Showing papers in "Synthese in 1967"

Truth and Meaning

Abstract: It is conceded by most philosophers of language, and recently even by some linguists, that a satisfactory theory of meaning must give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words. Unless such an account could be supplied for a particular language, it is argued, there would be no explaining the fact that we can learn the language: no explaining the fact that, on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules, we are prepared to produce and to understand any of a potential infinitude of sentences. I do not dispute these vague claims, in which I sense more than a kernel of truth.1 Instead I want to ask what it is for a theory to give an account of the kind adumbrated.

Logic as calculus and logic as language

Abstract: Answering Schroder’s criticisms of Begriffsschrift, Frege states that, unlike Boole’s, his logic is not a calculus ratiocinator, or not merely a calculus ratiocinator, but a lingua characterica.1 If we come to understand what Frege means by this opposition, we shall gain a useful insight into the history of logic.

New reasons for realism

Abstract: Both the psychology of perception and the philosophy of perception seem to show a new face when the process is considered at its own level, distinct from that of sensation. Unfamiliar conceptions in physics, anatomy, physiology, psychology, and phenomenology are required to clarify the separation and make it plausible. But there have been so many dead ends in the effort to solve the theoretical problems of perception that radical proposals may now be acceptable. Scientists are often more conservative than philosophers of science. I end, therefore, as I began, with a plea for help.

Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas: Summary of oral presentation

Abstract: I N T E R P R E T A T I O N A grammar consists of syntactic rules that generate certain underlying abstract objects, and rules of semantic and phonological interpretation that assign an intrinsic meaning and an ideal phonetic representation to these abstract objects. Concretely, consider the sentence 'The doctor examined John'. The phonetic form of this sentence depends on the intrinsic phonological character of its minimal items ('The', 'doctor', 'examine', 'past tense', 'John'), the bracketing of the sentence (that is, as [[[the] [doctor]] [[examined] [John]]]), and the categories to which the bracketed elements belong (that is, the categories 'Sentence', 'Noun-Phrase', 'Verb-Phrase', 'Verb', 'Noun', 'Determiner', in this case). We can define the 'surface structure' of an utterance as its labeled bracketing, where the brackets are assigned appropriate categorial labels from a fixed, universal set. It is transparent that grammatical relations (e.g., 'Subject-of', Object-of', etc.) can be defined in terms of such a labeled bracketing. With terms defined in this way, we can assert that there is very strong evidence that the phonetic form of a sentence is determined by its labeled bracketing by phonological rules that operate in accordance with certain very abstract but quite universal principles of ordering and organization. The meaning of the sentence 'the doctor examined John' is, evidently, determined from the meanings of its minimal items by certain general rules that make use of the grammatical relations expressed by the labeled

Mood and Language-Game

Abstract: Consider the following sentences: (1) You live here now. (2) Live (you) here now! (3) Do you live here now?

Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas

Abstract: I think that it will be useful to separate two issues in the discussion of our present topic — one is the issue of historical interpretation, namely, what in fact was the content of the classical doctrine of innate ideas, let us say, in Descartes and Leibniz; the second is the substantive issue, namely, in the light of the information presently available, what can we say about the prerequisites for the acquisition of knowledge — what can we postulate regarding the psychologically a priori principles that determine the character of learning and the nature of what is acquired.

The ‘Innateness Hypothesis’ and Explanatory Models in Linguistics

Abstract: The ‘innateness hypothesis’ (henceforth, the ‘I.H.’) is a daring — or apparently daring; it may be meaningless, in which case it is not daring — hypothesis proposed by Noam Chomsky. I owe a debt of gratitude to Chomsky for having repeatedly exposed me to the I.H.; I have relied heavily in what follows on oral communications from him; and I beg his pardon in advance if I misstate the I.H. in any detail, or misrepresent any of the arguments for it. In addition to relying upon oral communications from Chomsky, I have also relied upon Chomsky’s paper ‘Explanatory Models in Linguistics’, in which the I.H. plays a considerable role.

Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?

Abstract: In the series of lectures, entitled Sense and Sensibilia, which Mr. G. J. Warnock has reconstructed from J. L. Austin's manuscript notes, Austin makes a sharp and witty attack upon the theory of sense-data. The texts which he singles out for criticism are Professor H. H. Price's book on 'Perception', Mr. Warnock's study of Berkeley, and most of all my own Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. Though he says that he chose these books for their merits rather than their deficiences, he sets about my book especially in a rather scornful way. It may even be questioned whether he is always scrupulously fair. I am not, however, now concerned to vindicate the honour of my self of twenty-seven years ago. My reason for taking up the subject is that it is widely believed that the sense-datum theory succumbed to Austin's attack. The purpose of this essay is to see how far this belief is justified. The best way to achieve this wiU be to examine Austin's arguments in detail. I make them just seventeen in number and shall go through them very nearly in the order in which they occur in the book. As might be expected, they vary a good deal in their depth, and there is a certain amount of overlap, between them.

Conceptual Revolutions in Science

Abstract: By now, most analytical philosophers are accustomed to putting their thoughts about morals into a different box from their thoughts about science. By doing this, however, one may conceal the fact that, at the heart of both ethics and the philosophy of science, there lies a common problem — the problem of evaluation. Human conduct can be rated as acceptable or unacceptable, fruitful or misguided, can be approved of or judged inadequate. But so can human ideas, theories, explanations. And this is no simple play on words. In either case — whether moral or intellectual — we can inquire about the standards, criteria or other considerations involved in an evaluative appraisal, and about the bearing of those ‘considerations’ on the actual force and implications of the appraisal. So it is worth asking ourselves, from time to time, whether ethics and philosophy of science might not be more alike than they at present are.

Some problems in the geometry of visual perception

Abstract: In view of the long history of discussion about the nature of perception, both by philosophers and psychologists, it may seem foolhardy to propose to begin afresh with a general discussion. However, as we hope to show in this paper, many of the most fundamental problems about perception have not as yet been clearly settled and are just now receiving careful formulation. We believe that from a scientific standpoint the problems of perception are difficult, and we want to say at once that we do not propose to solve may of them here. Our purpose is mainly to set up a general model which we may use as a framework for discussion. In these general terms, we shall try to summarize a class of empirical observations about perception, organize some of the fundamental problems into sharply defined classes, and suggest one or two possible explanations. 1.1. Physical Space vs. Perceptual Space We shall, as our title suggests, limit ourselves to a discussion of visual perception, and also to those visual phenomena involving perception of geometrical characteristics as opposed to such things as color, texture, and the like, although many of our remarks are more generally applicable. Our discussion for the most part will deal with binocular vision, although several of our explanations, notably those in terms of eye movements, will be monocular in nature. To begin with, we shall distinguish between physical space and perceptual space, the space from which we draw our 'conscious' perceptions. For the latter we shall also use the phrases visual space or subjective visual space. It seems sensible to take as physical space ordinary three-dimensional Euclidean space. This space we denote by E3, or simply by E. (It is possible to argue about this choice of physical space.) For perceptual space, we propose no a priori structure of a general nature. Indeed, we shall try to study how one might infer the geometric

The Value of Perfect Information

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to assess the value of information of a certain type, in terms of its usefulness for decision making.

Comments on Stenius's ‘mood and language-game’

Abstract: In his extraordinarily clear and candid paper, Stenius concentrates on one problem: 'How is the modal element of language to be characterized semantically?' This is also the problem on which I will concentrate these remarks. However, the problem is fundamental and raises several im portant questions concerning the nature and function of language. This very way of posing the problem presupposes that one can distin guish two elements in language, one which is common to the different moods, the 'sentence-radical' as Stenius calls it, and a modal element. Not everybody would agree to this. As Stenius has pointed out himself in his book on Wittgenstein's Tractatus (p. 157), there is both in the Tractatus and among logical empiricists a tendency to consider language as fundamentally descriptive, without any modal element. However, there are good reasons for distinguishing between a sen tence-radical and a modal element. First, such a distinction seems natural, or at least prima facie plausible. Several philosophers have introduced it, for example Husserl, Sheffer, Lewis, and Hare. And there are also good arguments for such a distinction. Frege's writings contain a number of such arguments, which also, like Stenius's, throw light on the distinctive quality of the modal element. For example, Frege points out that although when one asserts an if-so statement, one asserts neither the antecedent nor the consequent, these must nevertheless be assumed to possess a truth value. Frege also mentions several other examples where a distinc tion between a sentence-radical and a modal element is welcome, as in connection with reductio ad absurdum arguments.1 It should be observed that these arguments and also the rest of what I will say, are independent of whether one accepts the picture theory of meaning. The picture theory shall therefore not take up a major part of this discussion. However, there are some linguistic expressions whose meaning is hard to account for by help of the picture theory, but which must nevertheless be considered as belonging to the sentence-radical. The truth-functional connectives have been given an interesting picture

On the Elementarity of Measurement in General Relativity: Toward a General Theory

Abstract: The evolution of theoretical physics, from the earliest studies in the Greek era to the present period, is characterized by one essential feature — an aim at generalization in the underlying bases for natural phenomena. When one takes to its logical extreme the premise which asserts the existence of the generalization that is sought, the conclusion is reached that all of the fundamental processes are, in fact, manifestations of a unified theory of the universe. The approach that will be taken in this lecture assumes that such a theory does indeed exist. It will be argued that if a logically consistent generalization were to be built from present day theories, then it must necessarily reject a part of their underlying premises. Nevertheless, it will be assumed that a reasonable direction to be taken in the construction of a general theory may indeed be guided by the mathematically consistent features of the earlier developed formulations which have yielded predictions that agree with a large group of facts. This would ensure, from the outset, that the newly constructed general theory will agree, in particular limits, with the successful predictions of the standard formalisms. In this way, the investigation that will be discussed attempts to build on the scientific knowledge that has been acquired in the previously developed theories.

Semantic and Pragmatic Characterizability of Linguistic Usage

Abstract: In order to be able to discuss Stenius's very suggestive contribution to this symposium, we seem called upon to bring a little more order into the variety of key notions employed by him, e.g. those of sentence, sen tence-radical, mood, modal element, semantic characterization of (the meaning of) a modal element, language-game, modal (semantic) rule, and so forth. We shall try to do so by taking as our point of departure two fairly simple artificial languages L? and L2, the vocabulary of which is in relevant respects similar to the one figuring in what Stenius calls the report-game and the combined game, respectively. Thus, Lx and L2 both has as 'descriptive' signs two one-place predicate constants 'P9 and 'Q9 as well as some finite (but large enough) number of individual constants 'at9, 'a2 ,...,'a9. Any sequence of the form Fa, where F is a predicate constant and a an individual one, is a sentence in Ll9 and a sentence-radical in L2. L2, but not Ll9 also contains the follow ing modal signs, or syntactic modal elements: T (the indicative sign, read as 'It is the case that'), '0' (the imperative sign, read as 'Let it be the case that'), and '?' (the Yss-No-interrogative sign, read as 'Is it the case that'). A sentence in L2 is then any sequence mFa, where m is a modal sign in L2 and Fa a sentence-radical in L2. In an obvious way L2-sentences may then be divided into indicative, imperative, and interrogative ones. As far as the syntax of Lx and L2 goes, these explanations will have to do for the moment. Next, we want to interpret Lt and L2 along the main lines indicated by Stenius. First, suppose we are given some non-empty domain of individuals D as our 'universe of discourse'. A valuation is a binary function F which, given D, assigns an individual in D to each individual constant and a subset of D to each predicate-constant, with the following restriction: V('Q9, D)=D?V('P9, D). In his 'language-games', Stenius chooses a particular domain of individuals consisting of squares in a flower-bed, which are assigned as denotations to individual constants; moreover, he obviously takes 'P9 and 'Q9 to denote complementary classes, or proper

Semantic sources of the concept of law

Abstract: The concept of law, despite its long ancestry, has given philosophers considerable trouble. A sign of strain has been that not infrequently it has given rise to a variety of metaphysical positions. I think that these difficulties are in part due to an insufficient grasp of the complexity of the background against which the idea of law has been formed; that there is a very tangled network of approaches differing widely from one another, belonging to quite different fields of man’s preoccupation with nature, often criss-crossing, and even colliding. As might be expected in such a case, the resulting definitions and notions do not necessarily agree; indeed, there may between them exist a positive conflict. Philosophers, in their guise as metaphysicians, try to lessen the conflict but often only achieve this at the cost of producing an air of paradox about their solutions.

Performatives and sentences verifiable by their use

Abstract: Lemmon's claim is an interesting one, for (1) avoids the concepts used by Austin in his discussions of performatives, concepts which themselves need further clarification. (For example, those of illocutionary force and speech acts.) However, I shall try to show that there is no simple way of interpreting (1) so that it is both broad enough to include performative sentences and narrow enough to exclude unwanted non-performative sentences. II

La Philosophie Géométrique de Henri Poincaré

Abstract: Le sujet, que je me propose de traiter, a un caractere historique. Je crains que, pour cette raison, il ne s’accorde mal avec les autres sujets traites dans ce colloque. On peut remarquer cependant qu’aussi E. W. Beth s’est vivement interesse a plusieurs questions historiques. En outre, la theorie conventionaliste de Poincare sur la nature des axiomes geometriques est encore discutee, en Europe par exemple par M. H. Freudenthal, en Amerique par M. A. Grunbaum. On n’est toujours pas d’accord sur le contenu et les merites de cette theorie. Il n’y a pas de doute qu’elle est toujours plus ou moins actuelle.

Logique et Théorie Physique

Abstract: Parmi les nombreuses questions de Philosophie des Sciences qui avaient retenu l’attention de Beth se trouve la question des rapports de la logique et des theories physiques; cette question a evolue d’une facon decisive a partir de 1930 a la suite de la formation des theories quantiques

Color concepts and dispositions

Abstract: What is it for a physical thing to be colored! Philosophical reflection about this question has had a long history, yet unlike reflection on most philosophical questions, this has led to a general agreement among philosophers about colors. Realistic accounts of color have been rejected in favor of some type of phenomenal account. In this paper I examine the main phenomenal account of color that has been put forth in this cen tury. My contention is that serious questions can be raised about the ability of any theory of this sort to account for the force of ordinary color explanations.

Remarques Sur La Théorie Intuitionniste Des Espaces Linéaires

Abstract: Faisons d’abord quelques remarques sur la theorie des espaces vectoriels sur un corps F. Nous designerons les elements de F par les lettres a, b, c,..., les vecteurs de l’espace V par x, y, z, u, ... .On sait que dans la definition de F entre essentiellement une relation d’ecartement # qui doit satisfaire aux axiomes suivants:

On methods in the analysis of speech perception

Abstract: Written as it is by one who was brought up in the tradition of phe nomenological linguistics but who has seen fit to assume the guise of an experimentalist, this article will reflect something of a struggle between the comprehensiveness of the former and the reductionism of the latter.1 In fact, it will be necessary to confine our attention to a rather narrow scope, viz. to the study of how acoustic events are handled by a per ceptual mechanism on their way to being interpreted as speech events. To make the investigation of the character of this mechanism feasible we will have to assume that the data at issue, the objects of our study, are certain to lend themselves also to some form of linguistic analysis. This certainty will remain in the background for the time being. Having made this distinction between phonetic and linguistic aspects of the material to be studied, we will first present some of the main features of the methods used in the analysis of speech perception proper. Later, we will return to a consideration of its repercussions for linguistic analysis.

Une HypothÈse Sur L’extension Des Relations Finies Et Sa Vérification Dans Certaines Classes ParticuliÈres

Abstract: La premiere partie de cet article (Paragraphes 1 a 4 inclus) est parue en traduction anglaise a The Theory of Models (Proceedings of the 1963 International Symposium at Berkeley, ed. by J. W. Addison, L. Henkin and A. Tarski), Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Amsterdam 1965, 96–106. Rappelons ses definitions et ses principaux resultats.