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Showing papers in "Sociological Theory in 1999"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the differences and relations between individualist and collectivist understandings of collective memory are discussed, and a strategy of multidimensional rapprochement between individualism and collectivism is advocated.
Abstract: What is collective about collective memory? Two different concepts of collective memory compete—one refers to the aggregation of socially framed individual memories and one refers to collective phenomena sui generis—though the difference is rarely articulated in the literature. This article theorizes the differences and relations between individualist and collectivist understandings of collective memory. The former are open to psychological considerations, including neurological and cognitive factors, but neglect technologies of memory other than the brain and the ways in which cognitive and even neurological patterns are constituted in part by genuinely social processes. The latter emphasize the social and cultural patternings of public and personal memory, but neglect the ways in which those processes are constituted in part by psychological dynamics. This article advocates, through the example of traumatic events, a strategy of multidimensional rapprochement between individualist and collectivist appro...

790 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the post-Fordist approach to workplace restructuring has been examined, including its uncertain handling of power and efficiency as factors that shape work organizations, its failure to acknowledge multiple responses to the crisis of Fordism, and its tendency to neglect the resurgence of economic dualism and disparity within organizations and industries.
Abstract: Social scientists increasingly claim that work structures based on the mass production or “Fordist” paradigm have grown obsolete, giving way to a more flexible, “post-Fordist” structure of work. These claims have been much disputed, however, giving rise to a sharply polarized debate over the outcome of workplace restructuring. I seek to reorient the debate by subjecting the post-Fordist approach to theoretical and empirical critique. Several theoretical weaknesses internal to the post-Fordist approach are identified, including its uncertain handling of “power” and “efficiency” as factors that shape work organizations; its failure to acknowledge multiple responses to the crisis of Fordism, several of which seem at odds with the post-Fordist paradigm; and its tendency to neglect the resurgence of economic dualism and disparity within organizations and industries. Review of the empirical literature suggests that, despite scattered support for the post-Fordist approach, important anomalies exist (such as the growing authority of “mental” over manual labor) that post-Fordism seems powerless to explain. In spite of its ample contributions, post-Fordist theory provides a seriously distorted guide to the nature of workplace change in the United States. Two alternative perspectives toward the restructuring of work organizations are sketched—neoinstitutionalist and “flexible accumulation” models—which seem likely to inspire more fruitful lines of research on the disparate patterns currently unfolding within American work organizations.

275 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: An internal reconstruction and an immanent critique of Bourdieu's generative structuralism is presented in this paper, where an analysis of the relational logic that permeates his whole work is presented.
Abstract: An internal reconstruction and an immanent critique of Bourdieu's generative structuralism is presented. Rather than starting with the concept of “habitus,” as is usually done, the article tries to systematically reconstruct Bourdieu's theory by an analysis of the relational logic that permeates his whole work. Tracing the debt Bourdieu's approach owes to Bachelard's rationalism and Cassirer's relationalism, the article examines Bourdieu's epistemological writings of the 1960s and 70s. It tries to make the case that Bourdieu's sociological metascience represents a rationalist version of Bhaskar's critical realism, and enjoins Bourdieu to give heed to the realist turn in the philosophy of the natural and the social sciences. The article shows how Bourdieu's epistemological assumptions are reflected in his primary theoretical constructs of “habitus” and “field.” To concretize their discussion, it analyzes Bourdieu's reinterpretation of Weber in his theory of the field of religion and of the young Mannheim in his theory of the scientific field.

236 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: As rational choice theory has moved from economics into political science and sociology, it has been dramatically transformed. The intellectual diffusion of agency theory illustrates this process. Agency theory is a general model of social relations involving the delegation of authority, and generally resulting in problems of control, which has been applied to a broad range of substantive contexts. This paper analyzes applications of agency theory to state policy implementation in economics, political science, and sociology. After documenting variations in the theory across disciplinary contexts, the strengths and weaknesses of these different varieties of agency theory are assessed. Sociological versions of agency theory, incorporating both broader microfoundations and richer models of social structure, are in many respects the most promising. This type of agency theory illustrates the potential of an emerging sociological version of rational choice theory.

217 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Recent work by political sociologists and social movement theorists extend our understanding of how religious institutions contribute to expanding democracy, but nearly all analyze religious instit... as discussed by the authors, but they do not analyze religious institutions' role in social movements.
Abstract: Recent work by political sociologists and social movement theorists extend our understanding of how religious institutions contribute to expanding democracy, but nearly all analyze religious instit...

142 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Mark Gould1
TL;DR: This article provided the theoretical resources to resolve a number of conundrums in the work of William Julius Wilson and John Ogbu, concluding that inner-city blacks are not enmeshed in a "culture of poverty, but rather are generally committed to mainstream values and their normative expectations.
Abstract: This article provides the theoretical resources to resolve a number of conundrums in the work of William Julius Wilson and John Ogbu. Contrary to what Wilson's and Ogbu's work sometimes imply, inner-city blacks are not enmeshed in a “culture of poverty,” but rather are generally committed to mainstream values and their normative expectations. Activities that deviate from these values derive from the cognitive expectations inner-city blacks have formed in the face of their restricted legitimate opportunity structures. These expectations, which suggest that educational and occupational success are improbable for inner-city residents, are accurate. If their opportunities were to improve, their cognitive expectations would change and most would be committed to taking advantage of these new opportunities. The differences that separate the inner-city poor from whites center on cultural symbols, which help constitute their identity, sometimes in opposition to the white majority. Most deficiencies in performance ...

89 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a major revision of the earlier theoretical work on religion is presented, where the basic micro elements and processes underlying religious expression are identified and connected, and all primary aspects of religion can be understood on the basis of exchange relations between humans and supernatural beings.
Abstract: In a major revision of my earlier theoretical work on religion, I attempt to identify and connect the basic micro elements and processes underlying religious expression. I show that all primary aspects of religion—belief, emotion, ritual, prayer, sacrifice, mysticism, and miracle—can be understood on the basis of exchange relations between humans and supernatural beings. Although I utilize a cognitive definition of religion, this new version of the theory is especially concerned with the emotional and expressive aspects of religion. Along the way I also clarify the difference between religion and magic and this sets the stage for explaining the conditions under which religion (but not magic) can require extended and exclusive exchange relations between humans and the gods, thus enabling some religions to sustain stable organizations based on a lay membership.

77 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Jurgen Habermas's view of religion as anathema to rational critical discourse reflects his misunderstanding that religion comprises a monolithic and immutable body of dogma that is closed to reason, and they highlight the doctrinal differentiation within Catholicism, its longstanding theological emphasis on the coupling of faith and reason, institutional reflexivity, and the doctrinally reflexive reasoning that contemporary Catholics use in negotiating what might appear as “contradictory” identities.
Abstract: This article argues that Jurgen Habermas's view of religion as anathema to rational critical discourse reflects his misunderstanding that religion comprises a monolithic and immutable body of dogma that is closed to reason. Illustrative data from Catholic history and theology and empirical data gathered from contemporary American Catholics are used to show the weaknesses in Habermas's negation of the possibility of a self-critical religious discourse. Specifically, I highlight the doctrinal differentiation within Catholicism, its longstanding theological emphasis on the coupling of faith and reason, institutional reflexivity, and the doctrinally reflexive reasoning that contemporary Catholics use in negotiating what might appear as “contradictory” identities (e.g., being gay or lesbian and Catholic). Although the data presented take issue with Habermas's disavowal of religion, the article shows that the practical relevance of doctrinal reasoning at both the institutional and the individual level vindicate Habermas's faith in the emancipatory potential of reasoned argumentation to advance participative equality.

71 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a follow-up work as discussed by the authors, the extended case method is used for cultural analysis and critique in the context of participant observation, and the authors argue that it can be used to understand the relation between culture and structure.
Abstract: Michael Burawoy's extended case method is a wonderful model for participant observation and for social research in general. It is not just a "method," a cookbook for doing social research; it is also a social theory in its own right. As a theory in its own right, it deserves the kind of treatment that Burawoy suggests researchers should offer other theories: it deserves reconstruction in light of anomalous cases. How does one reconstruct a theory? "We begin with our favorite theory .. ." suggests Burawoy (1998:16). Both of us learned participant observation from Michael Burawoy, and fell in love with his splendidly theory-driven, politically engaged, macroscopic approach to everyday life. In the spirit of Burawoy's own project of theory-as-dialogue, we would like to use our own work to revise the theory and practice of the extended case method, to make it a better theory. Our question is: Can the extended case method be used to study culture? In the process of asking this, we noticed that the distinction Burawoy often draws between culture and structure becomes a problem when we try to use his concepts for our objects of study; and then, by the same token, we notice that the same problem that applies to our objects of study could apply to his, too. Similarly, his use of Habermas in Ethnography Unbound inadvertently underlines a problem in Habermas's distinction between "lifeworld" and "system" (Calhoun 1992). With a better understanding of the relation between system and lifeworld, we will be in a better position to ask how to "extend" a case culturally. The question has become more pressing to us after having taught participant observation to students who ask: "Is it possible to use the extended case method to 'extend' to culture?" We think the answer is yes. As many of Burawoy's own students have brilliantly shown, the extended case method can indeed be used for cultural analyses. But Burawoy's own theory sits uncomfortably with cultural investigations; it squirms, reluctantly acknowledging that such research is possible. To theorize an "extension to culture" requires a reconstruction of Burawoy's vision that we think retains the core of his theory while taking away its grounds for discomfort with cultural analysis and critique. Using examples from our own recent work, we want to draw out some "anomalies" that drive us to reconstruct the extended case method. What needs reconstructing is the extended case method's implicit theory of the relation between culture and structure. To begin this reconstruction, we outline three different ways that cultural research conceives of connections between culture and structure. First, culture and social structure interpenetrate. Second, people apprehend social structure only through culture; culture structures people's ways of interpreting their own conditions. Third, culture is itself a structure; culture structures people's ways of not only interpreting, but also producing their own conditions. Burawoy would probably agree with the first of these, but has not clearly theorized the second or third. After showing how the latter two approaches could *Delighted thanks to our students, including Kelly Besecke, Jorge Cadena-Roa, Lyn Macgregor, Susan Munkres, Sharmila Rudrappa, and Mimi Schippers, for exploring these ideas with us, and to Mitch Duneier for suggesting we write a response to Michael Burawoy's article on the extended case method. We are equal co-authors. Please

63 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism, and that the failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly generalized, remains what it says: a materialism.
Abstract: I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism. The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly “generalized,” remains what it says: a materialism. In order to substantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions three areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of (1) human agency (as seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherness, and (3) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive social theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and self-understanding of social science. The action I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects reality in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subject and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for reasons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics before power.

62 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the concepts of habitus and capital are applied to an analysis of aspects of the life histories of low-income African American men, exploring how their past experiences relate to their present-day statuses as nonmobile individuals.
Abstract: The concepts of habitus and capital are crucial in the research tradition of social and cultural reproduction. This article applies both terms to an analysis of aspects of the life histories of low-income African American men. In exploring how their past experiences relate to their present-day statuses as nonmobile individuals, this article also revisits and redefines the utility of habitus and capital as conceptual devices for the study of social inequality. It expands the empirical terrain covered by the concept of capital to include that which allows low-income individuals to manage their existence in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities while also hindering their mobility in the broader social world. One implication of this approach is an improved cultural analysis of low-income individuals. The improvement lies in that their behavior can be better understood as reflections of their readings of social reality, which are based upon the material and ideational resources that they have accumulated throughout their lives, and not simply as manifestations of flawed value-systems or normative orientations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that any coherent principles of social justice, whether economic or cultural, may only be possible if one begins with the idea that all human arrangements are, first and foremost, limited; hence, strictly speaking, religious.
Abstract: Religion may well be the most inscrutable surd of social theory, which began late in the 19th century dismissing the subject. Not even the renewal of interest in religion in the 1960s did much to make religion a respectable topic in social theory. It is possible that social theory's troubles are, in part, due to its refusal to think about religion. Close examination of social theories of Greek religion suggest, for principal example, that religion is perfectly able to thrive alongside the profane provided both are founded on principles of finitude, which in turn may be said to be the foundational axiom of any socially organized religion. The value of a social theory of religion, thus defined, may be seen as a way out of the current controversies over the politics of redistribution and politics of recognition. Any coherent principles of social justice, whether economic or cultural, may only be possible if one begins with the idea that all human arrangements are, first and foremost, limited—that is to say: finite; hence, strictly speaking, religious. Durkheim got this only partly right.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Shils as mentioned in this paper provides a fully comparable alternative to the thought of Habermas and Foucault, with essentially similar roots: practice theory, the dissolution of Marxism in the twenties, and Carl Schmitt.
Abstract: Edward Shils was a widely recognized but misunderstood thinker. The original contexts of his thought are not well understood and greatly distorted by associating him with the concerns of Parsons. Shils provides a fully comparable alternative to the thought of Habermas and Foucault, with essentially similar roots: practice theory, the dissolution of Marxism in the twenties, and Carl Schmitt. Though Shils was indebted to the American sociological tradition, with respect to these issues his sources were outside it: in Hendrik de Man, T. S. Eliot, and Michael Polanyi. It is shown how Shils responded to Schmitt's argument about the inherent conflict between democracy and liberalism in terms of an account of civility and tradition, and how this argument results in a critique of Foucault, Habermas, and collectivistic liberalism.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors pointed out that most of the most active participation in social movements and popular politics in recent decades has been driven by religious commitments and organized through religious associations, and that the most influential approach in the field of social movements is barely open to considerations of religion (except perhaps as a source of networks for mobilization).
Abstract: Religion figures much more prominently in social life than in sociology. Indeed, there is perhaps no greater disproportion between the concerns of sociologists and those of the rest of the members of contemporary society. Most Americans believe in God and go to church or other religious services. Though sociologists count beliefs and attendance, these social facts hardly shape sociological theory or analyses of other specific domains of social life. Sociologists have focused a good deal on the ways in which migration is transforming American society, for example, but only glanced at the impact it is having on religiosity and religious preference. It is as though impacts on education, stratification, politics, and urban ecology are seen as significant in a way those on religion are not. The 1980s brought a dramatic surge of interest in the sociology of culture, but studies of television, art, and popular music held pride of place. With a few exceptions like Robert Wuthnow, a survey of the leading work in the field would not have given one the impression that religion was an important part of culture. The field of social movements offers a strong example of the general pattern of devaluation and neglect. Much of the most active participation in social movements and popular politics in recent decades has been driven by religious commitments and organized through religious associations. Yet the most influential approach in the field–the synthesis of political process theory and resource mobilization advanced most prominently by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam—is barely open to considerations of religion (except perhaps as a source of networks for mobilization). It even defines national social movements so basically in terms of state institutions as to marginalize if not rule out incorporating religion into the center of concern. This pushes both the Nation of Islam and the Promisekeepers to the side, despite their scale and social impact. It even obscures the historical roots of the American social movement field which lie largely in the great 18 th

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The carrière d'E. Digby Baltzell as discussed by the authors evoque l'influence of Charles Wright Mills and Robert Lynd sur la perspective sociologique adoptee par Baltzells.
Abstract: L'A. evoque la carriere d'E. Digby Baltzell. Il considere que ce dernier doit etre reconnu commun un specialiste de la haute societe americaine. Il souligne l'influence de Charles Wright Mills et de Robert Lynd sur la perspective sociologique adoptee par Baltzell. Il rappelle que Baltzell comme un grand nombre de sociologues de sa generation a a la fois rejete le totalitarisme nazi et le totalitarisme communiste. Baltzell rejetait egalement l'idee d'une societe sans classes, sans stratification. L'A. montre que, dans le meme temps, Baltzell defendait une certaine egalite des chances. Pour lui, la haute societe anglo-saxonne devait etre a meme d'assimiler les nouveaux talents quel que soit leur sexe, leur race et leur religion.