Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 2013"
TL;DR: In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his "most fruitful ideas" are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but SRAFFA is not mentioned anywhere else in the book as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the “anthropological view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics.
14 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the response of wonder itself, and its causes and effects, and ask why the sense of wonder can atrophy, and whether it can be suppressed deliberately.
Abstract: Although wonder is a response to what is extraordinary or regarded as such, this covers a variety of things. Hence, wonder covers a spectrum from mere surprise or puzzlement to stronger responses like dread or amazement; moreover, it is often linked to other powerful responses like fear or admiration, and it can lead people into many pursuits and areas of reflection. I look at the variety of the objects of wonder, and of the neighbouring responses and conceptual connections found here, then I discuss the response of wonder itself, and its causes and effects. Finally, I ask why the sense of wonder can atrophy, and whether it can be suppressed deliberately.
11 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that our understanding of what is real cannot be adequately elucidated if we consider only its role within language games, and argue that an important element in our thinking about what is and is not real emerges in our response to conflicting modes of thought.
Abstract: I look at a disagreement between Elizabeth Anscombe, on the one hand, and Peter Winch and Ilham Dilman, on the other, about whether it is legitimate to call something an error that counts as knowledge within some alien system of belief; and I look also at the question what Wittgenstein's view was. I try to show that our understanding of what is real cannot be adequately elucidated if we consider only its role within language-games, and I argue that an important element in our thinking about what is and is not real emerges in our response to conflicting modes of thought.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the periodisation of Wittgenstein's thought and what should properly be counted as part of his work are discussed. But, as pointed out by the authors, the interpretation of the Big Typescript as a grammatical investigation is incorrect.
Abstract: In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker addresses what he takes to be misconceptions of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to (1) the periodisation of his thought and to what should properly be counted as part of his work; (2) his conception of grammar since the Big Typescript (1929–33); and (3) his conception of philosophy as grammatical investigation. I argue that Hacker's restrictive conception of what ought to be considered part of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his conservative view of Wittgensteinian grammar are unjustified and prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary importance of On Certainty for epistemology. Finally, while agreeing that Wittgenstein views philosophy as grammatical elucidation, I suggest some reasons for the resistance that this view has generated.
In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker deals with three of the “many misunderstandings, misrepresentations and misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy” (2012, 1); the first of which concerns “the periodisation of Wittgenstein's thought”; the second, the supposition that what Wittgenstein called “grammar” in PI differed fundamentally from, and was more limited than, his conception of it when he was writing the Big Typescript; and the third, the claim that what Wittgenstein took to be grammatical statements are, in fact, dogmatisms, theories or doctrines inconsistent with his meta-philosophical remarks in PI. I address each of these concerns seriatim.
8 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that the contrast between virtue and continence should be seen as a degree of degree, where virtue is a continence that has matured with practice and habit, becoming more stable, effective and self-aware.
Abstract: Many recent writers in the virtue ethics tradition have followed Aristotle in arguing for a distinction between virtue and continence, where the latter is conceived as an inferior moral condition. In this paper I contend that rather than seeking to identify a sharp categorical difference between virtue and continence, we should see the contrast as rather one of degree, where virtue is a continence that has matured with practice and habit, becoming more stable, effective and self-aware.
5 citations
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5 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that interpreting Wittgenstein's observations about the interrelations between "noticing an aspect" and other psychological concepts as a systematic theory of aspect-seeing diminishes key lessons of the explorations.
Abstract: Seeing aspects is a dominant theme in Wittgenstein's 1940s writings on philosophy of psychology. Interpreters disagree about what Wittgenstein was trying to do in these discussions. I argue that interpreting Wittgenstein's observations about the interrelations between “noticing an aspect” and other psychological concepts as a systematic theory of aspect-seeing diminishes key lessons of Wittgenstein's explorations: these interrelations are enormously complicated and “noticing an aspect” resists neat classification. Further, Wittgenstein invites us to engage in his “placing activity,” and by doing so we are building a skill that is valuable for enabling us to help ourselves when we encounter conceptual difficulties.
4 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that this is not how we should interpret the later Wittgenstein because he insists that particular circumstances of use play a necessary role in determining the boundary between sense and nonsense.
Abstract: Peter Hacker defends an interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's notion of grammar, according to which the inherently general grammatical rules are sufficient for sense-determination. My aim is to show that this interpretation fails to account for an important contextualist shift in Wittgenstein's views on sense-determination. I argue that Hacker attributes to the later Wittgenstein a rule-based, combinatorial account of sense, which Wittgenstein puts forward in the Tractatus. I propose that this is not how we should interpret the later Wittgenstein because he insists that particular circumstances of use play a necessary role in determining the boundary between sense and nonsense.
4 citations
TL;DR: Winch's readings of Wittgenstein and Weil call for a significant rethinking of the relation between metaphysics and ethics as mentioned in this paper. But there are confusions, perhaps to be found in all three of these writers, that we may slip into here.
Abstract: Winch's readings of Wittgenstein and Weil call for a significant rethinking of the relation between “metaphysics” and “ethics.” But there are confusions, perhaps to be found in all three of these writers, that we may slip into here. These are linked with the tendency to see idealist tendencies in Wittgenstein, and with his remark that giving grounds comes to an end, not in a kind of seeing on our part, but in our acting. The sense that we think we see in this suggestion is dependent on a distorted conception of “justification.” Getting clear about this involves coming to appreciate just how much of our nature as ethical beings is engaged when we do philosophy.
4 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, a critical response to Dr. Tamara Dobler's paper "What Is Wrong with Hacker's Wittgenstein? On Grammar, Context and Sense-Determination" is given.
Abstract: This is a critical response to Dr. Tamara Dobler's paper “What Is Wrong with Hacker's Wittgenstein? On Grammar, Context and Sense-Determination.” It demonstrates that Dr. Dobler has no idea of what Wittgenstein meant by “grammar” or “rule of grammar.” She does not know what Wittgenstein meant by “grammatical proposition,” nor does she know what a compositional account of meaning or a category mistake is. She labours under the illusion that to say, as Wittgenstein did, that a rule of grammar excludes a form of words from use is incompatible with the claim that whether an utterance makes sense may be a context-dependent issue. Unlike Dr. Dobler, Wittgenstein did not.
3 citations
TL;DR: Wittgenstein is best understood as saying what he means and meaning what he says, and it is a mistake to suppose the examples of the shopkeeper and builders in §§ 1-2 cannot be read straightforwardly as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: §§1–7 of the Investigations should be taken at face value and not read against the grain Wittgenstein is best understood as saying what he means and meaning what he says, and it is a mistake to suppose the examples of the shopkeeper and builders in §§1–2 cannot be read straightforwardly The seven sections function as a prologue alerting the reader to the type of problem he intends to tackle and the type of approach he intends to pursue
TL;DR: In this article, Gaita argued that X is part of the very concept of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond GaitA's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's.
Abstract: X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the notion that meaning is intrinsically normative and argue that anti-normativists do not require the contextualist reading of the normativity thesis to make their case.
Abstract: This paper defends the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. Recent anti-normativist objectors have distinguished two versions of the thesis – correctness and prescriptivity – and have attacked both. In the first two sections, I defend the thesis against each of these attacks; in the third section, I address two further, closely related, anti-normativist arguments against the normativity thesis and, in the process, clarify its sense by distinguishing a universalist and a contextualist reading of it. I argue that the anti-normativist position is successful only against the universalist reading but point out that normativists do not require this reading of the thesis; the contextualist one is both possible and desirable for them. Furthermore, I argue that anti-normativists require the contextualist reading of the normativity thesis to make their case, as well as to avoid meaning relativism. In the final two sections of the paper, I explain how a contextualist understanding of the normativity thesis is compatible with Quine's elimination of analyticity, thus undermining a key underlying reason for anti-normativism, and I respond to the objection that a contextualist reading of the normativity thesis is either self-contradictory or else trivial.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors question the validity of the frame/body distinction and the resolute reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Abstract: “Resolute” readings of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus maintain that the book is divided into two parts: an intelligible “frame” and an unintelligible “body.” This article questions the validity of the “frame/body distinction” and, by extension, the resolute reading itself. It first establishes the tenability of the resolute programme as entirely dependent upon such a frame/body distinction. It then explores three possible ways the claim that the Tractatus contains such a distinction might be grounded, arguing in each case why it cannot do so. It therefore concludes that the frame/body distinction is unjustified, and the resolute reading untenable.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the possibility of reconciling perspectivalism with an account of what it could mean to speak of the world as it is in itself, and contrast this with the ideas of Thomas Aquinas.
Abstract: Perceptual experience is perspectival, and human minds occupy a variety of “viewpoints.” These considerations provide grounds for both realist and anti-realist philosophies. Each is represented in adjacent areas of thought, and often connects with familiar debates between “conservatives” and “liberals,” which in turn are commonly related to disputes about religious and naturalistic accounts of the world and of the place of human beings within it. These have been joined from an orthogonal direction by Thomas Nagel in his recent book Mind and Cosmos. This is considered and contrasted with the ideas of Thomas Aquinas before returning to the possibility of reconciling perspectivalism with an account of what it could mean to speak of the world as it is in itself.