Showing papers in "Phronesis in 2000"
TL;DR: This paper showed that although the desires of vicious people are determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform.
Abstract: Contrary to what most interpreters hold, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The present paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionally been taken to assert that unjust and self-indulgent people are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgent people as "incurable", he does not mean that they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment; (3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform.
55 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors argues that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the Philebus as a first best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate rather than reject pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life.
Abstract: This paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the Philebus. According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure, or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken the "mixed life" of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the Philebus to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly, scholars such as Irwin have seen the Philebus' arguments against false pleasures as an actual attack on hedonism, showing in Irwin's words "why maximization of pleasure cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life." Against these claims, I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the Philebus as a rst best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate rather than reject pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. Thus, I offer alternative readings of controversial passages that have given rise to the prevalent interpretation criticized here, and advance positive evidence that at least some pleasures are seen by Plato as inherently good. In addition, I demonstrate that Plato's arguments against false pleasures do not by themselves constitute an attack on hedonism. Rather, they can be seen as a strategy to show the hedonist that, in order to be a maximal, or even a consistent, hedonist, he should go for true, and not fake pleasures, if after all pleasure is the object of his pursuit. But, since this cannot be achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is to be accepted even by hedonist themselves.
40 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the notion of the variabilite du droit naturel and the diversite interpretations that l'on peut donner d'un sentiment communement partage du juste ou de linjuste (cf. Rhet.
Abstract: presente etude propose une interpretation de EN , V, 10, en defendant deux premierement que la notion centrale de la variabilite du droit naturel e la diversite des interpretations que l'on peut donner d'un sentiment communement partage du juste ou de l'injuste (cf. Rhet ., I, 13); deuxiemement que, echapper au relativisme de type protagoreen, Aristote defend l'idee d'un parfait qui seul peut fournir la meilleure interpretation de ce sentiment.
34 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors trace the development from Aristotle to Philoponus and set out the deductive system on which the logic of the wholly hypothetical syllogisms was grounded, and argue that it would be mistaken to assume that there was one prevalent understanding of the logical form of these arguments even if the ancients thought they were all talking about the same kind of argument.
Abstract: In antiquity we encounter a distinction of two types of hypothetical syllogisms. One type are the 'mixed hypothetical syllogisms'. The other type is the one to which the present paper is devoted. These arguments went by the name of 'wholly hypothetical syllogisms'. They were thought to make up a self-contained system of valid arguments. Their paradigm case consists of two conditionals as premisses, and a third as conclusion. Their presentation, either schematically or by example, varies in different authors. For instance, we find 'If (it is) A, (it is) B; if (it is) B, (it is) C; therefore, if (it is) A, (it is) C'. The main contentious point about these arguments is what the ancients thought their logical form was. Are A, B, C schematic letters for terms or propositions? Is 'is', where it occurs, predicative, existential, or veridical? That is, should 'Α στι' be translated as 'it is an A', 'A exists', 'As exist' or 'It is true/the case that A'? If A, B, C are term letters, and 'is' is predicative, are the conditionals quanti ed propositions or do they contain designators? If one cannot answer these questions, one can hardly claim to know what sort of arguments the wholly hypothetical syllogisms were. In fact, all the above-mentioned possibilities have been taken to describe them correctly. In this paper I argue that it would be mistaken to assume that in antiquity there was one prevalent understanding of the logical form of these arguments even if the ancients thought they were all talking about the same kind of argument. Rather, there was a complex development in their understanding, starting from a term-logical conception and leading to a propositional-logical one. I trace this development from Aristotle to Philoponus and set out the deductive system on which the logic of the wholly hypothetical syllogisms was grounded.
30 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the democratic man is a jumble of desires, someone in whom order and unity have all but disintegrated, and argue that if there were a single deliberating reason imposing a life plan upon his life, the fragmentation of life and character discussed earlier would only be superficial.
Abstract: This paper tackles some issues arising from Plato's account of the democratic man in Rep. VIII. One problem is that Plato tends to analyse him in terms of the desires that he fulfils, yet sends out conflicting signals about exactly what kind of desires are at issue. Scholars are divided over whether all of the democrat's desires are appetites. There is, however, strong evidence against seeing him as exclusively appetitive: rather he is someone who satisfies desires from all three parts of his soul, although his rational and spirited desires differ significantly from those of the philosopher or the timocrat. A second problem concerns the question why the democrat ranks so low in Plato's estimation, especially why he is placed beneath the oligarch. My explanation is that Plato presents him as a jumble of desires, someone in whom order and unity have all but disintegrated. In this way he represents a step beyond the merely bipolarised oligarch. The final section of the paper focuses on the democrat's rational part, and asks whether it plays any role in shaping his life as a whole. For the disunity criticism to hold, Plato ought to allow very little global reasoning: if there were a single deliberating reason imposing a life plan upon his life, the fragmentation of life and character discussed earlier would only be superficial. I argue that Plato attributes very little global reasoning to the democrat. Aside from the fact that the text fails to mention such reasoning taking place, Plato's views on the development of character and his use of the state-soul analogy show that the democrat's lifestyle is determined just by the strength of the desires that he happens to feel at any one time.
21 citations
TL;DR: Plato's main concern in the Cratylus is to argue against the idea that we can learn about things by examining their names, and in favour of the claim that philosophers should, so far as possible, look to the things themselves.
Abstract: Plato's main concern in the Cratylus, I claim, is to argue against the idea that we can learn about things by examining their names, and in favour of the claim that philosophers should, so far as possible, look to the things themselves. Other philosophical questions, such as that of whether we should accept a naturalist or a conventionalist theory of namng, arise in the dialogue, but are subordinate. This reading of the Cratylus, I say, explains certain puzzling facts about the dialogue's structure and dramatic emphasis, as well as making the dialogue look better on philosophical grounds. In support of my claim, I argue that Hermogenes' conventionalist theory of naming is quite sensible, and is not refuted by Socrates; that the main purpose of the etymological section is to undermine our con dence in etymology as a form of philosophical enquiry; and that the apparently tangential and inconclusive discussions in the nal section of the dialogue are best understood as illustrations of Plato's thesis about philosophical methodology.
12 citations
TL;DR: A detailed analysis of these texts, as well as DA 2.7 and De Sensu 6 on the roles of light and the transparent medium in vision, show that, for Aristotle, the physical processes which sense organs undergo are not standard qualitative changes (i.e. alterations), but activities or the actualizations of potencies in the material constituents of living animal bodies.
Abstract: Amid the ongoing debate over the proper interpretation of Aristotle's theory of sense perception in the De Anima, Steven Everson has recently presented a well-documented and ambitious treatment of the issue, arguing in favor of Richard Sorabji's controversial position that sense organs literally take on the qualities of their proper objects. Against the interpretation of M. F. Burnyeat, Everson and others make a compelling case the Aristotelian account of sensation requires some physical process to occur in sense organs. A detailed examination of the interpretation by Everson and Sorabji of Aristotle's theory, however, shows that their reading cannot be the correct one, since it involves many textual and philosophical difficulties. Their interpretation, for instance, would require abandoning Aristotle's requirement that only a transparent substance is suitable matter for an eye. Likewise, their understanding of the Aristotle's doctrine of sensation as the reception of form without matter in DA 2.12 cannot be reconciled with other texts of his from On Generation and Corruption. An analysis of these texts, as well as DA 2.7 and De Sensu 6 on the roles of light and the transparent medium in vision, show that, for Aristotle, the physical processes which sense organs undergo are not standard qualitative changes (i.e. alterations), but activities or the actualizations of potencies in the material constituents of living animal bodies.
11 citations
TL;DR: A comparison of De E 393f-394a with De Iside 369b-d shows that it is only in the sublunary realm of Nature that Plutarch assumes a duality of two distinct Powers; at the higher levels of reality the divine is unified and harmonious.
Abstract: The article interprets Plutarch's dualism in the light of the Apollo-Dionysus opposition as presented in De E 388e-389c, arguing that Plutarch is no dualist in the strict sense of the word. A comparison of De E 393f-394a with De Iside 369b-d shows that it is only in the sublunary realm of Nature that Plutarch assumes a duality of two distinct Powers; at the higher levels of reality the divine is unified and harmonious. If Plutarch fails to emphasize this point clearly enough, it is because his primary philosophical interests were ethical, not metaphysical.
11 citations
TL;DR: In the light of Glucker's claim to have found in De Divinatione 1.115 a separate, unnamed Pythagorean-Platonic influence on Cicero, the authors examined the passage again with special reference to early Platonic interpretation, finding that the Meno influence is wider than had been suspected, suggesting the correspondence between the two types of 'natural' divination, dreams and ecstatic prophecy, and the kinship of souls.
Abstract: In the light of Glucker's claim to have found in De Divinatione 1.115 a separate, unnamed Pythagorean-Platonic influence on Cicero, I examine the passage again with special reference to early Platonic interpretation. I find that the Meno 's influence is wider than had been suspected, suggesting (i) the correspondence between the two types of 'natural' divination, dreams and ecstatic prophecy, and (ii) the kinship of souls. Posidonius' influence on the underlying interpretation of Platonic psychology is to be detected, insofar as he would have read Meno 81d as a statement about all souls (together) having all available knowledge. However, Cratippus, Cicero's other main source, can be held to have directly borrowed from Meno 81d2-3 for his crowning argument ( De Div. 1.71), and it is likely that other material that uses 81d would also stem from Cratippus. A little is known elsewhere of early interpretation of the Meno . Comparison with other early 'Platonist' material suggests strongly that we must look to Antiochus' school for this view that dreams regularly contain substantial truth explicable in terms of the nature of soul. This would lead once again to Cratippus, and nothing prevents our detecting his hand behind 1.115. Indeed 1.70, which Glucker uses to argue that Cratippus' dream-divining soul would literally have to leave the body, only makes good sense when understood metaphorically.
10 citations
TL;DR: Laerce et al. as mentioned in this paper present le nouvelle edition des Vies des philosophes de Diogene Laerce dans la traduction italienne de M Marcovich, fondée sur une revision des principaux manuscrits grecs et latins.
Abstract: Presentation de la nouvelle edition des «Vies des philosophes» de Diogene Laerce dans la traduction italienne de M Marcovich, fondee sur une revision des principaux manuscrits grecs et latins Examinant les criteres de constitution du texte, l'A critique quelques corrections inutiles du texte traditionnel, ainsi que certaines imprecisions de l'appareil textuel
10 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors trace back to Plotinus a strategy applied by Augustine and Descartes whereby sceptical arguments are used to set aside sensualist forms of dogmatic philosophy, clearing the way for a dogmatism independent of sense-perception which is'self-authenticating' and thus immune to, and even proven by, sceptical doubt.
Abstract: The first part of this paper traces back to Plotinus a strategy applied by Augustine and Descartes whereby sceptical arguments are used to set aside sensualist forms of dogmatic philosophy, clearing the way for a dogmatism independent of sense-perception which is 'self-authenticating' and thus immune to, and even proven by, sceptical doubt. It is argued that Plotinus already uses this strategy in the opening chapters of Enneads V 5 and V 3. The second part of the paper argues that Plotinus' account of how the ineffable One is said (we do not actually say the One, but merely express our own affections) is inspired by the structure of sceptic discourse (the sceptic does not say things as they are, but merely expresses personal affections). Finally, similarities and differences between sceptic discourse about things and Plotinian discourse about the ineffable are explored.
TL;DR: A detailed reading of VI.7.32 and 33 reveals that, in these two crucial passages at least, Plotinus adopts an aesthetic approach to the One and that, far from confining Beauty to Intellect, he equates the One, the Good and the Beautiful as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The status of beauty in Plotinus' metaphysics is unclear: is it a Form in Intellect, the Intelligible Principle itself, or the One? Basing themselves on a number of well-known passages in the Enneads , and assuming that Plotinus' Forms are similar in function and status to Plato's, many scholars hold that Plotinus theorized beauty as a determinate entity in Intellect. Such assumptions, it is here argued, lead to difficulties over self-predication, the interpretation of Plotinus's rich and varied aesthetic terminology and, most of all, the puzzling dearth of references, in the whole of the Enneads , to a Form of Beauty. A detailed reading of VI.7.32 and 33 reveals that, in these two crucial passages at least, Plotinus adopts an aesthetic approach to the One and that, far from confining Beauty to Intellect, he equates the One, the Good and the Beautiful. This reading is here supported not only by an analysis of the text but also by a consideration of the semantic differences between μορη and eιδος, the inter-relatedness, in Plotinus' philosophy, of the concepts of love and value, and the exclusion of beauty from the πρωτα γeνη. In turn, the exegesis of VI.7.32 and 33 raises the issue of the significance for aesthetics understood in the narrow sense of the word, of Plotinus's ontology of beauty. It is here claimed that in so far as sensible beauty, both artistic and natural, can be nothing else than an effect of the shaping action of the Forms and a reflection of their radiance, singular or global, it should not be held that Plotinus had an aesthetics in the modern sense of this term.
TL;DR: Stobaeus records a placitum where Empedocles says that the world is destroyed by the domination in turn of Love and of Strife as mentioned in this paper. But for over two hundred years scholars have been unable to hear that simple message.
Abstract: Stobaeus records a placitum where Empedocles says that the world is destroyed by the domination in turn of Love and of Strife. The placitum makes perfectly good sense in the context of Empedocles' belief that Love and Strife produce, in turn, a non-cosmic state of total unity (Love) and of total separation (Strife). But for over two hundred years scholars have been unable to hear that simple message. Sturz (1805) emended the text so as to make it fit the non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles that he had taken over from the pages of Tiedemann (1791). When Diels included Stobaeus' text in his edition of Aetius, in the Doxographi graeci (1879), he failed to remove the emendation, although his own reconstruction of the chapter heading in Aetius made the emendation impossible. Twenty years later, Diels saw the light, and printed Stobaeus' placitum, unemended, in his Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta (1901) and in successive editions of his Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (from 1903 onwards). But Kranz resurrected the emendation in the Nachtrage to his sixth edition of the Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1951). The emended placitum is used again by Uvo Holscher (1965) to support a non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles and is repeated in the latest collection of the fragments and testimonia (Brad Inwood, 1992). Holscher fails to appreciate that the text that he uses to support his reconstruction is merely Sturz's translation into Greek of the non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles proposed by Tiedemann at the end of the eighteenth century.