Showing papers in "Middle East Journal in 2011"

Economic and Institutional Reforms in the Arab Gulf Countries

Abstract: Over the last decades, Dubai has applied an economic developmental model which is strongly pro-business, emphasizes market liberalism and economic openness, and embraces globalization, while at the same time refraining from challenging the traditional neo-patrimonial leadership structure in the country. As such, the "Dubai model" has so far been distinctly different from economic models applied in the other GCC countries. However, judging from official statements, development projects under implementation, and the effort currently expended in creating economic assets in the other GCC states, these states seem to be embracing the "Dubai model" of development. This article will analyze the claim that the "Dubai model" is displacing the rentier state model as the general developmental model among the Gulf countries.

Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy

Abstract: Uniquely for a country its size, Qatar has emerged as one of the world's most proactive mediators in recent years. Motivated by a combination of international prestige and survival strategies, the country has sought to position itself as a neutral peacemaker in many of the international and intra-national conflicts brewing across the Middle East region. In three of the most notable cases in which it has involved itself — Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen — Qatar has proven itself to be a capable mediator in reducing tensions but not, crucially, in resolving conflicts. Qatar's successes have been facilitated by a combination of its perceived neutrality by the disputants, the vast financial resources at its disposal to host mediation talks and offer financial incentives for peace, and the personal commitment and involvement of the state's top leaders. These successes, however, are often checked by limited capabilities to affect long-term changes to the preferences of the disputants through power projection abilities, in-depth administrative and on-the-ground resources, and apparent underestimations of the complexities of the deep-rooted conflicts at hand. Qatari mediation efforts are likely to continue in the foreseeable future, but their outcomes are also likely to remain mixed.

Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or the Illusion of Peace?

Abstract: This article investigates the effectiveness of Lebanon's post-conflict strategies by exploring the "reconciliation" efforts that were undertaken after the war, and highlights the obstacles to such efforts. While Lebanon signed a peace agreement in October 1989 to officially end a 15-year civil war, today it is still a troubled country. Many have attributed Lebanon's inability to shed its conflict-prone past to its sectarian system; however, this article traces the ongoing instability, in part, to the failure of the government to deal effectively with the abuses of the civil war.

The role of Iran in the failed coup of 1981: the IFLB in Bahrain

Abstract: In December 1981, a group baptized al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn [The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain] unsuccessfully attempted to carry out a coup d'etat in Bahrain. The group published newsletters and books in which it described its attempts to overthrow the Al Khalifa ruling family and install Iranian-style Islamic rule instead. These documents provide evidence for the group's involvement with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and of the support the Iranian regime provided for their activities against the Bahraini government.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945-1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology

Abstract: This article examines the founding, social origins, and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria from 1945 to 1958. The organization was influenced ideologically by the original Egyptian Brotherhood, but its founding was essentially an independent move. Unlike its Egyptian counterpart during this period, the Syrian Brotherhood was a participant in parliamentary politics. Its discourse was reflective of this fact, and in public it emphasized the universal nature of its message and eschewed sectarianism in Syria's divided society. An examination of internal documents, however, reveals that the organization was concerned with protecting Syria's Sunni Muslim majority. While in Egypt the Ikhwan developed in opposition to the establishment 'ulama', which were seen as being unresponsive to the needs of Muslims in a modern society, in Syria the 'ulama' played a leading role in the organization. In the pantheon of modern Islamist movements, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) holds pride of place. It continues to influence millions, primarily in Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria. Yet it appears that the attention devoted to the Brotherhood has not been properly balanced. The Egyptian Brotherhood has naturally been the object of considerable scrutiny. In its heyday from the 1930s to the 1950s, it was an extra-parliamentary movement that resorted occasionally to violence and assassination to advance its cause.1 It was widely influential and its leader, Hasan al-Banna, was an arresting figure who merited being described by the overused word "charismatic." Far less scholarly attention has focused on the Ikhwan of Syria, and this is unfortunate, for that organization presents a useful contrast.2 It was a small, elitist organization that never approached the level of mass support enjoyed by the Egyptian Ikhwan. It was also, for most of the 1945-1958 period that this research covers, a parliamentary body participating fully in the hurly-burly of Syrian parliamentary politics, a position that forced upon the Syrian Ikhwan modes of behavior very different from those of the Egyptian Ikhwan.3 Indeed, in many ways the Syrian Brotherhood resembled the other Syrian ideological parties more closely than it did the Egyptian Brotherhood. This study explores the circumstances that made the Syrian Brotherhood unique, by examining new evidence regarding its founding, social origins, organization, internal training, and education. As will be demonstrated, this was a party that put a decidedly Syrian spin on the Ikhwan's message, for it was in ideological competition with other ideology-based parties, such as the Ba'th and the Communists, that developed during this period in response to increased social mobilization. Founding: The Egyptian Connection The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has always lived in the shadow of the mother movement in Egypt, so a study of the Syrian movement immediately begs this question: Was the Ikhwan in Syria founded at the direction of the Egyptian Brotherhood, or did it arise on its own? The answer turns out to lie somewhere in between. The Egyptian Ikhwan, centered in Cairo, did have a section responsible for "liaison with the Islamic world." This section's task was to spread the message of the Ikhwan abroad, and to coordinate activities with other Islamic organizations where they existed. It was natural enough that the Egyptian Ikhwan, with its anti-nationalist and pan-Islamic orientation, would emphasize liaison with Islamic movements and personalities throughout the Muslim world, but it is not clear if the section aimed to establish Ikhwan branches outside of Egypt. In any event, the Cairo center of the Egyptian Ikhwan was an attraction for foreign students studying at al-Azhar. "As potential missionaries for the cause after they returned to their respective countries," notes Richard Mitchell, "these students found themselves welcomed and whenever possible urged to join in the activities of the society. …

Tribal Law and Reconciliation in the New Iraq

Abstract: As of 2009, the Government of Iraq had failed to take key steps needed to promote reconciliation between Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a communities. In contrast, Iraq's tribal leaders began working as soon as security improved in 2007 to re-knit the Iraqi community through the processes of tribal law. This article explores their efforts in Baghdad in 2008-2009. It is based primarily on approximately 30 interviews conducted when the author was a member of a Human Terrain Team supporting the US military.

Jordan and the rise and fall of the arab cooperation council

Abstract: This article examines Jordan's role in the creation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), from its origins to its sudden demise in the turmoil of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war. The analysis focuses on three key factors in Jordan's foreign policy, namely, the concern with external security threats, the pressures of domestic politics, and the economic constraints on the Jordanian regime.

The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects

Abstract: As the Israeli-Palestinian peace process continues to stalemate, voices calling for an inclusive single state in Israel/Palestine as an alternative to the two-state solution have grown louder. This article reviews the Palestinian debate around the one-state solution and analyzes the challenges its advocates face in generating political support, central among which is the difficulty of redefining the Palestinian cause in terms of a struggle for equal political rights within a single polity rather than in terms of a struggle for a separate state.

The Settlers: And the Struggle over the Meaning of Zionism (review)

Abstract: decades? why have many of Israel’s governing institutions, including the military, supported occupation and settlement? Taub’s decision, which he declares, to avoid deeper analysis of other ideological, historic, and political elements in Zionism’s struggle for identity creates an incomplete picture of why occupation and settlement policies occurred and why Israel remains deeply divided 62 years after its birth. The strength of The Settlers is its history of the philosophical and political evolution of modern Religious Zionism. It started with Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook, who taught that Zionism was ordained by God as a phase toward the coming of the Messiah. Kook died in 1935, but his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, went further by calling on Jews to take political action to speed Redemption. This violated traditional Jewish teaching that only God could ordain the messianic End of Times. The euphoria of Israel’s conquests in 1967 gave Kook’s followers their chance. By aggressive politics, aligning with the secular vision of Greater Israel supported by the Likud Party and some hawkish Labor Party politicians, Religious Zionism and settlement thrived. A new, radical generation of rabbis schooled at Zvi Yehuda’s Markaz Harav Yeshiva worshiped settlement of the land as Judaism’s highest duty, rejected the primacy of Jewish values of justice and sanctity of human life, and dehumanized Arabs and other non-Jews. Religious settlers, increasingly, followed edicts of such fanatics as former Israeli Chief Rabbi Shlomo Aviner who claimed that God’s command to settlement “is above moral, human considerations,” and even “human life.” Nevertheless, settler leaders, aware of their dependence on the state, softpedaled theology. The Supreme Court’s Elon Moreh decision that land seizures for settlement were illegal unless needed for security was a setback. But the settlers persevered, with growing support from Israeli authorities, and proclaimed ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Dance and Political Credibility: The Appropriation of Dabkeh by Zionism, Pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism

Abstract: This article examines how the rural folkdance dabkeh has, in the last century, been appropriated and reinvented as a tradition in order to construct the imagined communities of Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism within Palestine/Israel. This appropriation has led to extensive debates and suppositions on the source, meanings, and cultural ownership of dabkeh. The following historical narratives, emerging from interviews with dance practitioners and dance advocates in the West Bank, Israel, and Lebanon, and from literature in libraries and archives in the West Bank, Israel, and Great Britain, draw attention to the salient links between dance and politics and the multiple ways in which collective identities can be constructed and deconstructed. These histories further raise questions about how local cultural autonomy and sustainability within the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been affected by the process of political appropriation. Dabkeh,1 a circling folkdance made up of intricate steps and stomps, has helped construct three very different political communities and cultural identities during the 20th century. Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism have all gained political credibility through the public performance of a dance2 that, in the previous century, had no associations with any of these ideals. The three histories of dabkeh present a post-nationalist critique of dance in Palestine/Israel.3 Revealing how dance can be used to define (and re-define) a collective identity, these narratives highlight the artistic legacies of Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism. More importantly perhaps, they provide a historical baseline from which new, innovative choreographic histories might be identified and celebrated. Imagining , inventing, and salvaging cult ural identity thro ugh danc e Across the world, the social dances and movement rituals of particular groups of people have been appropriated and given a "second existence"4 as physical spectacles. These spectacles display a homogenized cultural identity and help validate new national, ethnic, or religious boundaries around people and place. In the public imagining of such a community,5 the invention of shared traditions6 through national folkdance troupes and festivals can make politicized aesthetics, ethics, gender roles, and social hierarchies appear inherent to a community.7 This re-invention of dances is thus highly selective and can be seen as influenced by the ideological agendas of political elites guiding the appropriation.8 As the following histories of dabkeh illustrate, shifts in these political environments and agendas can allow the boundaries of a community to continue to be guided by historical precedent while remaining in flux. Within Israel and Palestine, the search for historical precedents as a basis for contemporary cultural actions can have a particular urgency amongst population groups that have experienced collective traumas. War, exile, colonization, or other political and natural disasters can dislocate people from their cultural pasts, threatening a population's existing bonds and networks.9 Reviving elements of the distant cultural past and reconstructing them as a shared traditions can demonstrate that the past is not lost, but rather continues on into the future.10 When the traumatic events themselves are also projected across generations through cultural lamentations (in folksongs, dances, oral histories, and other arts and rituals), the disrupted social bonds of a traumatized community can appear resilient to the traumatic events.11 Folk dances can therefore be perceived as carrying both an ancient cultural past and a reminder of the threats to a traumatized community. The revival of dance heritage can, however, be highly and purposefully selective. In Palestine, this selection has further been influenced by the ways in which local cultural history was documented in the early 20th century. …

The Transformation of the Afghan Refugee: 1979-2009

Abstract: In the last 30 years, the social and linguistic articulation of the Afghan in Pakistan and Iran has gone from muhajir [refugee], to migrant, and even to terrorist. This article provides an overview of that transformation to demonstrate that it depends more on external factors rather than any fundamental change in the conditions structuring Afghan migration. Examining the migration regime operating between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran further confirms the problems of a refugee/migrant dualism.

Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, 2005-2007 (review)

Abstract: IRAQ-Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, 2005-2007, by James A. Russell. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. $24.95. Reviewed by Austin Long The broad story of the Iraq war has been well documented. A rapid victory by US and allied units gave way to an enduring insurgency. In the widely accepted contemporary narrative, 2003-2006 saw US military units flailing against insurgents without success. In 2007, some combination of the promulgation of a new counterinsurgency doctrine - the decision to send additional troops to Iraq - and the leadership of General David Petraeus combined to reverse the tide of the war. Change therefore came primarily from decisions taken at the highest levels of command, though executed bravely and effectively by personnel at the tactical level.1 James Russell rightly challenges this narrative, as well as theories of top-down military innovation, by examining how different US military units sought to adapt to counterinsurgency in Iraq before the major changes in 2007. In the present volume, he provides a theoretical chapter on innovation, with a focus on bottom-up military innovation, and three empirical chapters from the period 2005-2007 (western Anbar province, Anbar's capital Ramadi, and Ninewa province). Russell illustrates the manifold ways in which units modified or created standard operating procedures and incorporated new technologies to combat insurgency without extensive guidance from higher echelons. There is much to recommend in this book. Russell has great insight into the US military and his empirical work is extraordinarily fine-grained, particularly for contemporary history. He has combined interviews with military personnel, unclassified primary sources (many of which are available in an online appendix from the publisher), and secondary source accounts to produce detailed case studies. His description of existing theories of military innovation and the development of his own theory is extensive without being bewildering for the uninitiated. Russell is also careful to note that innovation is not synonymous with success. While he attributes much of the substantial improvement in security in Ramadi from 2005 to 2007 to tactical changes by US military units, the same is not true in Ninewa. Here he caveats at the conclusion of the chapter "... this analysis does not argue that wartime innovation produced a 'victory' like that which occurred in the fall of 2006 during the battle for Ramadi" (p. 190). This caveat crucially highlights the limits of even successful counterinsurgency innovation. There are two limitations of the book, one in terms of social science and the other empirical. …

The Saudi Arabian Labor Force: A Comprehensive Statistical Portrait

Abstract: This article provides a framework from which to explore the Saudi labor force, drawing from the national labor market model designed by the US Department of Labor in the 1940s and applied to the Saudi workforce using data from the Saudi Arabian Central Department of Statistics and Information. The findings provide the first comprehensive statistical portrait of the Saudi labor force and a baseline from which to systematically track expected increases in labor force participation, especially among Saudi women and youth, in the decades to come.

Ben Ali's "New Tunisia" (1987-2009): A Case Study of Authoritarian Modernization in the Arab World (review)

Abstract: TUNISIA Ben Ali's "New Tunisia" (1987-2009): A Case Study of Authoritarian Modernization in the Arab World, by Steffen Erdle. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2010. euro49.80. Reviewed by Clement M. Henry For anyone wishing to probe beneath the headlines about Tunisia's transition to democracy, Ben Ali's "New Tunisia" offers the starting point, an invaluable understanding of the political landscape on the eve of the uprising. Although the author did not and could not predict the spectacular events leading to Ben Ali's resignation on January 15, 2011, just months after the final editing of the book, he did note the "autonomization" (p. 227) - that is, the spiraling out of control - of corruption (in fact, kleptomania) within the presidential entourage in the previous two years that helped to precipitate the uprising. President Ben Ali and especially his wife, former hairdresser Leila Trabelsi, offered captivating targets. Based on a total of about six months in the field, spaced over six visits between 2001 and 2009, Dr. Steffen Erdle demonstrates familiarity with a wealth of resources and documents the informal as well as formal structures of power. He discovers obvious similarities but also significant differences between the Ben Ali regime and that of his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987). Both regimes rested on three pillars: president, party, and state bureaucracy. Ben Ali essentially "modernized" the ancien regime by broadening the social bases of party and state and by converting the bureaucracy's economic role from manager-CEO to strategist and regulator, as Tunisia continued gradually to open up its economy to foreign competition and investment and to promote export-oriented growth, especially in light manufacturing sectors (not only textiles). Erdle is careful, however, to hedge his bets about Ben Ali's authoritarian "upgrade." He notes the critical changes in the presidency, which not only created a "shadow government" of advisors (p. 140) and transformed the prime minister into an executive coordinator but also substantially upgraded the security services, including a Presidential Guard, and brought members of the seven presidential families into the core politically relevant elite (PRE). Bourguiba had also included family members in his inner circle but never in such large numbers or with such grave economic consequences. The Ben Ali families "simply 'grafted' themselves on existing (or emerging) [economic sectors]...The 'good thing' about this strategy is that there is little immediately perceptible disruption to outside observers; the 'bad thing' is that it will have incremental ripple-through effects for the entire economy" (p. 228, n. 10). Not only did these practices discourage private investment; the biggest impact may have been political: the further de-institutionalization of the ruling party. The "familization" of politics may have helped Ben Ali be the supreme arbitrator - at least until his wife appeared to be taking over, given his state of health (p. 147) - but, as Erdle notes, "it tends to infringe upon (and undermine) the political authority, functional autonomy, institutional integrity, and procedural effectiveness" (pp. …

Exacerbating social cleavages: the media's role in Israel's religious-secular conflict

Abstract: This article challenges the traditional model of the media as a positive agent for political socialization. The increasing variety of news sources has reversed the role of the media, contributing to growing cultural fragmentation, rather than the unification of nations. One of the most volatile cultural cleavages in countries around the world is the clash between fundamentalist and secular members of the same religion. This work explores the role of the media in societal rifts through a study of the secular and religious press in Israel. The potentially divisive impact of the media has implications for other countries in the Middle East that are also characterized by religious-secular tensions.

Zoroastrians in Iran: What Future in the Homeland?

Abstract: Zoroastrianism, a religion which arose among Iranian peoples some 3,000 years ago, was the religion of the majority of Iranians prior to the Arab conquests of the mid-7th century. Since that time, a steady process of conversion to Islam has left a small Zoroastrian minority of 20,000 or less in Iran today. While community leaders are making efforts to keep the religion alive, factors such as emigration, intermarriage, and low birth rates now put the very survival of this ancient faith into question, not just throughout the global diaspora but within the land of its birth. Zoroastrianism is one of the world's oldest living faiths. Tracing back most likely to sometime in the 2nd millennium BCE,1 it became the national religion of many Iranian peoples and was the state religion of the Sasanian Empire from the 3rd century CE until the Arab conquest in the 640s. During the subsequent centuries, most Iranians converted to Islam, and a small group of Zoroastrians emigrated to India where they established the Parsi ("Persian") community.2 In Iran, numbers have now dwindled to less than 20,000, at least according to official figures,3 although since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 there has been much speculation about the extent of "re-conversion" to Zoroastrianism by Iranian Muslims disaffected by the country's present Islamic regime. The causes of the Zoroastrian community's decline in Iran date back to the Arab conquests and have been compounded by some contemporary issues. In historical terms, there have been various explanations as to why a majority of Iranians abandoned their traditional faith in favor of Islam, especially since the long-popular "conversion by the sword" theory has now been largely discredited. Indeed, the evidence is rather that at least during the first century or so, the Arabs were actually mostly reluctant to allow non-Arabs into their prospering community,4 requiring them to acquire an Arab sponsor [mawla] through whom they could obtain a kind of honorary Arab tribal identity.5 That so many non-Arabs chose to do so can be taken as evidence that membership in this community was very attractive, and encompassed temporal as well as spiritual advantages. Another factor often cited is the dependence of the Zoroastrian priesthood on state support, which was lost to them with the fall of the Sasanians. Later, with the increasing application of the then-nascent norms of Islamic law from the 'Abbasid period onwards, legal issues such as family inheritances accruing entirely to individuals converting to Islam, the stipulation that children of mixed marriages be raised as Muslims, and the prohibition against proselytization by non-Muslims, as well as social issues such as localized persecution of non-Muslims by members of the Muslim majority, were all factors leading numerous Iranian Zoroastrians to embrace an Islamic identity. Contrary to some common perceptions, the Islamization of Iran was not instantaneous but rather took place over several centuries. Nevertheless, in urban areas an estimated 80% of the population had become Muslim by the 10th century.6 Over the subsequent centuries the rural communities followed, although their case is more difficult to document. What is clear is that the contexts in which Zoroastrianism survived in Iran were largely rural, especially in the villages around the cities of Yazd and Kerman.7 This reality persisted well into the 20th century. By the 19th century the living conditions of Iran's Zoroastrians had deteriorated to such an extent that the Parsis, who had begun to prosper in British India, began to send financial aid and lobby Iran's government on behalf of their co-religionists. It was through such pressure that the Qajar monarch Naser al-din Shah repealed the jizya (a tax on non-Muslim subjects) on Zoroastrians in 1882. Parsis, meanwhile, built schools and medical clinics for Zoroastrians in Iran.8 The 20th century saw additional helpful trends, such as the Iranian nationalism of Pahlavi ruler Reza Shah (r. …

Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria's Hereditary Succession

Abstract: When Hafiz al-Asad died in 2000, his son Bashar became Syria's president. By examining an unresolved inconsistency in the leading accounts about Syria's succession, this article reveals the limitations of single-person rule analysis as the causal explanation for Syria's hereditary leadership selection. I provide an alternative explanation by emphasizing the role of senior elites in forming regime consensus around Bashar al-Asad's candidacy. Hereditary successions, therefore, reveal an instance of authoritarian continuity rather than one likely to end in regime breakdown. Hafiz al-Asad died on June 10, 2000 after nearly 30 years at the helm of one of the Middle East's most volatile regimes. Syria witnessed 15 successful coup d'etats between 1949-1970,1 external wars with Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973), vicious Pan-Arab competition with regional states,2 and a near civil war between 1976-1984.3 Al-Asad slowed the raucous domestic political upheavals by stitching together a "hard" state compared to its regional counterparts.4 Much of the literature on Syria seems to suggest that the country requires a strong, repressive leader to offset the state's early proclivity for regime turnover. As Flynt Leverett argues, al-Asad transformed a coup-ridden "semi-state into a veritable model of authoritarian stability."5 The country's politics are often explained through a sectarian lens, since al-Asad hailed from Syria's minority 'Alawi sect.6 Other accounts describe al-Asad's political dominance through the "personalized rule" framework.7 Using this framework, however, influences how central events - such as presidential succession - are explained. Al-Asad's death in 2000 gripped the region. The leader was widely rumored to be preparing his son, Bashar, for the presidency. Some, however, speculated that his offspring's succession was far from certain.8 Israeli intelligence learned of al-Asad's death five hours before the media reported it but "held back" public reports so as not to invite a contentious transfer of power on its border.9 Instead of a contested succession process in a potentially unstable environment, Syria seamlessly became the first hereditary republic in the Arab world. The day that al-Asad's death was announced, Parliament amended the constitution to lower the eligibility age for presidential candidates, while the security forces closed airports and sealed the Syrian and Lebanese borders to prevent outside opposition figures from entering the country to challenge the process. During the next 48 hours, the ruling Ba'th party's leadership inserted al-Asad's son at the top of its command structure as the military promoted and named him the armed forces' commander-inchief. The interim President dutifully oversaw Parliament's unanimous nomination of Bashar as the lone candidate for a national referendum. On the one-month anniversary of his father's passing, Bashar received over 97% of votes cast in the referendum. The inauguration occurred a week later. In order to anoint him, senior elites from across the political establishment proved swift in their decision-making and capable of sustaining the uncontested execution of consensus over a period of five weeks. Rather than focus on the elites' coordinated response across the institutions of Parliament, the ruling party, security services, and the military, scholars emphasize the personalized character of Syria's hereditary succession. Since Hafiz al-Asad presumably designated his son as heir, his incomplete preparation appears irrelevant. The implication is that al-Asad's servants of power unhesitatingly installed his son. The President's dominating political reach appeared as extensive in death as it had been in life. Egyptian intellectual Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim quickly coined the term, "Jumalikaya," which combines the Arabic words for "republic" and "monarchy" to describe the event.10 The personalized rule narrative continues to prevail as the literature's explanatory norm over ten years after Syria's succession. …

Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007 (review)

Abstract: TURKEY Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007, by Carter Vaughn Findley. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2010. Reviewed by Metin Heper This is an ambitious monograph and, on the whole, well achieves its goal: coming up with a comprehensive account of history, economy, domestic politics, foreign policy, ideology, culture, and society in the Ottoman Empire and the Republican Turkey from the last two decades of the 18th century to the first decade of the 21st. Particularly concerning the Republican period, the emphasis is on ideology, culture, and society. One interesting characteristic of the monograph is that at the end of every chapter (from chapter two onwards), there are relatively extensive summaries of some relevant novels by Namik Kemal, Ahmet Midhat, Fatma Aliye, Halide Edib, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, Orhan Kemal, Adalet Agaoglu, and/or Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk, in that order. The reason offered by the author for this rather original format in an otherwise history-cum-social science monograph is that "writers of imaginative literature ... surpass scholars in conveying what it was like to live through tumultuous times" (p. 341). As a consequence, the concluding chapter almost entirely draws upon Pamuk's novel Kar (Snow). It is impossible to disagree with the author that such systematic straying to the literary works does enable the readers to have a better grasp of the ideological, cultural, and societal dynamics in different periods, although at times the message is "lost in translation," because the author has often gone into too much detail. Be that as it may, the basic argument of the book is that both in the late Ottoman and in the entire Republican periods two currents clashed with each other: the radical secular one, which earlier tried to salvage the Empire and later enabled the Republic to catch up with the contemporary civilization, and the Islamic conservative current, which perceived the "scientific materialism" of the first current as a threat to the time-worn traditions and Islamic morality of the people. It is noted that the three high points in the Islamic conservative current were religious awakenings made possible by Khalid al-Naqshbandi (Mevlana Halid) (1776-1827) from Iraq in the late 18th and early 19th century, Sa'id Nursi (1873-1960) in the early 20th century, and Fethullah Gulen (1938-present) in the late 20th and the current century. Findley points out that at critical moments, the "two currents could become starkly antagonistic" (p. 18). One may argue that these three religious awakenings were indeed conservative, but not radical because none of them targeted the state and modernization as such; they only had, in fact, favorable approaches toward them. …

In the Hunt for the "Sultans of Smack:" Dope, Gangsters and the Construction of the Turkish Deep State

Abstract: This article traces the development and evolution of the Turkish heroin trade against the backdrop of the Republic of Turkey's long transition from imperial core to nation-state In taking up heroin's relationship to modern Turkey, I would like to specifically explore the meaning and manifestations of what many inside and outside of academia have called the "deep state" Heroin, I argue, was and is one of the most vital enablers of the factional "deep state" rivalries that compete for power in Ankara, adding a steady violent dimension to local and national politics

The Interspersed Nation-State System: A Two-State/One-Land Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Abstract: This article explores the use of non-territorial state structures as a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By presenting a nation-state that exists over certain people, and not exclusive territory, this article offers a method for Israelis and Palestinians to each have the self-determination of an independent government while being able to mutually exist over disputed land. While the territorial state structure was designed in the 17th century, this new system may better fit modern conditions.

The Winner Takes All: The 1949 Island of Rhodes Armistice Negotiations Revisited

Abstract: Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the war. A large number of Palestinians had fled and had lost their homeland. After the war, Israel was in a much stronger military position than Egypt, and could resume the war if necessary. New empirical evidence shows that this imbalance of power on the ground was strengthened by strong support in Israel's favor from the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, as well as from the US administration. Such support served to limit the UN mediator's room for maneuver and ultimately contributed to a biased agreement. An analysis of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt at Rhodes sheds light on and widens our understanding of the approach and power relations which marked the 1949 negotiations. The armistice negotiations represent the first example of a process and an agreement based largely on Israeli premises. Such an agreement could not provide the basis for peace in the Middle East. Ever since 1947, mediators have tried to convince Israel, the Palestinians, and their surrounding Arab neighbors that a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict is both desirable and possible. Still, all initiatives launched by the United Nations in the years following 1947 and the subsequent establishment of the State of Israel have failed. Similarly, repeated attempts by the United States have had limited success. On the Island of Rhodes, Israeli and Egyptian delegations entered an armistice agreement under UN auspices on February 24, 1949. Ralph Bunche, a US doctor of political science and a former US State Department official, was the UN Acting Mediator (henceforth mediator). The agreement signed on Rhodes in 1949 between Israel and Egypt was the result of the first round of negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and formed the basis for three further armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors: Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The armistices were intended to provide the basis for later peace negotiations, which were expected to commence within a year.1 They were initiated in Lausanne, but nothing came of them. On December 10, 1950, Ralph Bunche received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to negotiate the armistice agreements in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbor states.2 Arab-Israeli peacemaking in the 1940s represents the crucial beginnings; the formative years that would later influence similar attempts. An appreciation of the approaches, processes, and outcomes of peace initiatives during this period is arguably of utmost importance for understanding the entire post-war era. This article seeks to shed light on the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian armistice negotiations and, through this exploration, call into question the accuracy of the traditional explanations offered with reference to this process. In fact, crucial issues with regard to the armistice negotiations on the Island of Rhodes have not been adequately studied.3 This article will provide fresh insights into what took place on Rhodes during the Israeli-Egyptian armistice negotiations. Why did the armistice agreement reached on Rhodes fail to contribute to later peace negotiations in the Middle East? Can the answer be found in the nature of the final agreement and how this agreement was reached? Could it be that the very nature of the negotiations, with specific reference to the mediator's room for maneuver and the role of external actors, such as the United States and UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, proved decisive in terms of the final outcome? Mediation theory points to the fact that process symmetry rarely serves to redress existing power asymmetry between negotiating parties. …

Blood, Beliefs and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, 2007-2009 (review)

Abstract: Blood, Beliefs and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, 2007-2009, by Robert Olson. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2009. $35. Reviewed by David Romano Robert Olson's book seeks to gauge the Turkish state's attempts to manage Kurdish nationalism by examining the period from national elections in 2007 to nationwide municipal elections in 2009. Professor Olson constructs his view of this period from mostly Turkish news sources (newspapers such as Hurriyet, Radikal, and Zaman), analyst's views in the Jamestown Foundation publications, some academic secondary sources, and a few personal interviews. As a historian, Olson possesses a good command of both the longue duree background to the Kurdish issue in Turkey as well as very current events, which are the focus of his book. Blood, Beliefs and Ballots thus offers the reader a nuanced treatment of a complicated issue, facilitated by the very circumscribed time period it examines as well as Olson's tendency to let actors "speak for themselves," unmolested by much of his own analysis or interpretation of their views and statements. Of course, the mere act of selecting which statements and events to focus on during this short but eventful time period necessitates choices and interpretations on Olson's part. These choices appear to have been made in as objective, reasonable, and fair a manner as any academic could wish for, fortunately. Especially for readers who didn't spend 2007-2009 reading current events in Turkey so closely, the book provides a nice summary of the time period. Some of the more useful bits of analysis include a view that the Turkish military (TSK) has progressively accepted the greater Islamicization of public life in Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in hopes of using this as a tool to constrain the perceived greater threat of the secular Kurdish nationalist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Democratic Society Party (DTP) - now closed down by the Turkish courts and replaced with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Similar considerations may have led the TSK to buy into better relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) or Iraq, in the hopes that cooperation from more conservative Iraqi Kurds could help Turkey manage the more Leftist variant of Kurdish nationalism within its own borders. Neither strategy appeared particularly successful, however, given the DTP's improved electoral showing in the 2009 elections (compared to Olson's starting point comparison of the 2007 elections). Olson thus concludes that given Kurdish nationalist increases in electoral support in Turkey's southeast, "The 29 March elections showed both successes and failures. Turkey achieved success in that it did not meet any of the major demands of the PKK or the DTP for political autonomy, regional or provincial decentralization in the heavily Kurdishpopulated regions ... Turkey was also successful in not granting the major cultural and linguistic demands of Kurds" (pp. …

Public Diplomacy 2.0: An Exploratory Case Study of the U.S. Digital Outreach Team

Abstract: The past five years have witnessed innovations in American public diplomacy methods towards the Middle East, moving from one-way communication through broadcasting and the print media to a more interactive model in which the government joins the conversation. This paper assesses the potential of this new model through an analysis of an early US government Web 2.0 public diplomacy initiative, the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), focusing on an embedded case study, that of Arabic Internet discussions of Barack Obama’s Cairo speech of 4 June 2009, in which the DOT participated. The DOT is a team of ten civil servants that has its own Facebook, Youtube, Flickr, and Twitter accounts, but mostly operates through posting messages on popular Internet discussion forums. The Bureau of International Information Programs that hosts the DOT states that the DOT’s mission “is to explain U.S. foreign policy and to counter misinformation” (IIP 2009). Public diplomacy in Web 2.0 (or public diplomacy 2.0 for short) is embraced by the Department of State on several levels. The Secretary of State has a team of bloggers who post English-language blog and Twitter entries about her activities (Lichtenstein 2010). The State Department website launched an initiative in 2010, Opinion Space, which invites visitors to register their opinions about a number of issues, from politics to the economy, and to instantly find out where they stand on the opinion scale vis-a-vis others in the world. A number of US diplomats also blog or use Twitter to reach out to people. In South Korea, the American Embassy runs a networking site, called Cafe USA, to engage Korean youth (Seo 2009). However, in the context of the Middle East, public diplomacy initiatives have been driven by the post 9/11 security framework that regards the “war of ideas” as a component of the “war on terror”. This framework follows Jamie Metzl’s advocacy of the use of communication technologies like the Internet and satellite television for “defining the legitimacy of the use of force” (1999: 178) by the United States. Barack Obama’s administration presented hope for a changed US image in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and his speech in Cairo in June 2009 was seen as an attempt to reframe the relationship between the USA and the Muslim world: “This cycle of suspicion and discord must end. I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they

US-French Collaboration on Lebanon: How Syria's Role in Lebanon and the Middle East Contributed to a US-French Convergence

Abstract: This article considers US-French collaboration on Lebanon, especially between 2004 and 2008. It examines the political background to such collaboration and its manifestations at the United Nations Security Council and in the two powers' relations with Lebanon, Syria, and other regional players. We argue that the changed political landscape in the Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (particularly Syrian policy in Lebanon and towards Iraq) as well as developments in the Lebanese theater since the turn of the 21st century prompted such collaboration. After briefly discussing the insights of Realist and Liberal Internationalist theories of international relations, the article concludes that Daniel Deudney's Republican Security Theory offers the most plausible explanation for US-French collaboration on Lebanon. The literature on the international relations of the Middle East has devoted limited attention to how the United States and major European powers (primarily France and Britain, but increasingly the European Union) have worked together or at cross-purposes in pursuit of their interests in the region. Published work tended to emphasize US-European rivalries and competition, highlighting how the United States in the late 1940s and 1950s sought to replace France and Britain as the dominant power in the region.1 Breaking away from the trend that stresses conflict among the major powers, this article analyzes US-French collaboration on Lebanon since 2004. In addition to highlighting the significance of Lebanon to the US-French rapprochement in the aftermath of the Iraq War, this article addresses a number of questions regarding why France and the United States decided to work together in Lebanon and the implications of their close collaboration for the Lebanese internal situation and for US-French relations in the Middle East. We will first consider the ebbs and flows in US-French relations from the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States until the passage of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559 (September 2004) which was, from the outset, a joint USFrench initiative. We will then look at how the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 drove France and the United States to intensify their collaboration on Lebanon. The third section examines how the two powers responded to the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah and subsequent developments in Lebanon that weakened their local partners. Fourth, we shed light on the relative merits of Realist and Liberal Internationalist explanations for the emergence of US-French collaboration. Finally, the conclusion suggests that Daniel Deudney's Republican Security Theory does a better job than Realism and Liberal Internationalism in explaining US-French collaboration in Lebanon.2 US-French relati ons from the attac ks of 9/11 until the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 The United States and France have been significant players on the Middle East scene for many decades. While their long and sustained engagement in the affairs of the region has led to a number of collisions,3 the overall relationship remained sufficiently amicable to permit collaboration whenever the two countries perceived their interests as converging. Thus, in the 1980s, the United States and France collaborated to deny Iran victory in its long war with Iraq; and in 1990, France, despite its initial push for a diplomatic solution, joined the military coalition that the United States formed to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and later took part in the UN-sanctioned surveillance operation that established no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.4 The 21st century brought opportunities for both conflict and cooperation. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the French government and media expressed solidarity with the United States. France's leading newspaper Le Monde carried the headline: "Nous sommes tous Americains! …

Iran's Oil Nationalization and Mossadegh's Involvement with the World Bank

Abstract: The first encounter between the World Bank and Iran over Iran's oil dispute with Great Britain took place in Washington, DC. The World Bank's Vice President, Robert Garner, met with Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who was in the United States to address a British resolution pending before the United Nations Security Council. In three Bank missions to Iran between January and March 1952, several features of the Bank's proposed temporary management of the recently nationalized Iranian oil company were discussed. The Iranian government refused to approve the employment of British nationals under the Bank's operation of the nationalized oil company. The Bank, meanwhile, prevented by its Articles of Agreement from excluding employment of personnel from one of its members, could not agree to undertake the temporary operation of Iran's nationalized oil company. After a few months' break in contact between Iran and the Bank, the Iranian government sent a representative to the Bank to reopen the discussions - but unaccompanied by a controversial international adviser Mossadegh had requested. Consequently, when the oil talks reopened, the Iranian representative was unprepared to fully articulate a new Iranian proposal that would allow the reengagement of British personnel. Unfortunately, the Bank team did not follow up on this meeting and did not support the Iranian representative in refining the new proposal. Less than a year later, Mossadegh was deposed, and an international consortium took over operation of the Iranian oil company. The fall of Mossadegh demolished the hope for national sovereignty and full democracy in Iran - with far-reaching consequences for the Iranian people and the international community. This article, based mostly on archived and unpublished World Bank materials, reviews the involvement of Mohammad Mossadegh's government with the World Bank after the March 1951 nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Before nationalization, the AIOC had a considerable international market share for crude and petroleum products. Its operation of the world's largest refinery in Abadan ensured an uninterrupted supply of oil products to the British merchant and navy fleet. However, the Iranian workers in Abadan lived in appalling conditions, with no running water or electricity. The AIOC's profit distribution was also highly uneven. For example, in 1946, its profit taxes to the British government were twice as large as its royalties and net profits payments to Iran. In February 1951, the AIOC increased its profit-sharing offer to 50-50, but the Iranian government was not satisfied. Many Iranians considered the AIOC exploitative, and its nationalization plan constituted a critical element of the government reform program. On March 20, 1951, the Iranian Senate approved the nationalization bill. In May 1951, the AIOC applied to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for arbitration proceedings. While British warships were stationed near Abadan, the British government appealed to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pass a resolution for the two parties to resume negotiations.1 After the AIOC was nationalized and its British personnel left Iran, operations at its oil fields ceased. Iranian-trained workers were unable to manage large-scale oil production, and a British-imposed embargo made it almost impossible for Iran to find tankers to export oil.2 Consequently, the heavily oil-dependent Iranian economy suffered considerably and while the US refused to grant financial support and the Soviet government declined to repay its wartime debts to Iran, budget and balance-of-payments deficits ballooned.3 Among several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute, at least two were made by from the US government: first by Henry Grady, US Ambassador to Iran,4 and then by W. Averell Harriman, President Harry S. Truman's special foreign policy assistant, who went to Tehran to reconcile the two diverging positions. …

Military Intelligence, Tribes, and Britain's War in Dhofar, 1970-1976

Abstract: This article examines the hitherto overlooked role of military intelligence in the Dhofar campaign of 1970-1976. Drawing on an array of new sources, it not only details the functional role of military intelligence in the campaign, but also makes a distinction between "attitudinal" and "behavioral" support in understanding the "human terrain," and thereby how military intelligence helped secure acceptance of the regime of Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id among the tribes of Dhofar.

Border Pedagogy in Israel

Abstract: Sense of geographical place is an essential element in students' understanding of their own place in the world. For a country such as Israel, with numerous neighbors with which it has had contentious relations, the idea of place and especially the conception of "borders" takes on an even greater importance. This article examines in detail the teaching of borders in the Israeli secondary school curriculum by examining the maps and language used to describe the country's physical (and mental) borders.

War of Narratives

Abstract: From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust, by Meir Litvak and Esther Webman New York: Columbia University Press, 2009 $95 The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives, by Gilbert Achcar Translated by GM Goshgarian New York: Metropolitan Books / Henry Holt & Co, 2010 $20 One of the most awkward and painful topics of debate among Israelis and Palestinians and their respective supporters is whether the Palestinians, displaced and stateless since the creation of Israel in 1948, are correct in claiming that they have been made to pay the price of Hitler's persecution of European Jews To many Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, there is a self-evident connection here, part of the long history of European colonial interference in the Middle East To most Israelis and Jews who view the return to Zion and the creation of the Jewish state as an answer to Jewish dispersion and vulnerability, the suggested connection is at best misleading or inaccurate, at worst offensive and unacceptable A war of narra tives As this reviewer has suggested elsewhere, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has, above and beyond the negotiable issues in dispute, given birth to a tangle of core arguments of this sort which are partly psycho-social, partly existential - and largely unwinnable1 Israelis and Palestinians have become locked in a vicious cycle, viewing themselves as the victims of the other - not just victims, but righteous victims2 And nowhere is their sordid competition for exclusive or superior victimhood more acute, self-righteous, and self-defeating than in the "war of narratives" (in Gilbert Achcar's subtitle) involving the Jewish Shoah and the Palestinian Nakba From Empathy to Denial and The Arabs and the Holocaust are very different books that complement one another in addressing - yet not resolving - these difficult issues Together, these volumes unfold a complicated and unhappy history of the interplay of Shoah and Nakba, their enduring impact on the identities of Israelis and Palestinians, and how they contribute significantly to each side's inability to empathize with the other A number of historical episodes are treated in both books: the persecution and genocide of European Jews; the collaboration of the Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, with Hitler's war against the Jews; West Germany's restitution to the Jews via reparation payments to the State of Israel; the trial (1954-1955) in Israel of Rudolph Kasztner, a Zionist official falsely accused of collaborating with the Nazis; the kidnapping, public trial, and execution by Israel of high-level Nazi functionary, Adolf Eichmann (1960-1962); the Catholic Church's pronouncements of contrition regarding centuries of Jew-hatred and its passivity during the Shoah (1965, 1998); Roger Garaudy's 1996 book and subsequent trial in France for Holocaust denial; Yasir 'Arafat's aborted visit to the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1998; and the United Nations' inauguration of an annual Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, 2005 Each of these Holocaust-related episodes has provoked critical, often hostile, commentary in the Arab world, as has distribution of a number of starstudded popular depictions of the Shoah in film (eg, "Schindler's List" [Steven Spielberg, 1993], "Life is Beautiful" [Roberto Benigni, 1997]) and on television ("Holocaust" [NBC, 1978]) The authors of these two works summarize and evaluate those Arab responses, but they do not always draw the same conclusions Unpleasant primary materials, overheated rhetoric Both books deal forthrightly with unpleasant primary materials reeking of stereotyping, racism, anti-semitism, and Holocaust denial Neither attempts to hide or gloss over disturbing evidence of prejudice and hatred emanating from a number of Arab thinkers and leaders Both books are admirable for the richness of their source material, the rigor of their scholarly citations, and for providing readers with excellent bibliographies and indexes - rare jewels indeed on today's publishing scene …