Showing papers in "The American Economic Review in 1968"

Особая экономика бюрократии (The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy)

Abstract: Экономическая наука не создала теории максимизирующего бюрократа. В настоящее время доминирующий подход к государственному управлению состоит в том, чтобы снабдить бюрократов, желающих по какой-либо причине работать эффективно, организационной структурой, информационной системой и анализом. Однако данный подход не развивает и явно не рассматривает как относящиеся к делу условия, при которых личные цели бюрократа согласуются с эффективностью бюрократии. В настоящее время, когда большая и все возрастающая часть экономической деятельности осуществляется в бюро, экономисты не сделали никакого значительного вклада в теорию, позволяющего дать ответы на следующие вопросы. Каковы отличительные характеристики бюрократии? Каковы основные составляющие теории бюрократии? Что конкретно максимизируют бюрократы и при каких внешних условиях? Каковы следствия максимизирующего поведения в данных условиях? Например, каков равновесный выпуск и бюджет отдельно взятого бюро для данных условий спроса и затрат? Каково влияние изменений в условиях спроса и затрат? Как сказывается бюрократическая организация экономической деятельности на благосостояние? Какие изменения в организации и структуре вознаграждения смогли бы повысить эффективность бюрократии? В данной статье представлена простая модель максимизирующего бюрократа и на основании этой модели сделана попытка дать ряд пробных ответов качественного характера на эти вопросы.

The peculiar economics of bureaucracy

Abstract: A SIMPLE MODEL IS PRESENTED OF THE MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT AND, BASED ON THIS MODEL, A SET OF TENTATIVE QUALITATIVE ANSWERS TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUREAUCRATICALLY PRODUCED GOODS AND SERVICES THE MODEL IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING TWO CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS: (1) BUREAUCRATS MAXIMIZE THE TOTAL BUDGET OF THEIR BUREAU; (2) BUREAUS EXCHANGE A SPECIFIC OUTPUT FOR A SPECIFIC BUDGET THE LATTER CHARACTERISTIC GIVES THE BUREAU THE SAME TYPE OF MARKET POWER AS A MONOPOLY IT IS SHOWN THAT THIS MODEL IMPLIES THAT THE BUREAU WILL PRODUCE A GREATER QUANTITY THAN THE PARETO-OPTIMAL LEVEL THE EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR A BUREAU ARE COMPARED WITH ALTERNATE FORMS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE BUREAU WILL PRODUCE A HIGHER LEVEL OF FACTOR SURPLUS THAN EITHER THE MONOPOLY OR COMPETITIVE ORGANIZATION, UNLESS THE BUREAU IS ALSO A MONOPSONIST HOWEVER, IN THIS MODEL, THE BUREAU WILL CREATE NO CONSUMER SURPLUS THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DEMAND AND COST CONDITIONS ARE EXAMINED SOME PRELIMINARY TESTS OF THE MODEL, ANALYTICAL EXTENSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ARE ALSO DISCUSSED /BPR/

An income-net worth approach to measuring economic welfare

Abstract: economic welfare, the single-dimensional, money-income measure so commonly used leaves much to be desired. The concern of this paper is with the development of an approach for measuring current economic welfare which is operationally feasible and broader in scope than the traditional money-income measure. The measure proposed is based on a combination of current income and current net worth (assets minus liabilities). These are made commensurable by converting net worth into an annuity value, which is added to current income. While this proposed measure stops well short of an "ideal" measure, we show that even this change leads to policy prescriptions rather different from those generated by the current income measure of economic welfare. I. The Measure The proposed measure rests on the assumption that current income and current net worth are both important determinants-although not the sole determinants-of the "economic position" of a consumer unit. A unit's economic well-being or economic position should be thought of as a function of the flow of services over which it has command. This flow depends importantly on the consumer unit's current income and

Optimal mechanisms for income transfers

Abstract: : The poor receive a sub-optimal amount of material goods through the natural economic processes of our society. Poor and non-poor alike seek to institute mechanisms that give something to the poor beyond what they get from the normal workings of the 'competitive' system. The fact that the non-poor share in this desire indicates that an externality is generated when the economic welfare of the poor is improved. On a collective basis, the non-poor are willing to pay for this externality. They sacrifice some of their income in support of redistributive programs that benefit the poor. In this paper we will not be concerned with moral or ethical values. We develop our analysis with the aid of a simple two-party model. One party is the representative poor man, the other the representative citizen. The representative citizen asks himself the central question of this essay. How should assistance programs to the poor be structured so as to maximize the utility function of the representative citizen. (Author)

"An Experiment with TIPS: A Computer-Aided Instructional System for Undergraduate Education"

Abstract: Computer-aided instruction, while admitted by many to have great teaching potential, has remained for most a phenomenon belonging to the twenty-first century. The presumed necessity of expensive machines and computers, wide-scale feasibility testing, and large quantities of scarce technical and instructional resources has been considered to relegate the day of practical, economical, and extensive use of computeraided instruction in the college classroom to the distant future. In this paper I report on a Teaching Information Processing System-TIPS for short-which applies computers to teaching in a manner which is not only economical and implementable-indeed, it has been utilized at the University of Wisconsin-but which also contributes to the effectiveness of the educational process itself. In what follows I shall present a description of the TIPS system and report the results of an experiment in which it was used in an economic principles course. I will conclude with several observations on the long-run potential of TlPS.

Simulation of transport policy alternatives for colombia

Abstract: A MACROECONOMIC AND TRANSPORT MODEL HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO EXPLORE THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE ECONOMY OF AN UNDERDEVELOPED NATION AND ITS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. THE MACROECONOMIC PORTION OF THE MODEL PRODUCES ANNUAL PROJECTIONS OF REGIONAL DEMANDS, PRODUCTION LEVELS, AND INCOMES. THE TRANSPORT SECTOR DETERMINES MARKET AREAS, DISTRIBUTION AND ROUTING OF THESE COMMODITY FLOWS, AND ASSIGNS THEM TO THE LINKS OF A NETWORK REPRESENTING THE INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORT FACILITIES EXISTING OR PROPOSED FOR THE COUNTRY OR REGION UNDER STUDY. THE COUNTRY OF COLOMBIA, SOUTH AMERICA WAS CHOSEN FOR EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE MODEL. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE MODEL IS USEFUL FROM BOTH A PRACTICAL AND A PEDAGOGICAL STANDPOINT. IN THE DISCUSSION, IT IS NOTED THAT THE CRUX OF THE MATTER MAY WELL BE IN THE DYNAMIC INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR AND THE REST OF THE ECONOMY. A PRINCIPAL FEATURE OF THIS MODEL IS JUST THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE ABOVE MODEL CANNOT HELP WITH SOME IMPORTANT CLASSES OF TRANSPORT QUESTIONS, BUT THAT THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF TRANSPORT PROBLEMS IN LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMIES FOR WHICH IT IS WELL SUITED. /BPR/