorships are not always able to influence policy, they serve a number of important functions, like coordinating elections and organizing the masses to prevent coup attempts. Moreover, parties allow the regime to recruit supporters, providing an additional means of controlling society and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of foreign observers. They also help co-opt elites by facilitating power-sharing deals and manage elite conflicts by distributing the spoils of power. We define legislatures as independent bodies of elected or selected individuals vested with the responsibility of making, amending or repealing laws. (3) These institutions also serve as a forum for elites to discuss policies, map out political agendas, coordinate actions or simply air grievances. (4) Dictatorships rely on parties and legislatures because they help to prolong their survival. (5) Indeed, regimes that use these institutions are longer lasting than those that do not. (6) On average, dictatorships with neither a party nor a legislature rule for three and a half years, dictatorships with at least one party rule for eight and a half years and dictatorships with at least one party and a legislature rule for eighteen years. (7) These differences are substantial. Regimes with at least one party last more than twice as long as their institution-free counterparts, a relationship that is even more pronounced when they also possess legislatures. (8) Because parties and legislatures are so important in extending the longevity of regimes, of the 236 authoritarian regimes in power from 1946 to 2009, only four used neither a party nor a legislature during their tenures. (9) Dictatorships appear to be well attuned to the fact that legislatures and political parties prolong their lifespans. Most incorporate parties and legislatures into the regime apparatus at some point during their rule. …

Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or Mutually Reinforcing Strategies

Abstract: This article explores the strategies used by China and India to build a strong relationships with Africa. It analyzes China and India's competing interests and strategies around four broad issues: access to Africa's potentially vast markets, development cooperation, diplomatic influence and energy security. Several questions are raised based on the nature, similarities, differences and impacts of Chinese and Indian strategies. Will these create a new dynamism in South-South relations, or lead to a new form of asymmetrical relations between Africa and its Asian giant friends? What are the likely implications of closer Sino- and Indo-African ties for the continent's relations with the West, Africa's traditional trading partner, with which it has long-established relations, economic ties and strategic interests? In seeking explanations or answers, we caution that the differences between Chinese and Indian strategies of engagement are more of form than intent, underscoring the primacy of the competing national interests that do not completely foreclose mutually reinforcing strategies. We note that India's strategies presently swing between playing "catch up" with China--which has clearly made greater inroads--and pragmatically accommodating Chinese and other interests in Africa. There are even instances, as in the case of the Sudanese oil industry, in which Chinese and Indian oil companies are cooperating as partners in an oil-producing consortium, despite competing in other African countries. While the emerging scenario is one of competition that is moderated to some extent by accommodation, we conclude, based on certain conditions, that in the medium to long term, India may turn out to be more competitive than China in its engagement strategies with Africa. ********** Over the last decade, China and India, two emerging global economies, have become Africa's most important economic partners, and their growing engagement with the continent is transforming Africa's international relations in a dramatic way. This relationship has evolved over time, but is currently dominated by competing interests in trade, investment, economic cooperation and the quest for influence. Trade between China and Africa is believed to have grown from about $20 billion in 2001 to $120 billion in 2009. (1) In the same regard, estimates suggest that trade between India and Africa rose from $9.9 billion in 2004-05 to $39.5 billion in 2008-09. (2) While securing energy resources is a critical factor in China's and India's expanding relations with Africa, both countries are also strengthening trade, investment and aid ties with Africa through various bilateral and multilateral forums such as the Asia-Africa Summit, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the China-Africa Business Council (CABC), the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), the India-africa Project Partnership and the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum. Africa, with an estimated population of about 900 million, is a potentially huge market for investments and manufactured commodities. In addition, given its vast natural resource wealth, including oil, the continent offers a trove of natural and energy resources--raw materials in high demand by the rapidly industrializing Asian giants. Also, given the socioeconomic and security challenges facing Africa, including the poverty of a vast majority of its peoples, the continent offers a developmental opportunity for aid, cooperation and peace support operations based on Southern solidarity. This article explores the competitive and mutually reinforcing strategies used by China and India in Africa. It also provides explanations for the ways competition between them has to some extent been moderated by accommodation as they pursue their interests in Africa. In setting about its task, this article is divided into four broad sections. The introduction addresses the background and key issues, including how the rising profile of China and India in Africa affects the continent's relations with its traditional trading partners in the West, who are concerned about what it could mean for their own interests and influence in Africa. …

The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean

Abstract: Submerged tensions between India and China have pushed to the surface, revealing a deep and wide strategic rivalry over several security-related issues in the Asia-Pacific area. The U.S.-India nuclear deal and regular joint naval exercises informed Beijing's assessment that U.S.-India friendship was aimed at containing China's rise. China's more aggressive claims to the disputed northern border--a new challenge to India's sovereignty over Kashmir--and the entry of Chinese troops and construction workers in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region escalated the conflict. India's reassessment of China's intentions led the Indian military to adopt a two-front war doctrine against potential simultaneous attacks by Pakistan and China. China's rivalry with India in the Indian Ocean area is also displacing New Delhi's influence in neighboring countries. As China's growing strength creates uneasiness in the region, India's balancing role is welcome within ASEAN. Its naval presence facilitates comprehensive cooperation with other countries having tense relations with China, most notably Japan. India's efforts to outflank China's encirclement were boosted after Beijing unexpectedly challenged U.S. naval supremacy in the South China Sea and the Pacific. The Obama Administration reasserted the big picture strategic vision of U.S.-India partnership first advanced by the nuclear deal. Rivalry between China and India in the Indian Ocean, now expanded to China and the United States in the Pacific, is solidifying an informal coalition of democracies in the vast Asia-Pacific area. ********** The past few years have seen a dangerous rise in mutual suspicion between India and China, propelling bilateral relations toward a deep and wide strategic rivalry. This article examines the security issues that have led to the open breakout of competition between India and China long implicit in their geographical proximity and their great power ambitions in neighboring areas and the Indian Ocean. New Delhi's perspective of Chinese policies that aim at the strategic encirclement of India, as well as Beijing's outlook on India's attempt to limit China's influence in South and Southeast Asia and its power projection into the Indian Ocean, has overridden their formulaic statements of shared interests as partners in strengthening a multipolar world. The new reality of rivalry is evident from the following security issues: (1) the escalation of the Sino-Indian border dispute; (2) the deepening of the strategic alliance between China and Pakistan; (3) China-India rivalry in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean; and (4) India's "Look East" policy to promote bilateral ties with other countries that have tense relations with China in the region, not least, the United States. China's long-standing dismissive attitude toward India's capabilities and great power ambitions was shaken when the Bush Administration began protracted negotiations with India in 2005 for entering into a long-term strategic partnership, shortly after their defense ministers signed the bilateral New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship. (1) The U.S.-India nuclear deal, approved by Washington and New Delhi in 2008, carved out an exception for India from American law prohibiting commerce in civil nuclear energy with a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The last minute push of the Bush Administration to gain an unconditional exemption for nuclear commerce with India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exacerbated China's suspicions that closer U.S.-India friendship was aimed at containing China's rise. Between 2002 and 2010, India and the United States carried out fifty joint military exercises. Since 2008, India has signed arms deals with the United States worth $8.2 billion. (2) China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs pressed India for an explanation, even suggesting that an Asian NATO was in the offing. This exaggerated response coincided with a much more aggressive Chinese claim to the disputed northeast border along the McMahon Line on the Himalayan frontier and the Line of Actual Control (LAC). …

Iran's Regime of Religion

Abstract: Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment, redefined religion and created institutions to enforce this new definition. The effect has been a transformation of religion into a symbolic form of capital. By monopolizing religious affairs, the political system has become a regime of religion in which the state plays the role of central banker for symbolic religious capital. Consequently, the expansion and monopolization of the religious market have helped the Islamic Republic increase the ranks of its supporters and beneficiaries significantly, even among critics of the government. This article demonstrates how the accumulation of religious capital in the hands of the government mutually influences the nature of the state and the clerical establishment and will continue to do so in Iran's uncertain future. ********** "The problem is not one of constructing definitions of religion.... It is a matter of discovering just what sorts of beliefs and practices support what sorts of faith under what sorts of conditions. Our problem, and it grows worse by the day, is not to define religion but to find it." Clifford Geertz (1) The political orientation of the Shiite clergy did not originate with the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Shiism had political value in Iran long before the founding of the Islamic Republic. Five centuries ago, the Safavid dynasty established Shiism as the government's official ideology. This was a historical turning point for the Shiite clerical establishment, which benefited from new political, social and economic privileges. For about five centuries, Iranian politics has been made in coordination with the clergy. Even the Pahlavi dynasty--known for its authoritarian and secular agenda--needed to give the impression that it was safeguarding Shiism as the government's official religion in order to gain legitimacy. The overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and emergence of an Islamic Republic in 1979 was an exceptional development in the history of the Shiite clerical establishment. Prior to the revolution, the clergy's role had been officially limited to the realm of sacred affairs, but the post-revolution era fundamentally changed the relationship between state and religion in Iran by thrusting clerics into unprecedented positions of political power and laying the groundwork for the development of Iran's unique strand of religious authoritarianism. However, over the past three decades the Islamic Republic has consolidated power and is now imposing its will on the clerical establishment that produced it, particularly the seminaries in the holy city of Qom, as well as on society more broadly. Thus, in order to better understand religious politics in Iran, we must also examine the politics of religion or, more precisely, Iran's political economy of religion. (2) Iran's regime of religion has transformed religiosity into a form of social and symbolic capital that can be bought, sold and traded in a new marketplace. Religious capital, as I define it, encompasses social status, network and class, along with educational credentials and popular perceptions of public displays of piety. These factors legitimize the outwardly religious, provide them privileges and imbue them with a unique authority in Iranian society. The government has used the following three mechanisms to confiscate religious capital: monopolizing the management of the seminaries in the hands of the state, regulating and supervising religious rituals and creating parallel institutions to implement functions traditionally monopolized by the clerical establishment. This article explores the ways in which individuals, including clerics, use socioreligious capital to improve their economic or political positions within the government-defined parameters of this new marketplace. It then explores the implications of this phenomenon for the perpetuation of authoritarianism, religious or otherwise, in Iran. …

New Media Entrepreneurs in China: Allies of the Party-State or Civil Society?

Abstract: Today more than 500 million Chinese Internet users roam social networking websites. Of them, as many as 300 million are part of a rapidly growing microblogosphere. This article examines the predicament of companies providing social networking services inside China's Great Firewall--specifically, the way in which they handle conflicting demands from the party-state and emerging civil society. In light of the phenomenal growth of microblogging and the Chinese government's tighter control over netizens in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, the issue of social agency comes to the fore. This article asks if the Chinese entrepreneurial class--the so-called "red capitalists"--could become agents of democratic political change. Are Internet entrepreneurs allies of civil society or the government? Based on their current esprit de corps with the state, it is unlikely that they will directly assist social change in the foreseeable future. Yet willingly or not, by providing civil society with tools to challenge the regime, they are becoming key players in the process of creating a more inclusive and accountable politics in China. ********** The tumultuous events of the Arab Spring--in which social media tools aided mass mobilization--underscored an emerging battleground between the state and the opposition in today's nondemocratic regimes. Against the backdrop of revolution in North Africa and the Middle East, the People's Republic of China also made global headlines. The feeble attempt to initiate similar protests met with intensified crackdowns by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on dissenting voices in society and the media. (1) Internet censorship in China is a pressing concern for observers of the country's politics, particularly in the run-up to the Eighteenth National CCP Congress in 2012, when President Hu Jintao seems all but certain to transfer the reins of power to Vice President Xi Jinping as both general secretary of the Communist Party and head of state. This article examines the predicament of social media companies operating within China's heavily restricted Internet environment, behind the so-called Great Firewall. Specifically, the article explores how these companies balance conflicting demands from the party-state and emerging civil society. Google's provision of a "speak-to-tweet" voice connection for activists, after Egypt's former ruler Hosni Mubarak pulled the Internet "kill switch" in January 2011, demonstrated that Internet businesses can do more than indirectly promote free speech. They can also fuel social unrest in authoritarian countries in more direct ways. This role, however, is far from preordained because social media often assist authoritarian rulers in surveilling civil society and stifling dissent? Arguably, the forces that drive democratization today are businesses that provide social media platforms, along with tech-savvy young people, unemployment and a rising middle class. The article analyzes one of these components: the Internet business sector which is turned, simultaneously, toward two poles of attraction. Is it an ally of the incipient civil society or the state? The sector exhibits both compliant and noncompliant traits. For the party-state, cooperation of social media companies is crucial for reining in public discourse, seen as a threat to social and political stability. At the same time, as facilitators of new tools of information-sharing, social media providers indirectly assist in inciting opposition to the authoritarian information order. This balancing act highlights the broader question of social agency: Could Chinese Internet entrepreneurs go beyond passively facilitating online opinion platforms and become agents of democratic political change? THE STATE-CAPITALIST POWER ALLIANCE The question about social agency stems from the widely held assumption of modernization theory--namely, that a society's increasing wealth strengthens the middle class and gives it influence to propel political change. …

The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations

Abstract: Tibet is a key factor in India-China relations. It is only after the 1950 Chinese occupation of Tibet that India and China came to share the now disputed common border. In recent years, China's military buildup and infrastructure development in Tibet, as well as reported plans to divert or dam rivers that rise in Tibet and flow into India, have raised India's anxieties. Conversely, China's insecurity about Tibet is an important driver of its approach toward India. India has been unable to assuage China's fears about its possible use of the presence of the Dalai Lama in India and its large Tibetan refugee population of about 120,000 to create trouble for China in Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama and a large community of Tibetan refugees in India has kept the "Tibetan question" alive. Given India's open democratic system and long tradition of giving refuge to persecuted peoples, India will find it politically impossible to meet China's expectations on the Tibet question without a significant quid pro quo. The breakdown of talks between the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama does not augur well for the future, and a post-Dalai Lama situation could become much more complicated. Of late, China's aggressive territorial claims on India, the deepening of the China-Pakistan alliance and a shift in China's position on Kashmir has led to a hardening of India's position on Tibet. India is now seeking satisfaction on what it considers to be the core issues relating to India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. India-China relations are unlikely to be on an even keel until this tangled knot is unraveled. ********** For thousands of years, Tibet was the buffer that kept India and China geographically apart and therefore at peace. It has only been for the last six decades or so, after China invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950, that India and China have come to share a common border, and with it the inherent issues of border security, such as the delineation and demarcation of the border and the movement of people and flow of trade across it. However, in the absence of any extensive historical experience of relations with each other, each country has a poor understanding of the psyche and system of the other. This was a critical lacuna when the two countries began to interact after India's independence in 1947 and the Communist Revolution in China in 1949. Both were then governed by proud nationalist leaders who were imbued with an exalted sense of the greatness, destiny and mission of their respective nations, but who also had deeply ingrained grievances arising out of the humiliations they suffered under colonial rule. Given the vanities, egos and different ways of thinking of the leaders of India and China, the likelihood of misperceptions and misunderstandings was built into the situation. (1) SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AND TIBET PRE-1950 Before the mid-20th century, India-China relations were minimal. There was some overland and seaborne trade, as well as occasional exchanges of pilgrims and scholars. (2) The experience of the Indians and the Chinese of the outside world was completely different. India did not--indeed could not--keep out foreign influences and ideas. Macedonians, Turks, Afghans, Persians, Mongols and assorted tribes from the Eurasian heartland who invaded India over the centuries made a profound and lasting impact on the country. The old order was not swept away. Rather, a new composite culture and society emerged as, over time, the invaders settled down in the hospitable climes of the plains of India. Here they lived in peace and prospered, eventually becoming indistinguishable from, indeed a part of, the local population. (3) That was not the experience of the Chinese, who remained self-assured that they were the "Middle Kingdom" and all others barbarians. This patronizing approach persisted when India and China became independent in the mid-20th century. …

Myanmar's fifty-year authoritarian trap

Abstract: Myanmar has been under military rule in various guises for nearly fifty years. The most durable and unyielding of the authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, Myanmar's military rulers have expertly exploited circumstances and methods that prolong their rule, even as they have failed to deliver genuine economic growth and development. Their methods include ruthlessly suppressing dissent, inciting ethnic divisions and fears of external threats and making implicit bargains with neighboring states and domestic elites over the spoils available to a rentier state. Myanmar's emergence in recent years as a significant regional supplier of natural gas has dramatically increased the country's distributable economic rents, thus exacerbating the country's political stasis. This article examines the ways in which Myanmar's military regime has maintained its rule through the exploitation of these methods, but with a particular focus on the impacts of the country's exploitable energy and resource wealth and its implications for Myanmar's economic development and political transition. ********** In March 1962 a military coup in Myanmar installed a regime that, in various guises, has continued to rule ever since. In April 2011 a nominally civilian government, complete with an executive presidency and a parliament, was installed despite widespread perceptions that the previous year's election was flawed. The new government has yet to do anything to suggest it is more than a facade for ongoing military control. The longevity of military rule in Myanmar is a function of a number of circumstances, including most notably that the country is ruled by a regime prepared to use lethal force against its opponents. The same regime has been almost as assiduous in rewarding its supporters. It uses its tight control over the economy to grant military and other elites concessions against its own labyrinthine restrictions and rules on economic activity. Myanmar's emergence as a rentier state in recent years through the regional export of natural gas has only increased its ability to pursue both aspects of this dual strategy of repression and patronage, further inhibiting genuine change after fifty long years of authoritarian rule. (1) REPRESSION The most obvious way in which Myanmar's military regime has remained in place is its readiness to swiftly and brutally suppress dissent. The coup that installed the military in 1962 was a relatively bloodless affair, but in the intervening years, the regime has been quick to put down challenges to its rule with violence. Such suppression has existed as a routine part of everyday life, manifested in an all-pervasive surveillance apparatus, bans against more than five people assembling without a permit, the harassment and imprisonment of political opponents and numerous other policies and institutions of political domination. (2) As of April 2011, there were over 2,000 political prisoners in Myanmar; most of them have been incarcerated and given lengthy sentences under biased legal proceedings and are frequently subjected to torture. (3) Outside of its prisons, the people of Myanmar face limits to their freedom of movement both domestically and internationally, and forced relocation is commonplace. Meanwhile, the flow of information in Myanmar is greatly restricted. The press is subject to tight censorship, the Internet is strictly controlled and the country's perfunctory education system is little more than a vehicle of indoctrination for the military's interpretation of Myanmar's history and its central role in this history. Myanmar's universities were broken up long ago and their faculties geographically dispersed to prevent student concentration and activism. (4) Similarly, state spending on education, at little more than 0.57 percent of GDP in 2000, was the lowest in the world. (5) Of course, on a number of occasions the suppression of dissent in Myanmar has been revealed in episodes of state-sponsored military violence against more widespread uprisings. …

Survival, Adaptation and Uncertainty: The Case of Cuba

Abstract: The Cuban Revolution recently experienced a major transition of leadership as power shifted hands from Fidel Castro to his younger brother, Raul Eschewing the role of caretaker, Raul embarked on an ambitious program aiming to streamline a cumbersome and inefficient state while reforming the economy in ways that will increase agricultural production, encourage self-employment and lead to sustainable economic growth At the same time, Raul Castro refashioned the ruling coalition and proposed major changes to the ruling Communist Party, including term limits, leadership rotation and the separation of party and state functions This article analyzes the emergence of a new Cuban political elite, explores how power is distributed between its military and party wings and examines the major challenges this coalition must overcome if it is to successfully manage the transition from the Castro era and stabilize Cuban autocracy ********** The Cuban Revolution is now in its sixth decade Born in the crucible of the Cold War, it survived the effects of longstanding US sanctions, the collapse of the communist bloc and Fidel Castro's quixotic efforts to create the "new man" through both socialism and communism The collapse of the Soviet Union plunged the Cuban economy into a prolonged tailspin from which it has yet to emerge; twenty years later, most economic indicators are still at a fraction of their pre-1989 levels (1) Christening this phase as the Periodo Especial en Tiempo de Paz (Special Period in Time of Peace), Fidel Castro vowed never to surrender He did not capitulate and the regime endured The profound economic crisis that engulfed the island spurred neither dangerous instability nor drastic political change Forty years after coming to power, Fidel Castro was still in charge; only a serious illness in July 2006 finally forced him to abdicate his posts As the economy continued to stumble, he seamlessly turned power over to his brother Raul, who formally assumed the presidency of the Council of State in February 2008 and then the post of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) at its Sixth Congress in April 2011 The defining characteristics of the Cuban Revolution have been chronic economic difficulty and remarkable political durability But how long can this endure? There is little doubt that Raul Castro views the faltering economy as a challenge to the regime's long-term survival His speeches are replete with calls for order, discipline and exigency in all spheres; his words exude a sense of urgency In an address to the National Assembly, he declared that the country was on the verge of a "precipice" (2) During another, he noted: "We have to permanently erase the notion that Cuba is the only country in the world where people can live without working" (3) "Socialism," he affirmed on yet another occasion, "means social justice and equality Equality of rights [and] of opportunities, not of income Equality does not mean egalitarianism [which is] another form of exploitation exploitation of the responsible worker by the slothful" (4) Since taking over from his brother, the eighty-one-year-old leader has begun to implement wide-ranging changes designed to reform the Cuban economy and reduce the bloated state--which employs nearly 85 percent of the workforce--while putting in place a "successor generation" that will inherit a more stable Cuban Revolution (5) Raul Castro does not describe his efforts as "reforms," preferring instead to describe them as an actualizacion (updating) of the model (6) It is too soon to tell whether these initiatives, which are timid in comparison to those implemented in China and Vietnam over the past three decades, will spur sustainable economic growth, but they nevertheless represent a sharp break from the paternalistic vision of his brother Raul Castro seeks to change more than the face of the Cuban economy …

Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute

Abstract: This paper investigates the threat of a water war between China and India. It argues that Indian suspicion of China has been premature. Beijing has not jet given its approval for major water diversion projects in Tibet, it has taken some limited steps toward easing the concerns of the Indian government and a growing number of Chinese experts have taken an interest in developing institutional frameworks for managing transboundary rivers. However, a definitive settlement or cooperation will be difficult because both countries perceive themselves as the victim of a greedy neighbor. While India complains about China's ravenous exploitation of the Himalayan rivers, it is common in China to accuse India of exaggerating the Chinese threat and being unreasonable in its demands. ********** Two thirsty regional powers, each on one side of a mountain range covered by steadily shrinking glaciers; a more quintessential example of a zero-sum game would be hard to imagine. While relations between China and India have historically been tense, the precious water reserves of the Himalaya might well form the prelude to a new era of hostility. Indian news media and think tank experts have warned that China will erect several dams on the headwaters of mighty rivers like the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Indus. "The project," warns Brahma Chellaney of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, "implies environmental devastation of India's northeastern plains and eastern Bangladesh and would thus be akin to a declaration of water war ..." (1) Pundits like Chellaney have even maintained that China is determined to exploit its riparian dominance and fashion water as a political weapon against India. This is not the first time that China and India have locked horns over water resources originating in the Himalayas. In 1962, tensions over the disputed boundary and Chinese infrastructure projects in Aksai Chin escalated into a brief border war. Many Indian strategists have approached the Tibetan plateau as if they were looking up against the walls of a fortress, uncertain about the aspirations of its rulers in Beijing. "The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north," wrote Sardar Patel, the iron fist of the first Indian cabinet, in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950. "In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the northeast, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us." (2) India was well aware of the fact that whoever controlled that geographic bastion also controlled India's lifelines. Nehru pointed at the great strategic value of the water resources of the Himalayas. "For my part, I attach probably most importance to the development of our big schemes--river valley schemes--than to anything else. I think it is out of those that new wealth is going to flow into this country," he stated in front of the Indian parliament; "When I see a map of India and I look at the Himalayan range, I think of the vast power concentrated there, which is not being used, and which could be used, and which really could transform the whole of India with exceeding rapidity if it were properly utilized." (3) Sixty years later, it seems that relations have come full circle, with China mulling over water diversion plans that India considers a threat and leaders on both sides being pressured not to make compromises on the national interest. The Sino-Indian water dispute is an important case on which to judge whether Asia's two juggernauts will be able to manage conflicting interests and avoid sliding into a downward spiral of rivalry that could destabilize the entire region. It allows us to test whether global challenges like climate change prompt states to work together to protect common goods, or whether environmental threats compel states to stand firm and grab the largest possible share of shrinking natural resources. …

The Myth of Economic Complementarity in Sino-Indian Relations

Abstract: It is now a part of conventional wisdom that both China and India are emerging economic, political and even military powers in the 21st century. Terms such as "BRIC" and "Chindia," and phrases such as "not China or India, but China and India" have entered popular discourse and policy discussions. Such terms imply a synergistic relationship between China and India--an implication that belies the tension that has characterized Sino-Indian relations for centuries. My view is less sanguine than many others' about the prospects of their relations. Relations between the two countries will be fraught with difficulties and will likely remain fragile. Conflict and competitiveness are deeply rooted in historical and structural causes, while forces for harmony are more contingent on political will cultural understanding and careful policy management. There are several areas in which their relations can go wrong. At a fundamental level, the two countries are in an economically competitive, not a complementary, relationship with each other. Their economic and social endowments are similar (as compared with China/U.S. or India/U.S.). India and China offer very different lessons about economic policies and growth. This is not to suggest that the two countries are headed toward an inevitable collision, but to identify the urgency of carefully managing their relations and nurturing trust and goodwill on both sides. ********** One of the most memorable terms that has emerged together with the emergence of China and India as economic powers is "Chindia." The credit apparently goes to Jairam Ramesh, who, as the Indian minister of state for environment and forests, gave the concept an apparent official imprimatur, (1) Premier Wen Jiabao also emphasized the complementary aspects of Sino-Indian relations in his 2010 trip to India. He had some tangible proof--the trip resulted in commercial agreements valued at $16 billion. (2) Beneath these official pleasantries, however, there are some underlying tensions. According to press reports, the Chinese delegation sought help from the Indian government to clamp down on what the Chinese viewed as excessively negative coverage of China in the Indian press--a request the Indian government politely declined on the grounds of press freedom. (3) Zhang Yan, the Chinese envoy to India, was quoted as saying that "China-India relations are very fragile and very easy to be damaged and very difficult to repair. Therefore, they need special care in the information age." (4) The idea of "Chindia" conjures the image of two fast-growing Asian giants united by their common challenges and their recent economic success. The term suggests that these commonalities are sufficiently powerful to overcome the weight of history--most notably, the Sino-Indian War of 1962. In fact, Zhang Yan's assessment of Sino-Indian relations is more accurate than those offered in official speeches by Jairam Ramesh and Wen Jiabao. Deep historical and structural forces will keep cooperation between the two countries at bay, and forces for harmony are more contingent upon political will, cultural understanding and careful policy management. It is not the claim here that the two countries will inevitably head toward collision. Rather, it is my contention that relations between the two countries will be fraught with difficulties and are, and will likely remain, fragile in the sense that Zhang Yan conveyed. Increased engagement between China and India has brought the border issues back to the fore rather than relegating them to the dustbin of history. Both countries claim sovereignty over two pieces of territory. One is Aksai Chin, located in the Indian province of Kashmir or the Chinese province of Xinjiang. The other is referred to as Arunachal Pradesh by India and South Tibet by China. In 1987, the two countries came close to another clash, but things calmed in 1993 when the two countries signed a treaty to ensure peace over disputed areas and introduced an interesting concept called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). …

More State Than Nation: Lukashenko's Belarus

Abstract: Belarus, a post-Soviet country ruled by Alexander Lukashenko since 1994, is a case of a contemporary regime that reverted to authoritarianism after a brief stint as an independent democracy. While some of the characteristics of the Belarusian system are typical of other nondemocratic regimes around the world and in the post-communist region in particular, others are distinct and set Belarus apart. This article emphasizes the role that social cohesion and national-identity formation play in perpetuating the current system. We apply the lens of public opinion to our analysis and focus on characteristics of the Belarusian regime that explain its vitality. Our analysis sheds light on the role played by such factors as national identity and social cohesion in the persistence and durability of authoritarian regimes. ********** In many times and in many places, authoritarianism has emerged, disappeared .and reemerged from the ashes like the mythical phoenix. (1) This cycle has continued in recent years. The Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2010 notes that there has been "backsliding on previously attained progress in democratization," with more states characterized as flawed democracies and authoritarian regimes in 2010 than in 2008. (2) This phenomenon is global, but the entrenchment of authoritarianism has been particularly pronounced in much of the former Soviet Union, where the earlier trend of democratization has stalled or reversed. In this context, Francis Fukuyama's assertion that "the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning" have been overcome by liberal democracy is no longer self-evident. (3) The Republic of Belarus is a stark example of authoritarian resurgence. It was once part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, one of the most liberally governed European states of the time, and was then ruled by Poland. It was later subsumed by the Russian Empire and became part of the Soviet Union in 1919, after the Bolshevik Revolution. When the Soviet Union was dismantled in 1991, Belarus emerged as an independent state and enacted a constitution with democracy and the rule of law as its core principles. A hotly contested election in 1994 that brought the current president, Alexander Lukashenko, to power was a testament to this commitment to democracy. Today, however, Belarus is recognized as "Europe's last dictatorship." (4) In 2010, the Economist Democracy Index classified it as one of the world's fifty-five authoritarian regimes, ranking it 130th out of 167 countries and underscoring its consistent backsliding. (5) The country has passed through almost all of the commonly cited stages of political development: it transitioned from progressive medieval monarchy to totalitarianism, then to emerging democracy and ultimately to renewed authoritarianism. While the Arab Spring of 2011 appeared to reverse this trend globally by overthrowing despots in the Middle East and North Africa, Belarus is headed for at least another four years of rule by Lukashenko. "There will be no pink, orange or even banana revolutions in Belarus," he once famously declared. (6) Several features of Belarusian authoritarianism are typical of other contemporary undemocratic regimes, such as those in Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Myanmar. Others factors are peculiar, setting the country apart. We focus on several interrelated factors in this analysis: the growing divergence of political and social values in Belarusian society, the redrawing of its social landscape, the unformed national identity of its people and their consequent ambivalence about the country's geopolitical orientation. In our discussion we apply the lens of public opinion, basing our analysis on a series of nationwide surveys conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), a nongovernmental organization dedicated to conducting sociological research in Belarus. …

Paradigm Shift in India-China Relations: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism

Abstract: "The world has enough for both of us" has come to be a regular refrain of Chinese and Indian leaders. Even academic commentaries sometimes use this argument to explain why Asia's two fastest growing economies and increasingly dynamic billion-plus-strong societies will not clash as they pursue peaceful development. Their relationship continues to be examined in simplistic dichotomies of competition or cooperation, rivals or partners, friends or foes, etc., ignoring the complex nature of their evolution and interactions. This paper argues that their continued rapid economic growth and resultant ever-expanding engagement with the external world is not completely innocent, and that their growth has begun to influence their bilateral relations. Prima facie, multilateral forums provide China and India with a relatively neutral playground in which the two countries have gradually begun to decipher their stronger commonality of interests in addressing their regional/global challenges within multilateral settings. This expanding mutual trust and understanding at the multilateral level is expected to have a positive impact on the nature of their historically complicated bilateral equations. No doubt, their difficult bilateral engagement also impacts their interactions at the multilateral level and their mutual trust deficit circumscribes their joint strategies in multilateral forums. Yet, on balance, contemporary Sino-Indian relations seem to mark a clear shift in the center of gravity from a bilateral to a multilateral matrix. This shift is now discernible enough to stand scrutiny and also to guide the future direction of Sino-Indian equations. ********** No single nation-state, however powerful, can successfully tackle its security and developmental challenges without engaging in multilateral partnerships. Given the nature of emerging challenges of national development and security, even bilateral relations have to be increasingly located in multilateral settings. Especially as emerging powers begin to engage in new global challenges like terrorism, climate change, energy security and global economic recovery, new disjunctions in the international system threaten an uncertain future. But while multilateralism may be relatively easy and effective in engaging problematic actors and issues, it has its own fault lines. Multilateralism is generally a misfit for making quick responses and building consensus. This can circumscribe even bilateral initiatives. Multilateralism also carries historical baggage. Emerging nations feel restricted by dated yet influential regional and global norms rooted in post-Second World War multilateral frameworks. (1) The largest and most visible frameworks--the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions--have themselves been the subject of debate for several decades, though the international community has yet to propose viable alternatives or identify options for structural reform of existing multilateral frameworks. Meanwhile, commitment of member states to such frameworks and their norms provides at best only a minimum guarantee of circumspection; it often does not define national policies. If anything, the rising tide of multilateralism often makes these powers skeptical of existing norms. Bilateralism, more often, remains the mainstay of emerging powers' newfound interest in multilateralism. While outwardly expressing support for multilateralism, most states continue to work on a bilateral basis to support multilateral discussion and have a fallback position if multilateralism does not deliver. These trends in multilateralism suggest that successful multilateral action largely depends upon issues of multilateral concern having been discussed first in bilateral channels. The resolution of at least some of the contentions at the bilateral level allows discussion at the multilateral level to focus on specifics. (2) This is especially true of Asia, whose participation and influence in post-Second World War multilateral institutions have been either minimal or tied to their relations with P5 countries, i. …

Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions

Abstract: China and India remain locked in a stagnant embrace when it comes to the most intractable of security dilemmas: the Sino-Indian border issue. A closer look at Chinese and Indian strategic, scientific and academic experts" security perceptions vis-a-vis one another reveals that there is much more to the Sino-Indian security dynamic than meets the eye. Chinese and Indian strategic analysts hold divergent interests when evaluating each other's military modernization, the former preoccupied with India's naval development and the latter with China's army. Technical analysts in each country share a similar level of interest in the other's aviation and aerospace programs. Scholars exhibit a strong, if not symmetrical, level of focus on the other country's nuclear strategy and status. Using this tripartite discourse as a baseline, this essay provides both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of each group's perceptions to better understand Sino-Indian security relations and to propose measures within each arena to enhance mutual understanding. It shows that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore. ********** Chinese and Indian interlocutors have spent countless hours debating the border issue in the years following the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. The latest set of border talks between India's National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and China's State Councilor Dai Bingguo in November 2010 represented the fourteenth in a series, followed in rapid succession by Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India. (1) Yet, both meetings resulted in tepid pronouncements of "steady progress" when it came to the border, which markedly contrast with the tit-for-tat politics of late. (2) Despite years of confidence building measures (CBMs) and agreements, China and India are currently locked in a stagnant embrace when it comes to this most intractable of security dilemmas. There is no question that the border issue assumes both a looming and lingering presence in Sino-Indian relations. However, when analysts are divided into three groups--namely strategic, technical and academic--it becomes apparent that there is much more to the Sino-Indian security dynamic than meets the eye. Chinese and Indian strategic analysts maintain a divergent approach, the former preoccupied with India's navy and the latter with China's army. Technical analysts in each country share a similar level of interest in the other country's aviation and aerospace programs. Experts with a more scholarly bent exhibit a strong, if not symmetrical, level of focus on the other country's nuclear strategy and status. Using this tripartite discourse as a baseline, this essay provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of each of these groups' views to gain a better sense of the level and nature of future Sino-Indian interaction. This approach mitigates some of the generalizations and abstractions that hamper improved communication. It demonstrates that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore. METHODOLOGY The primary sources for this essay consist of Chinese and Indian journals and interviews that fall into three categories: strategic, technical and academic. While these groups may never be neatly defined or separated, they serve as the guiding framework for perceptual evaluation. Two comparable journals from China and India within each of the three categories were selected--six in total. These journals were then surveyed from January 1991 through December 2009. (3) These materials were used to statistically account for the number of times Chinese and Indian analysts made reference to the military-related systems and training of the other (e.g., India's Su-30MKI procurement from Russia, China's M-9/M-11 cooperation with Pakistan), as well as the various concepts relating to security intentions (e. …

China and India: More Cooperation Than Competition in Energy and Climate Change

Abstract: Energy and climate change are two important areas in which there is much more cooperation than competition between China and India. After a few years of trying to outbid each other for oil and gas exploration and production licenses, both have found it more productive to bid jointly for many such contracts. Even though neither China nor India has agreed to limits on their emissions of greenhouse gases, both are committed to reducing the carbon intensity of their development, by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2020 for China, and 20 to 25 percent over the same time period for India. To achieve these goals, the two countries have launched major programs to install power plants using renewable energy sources and nuclear energy, and to increase the efficiency of energy use. It is unlikely that either China or India will agree to absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from their present levels soon, but they may be willing to cap them at future levels that still permit their future per capita income to become comparable to that of countries in Western Europe. At the recently concluded United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, China was strongly supportive of a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment period, but India indicated that it may be willing to explore other approaches suggested by the United States, the EU and small island nations. Though their paths to addressing climate change may begin to differ, it is highly likely that China and India will continue to share the same strategic goal of achieving parity with the West in terms of standard of living of their populations, even if it means higher emissions for another decade or two. ********** Competition for scarce natural resources has been an important determining factor in human development. Tribes of hunter-gatherers fought over land and the flora and fauna that surrounded them, and early agricultural societies that existed along rivers fought deadly conflicts over getting their share of the water. Kingdoms large and small traded or battled for iron, gold and other metals, as well as precious stones. The beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe and the input materials it required were major reasons for the expansion of colonialism. The horrors of two world wars during the 20th century, and of a cold war that almost became hot, convinced most countries that it was better to buy commodities needed for economic development than to occupy countries militarily. This lesson was confirmed by the high cost the United States has incurred since its occupation of Iraq in 2003. The largest commodity in global trade today is energy--oil, coal and natural gas. Oil is the fossil fuel with the smallest reserves-to-production ratio. (1) Europe has been a net importer of oil for more than a hundred years. The United States lost its energy self-sufficiency and became a large importer of oil during the decade following the Second World War, and China went from being a net exporter of oil to a net importer during the 1990s. As countries around the world industrialize and become more affluent, concern is growing that there may not be enough oil at affordable prices to accommodate the development needs of these countries. China and India are by far the two most populous nations and have high rates of economic growth and energy demand. Between 1990 and 2010, the total energy used in China has almost tripled and that in India doubled during the same period. (2) Essentially all energy sources can be used to generate electricity, provide heating and cooling for homes and offices, and run industrial processes. However, the world's transportation systems are still almost completely dependent on oil. Energy used for transportation has been growing faster than for any other use, and total oil requirements have increased faster in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) than anywhere else. …

Sovereign Wealth Funds in Nondemocratic Countries: Financing Entrenchment or Change?

Abstract: The rising prominence of sovereign wealth funds--investment funds that are owned or controlled by national governments--has stirred debate about their potential use as tools to pursue global political interests rather than economic or financial ends Recent sanctions levied on the Libyan Investment Authority, formerly operated by the government of Muammar al-Qaddafi, underscore this question This article argues that the governance, accountability and transparency arrangements of sovereign wealth funds reflect the quality of political institutions within the countries that own them In contrast to funds based in democratic states, those managed by authoritarian governments are distinguished by a lack of public oversight and are instead tightly controlled by the prevailing political leadership The link between political leadership and fund management in many authoritarian countries allows governments more flexibility in using financial assets to pursue immediate political agendas ********** As the unrest in Libya escalated in February 2011, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution 1970 This measure--along with Resolution 1973, which closely followed it in March--condemned the Libyan government's use of force against civilians and imposed a number of international sanctions on the country, (1) In an attempt to drain financial resources from the government of Muammar al-Qaddafi, the Council requested that UN member states freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources controlled by institutions and individuals affiliated with the regime" One of these institutions was a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) named the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) Established by the Qaddafi government in 2006 to manage state-owned financial assets, it was mandated to build a well-diversified investment portfolio that would create a sustainable source of revenue, reduce the economy's dependence on oil and act as a savings fund for the future (3) Since its establishment, Qaddafi and his family retained tight control over the fund, and Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam directed much of its investment activity (4) The precise volume of assets controlled by the LIA remained unclear until May 2011, when Global Witness, a British nongovernmental organization, obtained LIA internal documents estimating the sum to be around $64 billion (5) By imposing sanctions on the LIA, the Security Council made clear its recognition of the fund's political influence Security Council Resolution 1973 identified the LIA as "a potential source of funding for [Qaddafi's] regime" and thus ultimately capable of influencing the outcome of the civil war This marked the first time that an SWF was specifically targeted by international sanctions The shift in the international perception of SWFs and their role in political unrest became an unforeseen repercussion of the Libyan conflict The rise of SWFs during the past decade ignited intense debate about their impact on international affairs The funds, defined as "government-controlled pools of assets designed to engage primarily in foreign investment," have recently emerged as important actors on the global financial and diplomatic stage (6) Because SWFs are directed by governments, they represent potential instruments for states to exercise soft power in support of foreign policy objectives They are thus recognized as capable of influencing outcomes in times of mounting geopolitical rivalry To some observers, the growing prominence of SWFs indicates that the global financial system is becoming increasingly "neo-Westphalian" in character--ie, dominated by the political interests of nation-states pursued by their governments (7) Academic analysis adds another dimension to this debate by assessing the interplay between SWF characteristics and domestic politics A recent comparative analysis of global SWF assets has found that approximately 72 percent of assets under management of SWFs is controlled by authoritarian governments or hybrid regimes, while only 28 percent is controlled by democratic governments …

North Korea's State-Loyalty Advantage

Abstract: Although North Korea's northern border remains easy to cross, and North Koreans are now well aware of the prosperity enjoyed south of the demilitarized zone, Kim Long Il continues to rule over a stable and supportive population. Kim enjoys mass support due to his perceived success in strengthening the race and humiliating its enemies. Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethnonationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race. South Koreans' "good race, bad state" attitude is reflected in widespread sympathy for the people of the North and in ambivalent feelings toward the United States and Japan, which are regarded as friends of the republic but enemies of the race. But North Korea cannot survive forever on the public perception of state legitimacy alone. The more it loses its economic distinctiveness vis-a-vis the rival state, the more the Kim regime must compensate with triumphs on the military and nuclear fronts. Another act of aggression against the Republic of Korea may well take place in the months ahead, not only to divert North Korean public attention from the failures of the consumer-oriented "Strong and Prosperous Country" campaign, but also to strengthen the appeasement-minded South Korean opposition in the run-up to the presidential election in 2012. ********** For all its problems, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) enjoys one significant advantage over its rival to the south. North Koreans identify strongly with their nation (race) and their state, between which they appear to make little distinction, while in South Korea loyalty to the race militates against state-loyalty. (1) Awareness of the difference between the two Koreas can help us understand not only the overbearing confidence that Pyongyang displays when dealing with Seoul, even when requesting aid, but also the apathy with which the South Korean public has responded to acts of North Korean aggression in recent years. In South Korea, citizens' reluctance to identify with the state is a common topic of discussion among conservatives. (2) In the United States, however, even Korea watchers tend to overlook it entirely. The general assumption in Washington is that if one of the two Koreas can count on its people in a crunch, it is the Republic of Korea (ROK). This assumption rests on a misperception of North Korea as a communist state that has failed even on its own terms. Also at work is a confusion of South Korean nationalism with patriotism, as evidenced in international press references to the ROK's "patriotic" sports fans. (3) This derives from the common tendency of native English speakers, including many political scientists, to use the words "state" and "nation" interchangeably--as Koreans do not. (4) We must therefore distinguish clearly between Korean nationalism, which is a sense of proud identification with the Korean race, and South or North Korean patriotism, i.e., loyalty to the respective state as a political entity. For clarity's sake I will resort to a redundant but common prefix and discuss ethno-nationalism. First, however, I must take issue with the current consensus in regard to North Korea's longevity. The perception of the DPRK as a Stalinist or hard-line communist holdout surviving by dint of exceptional totalitarianism still features in some journalism and Western conservative scholarship, but it seems to be waning, not least because it is now so easy (if still illegal) for North Koreans to cross the border or to telephone outsiders. (5) Far more popular nowadays is the notion that the DPRK owes much of its stability and longevity to its popular success in adapting communism to indigenous Korean traditions. …

Technology Trade in India-China Relations: Divergent Dynamics and Implications

Abstract: The recent and growing technology trade among India, China and the rest of the world is punctuated with distinctive trajectories and dynamics. Propelled by the simultaneous phenomena of impressive economic growth and increasing technological capabilities, the two countries under review have made a paradigmatic shift from being predominantly technology-importing countries in the 1980s to technology-exporting countries at the beginning of the 21st century. The consequent outcome of this process is the changing composition of technology exports wherein the share of technology-intensive products is increasing in their overall export baskets, which is a clear indication of the two countries' growing technological prowess. A key element in this growth is that the technology component in the overall bilateral trade between India and China is increasing both in volume and diversification. A considerable part of China's exports to India consists of technology-intensive products, but primary goods dominate Indian exports to China, revealing China's edge over India. This is likely to change as India strengthens its comparative advantage in software and begins to catch up with China in sectors such as manufacturing. These developments have several implications not only for their economies, but also for those in both developed and developing countries. ********** Technology trade, a critical component of trade of late, is recognized as a key indicator of the development of economies that are increasingly knowledge-driven and information-based. Acknowledging this, India and China have been orienting their trade architectures to factor technology into their global and bilateral trade relations, and they are benefiting from the process. India and China have emerged as the twenty-first and largest merchandise exporters with trade-to-GDP ratios of 46.2 and 58.6 respectively during 2007-2009. A trend worth noting is the growing size of technology-intensive exports in their export baskets, a potent sign of the maturing of their technological capabilities. (1) Another trend is that technology trade between India and China is beginning to acquire a competitive dimension as both countries witness a steady rise in their technological capabilities. As these trends evolve, the future of technology trade among India, China and the rest of the world will be much more complex and variegated. One of the implications of the growing Indian and Chinese technology trade is that hitherto established technology giants such as the United States and Japan find their technology trade diminished, putting enormous pressure on their current technological capabilities. The result is that they are trying to find ways and means to further climb the technological ladder. This is an excellent opportunity for the growth not only of technology, but also of trade. At the same time, the technological rise of India and China, has motivated some technology laggards such as Fiji, Nepal, Jordan and Kenya, to name a few, to invest in the development of technology, which in turn will impact the growing Indian and Chinese technology trade. Given these remarkable developments, examining the technology trade between the two countries will provide interesting clues to the unfolding global technology trade, which is growing in its share of overall trade. Prior to this examination, two qualifications need to be made. First, a discussion on the nature of the symbiotic relationship between technology and trade is required in order to locate technology trade between India and China in the larger context of the increasing role of technology in trade. Second, a brief analysis of their technological capabilities, with a focus on their foundations and strengths in specific areas, and of their global technology trade more generally is imperative to better understanding technology trade between the two countries. (2) TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE: CHANGING TRENDS A number of recent studies have convincingly articulated the mutuality between technology and trade, particularly in terms of impact. …

Beijing's Balancing Act: Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad

Abstract: The "all-weather" Sino-Pakistan relations, characterized especially by Beijing's position on the Kashmir issue and its long-standing and close defense ties with Islamabad, continue to affect New Delhi's threat perceptions and Sino-Indian relations. Beijing's need to sustain friendly relations with Pakistan stems from its desire to mitigate ethnic separatist problems, improve energy security and execute its policy of hedging against a rising and future rival in India. Despite the changing international and regional security environments and Beijing's more balanced South Asia policy, this need is viewed in New Delhi as a major obstacle to enhancing mutual trust and improving bilateral relations between China and India. Conversely, without de-hyphenating Sino-Indian ties, the Pakistan factor will remain a point of contention in fully developing the increasingly important relationship between Asia's two rising powers. ********** The year 2010 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. Beijing and New Delhi celebrated the occasion with a series of festivities and high-level visits. Indian president Pratibha Patil visited China in late May, while Chinese premier Wen Jiabao led a 400-member delegation for a three-day visit to India in mid-December, during which major business contracts worth $16 billion were signed. With annual trade at $60 billion, the two countries are poised to reach $100 billion in trade in the coming years. (1) Since 2003, Beijing and New Delhi have established multiple channels of bilateral dialogue and consultation aimed at improving mutual understanding, developing a political framework for resolving territorial disputes and promoting bilateral cooperation on both regional and global issues. There have been regular meetings between Chinese and Indian leaders, either at bilateral summits or on the sidelines of international and regional forums. The two militaries maintain contact and in recent years have conducted joint exercises. China and India share similar positions and have cooperated on issues such as climate change, recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis and food security. However, despite the steady progress and commitments from both Beijing and New Delhi to further develop the bilateral relationship into a strategic partnership for the 21st century, major strains remain. Territorial disputes show no sign of resolution after fourteen rounds of meetings between the special representatives of both governments. Meanwhile, the two countries have also been embroiled in water disputes, growing rivalry in the Indian Ocean and competition for energy. Some of the major factors affecting Sino-Indian relations, especially where New Delhi's threat perceptions are concerned, are the resilient, all-weather China-Pakistan relationship over the past six decades and Beijing's position on the Kashmir issue. After the 1962 Sino-Indian War and until the early 1980s, China offered strong support of Pakistan's stance. Within the broader Cold War context, as Sino-Indian relations began to improve in the late 1980s, Beijing shifted to a policy of neutrality and called on both India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue and mutual consent. China's changing position on the Kashmir issue has been informed by its decision to develop a more balanced South Asia policy, including improving its relationship with India. China's close political and security ties with Pakistan grew out of a shared hostility toward India, and they have been sustained by Chinese concerns over energy security, ethnic unrest in China's western territories (e.g., Xinjiang) and the need to hedge against a rising and potential future rival in India. These in turn cause New Delhi to view continued close ties between Beijing and Islamabad as a deliberate attempt to encircle and contain India. The challenge for Beijing is to convince New Delhi that its continuing close ties with Islamabad are not directed at India and are largely driven by its domestic needs for economic development, energy security and campaigns against ethnic separatist activities. …

Perpetuating Communist Party Rule in China

Abstract: On the heels of democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), recent "mass incidents" (qunti shijian) in China have spurred renewed debate about the level of social dissatisfaction and the stability of authoritarian governance in the People's Republic of China. Yet, unlike in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in the MENA facing widespread rebellion against their ruling regimes, protests in China have not been directed at central political leaders or the political system as a whole. By examining the similarities and differences between Chinese and Middle Eastern authoritarianism, this article seeks to uncover which factors underpin continued public acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party and which ones--if left unchecked--bode ill for the regime. ********** A quick glance at the causes of unrest in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries n the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suggests that China, too, is susceptible to popular cries for political change. In China--much like in Egypt and Tunisia before the Arab Spring--income inequality has been growing, corruption is rampant and the same regime has had a choke hold on political power for decades. Yet underneath these superficial similarities lie key differences between China and authoritarian states in the MENA. First, the relationship of major socioeconomic sectors to the regime and to each other is fundamentally different in China. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia in recent years, China's ruling elites have pursued policies that mix capitalism and socialism in such a way that both prosperous and struggling socioeconomic sectors have benefited materially. The result has been that--despite widespread dissatisfaction with CCP corruption and injustice, particularly at the local level--no socioeconomic group has had an economic reason to seek the downfall of the CCP. (1) Moreover, CCP policies and practices have effectively divided China's vast lower class through differential treatment of the various groups therein. Second, the nature of the ruling regime in China differs quite dramatically from those in countries in the MENA that have experienced recent mass unrest. Rather than allowing political power to be concentrated in the hands of one man with no ideological justification for his rule, in post-Mao (and especially post-Deng) China, the CCP has instituted collective leadership and has worked to legitimate itself not only via economic growth, but also via nationalism and elements of socialism. Finally, the CCP has undertaken political reforms that have made the regime more responsive to the grievances and demands of the people, thereby improving the quality of its governance. (2) However, there are signs that this delicate balance may be tipping. First, since the spring of 2011, the CCP has backtracked on freedom of expression and political participation. These moves have proved counterproductive, increasing public dissatisfaction with the political status quo and jeopardizing the central leadership's reputation as benevolent "emperor." (3) Meanwhile, central authorities have been unwilling or unable to prevent local officials from snatching away the safety nets that have provided basic economic security to China's poor, which has spurred unrest from below. If CCP leaders wish to remain in power, they will need to enhance--not abandon--the factors that have worked in their favor in the reform era. POPULAR PROTEST IN CHINA, SPRING 2011 For at least the last decade, China has witnessed tens of thousands of mass incidents (qunti shijian) per year. Moreover, both the number of incidents and their level of violence have increased over time. (4) Though the demographic characteristics and grievances of the participants have varied, it is clear that wide swaths of the Chinese public are unhappy with the status quo. Following the wave of public uprisings against authoritarian governance in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries of the MENA in the spring of 2011, several large-scale and violent popular protests swept China. …

India, China: Brothers, Brothers

Abstract: China and India have had an often turbulent relationship. At the state level, strategic and diplomatic relations between the two are fraught with complications, tensions and misgivings that many observers believe are destined to continue for the foreseeable future. The purpose of this paper is to detail the various opportunities for cooperation that stem from the common challenges that China and India face as they continue to develop into major global powers. We argue that the key to successful cooperation will not occur at the intergovernmental level; rather, it will be based upon the building of social and cultural bridges between the Chinese and Indian people. ********** Despite gloomy predictions about the inevitability of competition between China and India, cooperation between Asia's two emerging powers is possible. It will, however, require a much more concerted effort to bridge the gap in sociocultural understanding that exists between the two countries. While growing economic ties have warmed relations between them, there remains a fundamental lack of appreciation on the part of each country of the underlying cultural and societal norms that define the other--norms that influence each country's perception of its own national interest. We argue that greater appreciation of these elements is critical if China and India are to successfully address issues such as the ongoing border dispute and the mounting trade imbalance. This essay is devoted to exploring avenues for cultural rapprochement and analyzing efforts made thus far. It also explores ways to make the process of engagement more effective, not only at the intergovernmental level but also in terms of person-to-person contact. With the remarkable economic resurgence of Asia, especially that of China and India, we contend that it is urgent for each country to gain a more direct and nuanced understanding of the other. In present and future scenarios, strategic and diplomatic relations between China and India are fraught with complications, tensions and misgivings on both sides based upon the historical legacies of relations between the two countries. Much of the mistrust and misgivings emanate from the legacy of the 1962 war between the two countries. The following five decades have seen generations of Indians growing up with an inherent wariness of China and anything Chinese. The public popular imagination in India was fuelled by the oft repeated stories of the "great betrayal" by the supposed ally nation. In the decade after India gained its independence from Britain in 1947, there was a lot of popular hope for a strong and mutually beneficial partnership between the two nations. This was reflected in the popular phrase that was chanted by Indian children in the 1950s: "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai," literally meaning "Indian-Chinese brothers, brothers". The general atmosphere of bonhomie and friendship was such that most Indians could not imagine the advent of Chinese military aggression on their relatively unguarded northeast frontier. Without going into the details of the 1962 misadventures, it suffices to say that they caused a dent in the national psyche of India, that lurks uncomfortably in the background even today. Conversely, traditional Chinese perceptions of India as being beset with irreconcilable socio-religious cleavages within an inherently unstable polity with weak leadership that is easily contained through proxies also aggravate tensions between the two. In a changing multipolar global power equation, Beijing could see India's economic and military rise as prolonging perceived American hegemony in Asia. This may in turn be viewed as a hindrance to China's establishment of a post-American Sino-centric regional order in the Asia-Pacific. Realist hardliners contend that Sino-Indian relations will continue to be characterized by competition and tension, interspersed with endless talks and limited cooperation on issues of mutual concern. …

Cities as the New Engine for Sino-Indian Cooperation

Abstract: Despite close geographical proximity and centuries-old ties, the relationship between China and India has been filled with obstacles and stumbling blocks. The majority of academic research and media reports tend to examine relations at the national level, yet cities have become increasingly important due to urbanization and globalization. This paper argues that, through the city platform, India and China can turn potential cooperation into reality. The differences between Chinese and Indian cities beget complementarity that provides great potential for cooperation. Local governments in both China and India have high levels of administrative power in decisionmaking. Cooperation between cities can avoid many obstacles that prevail in national-level cooperation. Local governments will not only be motivated to cooperate, but also can accomplish a great deal in promoting cooperation between the two countries. The conditions for city cooperation are improving. Cities can and should become a key path and a new engine for Sino-Indian cooperation. ********** Geopolitics, boundary disputes, mutual distrust and trade imbalances make China-India cooperation difficult at the national level. China and India's boundary disputes, for example, are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. Out of consideration for mutual security interests, both central governments will likely restrict cooperation in locations where territorial control is contested. The Indian National Security Council has called for the legislative body to pass "Security Restricted Area" legislation aimed at limiting or even forbidding countries like China from investing in these sensitive regions. (1) In economics, the increasing bilateral trade imbalance between China and India has become an obstacle for cooperation at the state level. A certain level of imbalance is inevitable, but a large imbalance is not beneficial for either party. These concerns primarily manifest themselves in relations at the national level. Local governments outside disputed regions and areas of strategic importance have more freedom to consider mutual cooperative benefits and are less concerned with contentious interstate relations or the national trade imbalance. At the same time, the rapid pace of scientific and technological development and the increasingly globalized economy have reduced the significance of borders between countries and increased the importance of cities as a focal point of international affairs. Indeed, cities are becoming independent economic units participating in global competition, cooperation, division of work and development. With an increasing number of people and economic activity concentrated in cities, the role of the city is more and more significant. Home to several of the world's largest cities and with a long-standing border dispute between them, China and India can benefit from cooperation at the city level. This paper argues that enterprises and civil society at the city level can overcome barriers to Sino-Indian cooperation at the national level and encourage cooperation and exchanges in many fields, including trade, investment, tourism, culture, education, technology and municipal construction. Under certain conditions, cities can become the engine of cooperation between the two countries. GREAT POTENTIAL IN CITY-LEVEL COOPERATION While China and India are experiencing different rates and levels of urbanization, cities have been a common platform for the bulk of social and economic activities in both countries. The differences between Chinese and Indian cities beget complementarity and great potential for cooperation. This potential merits further exploration. Urban populations play an important role in both countries, though China is more urban than India. In 2009, 46.6 percent of China's population, or more than 585.8 million people, lived in cities. (2) China's more than 280 cities (those over prefecture level and the prefectures) accounted for 62 percent of GDP and 59 percent of national fiscal income in 2008. …

India: A Global Economic Power? Revisiting the Past and Contemplating the Future

Abstract: Seventeen years after publishing "India: A New Tiger on the Block?" in the Spring/ Summer 1994 issue of the Journal of International Affairs, Arvind Panagariya revisits his analysis of India's 1991 economic reforms and looks ahead to India's economic prospects in a changing world order. ********** In the Spring/Summer 1994 issue of the Journal, I published an article entitled India: A New Tiger on the Block?" in which the concluding paragraph asked, "Will India accomplish in the next decade what China did in the previous one?" I stated that although it is overly optimistic to respond affirmatively, a 6 to 7 percent annual growth rate in India could not be ruled out. The world should not be surprised if, in a decade's time, it sees another tiger on the block. (1) This prediction was made against the backdrop of a balance-of-payments crisis in the first half of 1991. That crisis had brought India's growth rate down to below 2 percent in fiscal year 1991-92. (2) According to the data available at the time I wrote the above-mentioned article, recovery from the crisis had begun but growth was still modest--4 percent in 1992-93 and 3.8 percent in 1993-94. (3) Therefore, it was far from clear that the liberalizing reforms that had been and were being introduced would succeed. I was out on a limb; no one else at the time seemed to stake a claim to India's growth matching the Chinese level within a decade. Luckily for India, the subsequent events have fully justified the liberalizing reforms that had begun to be introduced stealthily and haltingly in the second half of the 1970s but that became bolder and more systematic beginning with the important package of 1991. India grew at an average annual rate of 6.2 percent during the decade spanning 1994-95 to 2003-04. And, beginning in 2003-04, within a decade after the publication of the article, it shifted to the 8 to 9 percent trajectory commonly associated with the tiger economies of East Asia. By 2008-09, correcting for inflation, the per capita GDP in India had reached 2.26 times its level in 1990-91. (4) Side by side, the proportion of population living below the poverty line had declined from 36 percent in 1993-94 to 27.5 percent in 2004-05. (5) In this paper, I briefly discuss the key developments that have taken place since the systematic reforms of the 1990s. The gist of this discussion is that while India has made significant economic progress after having lost nearly three to four decades, it still has some distance to go before it is able to make abject poverty history. I argue that a much bigger transformation awaits India in the coming fifteen years. During these years, it will surpass China in terms of growth and begin to catch up with it in terms of GDR By 2025, India will turn into the third or fourth largest economy in the world. It will also become an ever-larger supplier of the highly mobile global workforce during these years. These expected developments in India will have far-reaching implications for the world economy. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF THE INDIAN ECONOMY Prior to the reforms, India started at such a low level of income and with such vast poverty that somewhat paradoxically it is possible today to simultaneously argue that reforms have yielded unprecedented growth and poverty reduction and that despite the reforms, poverty remains pervasive and per capita incomes low. If you are cheering for the reforms, you emphasize the first and if you are nostalgic about the old order, you assert the latter. Writing in 1980, only a decade before the 1991 reforms, Gary Fields, a leading expert on poverty at the time, described poverty in India in these dire terms: India is a miserably poor country. Per-capita yearly income is under $100. Of the Indian people, 45 percent receive incomes below $50 per year and 90 percent below $150 ... India's poverty problem is so acute and her resources so limited that it is debatable whether any internal policy change short of a major administrative overhaul and radical redirection of effort might be expected to improve things substantially. …

The Not-So-Surprising Rise of China and India: An Interview with Kishore Mahbubani

Abstract: In an interview with Jose Vericat of the Journal of International Affairs, Kishore Mahbubani, dean and professor in the practice of public policy at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, situates Sino-Indian relations in historical context, explains the U.S.-China-India balancing act and assures us that the rise of two somewhat acrimonious giants is not all bad news. Journal of International Affairs: What will the global balance of power look like in five to ten years? Kishore Mahbubani: I think it is very clear that the power will shift to Asia. As I have explained in my last book, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, the past two hundred years of western domination of world history have been a major historical aberration because from year one to year 1820 the two largest economies of the world were consistently China and India. It is only in the last 200 years that Europe and North America took off. But against the backdrop of the last 2,000 years, the last 200 years have been an aberration, and all aberrations come to a natural end. Journal: Why has that been an aberration? Mahbubani: If you have a 2,000 year pattern of history and a 200 year pattern of history, that 200 year pattern of history is an aberration. It is much more natural for China and India to be the two largest powers in the world given the size of their populations, their histories, their cultures. And so it is perfectly natural for China and India to assume the number one and number two slots in the world. Journal: Who will dominate Asia out of those two powers? Mahbubani: We hope neither one. The good news about Asia is that even though China is a very large country of 1.3 billion people, that is still only about one third of Asia. India has 1.1 to 1.2 billion. So neither power has the capacity to dominate Asia. The good news is also that both powers realize that it is in their interest to continue what I would call the current ASEAN-led cooperative order in Asia. Both of them are very supportive of the process of regional cooperation started by ASEAN. Journal: Would you call this shift a decline of the West or the rise of Asia? Mahbubani: The decline of the West is not taking place in absolute terms. I have to emphasize this. The American economy is not going to shrink absolutely. The European economies are not going to shrink absolutely. They are only going to shrink in relative terms and not in absolute terms. And so they are still going to continue to have very large economies. In fact, the United States will have the world's third largest economy by 2050. The European economies will still be very large but their share of the global GNP will go down dramatically. Journal: What does the rise of India and China mean for the rest of world? How would competition between the two nations help or hurt? Mahbubani: I think that China and India are really focused on their domestic and internal development. Neither of them, as of now, has any great power pretensions because they still have a lot of unfinished business in their own countries. India still has the largest pool of absolutely poor people. Depending on how you calculate it--there are various definitions of absolute poverty--about 200 to 300 million people. China too wants to focus on many internal challenges. So neither of them is trying to dominate the world in any kind of way. The good news is that both of them want to continue with the 1945 rules-based order that they joined, that the United States and Europe started. And that provides the greatest hope for the world, because if China and India actually accept the 1945 rules-based order, they will emerge as Germany and Japan did after the Second World War: peacefully, rather than as Germany and Japan emerged before the Second World War, which was not peacefully. Journal: You do not see competition between the two? …

The Art of Censorship in Vietnam

Abstract: Vietnam now participates in a capitalist market and keeps its borders open, but it still imposes a dated yet effective communist matrix of control over the country's media outlets. This article examines the effectiveness of this system of control with respect to visual art. I find that contemporary art in particular is able to communicate--and express frustrations with--the tensions between rapid economic development and political stagnation, and between cultural traditionalism and modernization. Art can speak with relative impunity because its meaning is more difficult to pinpoint than written criticism of the regime. However, it is important to note that few, if any, Vietnamese artists advocate a change of regime. Instead, they emphasize their concerns about tensions in society caused by rapid development and its effect on centuries-old traditions. The current one-party regime certainly contributes to this tension, but it would be an oversimplification to call these artists "protest artists"; rather, they act as a lens through which both Vietnamese citizens and outsiders get an honest and unbiased view of a country that is too often thought of in terms of colonialism or war. ********** In Vietnam, all art exhibitions must apply for an official exhibition permit from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. The purpose of the board is to regulate the exposure of art to the general public according to the state's wishes and needs. In interviews for this article, several artists and art dealers--all of whom asked to remain anonymous--said that the Ministry is so disorganized and steeped in corruption that it does not do a thorough job of censoring content. As a result, the artist has possibly the freest voice in Vietnam. In December 2010, I was working at the Bui Gallery in Hanoi and submitted two paintings, "Stop" and "The Last Party" by the artist Pham Huy Thong, to the Ministry. Only one was approved. The police insisted that the gallery remove "Stop" from the exhibition but had no complaints about the second picture. Foreign guests of the gallery expressed shock at "The Last Party," wondering how such a piece could be displayed in a public, for-profit art gallery in a communist country. (Reproductions of the paintings discussed in this article are located in the "Images" section of this issue on pages 238 to 240.) The decision to remove one painting and ignore the other highlights the failure of Vietnam's policy of control and demonstrates the fundamentally self-defeating nature of censorship. Vietnam is in a unique position historically; it embraces Western capitalism and development and shuns the value system that brought the elites of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to power. The push and pull between modernity and Confucian and communist traditionalism can be felt in every corner of Vietnamese society, and contemporary art has become the clearest outlet for this tension. However, this conflict is largely hidden from those outside Vietnam. Tourists enjoy their steaming bowls of pho and cyclos and marvel at the maddening traffic and cheap souvenirs. They would be right to wonder, amid rising skyscrapers, bustling shops, a growing economy and the well-dressed, mostly well-fed population: Where is the oppression? Where are the gross human rights abuses? Is freedom of speech really possible in a communist country? In fact, human rights activists have recently called attention to an upsurge in the arrest of bloggers, religious figures and activists and to a host of constraints on freedom of speech. (1) How then can art--specifically contemporary visual art, a discipline that prides itself on freedom of expression--sustain itself and thrive in a communist state? To understand this duality, it is necessary to discuss Vietnamese history before the "American War" or the Communist Revolution, when the fine arts tradition, the backbone of the contemporary Vietnamese art movement, first developed. …

Blind Men and an Elephant: How the Indian and Chinese Press Cover Myanmar

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to examine how patterns of Indian and Chinese reporting on Myanmar reflect the political climates of each country. A sample of 94 articles from Indian sources and 106 articles from Xinhua News Agency (English) was examined using content-analysis techniques. There is a clear divergence in the topics covered by the Indian and Chinese media during the time period reviewed, 3 November to 17 November 2010, which was selected to coincide with Myanmar's first nationwide elections in twenty years as well as the release of political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. The Indian press provided more coverage of Suu Kyi's release and of Myanmar political affairs than the Chinese press, but neither India nor China covered Suu Kyi's activities in the days following her release. The Chinese press provided mare coverage of economic affairs and the Myawaddy border crisis, which the Indian press ignored. Surprisingly, the press in non-democratic China attentively chronicled and promoted Myanmar's elections while the press in democratic India had very little to say about them. This suggests that on these issues, the press focus on what they perceive to be in the national interest of their respective countries. ********** India and China are competing with each other for the spoils of a partnership with their mutual neighbor Myanmar, which has been tightly controlled by its military since 1962. (1) Each would like an advantage over the other in access to natural resources, bilateral trade and in expanding military hegemony in the region. Some observers have suggested that Myanmar is "the prom queen that both China and India want to dance with." (2) Myanmar, for its part, attempts to play one against the other. This study uses content-analysis techniques to examine how this struggle plays out in each country's day-to-day news coverage of Myanmar. Using news articles from a two-week time period in November 2010, this paper will describe how national political priorities are reflected in which stories are covered and which are not. In addition, this paper will describe an interesting and unexpected outcome in which the press in non-democratic China attentively chronicled and promoted Myanmar's national elections while the press in democratic India had very little to say about them. The elections of 7 November 2010 were a unique event in Myanmar's recent history and it is unclear how they will change the political dynamic in the country. (3) A general election has not been held in Myanmar since 1990, and the results of an election have not been honored since 1960. (4) The military first took control of the Burmese government in a 1962 coup, after which it installed a nominally civilian government. The generals seized direct control again in 1988 and annulled the results of the 1990 election in which a pro-democracy party won 80 percent of the seats in the legislature. (5) In the process, they disbanded political parties and arrested democracy leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi. (6) In 2003, it announced a "roadmap toward discipline-flourishing democracy" that would supposedly bring the country from military authoritarian rule to a limited version of democracy. (7) The junta drafted a new constitution--a deeply flawed document if one values government by consent of the people, since the military retains veto power over both houses of the National Assembly--that was ratified in May 2008 amid charges of widespread vote tampering. (8) In August 2010, the junta announced that nationwide elections would take place just a few months later. (9) The United States criticized the process as unfair and illegitimate, but China and India did not. Within a matter of weeks, junta leader Than Shwe traveled to both countries to secure regional support for the elections. (10) After the generals seized control of Myanmar over twenty years ago, India condemned the government in more withering terms than anyone, including the United States, but reversed its anti-regime policy in 1993 almost entirely because of Myanmar's growing economic relationship with China. …

Interventions against a Dictator

Abstract: The Arab Spring, a wave of revolutions in nondemocratic countries in North Africa and the Middle East, forced some dictators to flee from their countries while others stayed and one faced intervention by an international coalition. Using a stylized game-theoretic model, this article analyzes the decision-making process of a dictator and explains the different outcomes. A rational dictator only leaves the country if the expected costs from punishment outweigh the benefits of staying. For the international coalition, the model identifies a trade-off between the cost of the intervention and the potential for economic benefit from a successful intervention. A higher number of participants in the coalition increases the probability of the intervention's success. However, if the intervention fails, coalition participants lose all economic benefits. Therefore, an intervening country benefits from the participation of other countries because it lowers the risk of failure. If the intervention succeeds, the economic benefits are shared among all intervening countries. Thus, an intervening country has the most to gain if it acts alone. Furthermore, a country can deliberately abstain from an intervention to benefit from higher shares of economic profit if the intervention fails and coalition members lose all economic benefits. The model can help explain the rarity of unanimous votes for an intervention and the complex and tedious bargaining process surrounding decisions to intervene. ********** In early 2011, the world observed a wave of revolutions in nondemocratic countries in North Africa and the Middle East that became known as the Arab Spring. The revolution in Tunisia swept away the longstanding president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. After another successful revolution in Egypt, protests in Libya, Syria and Yemen intensified. The leaders of all three countries countered the uprisings with military force. After Muammar al-Qaddafi ordered his air force to attack demonstrators, the United Nations authorized an international coalition to intervene in Libya. (1) Although the Syrian regime was committing similar violence against its citizens, the international community chose not to intervene militarily. A game-theoretic framework based on a stylized model sheds light on the decisionmaking process underlying these choices at the international level. A dictator seeks to maximize his rents. (2) One can distinguish between two extreme types of dictators who seek high rents. (3) The first type exercises force and control, coercing citizens to work. Since this coercion impedes the growth of the country--at least in the long run--leaders increase coercion and atrocities over time, resulting in a totalitarian regime (e.g., Mao Zedong in China, Pol Pot in Cambodia, Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, etc.). Other dictators try to maximize rents by stimulating growth (e.g., Park Chung Hee in South Korea and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore). (4) Often, a regime's party is founded for the recruitment and distribution of patronage. (5) The incorporation of opposition groups into the system (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan) can reduce the chance of rebellion. (6) The model focuses on totalitarian leaders, but the analysis also discusses a rationale for the existence of the second type of leader. The model assumes a hypothetical country where an insurgency of citizens, rebels or revolutionaries is endangering the rule of a well-established, exploitative dictator. (7) In line with recent events in Libya, the model assumes that the rebels cannot overthrow the current regime without military support from the international community. For this reason, the rebels are not modeled as active decision makers. Only the dictator and the international coalition of intervening countries are players in the model. The dictator can decide to leave the country to avoid punishment or stay and face a possible intervention from the international coalition. …