Showing papers in "The Journal of Buddhist Ethics in 2014"

Violence and Nonviolence in Buddhist Animal Ethics

Abstract: Introduction Regarding the treatment of animals, Buddhism is somewhat unique in that it advocates a position of total nonviolence. (2) This position is an extension of its general principle of nonviolence that is the foundation of Buddhist ethics. Buddhism advocates pacifism and completely rejects violence towards humans, animals, and sentient beings more generally. This position seems to be accepted among the vast majority of Buddhist sects and traditions. That Buddhism speaks in unison on this issue may be considered unusual given how various Buddhist creeds differ over so many issues, including such fundamental propositions as the existence or nonexistence of the self. (3) In this paper I will examine why Buddhism takes animal nonviolence so seriously. Ultimately, I will conclude that it is derived from a combination of prudence and genuine sympathy for the animal. Fear of a bad rebirth is a central reason for nonviolence towards the animal world. However, this is governed by a concern over animalkind's unhappy existence. As will become clear, these two motives are dependent such that prudence encourages genuine concern. It is helpful to contextualize these issues historically by looking at the antecedent religious and philosophical traditions. Consequently, we will need to look at the pre-Buddhist orthodox religion that has its roots in the Vedic and Brahmanical textual tradition. This tradition now significantly influences and, in fact, underpins modern Hinduism. Early Buddhism rejected the way the Vedic tradition treated animals and this strong stance influenced all subsequent Buddhist traditions. The Vedic tradition had a sense of reverence towards many animals precisely because of its propensity to engage in animal blood sacrifice. In contrast, Buddhists pitied animals instead of venerating them. Animal Welfare in Vedic India The killing of animals in the Vedic religious tradition was a complicated affair governed by rules of ritual propriety. Some animals were more sacred than others, although, in principle, most animals could be killed and eaten subject to certain ritual stipulations. One of the most important corpus of texts in the orthodox Indian tradition are the Vedas, and of particular importance is the Rgveda, a text that is foundational for modern Hinduism and the Vedic religion. At the heart of this religion is a rich culture of ritual that centers on the veneration and slaughter of animals. The Rgveda endorses the importance of animal sacrifice, especially the horse. The process and procedure by which the horse is sacrificed is described in some detail (1.162:1), but, in general, the animal is slaughtered in a ritually pure way using a method that can only be carried out by royalty (Flood 44). The horse is regarded with great respect and the hymn of the horse sacrifice is even directed specifically towards the animal to be killed: "Whatever runs off your body when it has been placed on the spit and roasted by the fire, let it not lie in the earth or on the grass, but let it be given to the gods who long for it" (1.162: 11). After the slaughter, the animal is then consumed in a great feast. In general, there is a sense that animate life has special significance in the Vedic world as evidenced by the Samaveda which describes how having an animal body is a "gift" since it provides the soul with a vehicle in which one can be mobile (15: 2, 351). This can be contrasted with the later Buddhist traditions, which are more inclined to regard existence as an animal as an affliction rather than a blessing. These early views on the treatment of animals are expanded upon in later orthodox legal texts. These legal texts are known as the Dharmasastra. Arguably one of the most important of these sastric texts is the Manusmrti (sometimes translated as The Law Code of Manu). Dumont argues that this text dates from at least the third century CE (52; Flood 56). …

Karma and Female Birth (1)

Abstract: Introduction In her study of the position of women in Thai Buddhism, Kabilsingh (31) remarks, "it is frequently said, for example, that 'women were born from their bad karma' ... many women are convinced that they carry a heavy load of negative karma due to the simple fact of their gender." As a result of this, according to Kabilsingh (16) "Thai women seem to accept their suppression without complaint. Exploitation, whether physical, legal, or cultural, has been justified on the basis of karma, and has therefore been accepted as the expression of [a] religious principle." (3) Testimony to this notion can be found in a 14th-century inscription from Sukhotai, where the queen mother formulates an aspiration that the merit of her founding a monastery may conduce to her rebirth as a male. (4) The wording of her aspiration conveys the impression that her urge to become a man is so strong that she imagines having become one already, and is now looking back at a previous existence as a female. (5) A rationale for this type of aspiration finds expression in a passage in the commentary on the Sutta-nipata, the Paramatthajotika, which reports an aspiration made by a woman to be reborn as a man. In her aspiration, she notes how disgusting it is to be a woman-even the daughter of a wheel-turning monarch will be under the control of others-and therefore aspires to become a male. (6) In other words, her aspiration to become a male is motivated by the wish to escape the restraints she experiences in a patriarchal society. The story then continues by reporting that she was indeed able to overcome the fruition of the previous evil deed (papakamma) that had caused her to be born as a woman and with the power of her present meritorious deed and aspiration was eventually reborn as a male devaputta. Change of Sex As the tale from the Paramatthajotika shows, the notion that being female is related to bad karma is found in the Pali commentarial tradition. Another example is the commentary on the Dhammapada, (7) which reports the tale of a householder by the name of Soreyya. The story goes that, on seeing the beautiful skin colour of the bhikkhu Mahakaccayana, Soreyya had the wish to have him as his wife or else that his wife might have a similar bodily hue. This impure thought caused him to change into a woman right on the spot. (8) The tale continues with his experiences as a woman until at some point he offers a meal to Mahakaccayana and asks to be forgiven, whereupon he becomes male again. In this story, a bad deed results in becoming a woman, and a good deed in turn enables becoming a man. In the course of narrating this tale, the Dhammapada commentary makes the following statement: Men who have transgressed with the wives of others will after death be tormented for many hundreds of thousands of years in hell; on coming back to human existence they will for 100 rebirths undergo birth as a woman. (9) Women who have made merit by giving, etc., and who have discarded the wish for birth as a woman with the mental resolve: "May this merit of ours lead to the obtaining of rebirth as a man," will after death obtain rebirth as a man. (10) This mode of presentation appears to follow a general tendency in ancient Indian literature, where in the words of Brown ("Change" 6) "a change from woman to man is always desirable while the reverse is always undesirable." (11) The Pali Vinaya reports rulings promulgated by the Buddha when a bhikkhu reportedly changed into a female and a bhikkhum became a male. (12) Unlike the Dhammapada commentary, however, the Vinaya does not give a value judgment for these two cases. Instead, both are simply reported as a matter of fact, without a distinction between the case of a male changing to female or vice versa. That is, in the canonical account there is no indication that for the bhikkhu to become a female is the result of bad karma, or that for a bhikkhuni to change into a male is the result of good karma. …

The Spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China: Charisma, Money, Enlightenment

Abstract: The Spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China: Charisma, Money, Enlightenment. By Dan Smyer Yu. London: Routledge, 2012, xi + 222 pages, ISBN 978-0-415-57532-4 (cloth), $138.00. According to Dan Smyer Yu's informative new book, the "marketing era" of Tibetan Buddhism has begun (4). Charismatic Tibetan lamas and urban intellectuals, in concert with upper-class Chinese devotees and Western enthusiasts, are working to revitalize Tibetan religion and culture in contemporary socialist China, against the backdrop of economic globalization and religious commercialization. While Western observers typically lament the irrevocable loss of traditional Tibetan cultural institutions under the weight of modern Chinese economic expansion, both Tibetan Buddhists and Han Chinese converts are taking full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the growing market economy to recast Tibetan Buddhism as antidote to the "spiritual crisis" of post-Maoist China. This is the story told in Smyer Yu's The Spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China, which focuses on the revivalist efforts of Chinese and Tibetan adepts of the Tibetan Buddhist Nyingma sect in and around the Kham and Amdo regions of Sichuan and Qinghai provinces, respectively. Based on extensive fieldwork in these regions as well as in several urban Chinese centers, Smyer Yu examines the new forms of Tibetan Buddhism that have developed through and within the growing counter-culture of Sino-Tibetan cyberspace. Smyer Yu illustrates how this Tibetan Buddhist revival is "trans-cultural, cross-regional, tech-savvy, conversant with modern science and familiar with the economic system" (5). And on this last count especially, he emphasizes how global market dynamics have both contributed to the growth of Tibetan Buddhism in China and led to the commodification and thus corruption of Tibetan Buddhist charisma. After an introductory chapter that sets this mise-en-scene of contemporary Tibetan Buddhism, Chapters two and three focus largely on the Weberian concept of "charisma" and how it is complicated by the case studies that Smyer Yu examines. In Weber's classic formulation, charismatic authority derives from the unique force of personality displayed by individual leaders, both religious and secular, which draws crowds of followers and forms the basis for the development of traditions and institutions. With the rise of these institutions, then, the personal charisma of their long-departed founders becomes "routinized"--calcified into laws and dogmas that lead to the predominance of "traditional" and "legal" forms of authority. Smyer Yu argues that in several respects the case of contemporary Tibetan Buddhism contradicts these classic Weberian theories. In Chapter two, "Tulkus, genuine charisma, and its transmissible interiority in Kham and Amdo," Smyer Yu emphasizes how Tibetan charisma functions as a "collective religio-spiritual phenomenon" (30). For one, given that the spiritual power of tulkus (reincarnate lamas) derives not from their individual personalities but from their claimed lines of reincarnation, Smyer Yu argues that Weber's charisma needs modification to account for the trans-personal, karmic trajectory of tulku authority. Secondly, integrating an avowedly Durkheimian perspective, Smyer Yu describes Tibetan charisma as a "collective representation" of the "totemic bond" between lamas and their followers (36). In other words, a lama's charismatic persona is (in part) created and reinforced by his community of followers, as exemplified in the case of Sangye Tsering Rinpoche, an eminent Nyingma tulku of the Smyoshil Monastery in eastern Kham. This fact, Smyer Yu maintains, gives cause to re-evaluate Weber's model of "routinization" as a degradation of pure charisma into petrified institutional structures. Instead, these very structures often "guarantee the renewal of genuine Buddhist charisma," as "charismatic education in the Tibetan case is a rejuvenation rather than a process of demise" (38). …

Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will: Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Beyond

Abstract: Overview and Disclaimer There are few passages, if any, in canonical or authoritative Buddhist texts that explicitly address anything remotely resembling the philosophical problem of free will. This series of four articles is intended as an in-depth guide to the secondary literature on Buddhism and free will, a fairly small and relatively recent body of writings that began roughly within the past half century. Although these four articles appear in this journal, the intended audience is not only scholars and students of Buddhist ethics, but also Western philosophers who for the most part have only recently begun to take Buddhism seriously and to try to mine it for ideas, arguments, theories, and alternative ways of knowing. This dual audience complicates matters. On the one hand, many Buddhist scholars are not only unfamiliar with the Western philosophical problem of free will and its many iterations in the hands of soft versus hard determinists, libertarians, compatibilists, incompatibilists, and semi-compatibilists, but are also unfamiliar with what other Buddhist scholars have written about free will. (I will explain these terms below.) Even much of the work of Buddhist ethicists betrays varying degrees of unfamiliarity with relevant doctrinal distinctions pertaining to divergent forms of Buddhism as well as to divergent theoretical perspectives within Western philosophy. On the other hand, Western philosophers who wish to explore what Buddhists think about free will might be significantly unfamiliar with basic Buddhist ideas such as Dharma, dependent origination, and the twelve-linked chain, or classic examples such as the chariot and its parts, not to mention doctrinal differences within the various traditions and schools of Buddhist thought. (I will explain these ideas briefly below.) Some of the work I will review in this article, for example, by Gier and Kjellberg, seems to presuppose an extensive background in Buddhist thought. This is despite the fact that it is contained in an edited collection of otherwise entirely Western analytic philosophical articles on free will, presumably targeting a Western audience. I wrote this series of articles in order to aid scholars on both sides of the Western/Buddhist divide in their attempts to understand the many often confusing if not conflicting claims to be found within the extant secondary literature. Review of Early- and Middle-period Scholarship My analysis of early-period and middle-period scholarship, in the earlier articles in this series, (3) supports the idea that the Buddha's teaching is mental-freedom-oriented and rests upon his doctrine of pratityasamutpada (dependent origination), the general doctrine that every event originates in dependence on multiple simultaneous and/or previous conditions, and the particular application of this generalization to the nidanas (twelve causal links in the chain of suffering). As the Buddha stated, "When that is present, this comes to be; on the arising of that, this arises. When that is absent, this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this ceases" (MN I 262 ff.; SN II 28). Note that, on its face, this description does not assert that causation is anything more substantive than a conditional relationship: when this condition is satisfied, that condition occurs. For ease of reference, let's call this minimalist description the Buddha's "conditionality formula." Determinism presupposes that a metaphysically maximalist nomological (lawful) necessity--what Jay Garfield describes as the "cement of the universe" (4)--serves as the truth condition for any instantiations of the conditionality formula. Thus, few Buddhists would be willing to equate minimalistic conditionality with maximalistic determinism; Charles Goodman appears to be one noteworthy exception. (5) By way of objection, however, it does not follow that just because instantiations of the minimalist conditionality formula are true that there is no maximalist nomological necessity that accounts for their truth. …

"We Love Our Nuns": Affective Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Bhikkhuni Revival

Abstract: Introduction (2) The Sri Lankan Theravada Buddhist order of bhikkhunis, or fully ordained nuns, was revived in the late 1990s after a gap of circa 1000 years. Since 1998 bhikkhuni ordination ceremonies occur regularly in the country. (3) Estimates on the number of nuns in the new bhikkhuni order range between 1000 and 2000. The rapid growth of the bhikkhuni order is, perhaps, surprising given the fact that the Sri Lankan government and the bhikkhu sangha have not yet formally accepted the revival. Consequently, although it is legal to hold bhikkhuni ordinations and establish bhikkhuni temples, these temples receive no government funding, making it especially hard for nuns to get a monastic education. There are, however, a number of prominent bhikkhus advocating on behalf of bhikkhunis. (4) Thus formal recognition of the bhikkhuni revival may well come in the not-too-distant future. Until then bhikkhunis rely on lay support for all of their needs. As Janet Gyatso has observed, "the real fate of the new female [Sri Lankan bhikkhuni] order is being decided by the lay community" (5). It is precisely because laity support their local bhikkhuni temples--often with great enthusiasm--that the Sri Lankan bhikkhuni order continues to grow. This paper examines lay responses to the Sri Lankan bhikkhuni revival, focusing particular attention on the presence of strong affective relationships between laity and nuns. Affective ties between laity and nuns became the focus of my research while I lived in a rural farming village for five months toward the end of a longer two-year period of ethnographic research in Sri Lanka. I am especially concerned in this paper with the use of the word "love" (Sinhala: adaraya, adare) (5) to describe lay-nun relationships in this village. Laity told me that they "loved" their nuns. Just what laity mean by the word "love" and what this can tell us about the dynamics of the Sri Lankan bhikkhuni revival is the subject of this paper. Lay responses to the Sri Lankan bhikkhuni revival have not received much attention. Public discourse on the revival on the part of scholars, activists, government officials, and monastic authorities still centers primarily on questions of the revival's scriptural validity. According to Buddhist monastic regulations (vinaya) new bhikkhunls must be ordained by a quorum of both bhikkhus and bhikkhunls. In the absence of a living Theravada bhikkhuni lineage, South Korean and Taiwanese bhikkhunls, who follow Mahayana rather than Theravada Buddhism, made up the quorums that ordained the first Sri Lankan bhikkhunls. These Sri Lankan bhikkhunls were ordained at international ceremonies held in India by South Korean (1996) and Taiwanese (1998) organizations. Opponents of the bhikkhuni revival thus argue that all Sri Lankan nuns are really Mahayana nuns and should not receive formal recognition by the government or monastic authorities. (6) However much questions of scriptural validity matter to those engaged in public debate over the revival, my research indicates that lay patrons of bhikkhuni temples have very different concerns. Their primary concern is whether or not they can get their religious needs met at their local bhikkhuni temple, not whether the South Korean and Taiwanese ordination ceremonies conformed to Theravada monastic regulations. Given the importance of the Sri Lankan bhikkhuni revival to bhikkhuni movements worldwide, I was surprised to find that Sri Lankan laity are often unfamiliar with the history of their own bhikkhuni revival. Indeed unless they have personal contact with a bhikkhuni temple, they may not even be aware that a revival has taken place. How is this possible? An alternative female renunciant order of ten-precept nuns (dasasilmata) was founded in 1905 at a time when there was still insufficient support for a bhikkhuni revival in Sri Lanka. Ten-precept nuns are technically not members of the Sri Lankan Theravada Buddhist sangha, although they live celibate monastic lives. …

Bhikkhave and Bhikkhu as Gender-Inclusive Terminology in Early Buddhist Texts

Abstract: Introduction The terms bhikkhave and bhikkhu, and particularly their appearance in Pali Buddhist literature appear, on the surface, to be terminology that excludes women. The vocative address to monks (bhikkhave and its equivalents) that occurs so often in sutta literature appears to be indicating that the teachings being proffered are addressed exclusively to male monastics. Similarly, the use of the normative bhikkhu (and its equivalents), in expositions relating to the teaching, again appears to indicate that monks are the sole and only concern of those offering the teaching. However, in both cases, such an understanding of each term is problematic. In this article, we discuss each of these terms, and look a little more closely at each, suggesting that in fact neither term should be considered to be exclusive language; that is to say, in neither case do the terms function as indicators that the address or the detail of the teaching is solely for monks. The term bhikkhave should be considered instead to be a form of--what we are calling--an idiomatic plural vocative; that is, a vocative that is intended to capture a broader audience than is implied by the actual term itself. Similarly, bhikkhu is intended as an umbrella nominative, to mean "monk or nun" and sometimes as well "laity" and should be read as generic. We first discuss the term bhikkhave, then bhikkhu, and following that we also include a note on the term arhanti. 1. Bhikkhave in Pali The vocative address to monks appears in two ways in the Pali canon--bhikkhave and bhikkhavo, with bhikkhave being the most common form. (3) Past scholars, such as Bechert, developed theories in relation to the use of the two, i.e. why one form rather than another was used--but today, with our current understanding of oral and manuscript traditions, the most obvious reason for the two ways of declining the plural vocative is simply that the texts that comprise the Pali canon are layered texts that came into their extant form over time. (4) The following is a typical example of how the vocative address appears, from the Samyutta-nikaya: Bhikkhus, whatever is not yours, abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness. And what is it, Bhikkhus, that is not yours? Bhikkhus, form is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness ... (5) This is how it appears in the majority of texts of the Pali canon, although not in the versified texts such as the Dhammapada, Theratherigatha and Sutta-nipata. This translation is Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation, but with all instances of the vocative reinstated. The term appears much more often than Bhikkhu Bodhi translates it. For example on the Ariyapariyesana-sutta of the Majjhima-nikaya, Bhikkhu Bodhi translates it only twelve times, whereas it appears in the sutta in the extant PTS Pali edition 121 times. Also, in the Sakka-samyutta of the Samyutta-nikaya, it appears 105 number of times in the PTS edition, but only sixty times in Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation. If we compare these numbers with some parallel suttas from other traditions, some of the differences in number are striking. In the Sakka-samyutta parallel in the shorter Samyukta-agama, translated by Marcus Bingenheimer, the term appears only eight times, compared to 105 in the PTS edition. In the (first half of the) Ariyapariyesana-sutta parallel in the Chinese Madhyama-agama, translated by Analayo ("Brahma's"), the term appears only twice, compared to 121 times in the full PTS edition. However, the differences are not always so great. In the Marasamyukta from the shorter Samyukta-agama, the term does not appear at all, and in the Pali only seventeen times, as many of the sections are just the Buddha and Mara in dialogue. Similarly, in other suttas in which the Buddha dialogues with just one or two people, or groups who are not his followers, there are no occurrences of the term in either the Pali or Chinese. …

Rethinking the Precept of Not Taking Money in Contemporary Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese Buddhist Nunneries

Abstract: According to monastic disciplinary texts, Buddhist monastic members are prohibited from accepting “gold and silver,” and arguably, by extension, any type of money. This rule has given rise to much debate, in the past as well as in the present, particularly between Mahāyāna and Theravāda Buddhist communities. The article explores the results of my multiple-case qualitative study of eleven monastic institutions in Taiwan and Mainland China, and reveals a hitherto under-theorized conflict between Vinaya rules and the bodhisattva ideal, as well as a diversity of opinions on the applicability of the rule against money handling as it has been shaped by socio-cultural contexts, including nuns’ adaptation to the laity’s ethos.

Experimental Buddhism: Innovation and Activism in Contemporary Japan

Abstract: Experimental Buddhism: Innovation and Activism in Contemporary Japan. By John K. Nelson. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013, 292 pages, ISBN: 9780824838980 (paperback), $32.00. In Japan, Buddhism is popularly perceived as an outdated tradition fixated on mortuary rites. This poor image, together with the post-war success of new religious movements, has resulted in contemporary Japanese Buddhism being a much-understudied field. In recent years, however, we have witnessed a shift in Buddhist Studies' traditional inclination toward textual studies, as more scholars have turned their attention to studying traditional Japanese Buddhism as a living religion (Covell, Borup, Rowe). John Nelson's study, reviewed here, is another important contribution to our understanding of the complex interactions between Buddhist tradition and contemporary Japanese society. Based on a great variety of sources, such as personal interviews, websites, news reports, and commercials, this study presents a rich and fascinating description of contemporary Japanese Buddhism. The strength of Nelson's publication lies in the depth of his descriptions, as well as in what he refers to as a "flexible combination" of different methodologies (xix). At the same time, the ethnography is presented in an easily comprehensible language, and in an appealing journalistic style that gives the reader a feeling of being where the action is. Nelson follows several other scholars in the study of contemporary religion who emphasize lived religion, which is religion as experienced, conceptualized, and even invented by the individual (McGuire). Accordingly, the book emphasizes the role played by individuals, rather than that of institutions, in constructing contemporary Buddhist reality in Japan. As its subtitle suggests, Experimental Buddhism focuses on innovative attempts by members of the Buddhist clergy to revitalize their tradition, thereby making it relevant and influential in contemporary Japanese society. Chapter one opens with a story of a 400-year-old Pure Land temple located in the heart of Kyoto. The temple's alleged deliberate burning, and the attempts to reconstruct it, highlights various tensions that exist between long-established Buddhist institutes and rapid social, cultural, and economic changes. Nelson's basic thesis, presented in this chapter, is that the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are characterized by unique historical and social circumstances that differ dramatically from anything Buddhism has ever encountered (10). These include rapid social changes brought about by external forces, shifting religious beliefs, and new configurations of the self. Nelson especially emphasizes globalization and personal choice as unique features in what he defines as the "late modern era" (27). Against the above backdrop, Nelson presents a gloomy picture of Buddhist institutions that largely fail to adjust themselves to the great economical, political, and conceptual challenges posed by late modernity. More specifically, he believes that Buddhism's future development lies in the hands of individual priests who are willing to risk experimenting with their traditional roles. Their "experimental Buddhism" is presented as a pattern of thought and action that can be characterized by five major features: (1) global position; (2) individualism; (3) great creativity; (4) everyday life as the source of the Buddhist values; and (5) reciprocity with society (23). As can be seen, Nelson regards experimental Buddhism as both a theoretical framework to examine recent developments in Japanese Buddhism, as well as a recommended course of action for Buddhists to follow. Chapter two provides a general background on contemporary Japanese Buddhism. The first section is perhaps one of the best, and it is definitely one of the shortest summaries of the history of Buddhism in Japan. Students and readers who are new to this field will find this section most helpful. …

Female Monastic Healing and Midwifery: A View from the Vinaya Tradition

Abstract: The provision of community-based medical care, the building and running of medical clinics on monastery grounds, and large-scale fundraising for the construction of hospitals are features of the engaged Buddhism characteristic of post-colonial period Buddhist revivals in Asia. To give just one example, Buddhist organizations founded and run by Buddhist nuns in Taiwan typically interpret Buddhism in a social-activist vein. Influenced by an important reformist line of Chinese Buddhist thought called "Buddhism for the human realm" (renjian fojiao) (DeVido 93-101), organizations like the Ciji Compassion-Relief Foundation and the Luminary Buddhist Institute consider the relief of illness and promotion of health to be a part of their Buddhist mandate. The ordained women involved in these organizations are contemporary examples of what appears to be a longstanding propensity of female monastics to engage in health related activities. In fact, in some ways, their interpretation of Buddhist monastic ethics closely resembles that of the ancient nuns whose behavior is said to have prompted injunctions against monastics practicing medicine among the laity during the Buddha's time. The monastic lawyers who formulated the various classical Indian Buddhist Vinaya collections actively promoted the care of the sick within monastery walls and treated illness as a topic of great importance and relevance for monks and nuns. In the Mahavihara Vinaya (usually called the Pali Vinaya), the Buddha clearly ordains that monks should nurse one another in sickness because they no longer have biological family to fulfill that function (Mahavagga 8.28; Horner 4.432; Kitagawa 11). (2) In his article, "Byo" ("Illness"), a classic study on Buddhist medicine, Paul Demieville draws our attention to an additional set of concerns qualifying the monastic practice of medicine. While noting the overall compatibility between the Buddhist ethic of compassion and the healing arts, as well as the fondness of Buddhist teachers for medical metaphors, Demieville remarks upon the cautious attitude of monastic lawyers with respect to monks and nuns practicing medicine among the laity (35-37). Indeed, the canonical sources discourage monks from making their medical skills generally available to the laity, with some carefully drawn exceptions. Gregory Schopen, for instance, points out a Vinaya passage concerning a "shaven-headed householder." This passage seems to describe an accepted practice in which ailing and presumably childless householders begin the process of becoming monks in order to receive monastic nursing. It is implied that, in exchange, they are to will their worldly possessions to the monastery ("Good Monk" 10-11). The scenario described by Schopen can be seen as a refinement of the more general rule forbidding the ordination of persons suffering from grave illness (Demieville 36). (3) The Samantapasadika, the most important commentary on the Mahavihara Vinaya, specifies a variety of laypeople to whom a monk may legally distribute medicines. These include: his mother, his father, their servants, domestic servants of the monastic community, his elder and younger brothers, his sisters, his various aunts and uncles, and children pledged to the monastery but not yet initiated. Even medical advice cannot be directly distributed to lay people who fall outside of these certain categories. (4) Scholars of Buddhist medicine agree that monastics are mandated to heal and nurse one another but should provide medical care only to certain lay people and to others only indirectly. A closer examination of Vinaya sources shows that this ambivalence is gendered in interesting ways. The Vinaya lawyers regulated nuns's involvement in the healing arts and other types of service with special care, suggesting that nuns were more likely than monks to take up community work, especially the work of healing. Demieville notes, "in the treatises of monastic discipline, this interdiction [against providing medical care to the laity] seems to apply to nuns more than to monks" (36). …

The Role of Deterrence in Buddhist Peace-Building

Abstract: I want to consider a strategy for peace that is not commonly associated with Buddhism, namely military deterrence. So far as I am aware, this topic has received little attention from students of Buddhism and peace. My argument in this article will be that deterrence is not ruled out by Buddhism's pacifist teachings, and appears to be accepted even in early Buddhism as a morally acceptable strategy for the avoidance of conflict. My claim essentially comes down to this: Buddhism does not teach that the threat of the use of force for defensive purposes by state authorities is in conflict with the Dharma. Note that I am speaking here of the threat of the use of force rather than the actual use of force. I am not concerned to defend the actual use of military force at this time; although I believe a case can be made for this, it would require a longer discussion and is not my aim in this article. Of course, there are many schools of Buddhism and many strands of Buddhist teachings. Discordant voices speak to us from diverse sources like the Pali canon, historical chronicles like the Mahavamsa, Mahayana sutras and numerous commentaries. Deciding which is the authentic voice of Buddhism is problematic. Using Mahayana sources such as the Upayakausalyasutra, the Satyakaparivarta, the Suvarnaprabhasa Sutra and the Mahaparinirvana Sutra--to name but a few--it is relatively easy to show that not only deterrence but the outright use of violent force is sanctioned by influential Buddhist scriptures. Here, however, I will restrict myself to the evidence of the Pali canon, which is generally regarded as representing a consistently pacifist body of literature. As Peter Harvey puts it, "Within the Theravada, no canonical text can be found justifying violence" (255). Accordingly, the Pali Canon will present the strongest test of my thesis that a policy of military deterrence is not in conflict with the teachings of early Buddhism. I I define deterrence as a military strategy used by state authorities with the aim of dissuading an adversary from undertaking hostile action. The reference to military strategy and state authorities is to distinguish deterrence by lawful authorities acting for the common good from the actions of groups who act outside the law and against the public interest, such as terrorists and criminal gangs. Deterrence will normally be for defensive purposes as a means of keeping the peace, and this is primarily the context I have in mind here (call this "defensive deterrence"); but it could also form part of a more aggressive policy, for example when used by an invading power to ensure compliance and deter retaliation (call this "offensive deterrence"). In all cases, successful deterrence convinces its target not to engage in hostile action by raising the stakes to the point where the price of aggressive action becomes too high. Deterrence is thus an attempt to achieve an objective without the use of force, and additionally can provide an opportunity for negotiation and reconciliation. In some respects deterrence is the mirror image of what Gene Sharp has termed "nonviolent coercion." Sharp is described by Sallie King as "arguably the foremost theoretician of nonviolent power in the world today" and "an established friend of both the Burmese and Tibetan Engaged Buddhists" (105). Nonviolent coercion is the third of four scenarios Sharp sketches by which political change can occur through non-violent means. It differs from deterrence in that nonviolent coercion is typically used against the state in campaigns of civil disobedience. To this extent it is arguably more aggressive in that it involves intentionally crippling the state by cutting off resources it needs to function. Deterrence, by contrast, normally aims at the preservation of the status quo and need not involve an intention to cause damage or harm. If this analysis is correct it follows that a strategy of defensive deterrence is, in principle at least, in keeping with the values of Engaged Buddhism. …

Attitudes arising from Buddhist nurture in Britain

Abstract: Focus groups comprised of seventy-five self-identifying Buddhist teenagers in Britain were asked to discuss value domains that previous research has identified to be of special interest to Buddhists. These included personal well-being, the nature of faith, the law of karma, monasticism, meditation, home shrines, filial piety, generosity, not killing animals, and alcohol use. The findings suggest that some attitudes held by teenagers were conscious and intrinsically nurtured ("worldview") while others involved social constructs ("ideologies"). The study finds that parents and the Sangha are mainly responsible for shaping "ideological" patterns in young Buddhists whereas informal nurture by "immersion" (possibly facilitated by caregivers) may be responsible for "worldview" patterns.

Buddhist Funeral Cultures of Southeast Asia and China

Abstract: Buddhist Funeral Cultures of Southeast Asia, and China. Edited by Paul Williams and Patrice Ladwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, ISBN: 9781107003880 (paperback), $39.99. This rich volume of essays is a product of the University of Bristol's Centre for Buddhist Studies research project Buddhist Death Rituals in Southeast Asia and China (2007-2011), directed by Paul Williams. The editors' introduction is followed by eleven contributions that focus on the presentation and analysis of empirical material. In general methodological terms, the volume's center of gravity lies clearly within the realm of ethnographically-based studies--roughly half of the contributors are anthropologists. These are complemented by three or four contributions of a more strictly art-historical, historical, or textual character, all of which however address issues of religious change/continuity or diffusion/adaptation that are quite close to similar issues addressed in some of the more ethnographic pieces. This general orientation is one of the present volume's points of originality, which sets it apart from previous publications, such as the volumes edited by Cuevas and Stone, or Stone and Walter, that are based more centrally on methodological approaches from the history of religions. One might at first be tempted to assume that some papers are thematically rather similar and invite close comparative investigation; in reality, the themes, cultural contexts, and approaches are on the whole so diverse that the issue of comparison ultimately proves very challenging. This diversity is well rendered by the book's title: what are investigated here are not only standard funerary procedures, but Buddhist funeral cultures more broadly. These comprise standard funerary rituals for the "good" dead (with highly specific variants for dead monks, for instance) and special rituals for the "bad" dead (a particularly rich theme in Asian cultures, as we know from the studies edited by Baptandier), but also annual communal rituals or festivals that aim at addressing still unresolved (or unsatisfactorily resolved) death matters-- potentially dangerous wandering ghosts who have not received funerary rites, or who have not found the passage to rebirth or to the afterworld, as well as the suffering denizens of hell. Beyond these various ritual units that are taken as wholes for the analysis, certain themes or dimensions of the funerary practices are also taken as objects of study: the recurrent theme of the pamsukula shroud or rag-robe (already the object of a well-known study by Bizot) or, for instance, the textual dimension of the rituals. The authors and editors have added to the volume a highly commendable set of links pointing to the occurrence of similar themes in other contributions within the volume. However, the discussion--apart from perhaps in the introduction--only very rarely suggests how exactly bringing together these materials could generate new insights. For lack of space, the present review will only briefly discuss the eleven primary contributions in turn--it will be impossible to properly acknowledge the merits of each--and will return to the introduction and the volume as a whole at the end. The first seven contributions focus (very broadly speaking) on Southeast Asian/Theravada contexts, and the last four on Chinese/Mahayana ones, the first of these bridging the divide rather elegantly, as we will see. Rita Langer's chapter, "Chanting as 'bricolage technique': a comparison of South and Southeast Asian funeral recitation," opens with the striking observation: "There is no ancient prescriptive text outlining in detail how a Theravada funeral is to be conducted" (21). Langer's original contribution is to examine the twin dimensions of ritual structure and inclusion of Pali textual elements across a number of well-documented performances in Sri Lankan, Burmese, Thai and Lao contexts. Both dimensions seemingly exhibit a certain degree of continuity, such that a set of highly recurrent "core elements," as opposed to more variable ones, may be identified. …

Towards a dialogue between Buddhist social theory and "affect studies" on the ethico-political significance of mindfulness

Abstract: Introduction The earliest mention of Buddhist social theory can be traced to Ken Jones's writings on socially-engaged Buddhism, and the idea has also been developed by others (Hattam), most notably David Loy (Awakening; Money). Buddhist social theory can be regarded as a sub-genre within contemporary Buddhist scholarship, particularly the emergent discourse called Buddhist critical-constructive reflection (Makransky) which cross-fertilizes Buddhist teachings with the research and pedagogical programs of the secular academy and beyond to develop new interfaces between academia, Buddhism, and society. Buddhist critical-constructive reflection is an adaptive methodology that can be developed in multiple ways--for example, via dialogical exchanges between psychotherapy and meditative techniques, Christian and Buddhist palliative care, neuroscientific and Buddhist understandings of consciousness, and so forth. In the case of Buddhist social theory, Buddhist doctrinal teachings would enter into conversation with the research of the humanities and social sciences. Simply put, Buddhist social theory attempts to account for the problems facing the human estate from the "self" end of the self-society continuum, whereas conventional approaches to critical social theory have largely focused on social structures. A principal analytical objective of Buddhist social theory is to investigate how personal adjustments in ethical conduct via spiritual self-cultivation might support and precipitate sociopolitical transformations. Thus, it plays an important role in Engaged Buddhism, which, following Think Sangha's suggestion, could be conceptualized as a "trialectic" of scholarly inquiry, spiritual practice, and social activism (quoted in Hattam 200). But while various initiatives of Engaged Buddhism have grown in recent times such that discussions about socially-engaged Buddhist activities have become commonplace in both scholarly and popular discourse, "Buddhist social or critical theory" as such has not been widely adopted as a subject of study (if only amongst Buddhist practitioner-scholars) in the way "critical theory" has. (2) This article thus formulates some hypotheses to further Buddhist social/critical theory. (3) In particular, it identifies ways to update Loy's proposals by staging an encounter between Buddhist understandings and the turn in humanities and social sciences scholarship of the past decade or so towards "affect studies." I first present an overview of Buddhist social theory to identify unexplored pathways of inquiry and show how contestations over the ethico-political significance of mindfulness represent a key area of concern. I then outline the principal objectives of affect studies to elucidate their relevance to Buddhist social theory, before identifying some topics of conversation between Buddhism and affect studies. These topics will be drawn from political theorist William Connolly's A World of Becoming (2011), which can be read as an indexical discourse of the broader "affective turn." Given the exploratory nature of this discussion, the arguments raised below will necessarily be suggestive rather than comprehensive. What it performs is an analogous exercise (since it is not strictly speaking "inter-religious") of "cross-reading" as proposed by Richard Kearney in his reflections on the hermeneutics of the religious stranger, where the aim is not some "unitary fusion" of disparate traditions but "mutual disclosure and enhancement" (50). (4) This dialogical exchange would require Buddhist participants to be receptive to the views of their non-Buddhist counterparts, whose disciplinary-specific terminology may not initially appear familiar or relevant. Such an ethos of intellectual hospitality is in keeping with the inter-religious/traditional friendliness and ecumenical spirit of Engaged Buddhism (King 56-66). Intellectual hospitality is vital if there is to be new discoveries between Engaged Buddhism and the Western social justice tradition, both of which, as Loy underscores, need each other to sustain their vitality into the future ("Buddhism and the West"). …

Escaping the Inescapable: Changes in Buddhist Karma

Abstract: Introduction This article presents a study of the way the doctrine of karma changes over time. The particular feature of the karma doctrine that is explored is the inevitability of experiencing the consequences of actions. Part I of this article recaps some points from "Did King Ajatasattu Confess to the Buddha, and did the Buddha Forgive Him?" (Attwood Ajatasattu) and establishes that karma was absolutely inescapable during the period represented in the Pali Nikayas, which I take to cover the last half millennium B.C.E., and perhaps a century into the Common Era. Inescapability of karma remained a feature of Theravada thought through at least to Buddhaghosa in the Fifth century C.E. Part II deals with the period from about 1000 B.C.E. to 500 B.C.E. and looks at the precedents of Buddhist karma, particularly the changes to Brahmanical eschatology that emerge in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. Drawing on "Possible Iranian Origins of Sakyas and Aspects of Buddhism" (Attwood), Part II will outline a possible prehistory for karma and will explore the conjecture that Zoroastrian ideas influenced the development of the Buddhist theory of karma. Part II will also try to show why karma had to be inevitable to have moral force. Part III will look at how karma changed in India during the first millennia C.E.. Developments in karma theory can be seen in the Sramanyaphala Sutra, the Siksasamuccaya of Santideva, and in the Sarvatathagata-tattvasamgraha (STTS). The Sramanyaphala is an early Buddhist text that has been edited by and/or for a Mahayana milieu. The Siksasamuccaya, on the other hand, is firmly rooted in the Mahayana and does not cite Early Buddhist sources, though it does show some possible hints of tantric influence. STTS represents a mature Tantric Buddhist attitude to karma. The neutralizing of bad karma, that is, the sidestepping of inevitability, becomes an increasingly important theme. The nature and role of ethics in this changed worldview is different from the ethos of the early texts. Over the course of this survey of Buddhist ideas, a major change in the conception of karma is seen. This article suggests that a perennial problem for Buddhists may have been influential in bringing about the change: the problem of how the unawakened can escape their own negative conditioning. Part I: The Inevitability of Karma In the Samannaphala Sutta King Ajatasattu is troubled by his conscience and goes to meet the Buddha. After hearing a Dharma discourse, he confesses that he killed his father, King Bimbisara, who was also the Buddha's patron. (2) The Buddha accepts this news, and acknowledges that the King intends to return to lawfulness (yathadhammam patikaroti). However, when Ajatasattu leaves, the Buddha says to the bhikkhus, "the king is wounded (khata), and done for (upahata)" (D i.86). Had Ajatasattu not killed his father, the text tells us, he would have attained the eye of wisdom (dhammacakkhu) after hearing the discourse. Patricide is one the five actions which result in immediate rebirth in hell after death. The committer of patricide is said to be atekiccha ("incurable" or "unpardonable") and the discourse could have no effect on him (C.f. A iii.146). Buddhaghosa's commentary records that after his death, Ajatasattu goes to the Hell of Copper Kettles (DA 1.237). It is a central feature of karma in the Pali texts that the consequences of actions manifest as rebirth in one or other of the realms in which one can be reborn. In the Culakammavibhanga Sutta, for instance, using a stock phrase, the fruits of actions are experienced "with the breaking up of the body after death" (kayassa bheda param marana M iii.203) as a happy or miserable destination (sugati/duggati). However, the moral force of karma would be weakened if it did not allow for actions to ripen in this life as well. The technical term for this is: "actions to be experienced in this life" (kammam ditthadhammavedaniyam). …

Blossoms of the Dharma: The Contribution of Western Nuns in Transforming Gender Bias in Tibetan Buddhism

Abstract: Gender Imbalance in Tibetan Buddhism In recent years, a number of Western (European, North and South American, and Australian) women have chosen to become Tibetan Buddhist nuns. Among them is the notable British-born Jetsunma Tenzin Palmo, renowned for her twelve years of solitary meditation in a Himalayan cave and, more so, for her pointed statement disclosing her intention to attain enlightenment in a female body (Palmo, in Mackenzie 58). Presently the most senior Tibetan Buddhist nun, Tenzin Palmo was the second Western woman to undergo novice ordination as a Tibetan Buddhist nun (Mackenzie 43). (3) She founded and is presently the abbess of a Tibetan Buddhist nunnery in India. Tenzin Palmo's vow to attain enlightenment in a female body remains an extraordinary and inspiring statement for Buddhist women. Her bold declaration is almost synonymous to saying that she intends to become a female Buddha--possibly, from a Buddhist perspective, the ultimate achievement in women's liberation (5, 7). Her statement is all the more significant because she is a Western woman in a traditionally Asian nuns' community. However, earlier in her career Tenzin Palmo experienced just how restricting the world of Buddhist monasticism could be for women when she joined her root guru's monastery as a twenty-one year old novice nun. She was the only nun amongst eighty monks and was not allowed to participate in any of their daily activities. She could only acquire the most basic teachings, while her male counterparts, the monks, engaged in serious Buddhist dialectics and philosophical studies (Palmo Reflections 14). The monastery she inhabited was visibly male dominated, as all the lamas, the lineage holders, and the tulkus were men. Although the twentieth century witnessed the emancipation of women in almost all areas of life, there were no female role models in Tibetan Buddhism for Tenzin Palmo to emulate (Mackenzie 6). Palmo felt that the "male voice" of Tibetan Buddhism was alienating and did not offer nurturing spaces for female practitioners (Palmo Heart 149). Furthermore, she noted that misogyny was encouraged through certain meditational visualizations which were used to cultivate aversion toward women's bodies, and which led to the view that women constitute a danger to monks since it is the women's bodies that are impure rather than those of the monks. She felt that the monks fail to see that their own impurity, rather than the presence of women in their monastic abode, is the real danger (Palmo Reflections 71). Palmo argues that there appears to have been institutionalized bias against women from the inception of Buddhism (71). The council of five hundred arhats that was held after the historical Buddha passed away did not document attendance by any women. She thinks that the Buddha gave teachings to women but very few of the teachings were recorded due to the exclusion of women from the council (71). Centuries later, when the canon was committed to writing, men's privileged education enabled them to read and write; therefore, they had the monopoly in choosing whose records to preserve for future generations (Haas 5, 9, 10). Consequently, the teachings and commentaries were recited and recorded from the male point of view and women were increasingly perceived as dangerous and threatening to the status of monks and to authority within the ecclesiastical hierarchy (Palmo Reflections 71). Rita Gross asserts that male power in Tibetan Buddhism is maintained through the practice of discovering and installing successive reincarnations of great lamas (Patriarchy 88). No leaders in Tibetan Buddhism are more respected and honored, or possess more power and influence, than these incarnations, particularly those who are heads of major lineages and prominent monasteries. It is generally taken for granted that each successive incarnation will be a male incarnation (89). Although accomplished women practitioners existed throughout Tibetan Buddhist history, they did not enjoy the institutional support of their male colleagues. …

Bhikkhuni Academy at Manelwatta Temple: A Case of Cross-Tradition Exchange

Abstract: Introduction On November 13, 2011, fifty bhikkhunis from different parts of Sri Lanka joined a three-month training program at Manwelwatta Temple near Kelaniya. It was the first of many training programs for Buddhist nuns to come. This article will use the case study of Buddhist nuns' training programs to examine the revival of the bhikkhuni sangha in Sri Lanka and the role of cross-tradition exchange among devotees of different Buddhist traditions in Asia. By "cross-tradition" I am referring to different Buddhist traditions such as, in this case, the Theravada tradition in Sri Lanka and the Mahayana Chinese tradition in Taiwan. The term "crosscultural" is avoided in order to highlight the issues of monastic lineage and orthodoxy (2) in this exchange. I began my research for this article by re-reading Nami Kim's essay on global feminist theology. She points out that Asian women are often homogenized as a single category and that the difference between Asian women is frequently ignored in (Western) feminist discourse (Kim). Her essay inspired me while I was a graduate student in London, but somehow the inspiration seems to have been lost in the re-reading. It took me some time to realize that now, back in Asia, the difference is a reality and I do not need an academic discourse to notice it. I now want less to raise awareness about the differences between Asian women than to explore how to bridge the differences. In this article I discuss a case study about bridging such differences between Asian women, an educational project for Buddhist nuns that involves agencies from Taiwan and Sri Lanka. The formal name of this project, as it appears on the nuns's certificate, is "Religious and Social Competencies Improvement Diploma Course for Bhikkhunis, International Academy of Buddhist Studies." However, Taiwanese volunteers involved in this project simply refer to it as the "Bhikkhuni Academy," for it is hoped that a permanent, formal academy for bhikkhunis will be eventually established on the temple ground. The term "bhikkhuni" rather than "Buddhist nun" is used to show the underlying intention of Taiwanese volunteers and donors who do not question the validity of re-establishing the bhikkhuni tradition in Sri Lanka. For convenience, I will also refer this project as the "Bhikkhuni Academy." Religious Women's Agency A. K. Sen defines "agency" as "what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important" (quoted in Ibrahim and Alkire 384). Anagol defines it as "conscious, goaldriven activities by [agents] that embrace the possibility of change; put more simply, it is purposeful action designed to have an impact" (615). In this article, the label "agency" is adopted for the actions taken by the three groups of actors in the founding of the Bhikkhuni Academy, because they share and take actions toward the common goal of enhancing educational opportunities for Buddhist nuns in Sri Lanka. Gender has a complicated history with agency. Men's agency is usually assumed to be proactive and takes the central role in the process of change, while women's agency is marginalized and/or valued for being submissive. R. C. Gardiner writes: For women, however, agency was disabled and dispersed according to social roles. ... The situation was clearly more complicated than one of active men oppressing passive women. There were passive men and active women, anomalies that the dominant ideologies attempted to dislodge, in part, by assigning agency and passivity differential moral value according to gender: male activity was good and passivity bad; female passivity was good and activity bad, and deviations from this model were "perverse." (3) Although Gardiner may have had Western culture in mind when she wrote this, the same critique is applicable to the topic of this article. The proactive and feminist-oriented actions of the nuns of Daxingshan Nunnery represent the Taiwanese women's agency mentioned in this article. …

Battlefield Dharma: American Buddhists in American Wars

Abstract: Introduction Today's American Buddhist soldiers are comparatively few in number and spread far and wide throughout the United States and the world. Most of those deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan have returned home. Others serve on ships, or on bases in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. American Buddhist military chaplains are also few, but growing. As of this writing, a number of candidates for Buddhist military chaplaincy are training at institutions such as the University of the West, and soon, at Naropa University. Buddhist Churches of America, the U.S. Department of Defense's official endorsing agency for Buddhist military chaplains, reports that four to five new candidates have applied for endorsement (Endo). Once commissioned, Buddhist military chaplains are most often sent to minister to U.S. Buddhist soldiers where they are concentrated, such as the West Coast, bases or ships in Asia, or in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Internet has emerged as an important space in which these soldiers--including the chaplains--can communicate with one another. They rely on the Internet to advertise events (such as Vesak celebrations in Iraq) share news (like the commissioning of a new Buddhist chaplain) or links of common interest. However, by far the most common, and, I argue, significant conversations have to do with the ethical issues American Buddhist soldiers face before, during, and after combat. When such questions arise, soldiers tend to turn to each other for help. However, it is difficult to have conversations about being both an American soldier and a Buddhist when fellow Buddhist soldiers are far-flung across the world. A cyber-sangha of American Buddhist soldiers has thus emerged to address this real need. This new cyber-sangha is best understood as an ethical space: a space that today's American Buddhist soldiers value because it provides them with an outlet to think through difficult ethical questions that cannot always be resolved on the battlefield. Moreover, this emergent cyber-sangha of American Buddhist soldiers signifies the arrival of an important new feature on the landscape of American Buddhism. As Buddhism integrates ever more deeply into American life and collective consciousness, it forms links with American conceptions of national security, military values, and America's role in the world. As I will show below, many American Buddhist soldiers, including chaplains, draw on multiple Buddhist texts and historical episodes to demonstrate the compatibility of Buddhism with the career of soldiering, American military values of honor, duty, and sacrifice, and the defense of American freedoms, especially freedom of religion. When viewed in the larger social and cultural context of American Buddhism, the development of this new cyber-sangha of American Buddhist soldiers represents a new generation's answer to the predominantly anti-war Buddhism of 1960s and 1970s that continues to define Buddhism in the public imagination. Who are American Buddhist Soldiers? My category of "American Buddhist soldiers" includes Buddhist chaplains and current and former non-chaplain soldiers who self-identify as Buddhist. Empirical information on the number of Buddhists in the U.S. Armed Forces (USAF) is difficult to come by, but all roads seem to lead to a 2009 Defense Department study entitled "Pay Grade and Religion of Active Duty Personnel by Service" (U.S. Department of Defense). According to that report, the numbers of self-identified Buddhists in the USAF in 2009 were: Army: 1,942 Navy: 1,112 Air Force: 1,343 Marines: 928 Total: 5,325 There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of these numbers per se. Alone, however, they do not tell us very much, only how many soldiers among those surveyed chose "Buddhist" as their religion. No further questions were asked; therefore there is no data about diversity of tradition, gender, age, ethnicity, years of military service, combat engagement, or anything else. …

Compassion in Schopenhauer and Santideva

Abstract: In this article I focus on compassion as presented by its strongest advocate, the Madhyamaka philosopher-monk Santideva, and cover four main areas: (1) previous general comparisons between Schopenhauer and Buddhism; (2) the specific relevant ethics of Santideva; (3) the specific relevant ethics of Schopenhauer; and (4) comparisons between Schopenhauer's and Santideva's moral philosophy. This will lead to my conclusion that, in a detailed treatment of ethics, the two are not compatible. General Comparisons Schopenhauer's philosophy has been compared to Indian thought (both Hindu and Buddhist) for some time. (2) There is an enormous variety of opinion and conclusion in this area. For example, Copleston and Kishnan have seen Schopenhauer's metaphysics as sharing only superficial features with Buddhism, whereas Muses and Dauer have seen it as the closest philosophy in the West to that of the Mahayana. Nanajivako thinks that Schopenhauer is comparable in certain areas to Theravadin Buddhism and in others to Tibetan Mahayana. Peter Abelsen seems to suggest that all comparisons are flawed and that Schopenhauer is not compatible with Mahayana or non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism; Nicholls specifically disagrees with Abelsen's view and offers a general comparison with the essential teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism. Welbon concentrates on Schopenhauer's interpretation of nirvana; Halbfass broadly finds similarities in Schopenhauer to "Indian" ideas; and Conze believes that Schopenhauer's work bears "numerous, and almost miraculous, coincidences with the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy" (222). In fact Conze, rather enthusiastically, claims that "[i]t is only on two points that he [Schopenhauer] differs from Buddhism" (223). (3) Schopenhauer himself, rather than simply stating that his philosophy and Buddhism are comparable, gives some limited examples of where he thinks the similarities lie. For example, he is aware (by WWR2 in 1844) of the Four Noble Truths: [In Buddhism] ... all improvement, conversion, and salvation to be hoped for from this world of suffering, from this Samsara, proceed from the knowledge of the four fundamental truths: (1) dolor, (2) doloris ortus, (3) doloris interitus, (4) octopartita via ad doloris sedationem (4) (WWR2 Payne 623) These truths, of course, are common to all Buddhist schools and cannot be taken as anything more than evidence that Schopenhauer had a general acquaintance with Buddhism. Even by the time he wrote WWR2 it is still highly doubtful, in my view, that he would have known of the subtle differences between the major schools of Buddhism which later scholarship has afforded and it is therefore very difficult to ascertain whether or not he knew there were different schools; for example, he 3 4 tends to refer to Buddhism as it existed geographically (in Burma, Ceylon, China, Japan and Tibet) but it is not at all clear that he had a good grasp of the differences. (5) He is aware of the Perfection of Wisdom (prajuaparamita), and although (in this context) he mentions the Mahayana, there is no clear evidence that he knew what made it distinct from non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism or even if he knew that Buddhism was anything other than Mahayana even in Burma and Ceylon. In fact, he mentions the prajnaparamita as though it were generally Buddhist rather than specifically Mahayana Buddhist: ... to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is--nothing ... . This is also the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists, the "beyond all knowledge," in other words, the point where subject and object no longer exist. See I. J. Schmidt, Ueber das Mahajana und Pradschna-Paramita. (WWR1 Payne 412) By the time he wrote WWR2 twenty six years later, he does not seem to have advanced his knowledge of the idea or the school from which it comes, nor does he mention that it is related to the Noble Eightfold Path (of which he knows by this time too; see WWR2 Payne 623), nor does he mention it in context with the other five Perfections (paramitas) of bodhisattvas. …

Cruel Theory/Sublime Practice: Toward a Revaluation of Buddhism

Abstract: Cruel Theory/Sublime Practice: Toward a Revaluation of Buddhism. By Glenn Wallis, Tom Pepper, and Matthias Steingass. Roskilde, Denmark: EyeCorner Press, 2013, 211 pages, ISBN 978-87-92633-23-1 (paperback), $29.95. In Cruel Theory/Sublime Practice: Toward a Revaluation of Buddhism, Glenn Wallis, Matthias Steingass, and Tom Pepper suspect quiescent and supernatural states. They reject what they term "x-buddhisms" as adjectival labels that proliferate to distinguish various schools of Buddhism. They promote a radical practice grounded in liberating socially engaged agents, who are committed to intellectual rigor, ideological application, and political confrontation. Expanding ideas discussed at the Speculative Non-Buddhism online project, they deny world-transcendence as a possibility for Buddhists or any sentient beings. Following a brief preface from Wallis, the book comprises three sections, meant to complement each other but written independently by these three collaborators at the online project. The first section, which Tom Pepper titles "The Radical Buddhist Subject and the Sublime Aesthetics of Truth," affirms a collective mind outside the individual brain, with communal aims allied with radical politics to overthrow capitalism. Wallis and Pepper advocate a vanguard of liberated subjects revitalized by their encounter with a "truth-event" of a conceptual breakthrough into existential freedom that they conjecture may have arrived with (or has been attributed to) the historical Buddha. The middle portion, "Speculative Non-Buddhism: X-Buddhist Hallucination and its Decimation," incorporates Wallis' survey of his project as a means to the end of replacing Buddhist convention with a theoretically grounded, rigorously formulated, densely articulated, and radical subversion of the status quo. Finally, Steingass in a chapter on "Control" critiques the counter-cultural credulity given to reactionary "x-buddhisms." Likely readers for this project will overlap with those who have welcomed or denounced its online inspiration. This book may appeal to those curious about interdisciplinary theoretical discussions of Buddhist and progressive concepts, but who are also disenchanted with current forms of Buddhism. Wallis' iconoclastic stance, advanced into an advocacy of communism by Pepper, demands that a reader must dismiss "x-buddhist" pieties. Readers immersed in philosophy, political theory, psychology, popular culture, sociology, and literary criticism will find many familiar and some eclectic references taken from the European intellectual tradition. These fields intersect with Wallis' familiarity with Pali and Sanskrit texts in the original. This exacting analysis demands concentration. Cruelty, applied by Wallis as exemplified by Antonin Artaud's theater, unnerves the practitioner, and a reader uninformed about "non-buddhism" may enter a similar bewilderment. These three authors expect their audience to look terms up, to study their online project, and to do supplemental reading if they are unfamiliar with theories or texts. Out of this regimen, the trio expects that a practitioner, invigorated by theory, will revive as an informed and radicalized subject. Wallis's precis about this book's individually authored chapters refuses consistency or coherence. Less an editor than a compiler, he instigates the debate continued by his two colleagues. Tom Pepper rejects an "ultimate cosmopolitan anti-intellectual aesthetic practice" which constitutes most of Western Buddhism. In the book's first chapter, "The Radical Buddhist Subject and the Sublime Aesthetics of Truth," Pepper equates postmodernism with "sophisticated anti-intellectualism" (22). Given Pepper is a literature professor, I pondered (fresh from reviewing Thomas Pynchon's recent novel Bleeding Edge) if erudite evocations of power and control within Pynchon's works or, for example, Roberto Bolano's 2666, Don DeLillo's Libra, Haruki Murakami's 1Q84, or Jose Saramago's allegories and chronicles deserved this tacit dismissal as "anti-intellectual" for their own sophisticated postmodernism. …

A Review of the Religion of Falun Gong

Abstract: The Religion of Falun Gong. By Benjamin Penny. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012, xiii + 262 pages, ISBN: 9780226655017 (cloth), $50.00. There is little doubt that Benjamin Penny's careful and detailed analysis of the religious aspects of Falun Gong will become required reading for anyone exploring this particular organization, and should be widely read by those with an interest in contemporary China and new and alternative spiritualities in general. Though, as he notes, the classification of the movement as a religion is far from straightforward--both its own adherents and the Chinese authorities would not term it a "religion"--he shows that it is imbued with a deep religiosity that means examining it as religion is not illegitimate. The book proceeds through six chapters that seek to examine the main aspects of the rise, development, and ideology of the Falun Gong movement. Penny does this with far more detail and precision than is done in much other literature on the subject, and I found a number of my own understandings improved or corrected convincingly and authoritatively. To go through the chapters, first is "What is Falun Gong?," which provides as background for the reader an impressive overview of both existing literature and Penny's own research. Chapter two, "The History of Falun Gong, 1992-99," explores the movement from its beginnings until the fateful showdown with the Chinese authorities. The next chapter, "The Lives of Master Li," looks at the biography of the founder, Li Hongzhi, and discusses the way he is presented and understood within his own writings and by the movement's participants. Penny shows that Li operates as a charismatic leader and has taken on quite cosmic proportions in the movement's understanding. Chapter four, "Spiritual Anatomy, Cosmos, and History," explores various aspects of the belief system and cosmology of Falun Gong. Here, and throughout, an invaluable service provided by this book is in the analysis of Falun Gong not simply as a set of teachings but as a developing and evolving movement, showing especially how the various understandings and presentations of ideas and concepts have changed since 1999. Chapters five and six may to some degree be considered together as they deal with "Cultivation" and "Steps to Consummation," or the practices and notions of spiritual/religious transformation that are believed to occur in Falun Gong. Throughout the text, Penny's grounding as a historian of Chinese religion is revealed in the way he dissects the movement's reliance upon previous religious systems, notably Buddhism, and as he demonstrates how Li has changed and reshaped the concepts and terms that were taken from this heritage. Penny also notes the ways that Western ideas have shaped the beliefs and presentations of Falun Gong, and how Li's exposure to American culture may have facilitated this. The final section, "Epilogue: Transformations," further expands upon the notion of the evolution of the movement. One area I would have liked the author to develop further is the question of what it means to call Falun Gong a religion in relation to scholarly debates around the meaning of this word. As is widely known what is branded and classified as a religion is to some degree culturally determined, and this is very much true in China. Though this is explained, a more analytic discussion related especially to wider disputes within Religious Studies as to whether religion is even a legitimate category of academic discourse would be useful. Penny's text fits into this discussion in a very useful way because it shows the flaws in the scholarship that argues that we should abandon the term "religion." Rather, to some degree, I would suggest, Penny shows that religion is a necessary category if we are to make sense of Falun Gong, which is not simply a therapeutic Qigong tradition, nor some specifically Chinese heterodox sect/evil cult. This is not to say that "religion" as a concept is not without its problems and that commonplace descriptions derived from a Christian narrative can be misleading, but more nuanced scholarly discourse around the term would, I believe, allow us to suggest that Falun Gong fits neatly alongside other phenomena we label in this way and that it provides a useful analytic category in such situations. …

Buddhism and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Compassion

Abstract: Introduction A claim to intellectual property rights (IPRs) allows a period in which the rights holder is entitled to a monopoly on the use of the property and in which he/she can gain monetary returns. International commerce has resulted in claims of intellectual property rights in nearly every country around the world. However, these claims are frequently controversial. Defenders typically argue that IPRs are necessary as an incentive for creative work and innovation that can be beneficial to the world. Critics argue that by holding a monopoly, the rights holder can create an unjust situation in which the patented product carries an unusually high price in the market. When the product is a necessity, such as life-saving medicine, those who are in need of the product might not be able to afford it. The monopolistic nature of IPR claims, then, can become a source of inequality and injustice. The controversies created by the use and enforcement of IPRs in various fields point to the need to explore the very foundation of the concept of IP. In this paper, I will consider how Buddhist ethics might regard the problem. My basic question is: How could the concept of IP be modified into an ethical one? A related question is: How might concepts available from Buddhism have a role to play in such modification? These are very complex questions. Here I merely hope to provide a general outline for the further development of a theory based on Buddhist philosophy. I argue that the notion of compassion (karuna) is central to answering these questions. Compassion is the desire to alleviate the suffering of others and acting to bring this about, so long as this is possible. Hence the holder of an IPR is said to be compassionate when she sees the suffering borne by her fellow human beings and, realizing that the intellectual property to which she is entitled can alleviate that suffering, acts accordingly. Here "compassion" is not only a term that denotes the subjective feeling of one who is compassionate, but also the objective and concrete actions that the compassionate perform to act out these feelings. I further argue that she should act in this manner because this would be beneficial to everyone in the long run, including the rights holder herself. Buddhism and the Concept of Property Rights A central teaching of the Buddha is that in order to achieve the final goal of liberation, a practitioner must learn how to eliminate ego grasping. Ego grasping consists of thinking in terms of "me" and "mine." The two are always intertwined. Without the "me" there can be no "mine," and vice versa. Thus, from the perspective of this central teaching it may seem that the Buddha has a negative attitude toward property--for property is always the "mine" of somebody. It would further seem that to achieve the goal of nibbana, one must relinquish all property, not taking anything as belonging to "me" (nor thinking in terms of a "me" to begin with). On the surface, the idea that one must let go of one's property might seem to be a teaching that recognizes no personal property at all. The Buddha's teaching to his followers that one should abandon grasping according to "me" and "mine" could be regarded as advocating a kind of utopian regime where everybody lives together peacefully without any concept of personal property rights. However, the Buddha did not intend to start a social or a political revolution. Although he advises his students to let go of attachment to personal property, he nowhere advocates any change in the political and legal structure of the society in which he happened to find himself. Furthermore, in the Vinaya, the second Defeat (parajika) rule emphatically states that monks who take what does not belong to them and which costs more than five masakas will be expelled from the Order, never to return. We do not know exactly how much a masaka was worth, but we do know that it was enough for a thief who stole property worth more than that to be imprisoned, banished or executed (DK). …

A Review of the Range of the Bodhisattva: A Mahayana Sutra

Abstract: The Range of the Bodhisattva: A Mahayana Sutra. Trans. Lozang Jamspal. New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2011, ISBN 978-1935011071 (cloth), $42.00. This sutra is a superb example of Mahayana literature with a finely crafted, coherent, and self-conscious narrative structure, which includes the extraordinary characterization of its main protagonist as a non-Buddhist nirgrantha. It has been the center of a number of recent studies that focus on its instructions for the compassionate conduct of warfare, corporal punishment, and torture. However, this should not distract us from the general literary quality of the text and its bearing on a wider range of interests, such as the ekayana doctrine, the perfections, pure lands, skillful means, the perception of heterodox traditions, and the cult of the book. Since this is a review for the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, I will focus on the ethical content of the translation. A great deal is at stake in the interpretation of the Buddhist ethics of violence, both for historical interpretation and current Buddhist communities engulfed in conflict. In the "Series Editor's Preface," Robert Thurman writes that the sutra "provides an important corrective to the popular misconception that Buddhist principles of nonviolence are naive and impractical" (ix). The exaggeration of Buddhist pacifism has led to a wide variety of distortions. For scholars, the view that Buddhist thought was somehow incompatible with power politics or relatively unable to support state violence, particularly in comparison with the robust eroticization of violence in Saivite contexts, has supported the impression that Buddhism failed to survive in India because of its pacifist ethics. [This is not an argument to be casually dismissed, but it is one that should be balanced by a consideration of the content of this sutra and other sources that we too often ignore.] It was earlier argued by Hindu nationalists that the ethics of Buddhism and Jainism had weakened India to invaders and colonialists. Today, it is a popular idea among young Tibetan refugees that Buddhist pacifism is responsible for the loss of their homeland. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, whose pacifism has a great deal to do with Tolstoy and Gandhi, is misread as typically Buddhist, when in fact he is quite extraordinary. The power of the Western assumption that Buddhism is unconditionally pacifist, a concept attractive to the colonized cultures on which it projected moral superiority, obstructs Buddhists who are trying to sort out their ethics in violent contemporary situations throughout the Buddhist world. I have been told many times, when seeking the help of superb native scholars in finding and translating Buddhist narratives on violence, that such passages cannot possibly exist. Scholarship in this area has often been met by hostility and incredulity. Many recent works on the Buddhist ethics of violence present themselves as exposes of the "dark side" of Buddhism, as if we should be surprised by the normal humanity of Buddhist peoples. Certainly Buddhists, like all peoples, often fail to live up to their highest ideals, but too often it is their failure to satisfy as a template for Western fantasies of pacifism that is the real source of disappointment, not their own sacred traditions, which are far more nuanced and complex. Textual sources that support violence are often dismissed as apocryphal, allegorical, obscure, or limited to certain schools or tantric influences, echoed in Thurman's honest expression of reluctance in accepting that this sutra goes as far as it does. This further supports the notion that Buddhist violence is inconsistent with its ideology. Violent Buddhists, even when their violence is a long-term function of monastic institutions, are too easily regarded as in bad faith with their tradition or the subjects of false consciousness. This sutra offers sophisticated practical thought on violence, arguing that compassionate internal governance and benevolent international relations enhance political security and prosperity. …

Buddhist Practice as Play: A Virtue Ethical View

Abstract: "Only what is fruitful is true" (Goethe, Legacy). (3) Introduction For more than thirty years a debate has been going on about which Western ethical theory is most suited to Buddhist ethics. Many good books and articles have been written on this subject. Highlights are Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, which makes a strong case for virtue ethics, and Goodman's Consequences of Compassion, which argues for a form of consequentialism. It is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the hermeneutical aspects of the matter. I think that the point of this debate is that by putting the Buddhist tradition in the context of a theory like virtue ethics or consequentialism, questions are asked of it that were never asked before. In this way, connections and correspondences within Buddhist ethics itself come to the fore that were implicitly there but never quite visible. This increases our understanding of Buddhist ethics. I want to contribute to this greater understanding of Buddhist ethics by engaging in this debate. I will do so by presenting a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhist ethics. The notion of praxis/practice as it was given by Aristotle and further elaborated on by Alasdair MacIntyre will be the main focus of my interpretation. I will continue on the path of Keown, and try to expand and deepen it; however, in my view, virtue ethics should be seen as depending less on its Aristotelian roots than in Keown's interpretation. While remaining in debt to Aristotle's formal notions, virtue ethics has taken many other valuable forms. My concern is not to which ethical theory Buddhist ethics "belongs" according to this or that text or body of texts. I think this can never be definitively established as if it were a matter of fact, because it is not. It is a hermeneutical matter, and as such there is more than just one way to look at it. As Goethe notes with the words I quoted above, the truth of a certain interpretation is not determined by whether or not it corresponds to the "facts" but by whether it is fruitful. My purpose is to show that a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhist ethics is possible and that it is a fruitful interpretation. It is fruitful in the sense that it integrates many, if not all, aspects of Buddhist ethics into a coherent whole, thereby increasing our understanding of it. I believe Goodman and others have shown convincingly that a consequentialist interpretation is also possible. However, I think that a consequentialist interpretation is less fruitful than a virtue ethical interpretation. It does not give room to important aspects of Buddhist ethics because ethical practice in general, and specifically in Buddhism, is done for its own sake and not for the sake of some external goal. This will, I hope, become clearer in the article. I will elaborate on the notion of praxis /practice in several "rounds," and in each round I will point out the way in which it fits in with Buddhist ethics. In the first round (the next two sections), I will show the core of the notion of a practice--its teleological and autarkic formal structure and how this hangs together with the notion of virtue. In the second round (the following two sections) I will go into how this view relates virtue ethics to consequentialist and deontological ethics. In the third round I will indicate how such a view can be grounded in a tradition with a view on reality and human nature. I I think that the basic question of all ethics is the Socratic question: "how should one live?" (Plato 352d; Williams 2). Other important ethical questions as "What is a good deed?" "How can we be happy?" or "What is our obligation towards other people?" are derived from this question. With ethics I mean the broad discourse that arises as an answer to this basic question. Ethics understood in this way does not have to make a distinction between ethics in the sense of morals and other practical aspects of life such as health. …

A Review of Buddhism Goes to the Movies: Introduction to Buddhist Thought and Practice

Abstract: Buddhism Goes to the Movies: Introduction to Buddhist Thought and Practice. By Ronald Green. New York: Routledge, 2014, 166 pages, ISBN: 9780415841481 (paperback), $34.95. Since 2003, when the first International Buddhist Film Festival was held in Los Angeles, there have been dozens of similar events around the world (Whalen-Bridge 5). The practice of exploring Buddhism through movies has since steadily increased, and similar events have been organized throughout the United States, in London, Amsterdam, Singapore, Calgary, Bangkok, Melbourne, Kuala Lumpur, and other global cities. Popularizing Buddhism with the help of movies has also been on the rise in classrooms, and Ronald S. Green's Buddhism Goes to the Movies is an introductory text that "describes the basics of Buddhist philosophy and practice" (xi), especially those elements associated with Theravada, Pure Land, Zen, and Tantric Buddhism. Ten chapters discuss a dozen films in order to introduce students to some of the more prominent Buddhist sects, foundational concepts such as the Four Noble Truths, and contemporary issues such as gender disparities and the rise of Engaged Buddhism. Little or no knowledge of Buddhism is assumed at the outset, and the ten chapters "can easily be considered units for a quarter or semester school term" (xi). Buddhism Goes to the Movies is not a focused study of the dozen films listed in the table of contents. Rather, it shuttles between discussion of the films and the Buddhist background issues that the author connects to the films. The first chapter, "Early Representations: Broken Blossoms and Lost Horizon," makes the point that Buddhism has been presented as an "other" to the Western imagination since the beginning of cinema history, and the chapter clearly explains the problem of orientalist representation. Interspersed with discussions of films by D. W. Griffith and Frank Capra, the reader will find glosses on the "Dalai Lama," "middle path," and "loving kindness," emboldened terms that are explained in a little more detail in the glossary. These sidebar discussions of Buddhist elements are not always organically related to the direct discussions of the films as one might hope. After the first chapter, each chapter begins with a summary of the films in question, usually running about two pages, followed by an analysis of relevant themes. For example, the second chapter uses Fight Club to explicate the Four Noble Truths. Green is not the only author to interpret the film Fight Club in relation to Buddhism; Charley Reed has written an article on the subject, and David Harper and Richard Anderson have included discussion of the film in their book chapter. Green's argument follows Reed's "Fight Club: An Exploration of Buddhism," in which a rather loose set of correlations is made between Buddhist topics (the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, the trikaya doctrine) and parts of the film. The narrator and main character Jack, dissatisfied with life, begins to attend various self-help groups, an activity which corresponds, according to Green (who follows Reed), to the four sights: old age, sickness, death, and then a renunciate. The film's audience eventually learns that Jack has all along been imagining Tyler, the charismatic figure who has led him to increasingly violent behavior. Without much recognition of the ways in which Buddhism and the ethos taught by the hallucinated guide Tyler diverge, Green proposes that the rules of Fight Club, an activity in which men bash each other back into a sense of grounded authenticity, are precepts of a sort. The apocalyptic/revolutionary plan Project Mayhem that concludes the film has five rules, recalling, argues Green, the Five Precepts of Buddhism: (1) You don't ask questions. (2) You don't ask questions. (3) No excuses. (4) No lies (which is also one of the Five Precepts), and (5) You have to trust Tyler, indicating the growing cult-like nature of the gatherings. …

The Politics of "Compassion" of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama: Between "Religion" and "Secularism"

Abstract: Introduction One of the most important events in Tibetan history was the retirement of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama from politics in 2011. This marked the end of his political authority, which the successive Dalai Lamas had held since the Fifth Dalai Lama (seventeenth century). In remarks he made at the time of his retirement during a public address in Dharamsala on March 19, 2011, he said, "In my letter (4) to the Tibetan Parliament, I suggested that the title of Ganden Phodrang (5) Shung will have to be changed. Ganden Phodrang will remain but it will not take any political responsibilities as we are now a democratic establishment" (6) (Collected 20). To understand the significance of this historical event, it is useful to understand the Tibetan concept of chos srid zung 'brel. Samdhong Rinpoche, former prime minister of the Tibetan government in exile, points out that this concept characterizes the unique Tibetan political system. He translates this term as "the union of dharma and polity." Definitions of chos srid zung 'brel The term chos srid zung 'brel can be divided to three parts: "chos," "srid," and "zung 'brel." Although "chos" can be translated as "religion" in English, this translation is not sufficient. The appropriate English word for chos depends on the context; therefore, several definitions of chos are examined below. "Srid" can be translated as "polity," and "zung 'brel" as "union," "combination," "together," and so forth. Chos srid zung 'brel is not an original concept of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. According to Samdhong Rinpoche: Since the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet through royal patronage and initiative, the unique and the famous expression "chos srid zung 'brel," meaning the union of Dharma and Polity became the popular expression for describing the culture of state policy. Consequently a large share of state power and revenue was utilized for maintenance and promotion of universal heritage and welfare of monks, monasteries, temples, religious institutions, etc. Many Westerners misconstrued the ancient Tibet and state with theocratic form which is not true since Buddhism is an atheist religion. (Tibet 34) Chos srid zung 'brel can be understood as a concept that characterizes and directs the nature of the Tibetan polity. However, this concept has several definitions, as follows. The Tibetologist Dung dkar blo bzang 'phrin las says, "It is not the proper meaning of chos srid zung 'brel that someone belonging to a certain religious sect (chos lugs) takes the reins of government (chab srid), but one person takes the reins of government (srid) and a religious sect (chos) as the top leader ('go gtso) of both" (3-4). The Tibetologist Hor gtsang 'jigs med points out that chos srid zung 'brel has three definitions (26). First, after the period in which the king (rgyal po) of the state (yul khams) and the top leader of a religious sect (chos bdag) are separate, one person attains both the position of the king and of the top leader of the religious sect. Such a system (lam lugs) is the first definition. The second definition is the political system based on the essence of a particular religion (chos lugs). The third definition appears in Article Three (7) of the Charter of the Tibetans-in-Exile 1991: "The future Tibetan polity shall uphold the principle of non-violence and shall endeavour to promote the freedom of the individual and the welfare of the society through the dual system of government based on a Federal Democratic Republic" (1). Among these three definitions, the first one is similar to that expressed by Dung dkar blo bzang 'phrin las. The second seems to be one that Dung dkar blo bzang 'phrin las rejects, namely that someone who belongs to a certain religious sect takes the reins of government. According to Hor gtsang 'jigs med, this definition appears in the Constitution of Tibet (bod kyi rtsa khrims) that was enacted in 1963. …

Dogen's Primer on the Nonmoral Virtues of the Good Person

Abstract: In the last fifty years, the Zen Master Dogen (1200-1253) has attracted substantial attention. This is true not only of those who seek to better understand Japanese religions, but also those who pursue comparative studies in the history and philosophy of Asian and Western thought. Toward these ends students exploring Dogen's thought have often turned to Western traditions as avenues of discovery. (2) Recent decades have seen a renewed philosophical and religious interest in "the virtues"; this has begun to influence the study of Dogen, albeit in a small way so far, and this article is intended as a contribution to that effort. The range and complexity of Dogen's writings present a challenge for anyone seeking to understand him, but some texts provide a good, accessible introduction. A case in point is the Shobogenzo Zuimonki (hereinafter SZ), which has been labeled a "primer" of Soto Zen. (3) Dogen's teachings therein cover numerous topics; a significant amount of space is devoted to describing the characteristics of a good person. At one point Dogen remarks: A man of old has said: "Do not talk about the conduct of others if you don't resemble them." This means that, without knowing or studying a person's virtues, one should not, upon seeing his weaknesses, conclude that he is a good person but suffers certain defects and does bad things. Look at just his virtues, not his shortcomings. This is the meaning of the saying: "The gentleman sees the virtues but not the shortcomings of others." (SZ 3.8) As with the junzi of Confucius, "the good person" expressed in the SZ includes, but also extends beyond, the conception of a moral human being. (4) We must note that the virtues of Dogen's good person are not systematically expounded in the text. This is not surprising, because it is not a formal treatise but a collection of Dogen's teachings delivered at Koshoji and recorded by his disciple Ejo (1198-1280). But if we can identify and schematize some of the virtues manifest in the text, we will gain insight into the picture of the good person it presents. Virtues are widely distributed across Dogen's writings, and we can get a sense of this, albeit a limited one, by looking at the table of contents of his massive Shobogenzo. For example, we find the chapter on "Bodaisatta Shishobo," translated by some as "The Cardinal Virtues of the Bodhisattva." In addition to the few instances where Dogen devotes a chapter of the Shobogenzo to virtues, we also see lists of virtues incorporated into various chapters, often appearing more than once. For example, in the Ippyaku-hachi Homyo-mon ("One Hundred and Eight Ways to Enlightenment") we find the aforementioned four virtues of the bodhisattva and the six paramitas both of which appear in the Makahannyaharamitsu chapter and elsewhere. (The paramitas, typically translated as "excellences" or "perfections," are often described as those virtues perfected by the bodhisattva in the course of his/her development.) One could subsequently demonstrate the presence of the paramitas in the SZ, proceed to identify other virtues in the Shobogenzo, and repeat the process with other virtues discovered. Thus, this meth odology could help to identify the virtues of a good person in our chosen text, and organize them via the various virtue lists one finds in the Shobogenzo. To the extent that this project would succeed, it would also strengthen the position of those who argue that across the range of Dogen's writings one finds overall a continuity and unity in viewpoint. But if this approach is useful for identifying and organizing for review many of the virtues of the SZ, it does not suffice as a holistic description of them. For that we need a schematization of the virtues in the text. Granted, it might be possible to develop a schematization wherein virtue lists like the bodaisatta shishobo and paramitas and others were components. But this is a daunting task, and in any event it would not necessarily be the most effective one. …

The ethics (and economics) of Tibetan polyandry

Abstract: Introduction In the midst of providing his moral defense of monogamy, the thirteenth century Italian theologian Thomas Aquinas argues, "Therefore, since certainty as to offspring is the principal good which is sought in matrimony, no law or custom has permitted one woman to be a wife for several husbands" (SCG III-II, 124.2). (2) Thomas was almost certainly wrong about this conclusion. Though it appears that he was ignorant of the practice of polyandry--that is, the practice of one woman simultaneously being married to multiple husbands--the tradition has existed in a variety of societies throughout history, and, in particular, continues to this day to be a prominent practice within agricultural communities on the Tibetan Plateau. Yet, though he was undoubtedly mistaken about the existence of polyandry, there is much less certainty with regard to Thomas's moral condemnation of this form of marriage, and so an examination of his criticisms deserves closer attention. Western philosophers have written almost nothing about Tibetan polyandry. Aside from a few offhand comments by Bertrand Russell-- where Russell's concern is logical, not ethical--there has never been, to my knowledge, any deep philosophical discussion of this Tibetan marriage practice (45). In addition, surprisingly few Buddhist studies scholars have tackled the topic. Nearly all of the investigations of Tibetan polyandry in the past fifty years have been carried out by anthropologists or, to a lesser extent, evolutionary biologists, and most of our collective knowledge about this marriage custom derives from a series of anthropological studies. Given this state of affairs, I believe the time is right to start a philosophical conversation about the ethics of Tibetan polyandry. In what follows I will engage in a preliminary examination of the moral status of Tibetan polyandry, focusing my inquiry on just two items. First, I will briefly describe the practice of fraternal polyandry in Tibet, identifying its central features and also teasing out the principal reasons why this form of marriage has continued into the twenty-first century. I will then reflect on some of the ethical questions surrounding the practice by looking at both natural law arguments and utilitarian considerations relevant to the practice. I will argue that the natural law criticisms of polyandry that are raised by Thomas Aquinas fail to be persuasive, but I will subsequently show that the utilitarian motivations that Tibetans use to support this form of marriage are themselves problematic. Background of Polyandry in Tibet I shall begin by tracing some of the basic features of polyandrous marriage as it is practiced on the Tibetan plateau. The details that follow come from anthropological research that has been carried out over the past forty years. (3) My aim is not at all to contribute to this research. I am only providing these details to help ground my subsequent philosophical analysis of Tibetan polyandry. Although there are obviously going to be small differences in the practice from region to region, the general features of Tibetan polyandry are fairly stable. First of all, and most importantly, the only common form of polyandry in Tibet is fraternal polyandry, wherein multiple brothers share a single wife. (To be more precise, because polyandrous relations commonly occur in successive generations, this means that in many cases the siblings who share a single wife will actually be half-brothers.) In most instances of polyandrous marriage two or three brothers take the same wife, but it is not unusual for four, five, or even six brothers to have a single wife. In these arrangements, the parents of the male children arrange a marriage for those sons whereby a bride is brought into the family unit. The eldest son is considered the dominant male figure in the marriage, but the expectation is that all the brothers will play equal roles in working for the good of the family, and also that all of the brothers (assuming they have reached an age of sexual maturity) will have equitable sexual access to the wife. …

The Trolley Car Dilemma: The Early Buddhist Answer and Resulting Insights

Abstract: Introduction Michael J. Sandel's Harvard course "Justice" starts with a question: While a trolley car is running at full speed, its brakes fail. If the driver continues on the same track, the trolley car will kill five workers working on the track. But it is possible to change tracks, which, if done, will kill one worker on the other track. The question here is: which is the right choice for the trolley car driver? To go on the same track or to change tracks? (Paraphrased from Sandel) This question presents a dilemma to me, for: (1) I have already proved that Buddhist ethics is one of absolute values (Pandita), and I have yet to see any significant argument to the contrary, (2) Buddhist ethics says "Thou shall not kill" unequivocally without providing any exception and, (3) Whatever choice the trolley driver makes in this scenario will end in one or five people getting killed. I have attempted in this paper to give a Buddhist answer to this dilemma, and discovered some insights along the way. The Concept to be Used Let us begin with an oft-quoted statement: Cetanaham bhikkhave kammam vadami (AN III 415) ("It is intention that I call karma ..." [Gombrich, What 7]). It enables us to attribute different moral values to the same kind of action depending on the actor's motives. But how many motives are possible for the trolley driver? First, I will assume that the driver has enough time, and a cool head, to consider all the pros and cons of his possible choices before he makes his decision. Psychologically, he will focus on either the workers that will be saved or those that will get killed. If he focuses on the workers that will be saved, his intention will be: (1) Either to abstain from killing them, (2) Or to save them. Here I should note that (1) and (2) are actually different from a psychological perspective: the former is essentially the refusal to do something whereas the latter is to undergo some kind of activity. On the other hand, if his focus is on those that will be killed, his intention will be: (3) To accept the inevitable with equanimity, (3) (4) Or to wish the workers dead because he somehow bears an ill-will towards them. Out of those four intentions, the last is unwholesome and evil whereas the first three are wholesome. The Buddhist Answer If the driver does NOT change tracks: It is an unwholesome deed if he intends to have the five workers on the old track killed. Even though he happens to spare the one worker on the sidetrack to which he chooses not to move, his action does not count as a wholesome deed because he has no actual intention to save the latter, whose survival is only the side effect of the former's choice. Or it is a wholesome deed if he intends to save the one worker on the new track, or to abstain from killing him, or to accept the inevitable fate of the five workers on the old track with equanimity. Although he happens to kill the five workers on the old track on which he is traveling, it does not count as an unwholesome deed because he has no intention to kill them (nor, for that matter, to save them). Or there will be both a wholesome deed and an unwholesome deed (coming after each other in any order) because, say, the five workers are the driver's enemies whom he wants dead whereas the one worker is his friend whom he wants to save. (I say "coming after one another in any order" because it is psychologically impossible to have one good intention and a bad one to arise at the same time.) Or there is neither a wholesome nor unwholesome deed arising in this case if the trolley driver is too frightened to do anything, allowing the trolley car to run on, resulting in the death of the five workers. In this case, he is free from moral responsibility. If the driver CHANGES tracks: It is an unwholesome deed if he intends to have the single worker killed on the new track. …