Showing papers in "Political Science Quarterly in 1966"

The new deal and the problem of monopoly : a study in economic ambivalence

Abstract: The massive depression of the 1930's detonated the crisis between harsh reality and the vision of material abundance and economic security created by the American industrial order. Amid widespread poverty there was increasing concentration of economic power and loss of individual initiative. Professor Hawley traces the pattern of this conflict. He analyzes the National Recovery Administration, the sources and nature of the antitrust ideology, the rise of Keynesianism, the confusion within the Roosevelt Administration during the recession of 1937-38, and the government career of Thurman Arnold. Attention is given to the administrators of the New Deal and to the beliefs, pressures, and symbols that affected their policy decisions. How and why these ideas and pressures produced policies that were economically inconsistent yet politically workable is also explained. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Selections from the Smuts papers

Abstract: Part XVIII. The last Five Years. 27 August 1945-17 October 1950: Documents 678-888 Biographical notes Index.

Rousseau's Two Models: Sparta and the Age of Gold

Abstract: co Jean-Jacques Rousseau was not a professional philosopher. He never pretended that he was. His great claim was that he alone had been "the painter of nature and the historian of the human heart."' It was an art that did not demand great logical rigor or systematic exposition of abstract ideas. Rousseau did not even aspire to these accomplishments. He did not think that perfect consistency was really very important. What did matter was always to be truthful.2 By truthfulness he meant what we generally tend to call sincerity, and in his case it involved an overriding will to denounce the social world around him. It made him one of the greatest of the nay-sayers. His denial was comprehensive, embracing civilization as a whole. And in his tone of undeviating contempt for all he saw around him, he was singularly consistent. Moreover, if he was the very prototype of the "homme revolte," he was not without a deep sense of order, and his ideas found expression in a form of social criticism that was both formal and traditional in its structure.3

The Compromise of 1787

Abstract: > On July 12, 1787, the Constitutional Convention, meeting in Philadelphia, adopted the three-fifths compromise regarding apportionnment of the House of Representatives. On July 13 the Continental Congress, meeting in New York City, adopted the Northwest Ordinance. The three-fifths compromise sanctioned slavery more decidedly than any previous action at a national level.' The Ordinance, on the other hand, was in Ulrich Phillips' words "the first and last antislavery achievement by the central government in the period."2 The Ordinance has become a symbol of the Revolution's liberalism, while the compromise, if not a covenant with death and an agreement with hell, is at least a dramatic instance of its pragmatic conservatism. Why did Congress and Convention act so differently? The answer to this question, could it be found, would surely throw much light upon the troubled relation between the Founding Fathers and the peculiar institution. Apart from the coincidence of dates, two circumstances make this problem still more intriguing. One is that the Continental

National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC

Abstract: z One of the most fascinating aspects of the decision-making process in the European Economic Community is what Leon Lindberg has called the "constant and complex interaction and interpenetration between Community and national institutions, policies, and processes."' To comprehend fully the background, evolution, and implications of major Community decisions, they must be analyzed in terms of interaction and interpenetration between the pursuit of goals by internal political forces within the member countries, the domestic politics of each member state, the interstate politics within the Community, and pressures exerted by third countries both on the national and Community level. This article will focus on a small but significant segment of this complex Community decision-making process, namely, the general strategies and techniques that influential national economic interest groups in the member states employ for the eliciting of favorable decisions and policies by the Community institutions. This discussion will concentrate on national interest groups and not on the European-level umbrella organizations such as COPA, UNICE, or