Showing papers in "Journal of Value Inquiry in 1977"

Obligations to future generations: Explorations and problemata

Abstract: The philosophical consideration of those general issues connected with the question of our obligations to future generations has emerged as an important aspect of current discussions in the area of normative ethics. And this is rightfully so. At a time when the courses of action and policies pursued in the present with regard to the environment, technology, and the quality of human life (to name only a few) can have the most radical sorts of effects extending into the distant future, it seems incumbent upon responsible philosophers to shed as much light as possible upon the human as well as conceptual issues involved. The breadth and ramifications of this particular problem are not difficult to appreciate. In order to evaluate any concrete claim which rests upon an assertion of our obligations to future generations, it is necessary to consider a whole array of factors. I will mention only a few. First, one must take into account the validity of the empirical data cited and the degree to which the effects of an action or policy can be predicted in the future. Then, it is necessary to consider whether the immediate effects of the action in the present would outweigh its future cumulative effects. This, in turn, leads to the more general question of whether it is at all justifiable to allow our concern for the welfare of future men to abrogate our moral obligations to individuals existing here and now. And this, of course, implies the necessity to consider a plethora of further philosophical issues: the meaning of the term "obligation," the logical coherence of ascribing "rights" to non-existent individuals, the criteria involved in assessing the ethical viewpoint implied in the assertion of such obligations, etc. However, the recent discussions of this problem by philosophers seem overly limited on several counts. For one thing, there has been a tendency to reduce the philosophical interest of this problem merely to the issue of the logical consistency of imputing "rights" to not-yet-existing individuals. 1 Though this sort of inquiry should not be discouraged, neither should it be substituted for an approach to this question in its full complexity. In addition, this issue is often approached in a manner which attempts to treat it by merely extending a given ethical theory to "cover it also." Again, though