Law & Policy 

About: Law & Policy is an academic journal published by Wiley. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Politics & Enforcement. It has an ISSN identifier of 0265-8240. Over the lifetime, 846 publications have been published receiving 21721 citations. The journal is also known as: body of law & legal system.

Industry Self‐Regulation: An Institutional Perspective

Abstract: Throughout the advanced countries of the world self-regulatory regimes are being introduced. This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self-regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory. The article examines the strengths and to a lesser extent the weaknesses of industry self-regulation from five closely related yet distinct vantage points: mediating institutions; industrial morality; institutionalizing responsibility; institutions responding to external pressure; and the roles of the state and third parties.

Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions

Abstract: In order to decide whether a comprehensive treaty covering all greenhouse gases is the best next step after UNCED, one needs to distinguish among the four questions about the international justice of such international arrangements: (1) What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global warming that is still avoidable?; (2) What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social consequences of the global warming that will not in fact be avoided?; (3) What background allocation of wealth would allow international bargaining (about issues like 1 and 2) to be a fair process?; and (4) What is a fair allocation of emissions of greenhouse gases (over the long-term and during the transition to the long-term allocation)? In answering each question we must specify from whom any transfers should come and to whom any transfers should go. As the grounds for the answers we usually face a choice between fault-based principles and no-fault principles.

Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

Abstract: A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate. Moreover, friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance.

Evaluating the Audit Explosion

Abstract: This paper reviews the claim that there has been an audit explosion in recent years and seeks to refine the argument in terms of its institutional and behavioral effects and its underlying causes and consequences. A framework for greater comparative sensitivity is suggested, both in cross-national and cross-sectoral terms, which focuses on variation in the knowledge base, formal organization, and operational dimensions of auditing. Finally, a preliminary framework for evaluating the design of auditing practices is developed that could inform a post-Enron critical discussion of the problems and the potential for auditing in the future.

Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies

Abstract: The search for regulatory alternatives to command and control has led many commentators to promote, or at least contemplate, the use of self-regulation to improve the environmental performance of industry. However, much of the current debate has been characterized by a choice between two mutually exclusive policy options: “strict” command and control on one hand, and “pure” self-regulation on the other. In fact, there is a much richer range of policy options, with most falling somewhere between theoretically polar extremes. This article demonstrates that there are a number of “regulatory variables” which policymakers can use to “fine-tune” regulatory options to suit the specific circumstances of particular environmental issues. In the vast majority of circumstances, a combination of self-regulation and command and control will provide the ideal regulatory outcome.