Showing papers in "Middle East Journal in 2005"

Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject

Abstract: WOMEN Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, by Saba Mahmood Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2004 xvi + 199 pages Gloss, to p 203 Refs to p 223 Index to p 233 $55 cloth; $1795 paper This book explores "the conceptual challenges that women's involvement in the Islamist movement poses to feminist theory in particular and to secular-liberal thought in general through an ethnographic account of the urban women's mosque movement that is part of the Islamic Revival in Cairo, Egypt" (p 2) However, Saba Mahmood promises more than an ethnography based on two years of fieldwork (1995-1997) She embarks on an intellectual journey of selfreflection in which she has come "to believe that a certain amount of self-scrutiny and skepticism is essential regarding the certainty of my own political commitments, when trying to understand the lives of others who do not necessarily share these commitments" (p xi) By refusing to take her own political stance as the necessary lens through which the analysis proceeds, the author opens up the possibility that "my analysis may come to complicate the vision of human flourishing that I hold most dear and which has provided the bedrock of my personal existence" (p xii) It is necessary, the author cautions as she embarks upon her inquiry, not to assume that the political position we uphold will necessarily be vindicated or provide the ground for our theoretical analysis As readers, we are invited to join her in "parochializing our assumptions, about the constitutive relationship between action and embodiment, resistance and agency, self and authority - that inform most feminist judgments from across a broad range of the political spectrum about non-liberal movements such as the women's mosque movement" (p 38) It is within that spirit that I have critiqued this book The five chapters are a running argument with and against key analytic concepts in liberal thought as these concepts have come to inform various strands of feminist theory through which non-liberal movements, such as the women's mosque movement, are analyzed Through each chapter Mahmood makes her ethnographic talk back to the normative liberal assumptions about human nature against which such a movement is held accountable "The Subject of Freedom" illustrates the different ways in which the activism of the mosque movement challenges the liberal conception of politics Mahmood analyzes the conception of self, moral agency, and politics that undergird the practices of this non-liberal movement in order to come to an understanding of the historical projects that animate it The pious subjects of the mosque movement occupy an uncomfortable place in feminist scholarship because they pursue practices and ideals embedded in a tradition that has historically accorded women a subordinate status "Topography of the Piety Movement" provides a brief sketch of the historical development against which the contemporary mosque movement has emerged and critically engages with themes within scholarship of Islamic modernism regarding such movements We sense the broad-based character of the women's mosque movement through the author's description and analysis of three of six mosques where she concentrated her fieldwork Despite the differences among the mosque groups - ranging from the poorest to the upper-middle income neighborhoods of Cairo - they all shared a concern for the increased secularization of Egyptian society and illustrate the increasing respect accorded to the da 'iya preacher/religious teacher (who undertakes da'waliterally call, summons or appeal that in the 20th century came to be associated with proselytization activity) "Women and the Da'wa" (pp 64-72) is particularly insightful, as the author juxtaposes the emergence of secular liberalism with the da'wa movement and concludes that "the modernist project of the regulation of religious sensibilities, undertaken by a range of postcolonial states (and not simply Muslim states), has elicited in its wake a variety of resistances, responses and challenges …

Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah

Abstract: Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, by Olivier Roy. New York: Columbia University Press, in association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2004. xi + 340 pages. Index to p. 349. $29.50. Olivier Roy devotes much of Globalized Islam to the distinction between what he calls "Islamism" and "neofundamentalism." He argues that Islamist movements tend to seek power in specific countries and have become increasingly nationalistic. Neofundamentalist movements, on the other hand, tend to focus on the Islamic world as a whole and do not concentrate on achieving power. According to Roy, neofundamentalists usually favor da'wa, or preaching, over jihad. "For neofundamentalists the aim of action is salvation, not revolution" (p. 248). Even when neofundamentalists do engage in jihad, they still shun "political action" (p. 250). Yet, Roy's list of "neofundamentalist" movements includes al-Qa'ida as well as the Tablighi Jama'a (p. 234). It is hard to see how anyone could argue that al-Qa'ida is more interested in salvation than revolution or that its acts of violence are not political. Roy is a knowledgeable and insightful scholar, and he makes many important points. He rightly stresses that Islam often serves primarily as a marker of national and/ or ethnic identity rather than as a political program. He rightly criticizes those who think that the behavior of Muslims today can simply be explained by examining verses of the Qur'an. And he correctly emphasizes that al-Qa'ida has an anti-imperialist dimension that should not be ignored (although this is hard to reconcile with his characterization of al-Qa'ida as an apolitical neofundamentalist movement). At the same time, however, Roy makes many sweeping generalizations that are simply inaccurate. He claims that "Bin Laden only paid lip-service to Palestine till the end of 2001" (p. 3). This is a common assertion. It is also an erroneous one. In a 1994 letter to Sheikh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden wrote: "The Shar'i obligation regarding Palestine and our Palestinian brothers, [who are] among the helpless oppressed men, women, and children, is jihad in the path of God and inciting the Umma to jihad to liberate all of Palestine and return it to Islamic rule." Much of this letter is devoted to rejecting the very idea of a peace agreement with Israel. (The Arabic text of the letter is available online at http://www.alwahabiya.org/articles/binladen_to_binbaz.htm) Roy asserts that "popular mobilisation in the Middle East centres around nationalism...not around Islam" (p. 51). Similarly, he contends that "Osama Bin Laden did not grasp that the genuine antiAmericanism of the 'average' Arab had never led to a sustainable political mobilisation, and that if such mobilisation ever did happen it would be over Palestine and Iraq that is, over Arab and not Islamic issues" (p. 56). It is true that groups like Hamas and the main movements fighting the American-led occupation of Iraq have a nationalist dimension, and this is an important point. …

The United Arab Emirates : Statehood and nation-building in a traditional society

Abstract: Nationals represent barely 20% of the population in the United Arab Emirates, but form the economically and socially privileged group of UAE citizens. The Rulers of the seven emirates were able to retain the historical loyalty of the "Emiratis" by advancing the economic development of the individual states, while Abu Dhabi-financed federal development helped to create a viable national state. Democratization is not of the same urgency as in some neighboring Gulf countries. Following the death on November 2, 2004 of Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, who had been the UAE's only President in 33 years of the country's existence as a modern state, it is an apt moment to take stock of the stage of this young nation's development. At the time of the imminent withdrawal of the British military and diplomatic protection between 1968 and 1971, when his emirate and a group of other small shaykhdoms had to decide on their political structure and future statehood, Shaykh Zayid had been an ardent advocate of political cooperation between the Gulf states, which were affected by this decision. Initially Bahrain and Qatar were expected to form part of a federal solution. When these two decided in July of 1971 to "go it alone" the seven Trucial States formed a federation, called the United Arab Emirates.1 The seven Rulers voted for Shaykh Zayid to be the UAE's first President. He was re-elected by them every five years. By the end of his life, Shaykh Zayid left behind a remarkably prosperous and stable country. Testimony to this was the spontaneous outpouring of sympathy from leaders all over the world, who came in person to Abu Dhabi to express their condolences. Many individuals and organizations who had benefited from his generosity joined the people of the UAE and the Gulf region in mourning the passing of their benefactor. ASPECTS DISTINGUISHING THE UAE FROM NEIGHBORING GULF COUNTRIES The United Arab Emirates does not fit ordinary norms - be they the ones of political and social structures or of economic assets. Just over a generation ago the population of the Trucial States was illiterate and after the decline of the pearling industry they became so poor that during the 1950s entire families emigrated to neighboring Qatar.2 Now, the UAE faces its biggest challenges because of its extreme and sudden wealth - not poverty. In many ways the UAE is still a developing country. Another surprising aspect of this extraordinary country is that Arabic is the declared official language of this Arab state, but Arabic is not the language used by the majority of the UAE's current inhabitants. Above all, it is the combination of the adopted federal form of government with the inherited role of the tribal rulers, which makes the UAE unique in terms of political structure and reality of governmental administration. When this federation was proclaimed in 1971, the majority of the distant observers had their doubts about the viability of this precarious structure.3 More than 30 years later it may be argued that the unorthodox nature of the UAE's political makeup may have proven to be its strength and is likely to serve the country well enough for the foreseeable future. The expectation now is that the foundations, which have been laid down in over three decades, will sustain lasting stability and prosperity into the future - even without the charismatic leader. Because the UAE has such an unusual political makeup, much depends on the function of its federal structure - more precisely on the relationship between the central administration of the Federal Government and the powers vested in the individual emirates' authorities. Regular observers of the Gulf are struck by the way in which Dubai has launched into a multifaceted development drive. oil production is irreversibly in decline in Dubai. Now the desert, which in the past was common tribal grazing land, but for which the current generation has no use any more, is being turned into a source of instant wealth in the form of marketable real estate. …

Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism

Abstract: MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism, by Zachary Lockman. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xxi + 272 pages. Maps. Notes to p. 292. Bibl. to p. 303. Index to p. 308. $65 cloth; $22.99 paper. The Middle East studies field has been engaged in a process of self-examination since the early 1970s. In the United States, this questioning originated in the discontent of a younger generation of scholars, influenced by the civil rights struggle, the New Left, anti-Vietnam War protest and the feminist movement, not just with area studies but with modernization theory more broadly defined. The idea, increasingly prominent as the 1970s progressed, that scholarly knowledge all too often reflected power relationships rather than dispassionate inquiry, was energized by Edward Said's Orientalism, published in 1978. Said viewed Orientalism both as a discourse that developed over many centuries of contact between the Orient and the Occident, as well as an institutionalized practice manifested primarily in the university. Said's work raised serious questions not only about the conceptualizations of the Middle East used by Western scholars, and their intentions when conducting research, but ultimately about the legitimacy of area studies itself as an institutional framework for generating cross-cultural knowledge. The proliferation of studies over the past quarter century centered around the concept of "Orientalism" makes Zachary Lockman's, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism, a welcome addition. Although it professes to offer only an introduction to the debates surrounding Orientalism, Contending Visions presents a comprehensive history of the issues surrounding the rise of Islamic and then Middle Eastern studies in Europe and especially in the United States, as well as an insightful discussion of the critiques of the field that arose during the 197Os and after. Lockman begins with an lengthy and nuanced discussion of the rise of Islamic studies, both in Europe and the United States. After analyzing the relations between Islam and the West in chapters 2 and 3, both in the Middle East and in Spain, he is particularly concerned to show in Chapter 4, "The American Century," that the rise of Middle Eastern area studies in the United States after 1945 coincided with the development of the Cold War. According to Lockman, the proliferation of Middle Eastern studies programs in American universities had as much to do with the desire to thwart Soviet power as to understand the region's social, political, and cultural complexities. Thus the main motive for funding Middle East area studies was to prevent the region from falling under Soviet influence, both because of its oil resources and strategic geographical location. Lockman is especially good in his exposition of Said's Orientalism, and the academic and political reactions to it. While a work of great import, Orientalism nevertheless suffers from a number of flaws. That Said was largely unable to explain German Orientalist interest in the Middle East despite the lack of German colonies in the region (or even the strong American concern with the region during the 19th century, also before major political and economic interests had developed) undermines his argument that knowledge of the Middle East produced in the West was correlated with colonial interests. Sadiq al-'Azm's assertion that Said never breaks with Orientalist ontology, thereby creating an "Orientalism in reverse," is another important criticism that Lockman deftly explains. Lockman is not as strong when discussing the impact of modernization theory on Middle East studies. …

The War of Muslim Minds: Islam and the West

Abstract: The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, by Gilles Kepel. Cambridge, MA and London, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004. 295 pages. Sources to p. 309. Acknowledgments to p. 312. Index to p. 327. $23.95. Gilles Kepel has emerged in recent years as a leading interpreter of Islam to Western audiences. He first made his mark in 1985 with The Prophet and the Pharaoh, on radical Islamist groups in Egypt, and he secured his position with the 2002 publication of Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (which had been published in France two years earlier). Kepel has carved out a role as someone who is sharply critical of Islamist movements without belying hostility to Islam, and as a dogged researcher. Given Kepel's background and accomplishments, his most recent book is a disappointment. This book is not without its merits. The penultimate chapter, "The Battle for Europe," is a fascinating extended meditation on the relationship between Europe, Islam, and radical Islam. While Kepel brings a good deal of his own history to this debate - he was on the French panel that banned the headscarf in schools, and he seems to have a personal vendetta against the controversial Swiss cleric Tariq Ramadan - he helpfully contrasts the British approach to its Muslim communities (which seeks to emphasize the rights and freedoms of individual members) with the corresponding French approach (which stresses communal recognition in exchange for loyalty to the state). He also usefully maps Muslim belief and practice in France, distinguishing between jihadists, quietist salafists, and the Muslim brotherhood members who simultaneously seek to assimilate and to carve out a communal political role. Kepel predicts that how the Muslim community sees itself- as violent or non-violent, as political active or inactive, and as primarily European or primarily Muslim - will be a key factor in the future of the continent. Kepel also provides a useful earlier chapter on the evolution of jihadi thought, although his tone here is more journalistic than scholarly. When Kepel ventures farther afield, however, he is less successful. Ostensibly framing the book is the argument that American neoconservatives and jihadist radicals share a desire to destroy the present order in the Middle East and remake it in their own image. His discussion of the neoconservatives' history is idiosyncratic, giving the movement far more intellectual consistency than it actually has, ascribing too much importance to Albert Wohlstetter, and never once mentioning the legendary godfather of the movement in Washington, Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Senate years of service: 1953-83). More seriously, Kepel's deep hostility to neoconservative thought leads his analysis astray. For example, in explaining why the Bush Administration set Iraq in its sights when the real enemy was al-Qa'ida, Kepel suggests, "Neoconservatives in Washington would not be satisfied tracking down a bunch of haggard bearded men, hiding out in caves or motel rooms, who conducted their business through satellite phone connections and back accounts in offshore tax havens. The United States required a worthy adversary for its war on terror - a nation with real estate to be occupied, military hardware to be destroyed, and a regime to be overthrown - not a terrorist NGO without status or headquarters, however devastating that NGO might prove to be" (p. …

The Politics of Islamic Finance

Abstract: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS The Politics of Islamic Finance, ed. by Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson. New York and Edinburgh: Columbia University Press and Edinburgh University, 2004. 295 pages. Contribs. Index to p. 307. $30. This collection of articles addresses a number of political aspects surrounding Islamic finance, and whets the reader's appetite for more in-depth treatment of the politics shaping the industry. A common shortcoming of essays collected in a single volume is that some points are treated repeatedly by various authors (albeit from slightly different vantage points and in different contexts), while other important points are not sufficiently addressed. Most political questions that come to mind today are framed by the post September 11"1 world order. Excluding the editors' introduction and conclusion of the volume, Ibrahim Warde's article is the only one that discusses this issue in some detail, paralleling and updating the analysis in his recent book, also published by Edinburgh University Press, in 2003. This analysis highlights US policy-circles' prior ignorance of the nature of Islamic finance (to the point of confusing two very different institutions: Al-Baraka and Al-Barakaat), but Western governments more generally have since increased their understanding of (and sympathy towards) Islamic finance. Indeed, after the publication of this volume, Britain's Financial Services Authority (FSA) licensed the first Islamic bank in Europe: Islamic Bank of Britain, PIc., and the first Western "Islamic" bonds were issued by the German state of Saxony Anhalt. The US Treasury also created a position of "scholar-in-residence in Islamic finance" to enhance Washington's understanding of the industry. Most articles in the volume concentrated on domestic and intra-Islamic-regional politics surrounding Islamic finance. In particular, the historical roots of Islamic finance, and the relationship of its financiers, pioneers and clients to Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are featured in multiple articles. The primary collective contribution of this volume, as summarized clearly in the editors' conclusions, is to highlight which political environments tend to be hospitable or hostile to Islamic financial growth, including relationships between various governments and their Islamist constituencies, be they actively political or otherwise. Particularly interesting are the nuanced analyses of government religious competition with private groups: For instance, the governmental posture in Egypt simultaneously exhibits hostility to Islamic banks through pronouncements and proposed legislation as well as offering Islamic financial services through state-owned banks. This phenomenon is part of larger competitions in most Islamic countries between state and private (grassroots or business-community-financed) domination of the religious scene. The first article of the volume, by Monzer Kahf, offers a most intriguing history of Islamic finance, from it, germination in the theoretical Islamic economics literature of the 1950s and 1960s, up to its current state. Kahf focuses his article on the alliance between wealthy Arab Muslims, who gave rise to the industry and continued to support it financially through its formative years, and jurist-consults (fuqaha) or scholars ('ulama '), who helped establish the industry's credibility. …

God's Rule: Government and Islam

Abstract: God's Rule: Government and Islam, by Patricia Crone. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. x + 400 pages. Charts to p. 413. Bibl. to p. 446. Index and gloss, to p. 462. $39.50. For many Muslim believers, it is an article of faith that religion and politics are fused. Patricia Crone accepts this doctrine and begins her new book by firmly grounding Islam in a Middle Eastern tradition of religious and political unity. The two examples she uses as evidence are the Sumerian city-states with their priest-rulers and "the federation of Israelites that Moses took out of Egypt for the conquest of Palestine" (p. 15). These examples are perhaps not the best choices since archaeologists have discovered military strongmen as well as priests among the earliest rulers in Sumeria. They also tell us of early popular assemblies (pukhrum), indicating that Iraq (!) and not Greece was the place displaying the earliest traces of participatory politics.1 As for the Israelites, many archaeologists are skeptical of the historicity of the Exodus and are inclined to regard the ancient Israelites as villagers of long standing in the Palestinian hills.2 In the case of Islamic origins as well, the scholarship of the past quarter century - in which Dr. Crone occupies a prominent position has cast doubts on the historicity of early 7lh-century events in Arabia as told by the 9lh-century religious scholars. While Islamic theology and law may posit a unity of religion and politics, historical research demonstrates their distinctiveness - more often in tension than in harmony. Apart from the initial fusion argument, the book is a masterpiece on the history of the tension existing between religion and politics during the formative period of Islamic civilization (7'h to 13th centuries C.E.). It begins with a discussion of the Umayyad caliphs, governors, and judges who ruled the expanding Islamic Empire in the early 70Os by religious as well as political decree. From the start, however, these rulers had to deal with critics, such as the Kharijis, Jama'i Muslims, and Shi'is, who advocated rival models of religio-political organization under either weaker or stronger caliphs. Crone coins the felicitous term jama'i (p. 28) to describe those early "communitarian" (later Sunni) Muslims who were critical of Umayyad religious functions but did not seek to overturn Umayyad rule. While admittedly the Kharijis and Shi'is espoused religio-political fusion, the very fact of their active hostility shows the unavoidable tensions between religion and politics in the historical process. Crone convincingly argues that Shi'ism in the mid-700s was still more generally Hashimite (family of the Prophet) than 'Alid (family of the Prophet's cousin 'AH) in orientation. Consequently, the 'Abbasid revolution of 750 appears as a victory for the Shi'i model of a strong caliphate, especially in religious matters. …

The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland

Abstract: PALESTINEAND PALESTINIANS The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland, by Helena Lindholm Schulz with Julianne Hammer. London, UK and New York: Routledge, 2003. v + 230 pages. Notes to p. 242. Bibl. to p. 266. index to p. 276. $27.95 paper. This book is part of a series on Global Diasporas edited by Robin Cohen. The series begins with two conceptual books followed by case studies, of which Lindholm Schulz's book is one. The intent of the series is interesting and creative, and certainly Schulz deserves credit for embracing its analytical framework and attempting to apply it to Palestinian exiles and refugees. She states that the ... purpose of this book is to look further into the relationship between diaspora and creation of national identity, as well as nationalist politics related to a particular territory, but also to explore the possibilities incumbent in a transnational existence and new, less territorialized identities even among a diaspora community as tightly knitted around the idealized homeland as the Palestinian (p. 4). In pursuit of her goal, Schulz interweaves Palestinian political history from the 1948-Nakba to the second intifada, including its first two plus years. Her methodology includes culling material from PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) documents, drawing on exile literatures and narratives, and oral histories based on over 150 admittedly non-representative interviews she conducted in 2000-2001, as well as some of her interviews from the mid-1990s. Additionally, Schulz draws on excellent field studies of several social scientists, especially the work of Rosemary Sayigh. She deploys all these sources in her attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the variations in identity and nationalist political behavior stemming from venues of the Palestinian diaspora. Her claim is that there is a dearth of such studies. Such works that exist are individual identity studies and Palestinian narratives, which she integrates into what she considers her comprehensive study. After reviewing the Nakba period through the 1967 war to trace and place the scattered Palestinians, Schulz goes on to discuss the diaspora experiences in the venues in which Palestinians found themselves. What is odd about this section is that she leaves out Syria, a country where over 400,000 Palestinians refugees live in greater social and economic comfort than elsewhere. In fact, while the Palestinians there have kept a Palestinian identity, they are well integrated into the fabric of Syrian society. They enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizenship without holding citizenship.1 Nonetheless, there is a strong return movement in Syria (a 'idouri) seeking the right of repatriation and full compensation. …

Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad

Abstract: SAUDI ARABIA Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, by Natana J. DeLongBas. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 290 pages. Map. Notes to p. 343. Gloss, to p. 348. Bibl. to p. 359. Index to p. 370. $35. Since Arabian warriors led by the House of Saud first burst out of Najd in central Arabia under the banner of Wahhabism in the mid-18lh century, the puritanical Islamic reform movement has suffered from a bad name. In those days, opposition came mainly from Muslim rulers and members of the religious establishment who feared that the austere revival movement would undermine their authority, to say nothing of their lucrative business opportunities derived from providing services to pilgrims to the Islamic holy places of Makka and alMadina, and to those visiting the tombs of local Muslim holy men in order to seek intercession with God. Until the discovery of oil in the 20"' century, the Western powers, for the most part, considered Najd to be too remote to be more than marginally important strategically or economically, and thus largely ignored it. As a result, Westerners knew as little about the people of Najd and their revival movement as Najdis knew about them. Following World War II, the Saudi state rapidly gained importance not only as a major oil producer, but with the advent of the Cold War, as a staunch ally of the West due to its strident opposition to communism as a heretical, atheistic, and anti-Islamic doctrine. But with the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, a backlash of anti-Saudi sentiment arose, particularly in the United States, that focused on a two and a half century old revival movement, Wahhabism, dubbed by some of its most vociferous antagonists as a doctrine of terrorism and hate. One of the fascinating aspects of this long-standing and ever-changing antipathy toward Wahhabism is how little its detractors have really understood or perhaps cared to understand the substance of the doctrines espoused by its founder, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Perhaps one should not be too harsh on his critics. Historically, access to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's writings has not been easy to come by. But the dearth of understanding makes Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad all the more important for contemporary readers. The author, Natana DeLong-Bas, was granted access to the writings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab by the King 'Abd al-'Aziz Foundation in Riyadh, and bases her study on what he actually wrote, not on what hostile commentators over the centuries have said he preached. The result is a lucid and carefully documented assessment of Wahhabism that, given what has previously been asserted by commentators and scholars alike, is clearly revisionist. Professor DeLong-Bas begins by addressing the historical context in which Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab preached his revival. Wahhabism was not created in a vacuum in a faraway isolated corner of Arabia. Throughout Islamic history, ideas traveled to the remotest places; and 18th century Najd, where Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was born, preached, and died was no exception. Moreover, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was no unlettered tent-meeting revivalist. He traveled to alMadina and Basra (in present day Iraq) to study Islamic jurisprudence under noted scholars, and also studied under his father, a respected local Islamic scholar in his own right. Father and son both subscribed to the ultra-conservative Hanbali School of Islamic Jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the Wahhabi revival movement did not require one to follow Hanbali law. In reviewing Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's works, the author notes that Wahhabism was in fact a powerful expression of a general concern shared by many 18th century Islamic reformers (p. 8). The author notes that mainstream 18th century Islamic reformers were concerned with what they believed were the heretical innovations (bid' a) that had crept into the religion since the Prophet Muhammad's time, particularly the association of divine characteristics with any human beings (shirk). …

A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East

Abstract: LANGUAGEAND LITERATURE A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East, by Yasir Suleiman, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii+ 230 pages. Appends, to p. 234. Bibl. to p. 254. Index to p. 270. $70 cloth; $27 paper. Political conflicts affect language repertoires, and in some cases language issues become part and parcel of the conflict. Language is not abstracted from reality and people but responds to surrounding changes. The Middle East, with its unique history and politics, offers a fertile background for the study of language and political conflicts. Yasir Suleiman, in the work under review here, deals with language and political conflicts in the Middle East, shedding light on the subject from various perspectives. The investigation of language and conflict in this book combines social as well as political conflict, although the latter is more dominant in the book. Such a study undoubtedly requires a multi-disciplinary approach. Suleiman leans on various disciplines, and he extensively borrows terms from political studies (e.g., conflict resolution, zero-sum game, confrontation, hegemony). The book focuses on national identity, state building, ethnic marking, map marking, and semiotic representation. This book is the second volume of a three-part study on language and society in the Arab world. The first of these volumes is The Arabic language and National Identity: A Study in Ideology (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003). The book comprises six chapters. Chapter 1 opens with some personal examples and concepts and introduces the content of the book. Chapter 2 explains the basic concepts employed in the book. It mainly deals with the interaction of power, conflict, and language. Chapter 3 deals in greater details with the debate between the language-modernizers and the language defenders with respect to Standard Arabic and its colloquial forms. Chapter 4 examines language and political conflict in Jordan. It deals with dialect as a boundary-setter as well as with the linguistic attitudes towards competing dialects in Jordan. The socio-political meanings of the Jordanian case are explored by using the concepts of code-switching, dialect convergence, dialect shift, and dialect maintenance in relation to the symbolic function of language in society. For this purpose, Suleiman utilizes the well-known sociolinguistic variable /q/ investigated in various Arab contexts, including Jordan.Chapter 5 examines the political conflict between Arabic and Hebrew in Israel/Palestine. Chapter 6 is conclusions. In this study, the author decided not to consider North Africa (though there is a long section about it in Chapter 2), preferring to restrict himself to the Middle East. The decision is justified since North Africa and other parts of the Arab world (e.g., Sudan, Somalia, and Mauritania) deserve separate studies. The book covers a good number of cases in the Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Israel/Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.), but it does not consider Lebanon, one of the most intriguing cases in the study of language and political conflicts in the Middle East, whether in terms of dialect variation and change, or bilingual education. In this book, unlike the previous one by the author (The Arabic Language and National Identity), Islamic nationalism occupies an important role and is treated in-depth, mainly in relation to language modernization. …

Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland

Abstract: PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland, by Juliane Hammer. Austin, TX; University of Texas Press, 2005. xiii + 225 pages. Appends, to p. 228. Notes to p. 238. Bibl. to p. 259. Index to p. 271. $55 cloth; $22.95 paper. The return of Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza areas of Occupied Palestine is a new phenomenon of the last decade since the Oslo Peace Accords (1993). Approximately 100,000 have returned, according to Dr. Hammer, and it is a segment of this population, young adults born in exile, upon which she has done an extremely valuable, insightful, and thorough anthropological ethnography. The process of "right of return" is an important and complex issue for many reasons. It is part of the Palestinian struggle ever since the illegal acquisition and confiscation of lands by Israel in 1948, after the 1967 war, and through its continued expansion and land grabs. Return and compensation are both emotional and political aspects in the conflict over land, statehood, and international human rights. Hammer writes that the returnees have not included people from camps in surrounding Arab countries, but Palestinians who were working for the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and applied to return and work with the Palestinian Authority and/or the police forces; beneficiaries of family reunification programs; returnees from Kuwait, and Palestinians with foreign passports (p. 4). Hammer chose to study 50 women and men between the ages of 16 and 35, who were born outside Palestine, and residing in the Ramallah/Jerusalem area. Her methodology includes in-depth interviews conducted primarily in Ramallah, and primarily in English. Additionally, the writer lived in the area and had valuable discussions with writers, politicians, scholars, and others between 1997 and 2000. Thus, she participated in activities that gave her knowledge and context for the cultural, religious, and political questions she investigated. Her sample is divided into the 'A' idin (those born in other Arab countries) and Amirkan (those born in America), and each group is divided into voluntary and involuntary returnees. The author discusses different forms of migration, such as forced and voluntary, as well as the emotions of exile and separation. For Palestinians, migration was a result of war, political persecution, economic pressure, and eviction of political activists (p. 15). A detailed history of dispossession provides a thorough background for this important case. There are several million not living in Occupied Palestine. Often, flight involved many moves, and although Palestine remained the foremost source of identity, many of those who fled also acquired new identities in order to adjust to their places of exile. These identities influence the ways they adjust to the Palestinian areas. Intermarriage with locals while in exile and gender become important factors, since only children of Palestinian fathers are "proper Palestinians" (p. 17). Those with Palestinian mothers also show a strong sense of national identity. Hammer relays stories of memory, which have accompanied the wrenching experience as told by parents to this younger generation. …

Independence, Cantons, or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?

Abstract: The Palestinian state remains an internationally endorsed project, yet an increasingly difficult one to implement. By analyzing the territorial, legal, and demographic developments that took place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over the past ten years, this article assesses the extent to which the prospective Palestinian state has become unattainable. A comparison between the South African apartheid experience and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is made to shed light on the ways in which the Palestinian territories are becoming analogous to Bantustans. While historical comparisons are never exact or prescriptive, they raise interesting parallels whose implications need to be considered, if not altered, in any attempt to materialize the project of viable Palestinian independence. A he idea of the Palestinian state as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a new one. Yet, it is still far from being realized. It received its clearest endorsement by the international community with the publication of the US-backed Road Map in May 2003. This plan called for the establishment of an "independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian State living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors," as envisaged by UNSC Resolution 1397 and the Saudi Initiative of March 2002.' However, after four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada that resulted in the killing of over 3,500 Palestinians and 989 Israelis,2 the economic and social resources of the Palestinians were severely damaged,3 and the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority destroyed; the prospects of a viable Palestinian state could not be more remote. The Israeli government's decision in June 2004 to "disengage" unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and to continue the construction of a separation wall in the West Bank gave another blow to the project of a viable contiguous sovereign Palestinian entity in the Occupied Territories. International scholars, as well as Palestinian NGOs, have long argued that the Oslo process and the Intifada did not bring the Palestinians closer to statehood, but rather confirmed an Israeli "apartheid" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS).4 Ariel Sharon, Israel's Prime Minister since 2001, had long contended that the Bantustan model, so central to the apartheid system, is the most appropriate to the present Israeli-Palestinian conflict.5 Others, by contrast, have maintained that the Palestinian territories have been transformed into cantons whose final status is still to be determined.6 The difference in terminology between cantons and Bantustans is not arbitrary though. The former suggests a neutral territorial concept whose political implications and contours are left to be determined. The latter indicates a structural development with economic and political implications that put in jeopardy the prospects for any meaningfully sovereign viable Palestinian state. It makes the prospects for a binational state seem inevitable, if most threatening to the notion of ethnic nationalism. The aim of this article is to analyze the demise of a potential Palestinian state by drawing on the South African apartheid paradigm. Although the comparison between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and apartheid South Africa is not new,7 it has not always been fully explained or accepted. This article seeks to fill this gap by exploring how the South African and the Zionist colonial experiences converged despite their significant historical differences. By carefully exploring the South African apartheid edifice, particularly the Bantustans, and comparing it with the structural developments set in place in the Palestinian territory since the Oslo process, it shows how the West Bank and Gaza Strip have moved towards a process of "Bantustanization" rather than of sovereign independence. This is a process by which Palestinian territories have been transformed into de facto population reserves out of which Palestinians cannot exit without the possession of a permit issued by Israeli military authorities. …

Negotiating Rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law

Abstract: Recent attempts to abolish the Personal Status Law, in force since 1959, with the intent of placing family matters in the hands of religious authorities, caused an uproar among Iraqi women's rights activists. This article seeks to place the protest in its historical context by tracing women's participation in shaping the Personal Status Law - touching upon both their achievements and disappointments. It highlights the threat that repealing the law would pose, not only to the advancements for which women activists have struggled long and hard, but more importantly to the very channel which made these achievements possible. It also exposes the "hidden costs" of the protest. Activists' energies were diverted into preserving a law which left many demands unanswered, and away from promoting improved legislation. Since the toppling of Saddam Husayn by the US-led coalition, the threat of abolishing Iraq's progressive Personal Status Law, in force since 1959, has hung like a dark cloud over the heads of many Iraqi women. Recent attempts to introduce clauses into the permanent constitution that would effectively repeal the law were preceded by similar efforts in 2003. In both cases women's voices resonated in protest. An examination of the response of women's rights activists to the 2003 attempt at abolition provides a framework for acquiring a more profound understanding of the current controversy involving family law. On December 29, 2003, the US-appointed Interim Governing Council (IGC), headed by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, the Shi'i cleric who also leads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), passed Decree 137 to abolish Iraq's Personal Status Law. In its place, the shari'a was to be applied in matters concerning marriage, divorce, custody of children, inheritance and all other matters of personal status, thus placing family affairs in the hands of religious authorities. In an effort to prevent this decision from becoming law, women openly condemned the move and carried out a series of organized protests. Activists representing 80 women's organizations demonstrated in al-Firdaws Square in Baghdad, carrying placards that read: "No to Discrimination Between Women and Men in Our New Iraq," "We Reject Decree 137 Which Sanctifies sectarianism and Division in Iraqi Society and Family." A delegation of women handed a letter of protest to 'Adnan Pachachi, rotating President of the IGC at the time, and a petition was sent to L. Paul Bremer, the Chief US Administrator in Iraq. At a conference addressing the role of women in politics, Decree 137 was a main focus of criticism. Protest also spread outside Baghdad. In Kirkuk, for example, women representing several Kurdish women's organizations demonstrated, and thousands of Kurdish women took to the streets at al-Sulaymaniyya.1 Activists denounced the absence of democratic debate. "Such a sweeping decision should be made over time, with an opportunity for public dialogue," said Nasrin Barwari, Minister of Public Works. "This is not what we hoped for in our new Iraq."2 They also warned of the consequences which a religious government, possibly heralded by this decision, would have on women and matters of personal status. According to retired judge Zakiyya Isma'il Haqqi, since 1959 Iraqi family law has evolved and been amended under a series of secular governments, giving women a "half-share in society" and an opportunity to develop as individuals. "This new law will send Iraqi families back to the Middle Ages. It will allow men to have four or five or six wives. It will take children away from their mothers. It will allow anyone who calls himself a cleric to open an Islamic court in his house and decide about who can marry and divorce and have rights."3 Activists not only demanded repeal of this decision but also an active role in drafting a new Personal Status Law. Maysun al-Damluji, president of the Iraqi Independent Women's Group, in an opening speech to the conference that addressed the role of women in politics, said that without the active participation of women's organizations, any change in the existing Personal Status Law would not be accepted by the Iraqi people. …

The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?

Abstract: This article examines the delicate dynamics of the triangle of Turkey-EU-US relations. While acknowledging the role of the United States in promoting close links between Turkey and the EU, this study underlines the limits of American influence on EU decision-making on issues concerning "deep integration." In this context, the future of this triangular relation depends on the interplay of contending forces in Turkey's domestic political arena as well as the dynamics of trans-Atlantic relations in the international scene. The first major war of the 21st century lasted only 21 days. Yet the US invasion of Iraq left a tremendous mark not only in Iraq and the volatile Middle East, but also intensified the already emerging trans-Atlantic rift and set the Turkish-American alliance on a troublesome path. The military victory came rather quickly for the United States. However, translating military victory into a political one and achieving longterm peace and stability, as well as restoring the delicate balance of the TurkeyEuropean Union-US triangle proves to be a much more challenging task for all the parties concerned. Turkey had been an important ally of the United States throughout the Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War and the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey's geostrategic importance came under increasing scrutiny. After a temporary interlude in the early 1990s, however, the strategic partnership between the two countries was restored on a new basis. Yet, Turkish-American relations came under severe challenge during the early months of 2003 in the context of the War in Iraq, following the failure of the Turkish Parliament on March 1 to authorize the deployment of US troops to Iraq via Turkish territory. Clearly, this was interpreted as a major blow by the Bush Administration, resulting in a serious setback in the long-standing TurkishAmerican partnership. What is interesting for our purposes is the impact of this rupture in Turkish-US relations on Turkey's relations with the European Union. The relevance of this question increases at a time when the Iraq War has resulted in a massive rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance as well as generating deep divisions within the "New Europe" itself. This article makes the following main arguments. First, the role of the United States in promoting closer links between Turkey and the EU, both historically and in the more recent context, has indeed been critical. Yet, one also needs to recognize the limits to American influence on the EU in decisions concerning "deep integration." This became particularly evident in the context of the Copenhagen summit of December 2002, when explicit pressure by the Bush Administration in support of accelerated progress for Turkish membership appeared to have backfired. second, the war on Iraq has pushed Turkey closer to the EU and accelerated the reform process on the economic and democratization fronts in line with the EU's Copenhagen criteria. In retrospect, the war has helped to tilt the balance of power within Turkey's domestic politics further in the direction of the "pro-EU coalition" which had already been gathering strength particularly since the Helsinki decision of 1999 granting Turkey candidate status. Moreover, the more credible set of incentives from the EU since the Helsinki summit, in addition to giving momentum to Turkey's transition from a procedural to substantive democracy and helping to transform its economy, also gave way to a closer alignment of Turkey's foreign policy with the major European powers leading to a relative "Europeanization" of Turkish foreign policy. Finally, the fact that short-term dynamics appear to favor closer relations between Turkey and the EU should not lead to the misleading interpretation that Turkey would be able to achieve smooth and rapid progress towards EU membership in the absence of US support. While in the December 2004 summit the EU had set a date to start the accession negotiations with Turkey, the thorny path towards Turkey's full membership is still full of difficulties and uncertainties. …

A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria

Abstract: A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria, by Christa Salamandra. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. xi + 164 pages. Notes to 171. Refs. to 187. Index to 199. $49.95 cloth; $21.95 paper. This ethnography focuses on the typically overlooked (at least in the anthropological literature) elite classes of the contemporary Middle East. In this case, the analysis focuses on the wide variety of contexts in which both the nouveau riche and the upper crust old families of Damascus pursue and display status and prestige in an effort at establishing a quintessentially Damascene identity. A New Old Damascus is a refreshing addition to the ethnography of the Middle East in that it eschews anthropology's more typical focus on the exotic and the marginal, and it offers up an analysis of intense identity management rich in voices, telling details, and theoretical engagement. Its sites of ethnography include the burgeoning leisure options that have expanded in Damascus in the past 15 years, including restaurants, cafes, clubs, and hotels in the Old City, as well as in the upscale neighborhoods scattered around Damascus. There is also a great deal of attention paid to the widely watched and commented upon nostalgic television serials that are offered up during the month of Ramadan. Additionally, those who are identified with the conservation, preservation, and celebration of Damascus, including novelists, philosophers, and government ministers, are among those whose voices appear woven into the analysis. Salamandra reports that in this elite social milieu one among many routes to pursuing distinction, authenticity, and Damascene identity involves the commodification of Ramadan and what Salamandra terms "ostentatious fasting" (p. 96). Ostentatious fasting is followed toward the latter half of Ramadan by elaborate fast-breaking iftar's and associated evenings of sociability at public sites of consumption and leisure across the city. The commodification of Ramadan is framed in her analysis as a reinvented tradition. This seems a gutsy choice, focusing on conspicuous consumption among the elite during the holy month of Ramadan (and one that Salamandra's cosmopolitan elite Syrian readers might not be inclined to accept). Salamandra's take on Ramadan's iftar, suhur, and television serials, however, are an integral and convincing part of her larger analysis of the pursuit of authenticity and distinction in the construction of Damascene identity. Perhaps the most fascinating chapter, in terms of ethnographic detail, theoretical engagement, and disciplinary upbraiding, is the one focusing on the intersection of consumption, display, and gender. …

Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror?: The 2004 US-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement

Abstract: In June 2004, the United States signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco. FTAs are typically thought of as economic agreements, but the agreement with Morocco has an explicit security component. Indeed, US officials have cast the agreement as an opportunity to support a close ally in the region, and its signing coincides with Morocco's denomination as a non-NATO ally of the US. Yet even if the FTA achieves its stated economic goals - a very tall and ambitious order - it remains to be seen whether or not the benefits will extend to a society divided by enormous social cleavages. As a result, the US-Moroccan FTA and Morocco's new found stature in US security policy paradoxically run the risk of deepening societal resentment within Morocco toward the government and, by extension, the US. Step by step, the Administration is working to build bridges of free trade with economic and social reformers in the Middle East. Our plan offers trade and openness as vital tools for leaders striving to build more open, optimistic, and tolerant Islamic societies. - US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, at the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with Morocco, June 15, 2004 On April 23, 2002, seven short months after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, King Muhammad VI of Morocco visited Washington to meet with President George W. Bush. The visit was the occasion for the announcement of the intention to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Morocco. Although Morocco is a longstanding ally of the US, the statement was nonetheless a remarkable development. At the time of its announcement, a Free Trade Agreement with Morocco would have been only the fifth free trade agreement between the US and a trading partner, after Israel (1985), Canada and Mexico (1993), and Jordan (2001). After several months of repose - during which time under federal law Congress had the opportunity to "comment" on the proposal - formal negotiations began in January 2003. Discussions proceeded for 15 months through 9 difficult rounds in Washington and Rabat, with a set of negotiations also conducted in Geneva during the Iraq War in March 2003. Ultimately, on March 2, 2004, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb Fassi Fihri signed a US-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement. Zoellick and Fassi Fihri signed the treaty in Washington on June 15, 2004, and both houses of Congress ratified the treaty in July 2004.1 The Bush Administration has explicitly portrayed the FTA with Morocco as an effort to build strategic, economic, and political ties with a moderate, friendly regime in the region that will serve, in turn, as a model for other countries. The obvious question: Will it work? The advent of the agreement presents a paradox. In addition to its obvious economic goals, the agreement has clear security and strategic goals as well. Yet if the FTA does not generate long-term economic growth and is not perceived by Moroccan society as beneficial to the country, it threatens to undercut Morocco's already shaky domestic stability and exacerbate anti-US sentiment in the country. FTAs are typically thought of as economic issues - more the domain of international political economy - with negotiators having to take into account their own country's economic interests as well as the political and economic constraints confronting their counterparts.2 This FTA is no exception; it certainly has a significant economic component. Despite the fact that the overall volume of trade between the two countries is quite small, negotiators had to bargain hard to get concessions and understandings about the full scope of the agreement. To cite a quick example, examined more fully below, Rabat was keen on securing safeguards that its agricultural sub-sector of wheat would not be affected adversely by imports of low-cost, highquality US grain. Morocco's agricultural sector employs nearly half of the country's population, and roughly 75% of the sector is devoted to cereal production. …

The Continuing Evolution of Iran's Military Doctrine

Abstract: Iran's military has tried to develop concepts for warfighting suitable for deterring the United States while dealing with a complex security environment and numerous constraints on its military power. The military's key task has been to align doctrine with service capabilities. This article examines the path of Iran's doctrinal developments and highlights the advantages and problems in Iran's approach and its seeming over-reliance on missile-based deterrence and the threat of unconventional and proxy war. Spurred by ongoing tensions with the West over its nuclear ambitions and the presence of US forces in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's un-elected leaders and principal military officials have publicly declared their view that US hostility toward the Islamic Republic has been increasing and would be resisted.1 As a result, Iranian officials have emphasized ongoing efforts to revise their country's military doctrine by applying observations of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to the development of new strategies and tactics to defeat American forces and to deny the United States critical military and political objectives. In fact, Tehran has been following this path since the early 1990s as it sought to bring its national military doctrine more in line with its Armed Forces' actual capabilities and provide the concepts and guidance for confronting the superior power of the United States. The clear emphasis of these doctrines is on using ballistic missile-based deterrence, unconventional operations, Iran's strategic depth, and popular mobilization for partisan warfare. If it can fulfill its maturing approach to doctrine, Iran will be better positioned to threaten US interests despite many military shortcomings. And, should conflict come, Iran could be much better prepared than recent American adversaries to upset seriously US operations through surprise, unconventional tactics, and worldwide retaliatory responses. FAILURE AND OPPORTUNITY NURTURE SECURITY OUTLOOK Iran's current approach to military doctrine reflects years of dealing with the complex geopolitical environment that emerged from Iran's revolution, its defeat by Iraq, and its lack of economic and technological strength. Major factors shaping Iran's initial efforts to develop a post-war doctrine included the losses of men and equipment during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq and the success of US efforts to restrict weapons sales to Tehran. Later, poor credit, the demands of a burgeoning population, and economic constraints caused by relatively low oil prices between the mid-1980s and early 1990s similarly constrained approaches to doctrine. When the basic principles of Iranian strategy and doctrine were formalized in 1992, Iran's lack of technological and material capabilities left few options for its defense but to rely on its daunting military geography, manpower reserves, and nationalistic and revolutionary zeal. The residual strength in the early 1990s of the legacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, insured that ideology would be a keystone for Iran's conception of war and military doctrine. The principles were established and codified in 1992 in the regulations of the Iranian Armed Forces, which remain an essential starting point for understanding Iran's evolving doctrine.2 The regulations were an attempt by Tehran to build on its wartime experiences, and several sections charge the military with the ongoing missions of obtaining information, evaluating threats from actual and potential enemies, and preparing plans for government approval. Such objectives suggest that doctrinal development is relatively systematic and involves some civilian oversight.3 The regulations also highlight the significant influence that still comes from the ideology of the founders of the Islamic Republic, which can limit the clarity of Iranian doctrine to Westerners despite similar terminology. The regulations point to an Iranian outlook that is essentially defensive but also zealous about protecting Islam. …

Women, Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle Over the Personal Status Law

Abstract: Since 1991, the status of women in Morocco has been the subject of widespread debate. Efforts by women's groups and liberal political forces to change the Shari'a-based Personal Status Code (moudawwana), were vigorously opposed by conservative and Islamist forces. For both sides, the issue was central to their overall orientations towards "tradition" and "modernity". King Muhammad VI ultimately tipped the balance in favor of change. The resulting new Family Law may well mark a milestone in Moroccan society's evolution. On March 12, 2000, the boulevards of Rabat and Casablanca were the scenes of two competing mass marches. The Rabat event, in favor of the government - and World Bank - sponsored Plan d'action national pour l'integration de la femme au developpement, was organized by a coalition of women's and liberal political groupings and parties, coincided with International Women's Day (March 8), and drew 4050,000 persons. The Casablanca march, in opposition to the Plan, was sponsored by a coalition of mainly Islamist groups for the "defense of the Moroccan family," and attracted an estimated three times as many persons as the Rabat procession. The significance of the two demonstrations was far-reaching. They marked a milestone in Morocco's evolution during the previous decade toward a more open, modern, and pluralist society. In this regard, the 1990s had been marked by steadily increasing political liberalization, expansion of the freedom of expression, real improvement in Morocco's previously abysmal human rights record, and the establishment of numerous voluntary organizations which filled the public space between the state and the individual.' From a different angle, the public show of strength by the Islamist current marked a kind of coming-out party. In Morocco, as in other authoritarian Arab regimes, Islamist movements have grown in strength in recent years, as they partially filled the gap left by the absence of authentic democratic political systems in which the authorities are accountable to its citizens. Moreover, Islamist movements have proved adept at exploiting the trend towards liberalization to advance their own ends, ones which were not congruent with the principles of a genuinely liberal civil society.2 From yet another perspective, the fact that the issue of women's standing in Morocco could galvanize so many people into action indicates that it is a bellwether subject for a society experiencing rapid change. Indeed this is true of much of the Arab world as a whole. To put matters in broader perspective, the question of the status of women has been central to a century of debate over the preferred directions which Arab societies should take. This article will focus on the debate over the status of women, analyzing the battle over the proposed changes of the Shari'a-based Personal Status Law (moudawwanat al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya; moudawwana) a battle which was ultimately resolved in the fall of 2003 by King Muhammad VI. Critical attention will be paid to the role of the monarchy, which stands as the supreme arbiter between two "national projects" - that of women's groups, in alignment with liberal political forces, and that of Islamist movements and other conservative forces in Moroccan society. THE MOROCCAN MONARCHY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN Traditional Arab societies, according to leading social scientists, are hierarchical, patrilineal, patriarchal, and class-based, leaving women, children, and the poor as their most repressed elements. Writing in the mid-1980s, Halim Barakat enumerated a list of five factors that reflected women's subordinate status: 1. Women are secluded and segregated, with the majority continuing to occupy the private domain of the household, and with public space reserved for males, and veiling (a sign of separation) still being widespread. 2. The roles most available to women are those of daughter, sister, wife, mother, mother-in-law, etc - with few professional careers available. …

Mubarak and the Islamists: Why Did the "Honeymoon" End?

Abstract: This article argues that the reasons behind Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's policy changes towards moderate Islamists was based on their ability to provide social services via an organized network of contacts. The outcome of this was that Islamists gained informal legitimacy from society but not from the state. This legitimacy was politicized to impel the state officially to recognize the Islamists, but instead of conceding to Islamist pressures, the state launched an offensive campaign to uproot their influence. The Islamists have had a noticeable impact in Egypt since the 1980s, in fpart as a result of the policies pursued by President Mubarak in the early years after he came to power in October 1981, following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. With the aim of easing the tensions that had been created by Sadat's policies in September 1981, as well as consolidating the legitimacy of the new regime, Mubarak set out to create a broad national front against the threat posed by Islamist extremists. This he did by tolerating the moderate Muslim Brothers (al-lkhwan al-Muslimun, also translated as the Muslim Brotherhood) and other political forces. As a consequence social spaces, such as syndicates, university campuses, charitable and voluntary organizations, and so on, were given a considerable degree of autonomy. The Muslim Brothers took control of such spaces and, by providing their constituencies with services that superseded and surpassed those supplied by the state, were able gradually to gain the support of these constituencies and to build up an informal legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Islamists was thus derived from society rather than from the state, which continued to deny them official recognition. Ironically, the spaces that had been initiated and maintained to legitimize the regime had turned into a source of legitimacy for its competitors. This eventually led the regime to reverse its policies and to launch an aggressive campaign against the Islamists. This article examines the real reasons behind the regime's policy changes towards moderate Islamists. Its main contention is that the impact of the Muslim Brothers was not based simply on the services they were able to deliver, but that it depended also on how these services were delivered. Indeed, such services had an impact only when they were provided through an organized network and when, in addition, they were politicized as a means of undermining the regime's legitimacy. In the context of an erosion of state legitimacy, mounting social and economic pressures, and a docile multiparty system, this development was intolerable. The article identifies three components as being responsible for the real strength of the Ikhwan: first, a legitimacy gained from the provision of services, secondly, an organized network which enabled the services to be delivered effectively, and, thirdly, a politicized use of that legitimacy. THE BUILD-UP OF LEGITIMACY A major reason for the popularity of the Islamists in Egyptian society was based on their ability to address people's wider social needs and concerns. The Muslim Brothers have always been recognized for their involvement with the needs of society. However, from the mid-1980s and early 1990s, this engagement became more obvious and robust than it had been in previous decades. The reason for this was partly related to the relative freedom that the movement had enjoyed when Mubarak came to power in 1981. As a result of the later policies of Sadat, Egypt's state-society relations had been tense. Mubarak had no option but to reconcile himself with political and social forces until his regime stabilized. He also tolerated the Muslim Brothers, alongside leftists and the Wafd Party, in order to create a broader national front against the threat posed by the extremist al-Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya groupings. By accommodating the Ikhwan within the political process in 1984 and 1987, Mubarak aimed to buy the support of the moderates and to signal that the new regime was not antagonistic to the Islamist movement in general, but only towards its violent wing. …

Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan

Abstract: This article focuses on the critical question of ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan. It examines current conceptual models of ethnicity and their application to present-day political affairs in the country. Research shows that it is not the presence of ethnic groups per se that leads to violence or instability but the absence of civil society and democratic governance and norms. Lessons may be drawn from Afghanistan's neighbors to the north. These Central Asian nations present cases of emerging civil societies, which are fragile, fragmented, and strongly influenced by the international donor community. After 23 years of war in Afghanistan, repression and neglect have had a devastating effect on civil society. Afghanistan was supposed to be the centerpiece in America's war on terrorism, an example of how to rescue a failed state. Disintegration would be terrible for Afghanistan, and bad for the United States and outside world.1 State failure, predictably tied to internal strife and humanitarian crisis, can spread from limited unrest to national collapse and then regional indeterminacy. So how is the rebuilding of Afghanistan faring? The international community2 is calling for the creation of a secular, multiethnic, and democratic state without providing the military force or resources to build it. Critical to helping Afghanistan emerge from its failed and threatened status are state capacity, the question of ethnicity, and the victory of normal politics over guns, imperiled today by the power of warlords outside Kabul. This analysis focuses on the critical question of ethnicity in Afghanistan. ETHNICITY: CONCEPTUAL MODELS Ethnic groups are no longer viewed as primordial, but are considered to be the products of history, the design of concrete procedures of administrative classification, political organization, and socialization. Analyzing colonial politics in Zambia, Daniel N. Posner3 concludes that the structure of a country's ethnic cleavages is not just a social fact but also a historical product. Posner indicates that the ethnic landscape is important because the dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict rise not from the presence of ethnic groups, but from the pattern of their relative sizes and geographic distribution. Countries containing a single large ethnic group or two evenly matched groups, he notes, have been found to be more violence-prone than those including a larger number of equally sized groups. Countries with a large number of small ethnic groups demonstrate slower rates of economic growth than countries that are more ethnically homogeneous. Posner also draws on ethnic fractionalization research to point out that the numbers and relative sizes of ethnic groups in the political system are central to the outcomes of economic growth rates, political instability, and the outbreak and duration of civil wars. In addition to their numbers and sizes, the physical placement around the country is also crucial. Posner states that the link between the characteristics of the cleavage structure and the likelihood of conflict is a basic supposition in nearly all explanations of ethnic politics and communal strife. If the Pashtuns,4 which comprise approximately 38% of Afghanistan's population, can be considered a single large ethnic group, Posner's research could be of interest here. Also, most Pashtuns reside in the south. Where they do live "intermixed" with other minorities - as in the north, such co-mingling as occurred was usually accomplished by force. Posner's research is basically at odds with that of James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin5 who find that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity, or indeed any particular cultural demography, does not by itself make a country more prone to civil war. Also, they found little evidence that one can predict where a civil war will break out by looking at where ethnic or other broad political complaints are strongest. …

Clash of interest over northern Iraq drives Turkish-Israeli alliance to a crossroads

Abstract: Turkey and Israel enjoyed an almost perfect relationship throughout the 1990s that amazed their friends, yet bothered their rivals. The US war in Iraq revealed, however, that the two longstanding allies did indeed have contradictory objectives and concerns with respect to the future restructuring of Iraq. While Turkey fears the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the same possibility seems favorable for Israel from its security standpoint, vis-a-vis threats posed by countries like Iran, Pakistan, and beyond. It appears that the "amazing alliance" is heading toward a crossroads. Such an eventuality may change the nature of the relationship from a "win-win" to a "lose-lose" situation unless proper steps are rapidly taken with a view toward rebuilding confidence on both sides. The military campaign of the United States against Saddam Husayn in Iraq has caused much damage on both sides, in terms of casualties and devastation. The death toll in the streets of Iraqi cities and towns rises daily. Many incidents that would be labeled as, at least, "tragic" a few years ago now turn out to be ordinary data entries for daily statistics. An assessment of the US Central Intelligence Agency outlined three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005 "with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war."1 Contrary to some relatively optimistic scenarios that have been discussed in the immediate aftermath of the general elections held on January 30, 2005, the future of Iraq is still uncertain in many respects. America's war has also caused much uncertainty about the future of some of the long established relationships among the states in the region. In this context, the deeply rooted Turkish-Israeli relationship2 also shows signs of being a victim of "collateral damage" from the war in Iraq. In the aftermath of the toppling of Saddam Husayn's regime in April 2003, it became apparent that Israel and Turkey might indeed have conflicting objectives and concerns with regard to the future restructuring of Iraq. When the United States set on to achieve its political goal of establishing a democratic regime in Iraq, the political climate between Turkey and Israel began to worsen. The US effort required the holding of free elections in Iraq to form a representative body, as the first step towards democratization.3 These elections affected the sensitive fabric of Iraqi society as the various groups making up the complex demographic structure of the country each began to make claims which could hardly be universally met. Among these is the conflict between those seeking a secular state, who see it as essential to a modern society, and the effort by Shi'i clerics to see that the legal system conforms to the shari'a. Meanwhile the Kurds, who constitute perhaps 20% of the population, insisted on a veto over any proposed constitution which did not satisfy their demands for autonomy. Others criticized this as anti-democratic because a minority was in effect holding the majority hostage. Turkey has always been uneasy about the aspirations of Iraqi Kurds; any prospect of Iraq coming apart and the emergence of an indepdendent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq produces wariness among Turkish statesmen and the military alike. While Turkey, once Israel's strategic ally,4 is searching for ways to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state out of Iraqi territory, Israel may be more than happy to see a powerful autonomous Kurdish authority or an independent state in northern Iraq. Since, speculative though it may be, a Kurdish entity with which Israel could conclude, inter alia, a comprehensive military cooperation agreement might be highly beneficial for Israel's security. For reasons that will be elaborated later in this article, such an agreement might enable Israel to build a forward defense capability against potential and active threats emanating from countries such as Iran, Pakistan and beyond, in the medium to long-term. …

Democratic development in Oman

Abstract: Everyone accepts a one size fits all model cannot deliver successful democratic reform. But it is less widely understood that the process is open-ended, with no predetermined finishing line. Development depends on a political version of bio-diversity, in which democracy emerges organically out of existing local traditions and practices. In the case of Oman a deeply rooted tradition of consultative rule, and the distinctive philosophy of Ibadism has been shaping democratic development for 30 years. In the debate over democratic reform in the Middle East nearly everyone involved is careful to show they understand there can be no "one size fits all solution" imposed upon the region from outside. It is widely, if not universally, recognized that the imposition of a standard political system would be both impossible and counter-productive. In order to support regional advocates for change, the United States government, too, acknowledges that the diversity of the countries and peoples engaged in the process must be respected. However, this does not prevent many policy makers and commentators conducting comparative exercises in which the progress towards democracy is evaluated either in relation to political systems already accepted as being democratic, or in relation to one another, or both. In many instances, surveys of the region ask which countries are ahead and which behind in their progress towards the goal of democracy. If there were a fuller understanding of the complex and various political ecologies of the region, it would be readily understood that such judgments are missing the point. They assume, for example, there is a common destination. The comparative evaluation of progress assumes a finishing-line, which marks the point at which a country becomes democratic. It also assumes a finishing-line demarcated according to the values, institutions, and social practices of existing, mainly Western, democracies. It does not accommodate the possibility that the process of political development currently under way in the countries of the region may be going in different directions. If one size is not enough for all, nor is one finishing-line. In some cases, the process of political development is both gradual and experimental, and therefore there may be no specific finishing-line in mind. While it would perhaps be wrong to characterize such gradual and cautious processes as "continual revolution," it might be equally misleading to suppose that each is headed towards a common goal, and further, that the common goal in question is either identical to or even closely resembles the kind of democratic systems with which we are familiar in the West. In a well-informed and valuable recent contribution to this journal, Michael Herb examines the movements towards democracy achieved by Arab monarchies (Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia). Herb is surely correct to claim that his project of comparison between the Arab parliaments he studies and parliaments elsewhere in the world may "provide us with some insights to the democratic potential of these parliaments, and it can help us to understand better the role of elected parliaments in these authoritarian regimes."1 However, the comparative exercise to some extent assumes a relationship between constitutional monarchies in Europe and the Arab monarchies discussed, in which the Arab monarchies are implicitly valued to the extent that they appear to be emulating the European models. The factors chosen to assess the extent of progress towards democracy (the implicit but never quite defined finishing-line) are derived from European practice (the existence of political parties, constitutionally defined powers for parliaments, electioneering). Other factors that might be used in the countries in question to evaluate the political process are not considered, partly, perhaps, because they would not produce a measurement of how far there still might be to go before the finishing-line is reached. …

Democratic Attitudes and Practices in Iraq, 1921-1958

Abstract: The prevalent perception is that democracy is untenable in Iraq because, it is argued, the country has an authoritarian political culture and no history of democratic institutions. This article presents a counter-narrative that shows that Iraq and its people do not necessarily suffer from an immutable democratic deficit. Focusing on the 1921-1958 era, periods of democratic attitudes and practices are chronicled and traditions of political pluralism and experience with representative political institutions are demonstrated. To many who have thought about and participated in plotting the path of Iraq's political future after the forcible ouster of Saddam Husayn from power, the title of this article, presupposing the existence of democratic structures and institutions in Iraqi history, would sound controversial, even outlandish. By no means has this been conventional wisdom. On the contrary, the standard prognosis of Iraq's future has been that either democracy was untenable in Iraq, or that the democratic road was so full of potholes and dangerous curves that it would take many years, even decades, for democracy to be implanted into the fabric of Iraqi society. And a main reason for the bleak outlook was that the country lacked a democratic tradition. "There has not been a single day of democracy in Iraq in its history,"1 opined Middle Eastern specialist Murhaf Jouejati. Edward Peck, former American Chief of Mission in Iraq agrees: "Lacking any previous experience with democracy, there is no manual or guide to which the Iraqis can turn."2 Further endorsement came from Larry Diamond, the eminent Stanford University expert on democratic transitions: "The social, economic, and political conditions for establishing democracy in Iraq are far from favorable. Unlike Germany, Japan and Italy, Iraq has no prior experience with multiparty democratic, or at least semi-democratic, government."1 This was confirmed by another prominent specialist, Thomas Carothers, who wrote in an op ed, that in Iraq "experience with democracy [was] absent."4 Beyond the opinions of independent experts and specialists, this skepticism seems to have prevailed within the government. Indeed, even secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a persistent public advocate of Iraqi democratization, had to concede that the country "has no experience of democracy and representative government,"5 and the General Accounting Office in a report to Congress stated categorically more than once that "Iraq lacks a democratic tradition."6 This pessimism about the prospects for Iraqi democracy represents one vision of Iraq that betrays deep concern over the country's political culture, which is seen as singularly inhospitable to democratic values. Iraq's history is depicted as one of continuous authoritarianism, marked by an excessive reliance on a central authority in which political institutions had neither represented the people nor curbed the power of the executive, but instead acted as vehicles for the mobilization of popular support for the leader. This is reinforced by over three decades of Procrustean dictatorship under Saddam Husayn that implanted the concept of the patriarchal, all-powerful political leadership deeper into Iraqi consciousness. How could liberal and pluralist institutions grow when the people have no history of democracy, no legacy of political debate and compromise, no traditions of political civility. Better that we understand this, the skeptics would counsel, and let Iraq be Iraq, bereft of any fanciful notions of Western-style democracy and liberalism. The purpose of this article is not to dismiss the skeptics' vision as false. In fact, its tenets are intellectually defensible. It is however important to recognize that historical recollection is not necessarily linear or cumulative. For instance, in the treatment of the "frontier" in US history, particular narratives that at one time had been forcefully asserted, were then forgotten, and later rediscovered. …

Woman's Identity and the Qur'an: A New Reading

Abstract: Woman's Identity and the Qur'an: A New Reading, by Nimat Hafez Barazangi. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004. xii + 136 pages. Notes to p. 147. Sel. Bibl. to p. 164. Index to p. 172. $59.95. Women's Identity and the Qur'an: A New Reading makes a valuable contribution to the Islamic scholarship-activism explosion of the 21st century. Barazangi's Introduction and first two chapters tediously push to locate what is unique in her work. Once she moves beyond attempts to prove her own autonomy and authority within the discipline of Qur'anic interpretation, she actually unveils her strengths in curriculum design. She reiterates the processes of her lifelong research and committed interactions with community activists. The monograph moves through small jagged rocks to climb a mountain, the mountaintop yields a worthwhile view of her aim to present a new pedagogy of Muslim higher learning. This review starts at the peak and limits consideration of the rocky beginnings. Chapter 3, "Autonomous Morality and the Principle of Modesty," combines the two topics in a heretofore-unused formula. The principle of modesty replaces the distorted popular emphasis on Muslim women's dress and the historical-cultural practice of segregating women and men in Muslim society, which, as the author points out, prevented the woman from authority on her own behalf and reduced her to proxy morality. Proxy morality, as practiced in early Islam, including by the wives and daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, she says, does not fulfill the Qur'anic mandate for full human moral agency. Baranzangi then makes her case for autonomous morality. She is "guided by two levels of autonomy" (p. 60). The first relates to every Muslim's "endowment of intelligence, ethics, and decision making" capacity. The second relates to the family as "the starting point to create a system of tranquility, independence and partnership for the welfare" of husband, wife and children. Although this depiction of the nuclear family has some shortcomings previously analyzed by Western feminists and proponents of the traditional extended family, the author's goal seems to be the inclusion of human relationships in the fulfillment of autonomy and moral agency. Chapter 4, "Gender Equality (alMusawah) and Equilibrium (Taqwa)" critiques the oft-used terms of neo-traditionalists, gender "equity" and "complimentarity." Although she erroneously considers "responsibility" in men to be biological (as if female child bearers are biologically irresponsible) she still does not concede to the idea that when a man "stands up to responsibility" (qawamah) it means that he "stand(s) out in rank." Contrary to today's realities (including single female heads-ofhousehold) she claims, "all men are financially responsible...." Yet, she does not allow this cultural practice of male qawamah to counter women's moral autonomy. Furthermore, taqwa, "the balance of individual conscientious moral choice and social action" (p. 74), is given an unconditional, gender inclusive interpretation, provided that women apply Islamic injunctions while "going through the process of generating meaning or developing polic(ies)" (p. …

The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process

Abstract: ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, by clayton E. Swisher. New York: Nation Books, 2004. xxii + 405 pages. Maps. Notes to p. 436. Index to p. 455. $14.95 paper. Any book that promises the "truth" about anything, and most especially about any aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, starts off with at least one strike against it. So it was with genuine surprise as well as pleasure that I found the book under review delivered, not exactly what its title promised, but rather a well-argued, thoroughly documented analysis of the latter part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s, at odds with much that has been published to date. However, Swisher is unwilling to consider open-mindedly Israeli concerns regarding security. In addition, he is dismissive of Israeli leaders' worries regarding domestic support for concessions to the Palestinians. As a result, the author's conclusions are somewhat one-sided. Clayton Swisher was an M.A. student at Georgetown University when he began this book as his thesis, and it has well outgrown its origins. (Just before press time, Swisher was named Director of Programs at the Middle East Institute, the METs parent institution.) He took full advantage of the unusual access he had developed to some of the most important participants in the peace process while serving as a special agent with the State Department's Diplomatic security Service. The well-footnoted chapters cite personal interviews with most of these figures, including Dennis Ross, the US point man in the peace process from 1988 through 2000, whose judgment, and objectivity are a main focus of Swisher's critique. Swisher also cites several unnamed senior American officials who were critical of Ross but did not feel able to speak on the record, as well as numerous on-the-record criticisms by Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans. Swisher believes strongly that the Oslo process, though skewed towards Israel's interests, could have and should have worked, and would have had Israel honored its commitments to end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This is a not-uncommon claim, but Swisher delves into the day-byday meetings on all sides that made up the substance of the process, and concludes that close examination shows how, at virtually every crucial juncture, Dennis Ross, abetted by Martin Indyk, another key player who was alternately US Ambassador to Israel and Assistant secretary of State, influenced President Bill Clinton to accept and even push Israeli aims. The Palestinians, having little leverage of their own, were the victims of this policy, according to Swisher and, though in principle willing to compromise, were simply unable to accede to Israeli demands. Swisher does not accept the twin Israeli claims of "security needs" and "domestic pressure" which were generally invoked by Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Although Swisher notes in the Introduction that he had been a strong believer in Israel's rectitude when he began this book, his research convinced him that Israel, and certainly Prime Minister Barak, were unwilling to take decisions that would have brought peace without harming Israeli security. He faults the United States in equal measure, for not recognizing that it was tilting much too far in Israel's favor, and by no means serving as an honest broker, which was its putative role in the process. …

Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan

Abstract: EGYPT AND JORDAN Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan, by Nachman Tal. Brighton, UK and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. xi+245 pages. Notes to p. 265. Bibl. to 269. Index top. 28!.$29.95 paper. Tal has written a useful account of the rise of Islamic political movements in Jordan and Egypt throughout the 1990s. The book provides a wealth of data about the different Islamic groups residing and operating in both countries, and offers some insights into their different, and often competing, agendas. Moreover, Tal considers the different strategies employed by the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes in facing the challenge of indigenous Islamic parties. A number of sub-themes appear throughout the book, and include references to the socio-economic appeal of Islamic parties, the failure of secular ideologies, the national character of Islamic parties, and the enduring relationship between Islam, culture and political expression. Although Tal seeks to understand the rise of radical Islam as a regional phenomenon, dating from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, he notes that the experience in each country is quite different and more often than not dependent upon the relationship between the regime and political Islam. Indeed, the author's own research on Egypt and Jordan highlights the differences more than the similarities between them. In other words, the challenge posed by the Islamist movement to the region's regimes is not monolithic, but country-specific. Nevertheless, Tal uses a comparative approach to the subject matter and addresses four central themes: the relationship between the modern state and political Islam, the struggle between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, the rise of Islamic terrorism in the 1990s, and the regime's response to Islamic terrorism. The author explores these themes in two discrete sections of the book: Radical Islam in Egypt, and Radical Islam in Jordan. Each section takes a broadly historical approach to the subject, and documents the evolution of the Islamic movement in both Jordan and Egypt. In doing so, Tal describes the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 1950s - both national and region-wide, and offers the reader a short typology of its more radical offshoots. Concomitantly, the author analyzes the response of both states to the threat posed by Islamic groups, and surmises that both have used a range of strategies including containment and confrontation. …

National human rights institutions in the Middle East

Abstract: Ten states in the Middle East have created or plan to establish "national human rights institutions" to implement internationally recognized norms. This article offers a systematic survey of this new but unexplored terrain, examining issues of institutional creation, design, and impact in the context of domestic and international influences. After describing the global trend and analyzing the regional cases, the article concludes by discussing the positive aspects and persistent challenges facing these emerging actors. A new kind of state institution is emerging in the Middle East and North Africa. Nine governments in the region have created "national human rights institutions" (NHRIs) in the last decade or so: Morocco (1990), Tunisia (1991), Algeria (1992), Palestine (1993), Yemen (1997), Jordan (2000), Qatar (2003), Egypt (2003), and Saudi Arabia (announced in 2003). Even Iraq's interim constitution calls for the creation of a "national human rights commission" in Article 50. The proliferation of NHRIs in the Middle East is itself part of a worldwide trend, as states form human rights institutions to appease and co-opt political allies and adversaries, both local and international. Despite the dramatic rise and potential implications of these nascent institutions for democratic governance, scholars and practitioners alike have overlooked them.1 NHRIs in the Middle East are not unambiguously beneficial to the defense of human rights, but they deserve close scrutiny nonetheless. At a minimum, they affect the discursive political environments in which they operate. By their association with state authority, they legitimate the claims that social actors make for the defense of human rights, invalidating arguments for the cultural irrelevance or developmental inappropriateness of rights. They also provide political focal points for domestic and international contests over rights violations, giving tangible bureaucratic form to the state institutional actors overseeing this area. NHRIs are increasingly active in the emerging global network of sub-state actors devoted to this issue, convening regularly with their foreign counterparts and with international and non-governmental organizations.2 Despite the resilience of authoritarianism and the persistence of rights violations in the region, NHRIs sometimes even improve the conditions facing individuals and groups - not a trivial matter for the victims of state abuse. In this article, we examine the creation and role of these NHRIs, offering a systematic survey of this new but largely unexplored institutional terrain. To this end, the article begins with a discussion of the global dynamics underlying their proliferation. Subsequent sections focus on specific human rights institutions across the region: those in the Maghrib; the Palestinian Commission; recent creations in Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf; and related institutional plans for Iraq. In each case, we discuss questions of institutional creation, design, and impact, highlighting the domestic and international contexts in which each institution was established. We conclude with a preliminary comparison of institutional similarities and differences, while analyzing the prospects for these emerging actors in the Middle East. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE The rapid diffusion of NHRIs across the Middle East and North Africa reflects a global trend. While a few government-sponsored human rights institutions existed during the Cold War, their proliferation accelerated dramatically with the surge of democratization in the 1990s. After the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna called for their creation, moreover, an increasing number of governments around the world responded by establishing them. Since then, no region has been excluded from the trend, and almost 100 countries had a NHRI or were in the process of creating one by the year 2000.3 National human rights institutions, sometimes called national human rights commissions, are quasi-official organizations, or permanent bodies established by states to implement internationally recognized norms in their domestic jurisdictions. …

Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam

Abstract: Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a "poor man's nuclear weapon" and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States. Americans breathed a sigh of relief when Iraq failed to use chemical weapons during the 2003 war to oust Saddam's regime, but they were dumbstruck after postwar investigations revealed that Saddam's once impressive chemical weapons program had all but collapsed during the 1990s under the weight of United Nations weapons inspections and the regime's internal decay and corruption. The postwar revelation that Iraq lacked substantial inventories of chemical weapons has slackened concern over chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf. But the region has witnessed the greatest use of chemical weapons in the world since World War I, and leaders elsewhere no doubt look to conflict in the Persian Gulf for lessons to inform their own chemical weapons programs. Even though the most recent Gulf war did not witness the use of chemical weapons, the study of the conflict still yields lessons on deterrence and war fighting for other nation-states harboring chemical weapons programs. The lessons that these states derive from conflicts in the Persian Gulf have implications for American security policy. Military power remains a critical, but by no means only, ingredient to ensure the security of nation-states, especially in the Persian Gulf. In making their gross military balance of power calculations, many nation-states conclude that they lack the money and means to achieve a rough measure of conventional military capabilities at least to match or balance those of their rivals. The procurement and maintenance of large-standing conventional forces is increasingly an expensive undertaking, which strains the economic means of many nation-states. Consequently, many nation-states turn to chemical weapons - what they consider a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) that is cheaper and more readily procurable than nuclear weapons - which they judge will give them the means in the first instance to deter armed conflict with adversaries or in the second instance to wage war in the event that deterrence fails. In the latter case, many nation-states hope that chemical weapons will compensate for conventional military shortcomings in battle. These calculations drove Saddam to invest in his chemical weapons program during the 1980-88 war with Iran. And they probably are driving Iran's interest in chemical weapons - as well as in nuclear weapons - today to hedge against American power in the Gulf. But how effective are chemical weapons for deterring adversaries and waging war in the event that deterrence fails? This article explores the rich case history of chemical weapons use in the Persian Gulf. The history of warfare in this region is ripe for examining the strengths and weaknesses of chemical weapons in contributing to the security and national interests of nation-states. The article discusses the use of chemical weapons in the 1960s civil war in Yemen that set the precedent for chemical weapons use in the region and gave an impetus to other chemical weapons programs in the Middle East. It then examines the large-scale and militarily significant use of Iraqi chemical weapons during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqis at the time were in an advantageous position because they had more robust and sophisticated chemical weapons capabilities than their Iranian foes. The study of Iraqi chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq War provides a stark contrast to the Iraqi non-use of chemical weapons in combat with American and British forces in the 1991 and 2003 wars. …