Showing papers in "Theological Studies in 1972"
TL;DR: Whereas genetic counselling has been primarily a verbal transaction based upon the analysis of pedigrees and the risks following the birth of genetically handicapped children, parents have begun to enlist in significant numbers as patients under the care of physicians who use more precise methods for detecting disease or abnormalities in the unborn fetus.
Abstract: NEW DISCOVERIES in human biology have already begun to affect the way parents, with their physicians and genetic counsellors, make decisions about parenthood and childbearing. While a storm of debate swirls about the morality of futuristic proposals for making "better" babies—in the genetic sense—some members of the first generation of parents in history are already crossing a borderline of decision-making, venturing out to use the knowledge obtainable from prenatal diagnosis of genetic disease in their unborn children. I refer specifically to the parents who enter genetic clinics and receive the technique of amniocentesis, which will be described fully below. The first stage of genetic medicine is already being institutionalized, insofar as amniocentesis for diagnostic purposes is no longer considered as "experimental," and a number of genetic clinics with supporting counselling units have been in operation for several years. James Sorenson has recently published the first results of his exploratory studies of the sociological factors which influence parents and genetic counsellors. The point I want to make in this introduction is that whereas genetic counselling has been primarily a verbal transaction based upon the analysis of pedigrees and the risks following the birth of genetically handicapped children, parents have begun to enlist in significant numbers as patients under the care of physicians who use more precise methods for detecting disease or abnormalities in the unborn fetus. The first installment of genetic medicine is upon us. Very grave ethical
33 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a new approach to the theology of marriage has been proposed, one that not only respects the traditional teaching of the Church, but also reflects a dimension of Christian marriage which has been lost or obscured in much of contemporary theological writing, a dimension that alone can justify the Church's teaching on the indissolubility of marriage.
Abstract: IN AN evaluation of a series of papers dealing with "Intolerable Marriage Situations," Ladislas Orsy, S.J., observed: "If I am permitted an aside here, let me say that I think the effort of historians and theologians in investigating the indissolubility of marriage or the possibility of divorce and remarriage can be misdirected. The main effort should be in investigating positively what a Christian marriage is." More recently, under the banner headline "Time to Change Teaching on Divorce," the editors of the National Catholic Reporter gave space to the complaint of Raymond Goedert, president of the Canon Law Society of America: "We are being criticized because of poor law. But law can only follow good theology. My quarrel is that theologians have not done their homework on what constitutes a sacramental marriage." For the past thirty years I have been engaged in research and teaching in the field of marriage. I have done my share of homework, much of it from secondary and contemporary material, but enough from primary sources to conclude that what we need is an altogether new approach to the theology of marriage. The newness should respect the traditional teaching of the Church, but it should recapture and reflect a dimension of Christian marriage which has been lost or obscured in much of contemporary theological writing, a dimension that alone can justify the Church's teaching on the indissolubility of Christian marriage and shed some needed light on the way "intolerable marriage situations" can be handled best in the external as well as the internal forum. Today, and for the last six centuries, Christian marriage has been discussed almost exclusively in terms of contract. In the first millennium of the Church's history, all marriage, pagan as well as Christian, was discussed almost wholly in terms of covenant. The contextual difference is basic, since it is only in terms of covenant that we can "investigate positively what a Christian marriage is."
23 citations
TL;DR: The subjectivity implied by an objective claim cannot, however, be studied by making it the object of some form of direct inquiry like introspection, in which data are collected, analyzed, and finally subsumed under a theory as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: EVERY VIEW of nature connotes a view of the human subject as knower I and moral agent, and it is my purpose to explore the implications of this fact. The subjectivity implied by an objective claim cannot, however, be studied by making it the object of some form of direct inquiry like introspection, in which data are collected, analyzed, and finally subsumed under a theory. The subject as subject cannot, of course, be the object of direct scrutiny by the subject. By studying the forms of objectivity assumed to be present in nature, one can, however, infer the forms of subjectivity that are presupposed. Inquiry of this kind must proceed according to phenomenological method, the purpose of which is to uncover the noetic pole (that is, the vector of research and inquiry) constitutive, with the noematic (or objective) pole, of the noeticnoematic (subject-object) intentionality structure within which the form of the question and the form of the answer mutually determine one another. Sedimented in common usage are two meanings for nature: one opposes it to the artificial, the man-made; the other opposes it to mind or spirit, the domain of meaning, culture, and values. Let me call the first the Aristotelian or romantic sediment, where nature is conceived as impregnated with rational purpose and striving, manifesting the logos of a cosmic organism—a logos that man can co-operate with for his good or violate to his destruction. In this view, man is a part of nature, illuminated spiritually by nature's logos and subject to its moral imperatives. His freedom to modify the course of nature by artificial interventions is limited by objective rules stemming from the supreme imperative of maintaining the harmony of nature as a whole. Christianity came to assimilate this view when it took over the cultural world of Greece and Rome. Nature's logos became the divine ideas, and the natural (or moral) law became the participation by man in God's eternal law. Man was not seen as creative of nature's logoi or of any part of the natural law. These were given to him as a body of articulated and preordained goals furnished with divine sanctions and communicated through the light of natural reason aided by the supernatural grace of God. The second meaning of nature has its source in the scientific movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which, inspired by 1 For a historical study of the concept of nature, see R. G. Collingwood's classic work The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1945).
15 citations
TL;DR: In a social situation that seems to force the individual to be on his own, it is no surprise that the subject matter of ethics is centered around "problems/' i.e., situations in which it is difficult to know what one should do as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: No ETHIC is formulated in isolation from the social conditions of its time. The contemporary emphasis in Christian ethics on the dynamic and self-creating nature of man is a reflection of the kind of society in which we live. Perhaps our ancestors were born to pre-established roles in a world where faithfulness to those roles guaranteed the fulfilment of moral duty. But we are born into a social world that forces us to be free, to be autonomous; for now the moral imperative is to actually fashion our lives by choosing among the numerous alternatives our social world presents to us. In such a world it is not surprising that current moral discourse employs the language of freedom and responsibility to focus on man as self-creator. The moral life is not constituted by correspondence to an objective moral order; rather it is to be constantly readjusted to the nuances and ambiguities of our ethical choices and experiences. Modern ethicists recognize that there is often more to our moral situation than our principles and rules contain; so much of our significant moral experience and life simply does not fall within the areas marked off by clearly defined roles or principles. "Responsibility" names the fact that often we are simply forced to fall back on ourselves in order to make decisions that have no relationship to objective standards of right and wrong. In a social situation that seems to force the individual to be on his own, it is no surprise that the subject matter of ethics is centered around "problems/' i.e., situations in which it is difficult to know what one should do. Ethical discussion then focuses on the best way to respond to such "problems": Should an ethical decision be determined primarily in relation to principles and rules, or by a loving response to the peculiarities of the immediate situation? Those who argue for "principles" suggest that only their approach assures objectivity in morals, or that love is sentimentalized if it is not "imprincipled." Contextualists maintain that adherence to principles results in a false security that makes one insensitive to the complexity of modern moral issues. 1 For a much fuller account of the idea of responsibility and its use in contemporary theological ethics, see Albert Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics (Washington: Corpus, 1968). 2 For an extraordinarily perceptive article that makes this point in a philosophical context, see E. Pincoffs, "Quandary Ethics," Mind 80 (1971) 552-71.
12 citations
TL;DR: The discovery of the molecular basis for a "transforming principle" revolutionized the authors' ability potentially to control what specific genetic information a cell contained or expressed and represents a subtle mechanism by which genetic information escapes the moral scrutiny of its possessors.
Abstract: CHANCE EVENTS AND THE MYTH OF GENETIC CERTAINTY T sciences of molecular biology and human genetics emerged within my own lifetime. Partly as a consequence of the development of these two sciences, my generation was the first to become swept up in what we now recognize as "The Biological Revolution." What made genetics "revolutionary" is that it was transformed from a science whose content was discernible only by inference, to one which seemingly could be known with certainty: the discovery which made the unknown knowable was made the year I was bom. In 1943, Oswald Avery wrote his brother Roy to describe his findings about a physiological principle which appeared to be able to confer the properties of virulence to a bacterium. The excited tone of his letter reflected the utter incredulity that Avery must have felt upon learning the outcome of his experiments: a chemical had made it possible to induce predictable and hereditable changes in living cells. Genes were molecules! As such they were subject to human control and manipulation. Avery wrote: "This is something which has long been the dream of geneticists [Up until now] the mutations they induced... are always unpredictable and random and chance changes." Although Avery was mistaken in his assumption that this knowledge would allow us generally to control where and when mutations occur, he was correct in concluding that his discovery revolutionized our ability potentially to control what specific genetic information a cell contained or expressed. Thus, when he discovered the molecular basis for a "transforming principle," he simultaneously acquired the ability to effect genetic transformations. The phenomenon by which the acquisition of knowledge per se changes that which has become known (or affords the potential for such change) represents a subtle mechanism by which genetic information (as well as much other knowledge in science) escapes the moral scrutiny of its possessors. Hans Jonas perceptively observed:
9 citations
TL;DR: Today genetic engineering and the authors' reproductive technology have catapulted the physician far beyond remedial medicine into the domain of creative designing and positive genetic planning, and the scientist, on the other hand, has traditionally remained aloof from humanitarian concerns.
Abstract: FOR CENTURIES physicians have been guided in their medical ethics by the rationale of the Hippocratic oath. The total thrust of this pledge is the physician's obligation to alleviate human suffering and pain caused by biological disorders and disease wherever his skills permit. The physician's role, then, participates in the divine concern as he tries to remedy the malfunctions of the human organism, to restore the health and normality God intended man to enjoy. Today's medicine, however, is no longer limited to remedying the faults and malfunctions of the human body. We are on the verge of using microbial and viral medicine to manipulate and modify the bedrock foundation of the human organism, our heredity. In this we face the possibility of so altering our human constitution that a new creature may be born which, despite its human origin and gestation, we may not consider a legitimate member of the human species because of its differences. In another vein, our reproductive technology has long passed the stage where Macbeth's enemy Macduff could be considered somehow not human because he was "not born of woman" but taken prematurely from his dying mother's womb in a Caesarean section. "Not born of woman" or of the natural union of man and woman today can mean a child conceived by artificial insemination, with frozen semen, conception in vitro, or even transplantation of an embryo from one woman to another. Tomorrow "not born of woman" may well mean a nine-month gestation in an artificial womb, or in a subhuman surrogate mother, or the product of asexual cloning which bypasses eggf sperm, genital intercourse, fertilization, and pregnancy. Today genetic engineering and our reproductive technology have catapulted the physician far beyond remedial medicine into the domain of creative designing and positive genetic planning. The scientist, on the other hand, has traditionally remained aloof from humanitarian concerns. In our scientific adoration, we have allotted to the scientist an objective pursuit of reality, an unbiased search for the truths of nature. Thankful for the blessings of science and technology, we have endowed the scientist with a superhuman dedication, totally undistracted by emotion, unswayed by prejudice. In the scientific ivory tower, human values, social repercussions, the uses and abuses of scientific and technological knowledge were viewed as
8 citations
TL;DR: This paper is an attempt to describe in simplified terms some recent developments in the areas of molecular and human genetics, with special emphasis on developments which are already finding medical application, or which seem to be likely to do so in the near future.
Abstract: INFORMED DISCUSSION of the ethical aspects of the application of discoveries in molecular genetics to human society requires a reasonably detailed understanding of the current and future technical possibilities. Yet, understandable descriptions of the technical possibilities are frequently difficult to come by, especially in an area which is changing as fast as molecular genetics. While newspaper reports of the latest scientific "break-throughs" are common, they are not always accompanied by sufficient information to enable the reader to put this latest "revolutionary" development in perspective. This paper is an attempt to describe in simplified terms some recent developments in the areas of molecular and human genetics, with special emphasis on developments which are already finding medical application, or which seem to me to be likely to do so in the near future. In order to focus this paper specifically on recent developments in genetics, I have not described work in other important areas such as in vitro fertilization and cloning. A review of recent developments in these areas, as well as an ethical critique of the experiments, can be found in the recent paper by Kass. While I have attempted to sketch the realm of the currently possible, and to extrapolate current trends a little into the future, nothing could be more deceptive than to assume that this is anything more than a highly selective "snapshot" as of early 1972. The pace of discoveries in the area of molecular genetics and the rate of development of our ability to synthesize, alter, and manipulate genetic elements in vitro is currently very rapid, and problems which looked like barriers to further development of genetic technology are rapidly disappearing.
7 citations
TL;DR: Oberman as discussed by the authors gave a survey of the literature on the late Middle Ages on the themes of Scripture and tradition, ecclesiology and conciliarism, and Gabriel Biel.
Abstract: Research trends on the thought of the late Middle Ages have seldom been the subject of a bulletin article. Generally one has had to ferret out the important literature from the Bulletin de théologie ancienne et mèdievale (which regrettably has run somewhat behind in its review of the secondary literature on medieval thought), the Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques (which briefly reviews the current periodical literature and maintains a sequential bulletin article on medieval doctrine), the bibliographies of individual authors which have appeared from time to time, or the various checklists available for medieval studies. The only recent bibliographical survey that treats late medieval thought is Heiko Oberman, \"Theologie des späten Mittelalters: Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung/' Theologische Literaturzeitung 91 (1966) 401-16. Oberman's article concentrates on the themes of Scripture and tradition, ecclesiology and conciliarism, and Gabriel Biel. The difficulty in getting a synthetic overview of the research in this field has widened the gap, perhaps more than in any other area of medieval thought, between the standard view, as recorded in textbooks, and the discoveries and new interpretations that have marked the research of the last few decades. In a separate article I have compared the traditional interpretation with the newer assessments, and for a fuller treatment of the earlier literature and the revised view of William of
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors reviewed several important contributions to this question, particularly in terms of the key part played by consequences in the development of norms, and concluded that moral norms play an important part in any life that hopes to remain human.
Abstract: Christian man is a being of principles. For he always has experienced and always will experience the need both to manifest his faith in action and to communicate to others the implications of his faith convictions. But to manifest and communicate an experienced value means eventually to formulate it into a value judgment or norm. Clearly, overemphasis on norms can degenerate into a neolegalism at odds with the Christian idea. Nevertheless, when cultures resist norme or formulate them badly, they begin to wallow in a bed of moral marshmallows. So while morality cannot be reduced to decisions and the norms which guide them, still moral norms play an important part in any life that hopes to remain human. But if normative statements are to function constructively in human life, they must be properly understood and interpreted. This takes us to the heart of methodology in theological ethics as it relates to decision-making. Last year these \"Notes\" reviewed several important contributions to this question. Here I should like to review at considerable length several articles which continue the discussion, particularly in terms of the key part played by consequences in the development of norms. In another of his valuable and creative contributions, Bruno Schüller, S.J., discusses two understandings of moral norms and emphatically rejects the second. Both appeal to what is \"according to nature\" but use the phrase in remarkably different ways. The first understanding
6 citations
TL;DR: The moral literature on genetic controls is enormous as discussed by the authors, and it touches on several different problems with ethical implications: eugenic engineering, genetic counseling and screening, genetic abortion, in vitro fertilization, cloning, etc.
Abstract: THE MORAL literature on genetic controls is enormous. 1 Furthermore, it touches on several different problems with ethical implications: eugenic engineering (both positive and negative), genetic counseling and screening, genetic abortion, in vitro fertilization, cloning, etc. Much of the occasional writing is general in character. The more systematic moral studies on genetics remind one of a masked ball: new disguises but behind them familiar faces. The familiar faces in this instance refer to the methodologies of well-known theologians on the (especially) American scene. Hence, even in the face of the exciting and/or frightening possibilities of contemporary biomedicine, there is a lingering sense of deja vu in the moral literature. Briefly, since ultimate attitudes and judgments vis-a-vis various genetic interventions depend heavily on how the author builds his approach, the emphasis falls heavily on methodology. Three approaches are discernible: a consequentialist calculus, a more deontological attitude, a "mediating" approach. 1 Literature of the 1960's can be found in Rosalind P. Petchesky's Issues in Biological Engineering, ISHA Bulletin no. 7 (Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs; New York: Columbia Univ., 1969). Cf. also THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 30 (1969) 680-92, where I review the recent periodical literature. This literature will not be reviewed here. Another valuable bibliographical source is Sharmon Sollitto's "In the Literature," which appears regularly in the Report of the Hastings Center. 2 A conference at Airlie House, Va. (Oct. 10-14, 1971) was devoted to "Ethical Issues in Genetic Counselling and the Use of Genetic Knowledge." It dealt heavily with counseling, screening, and abortion. The papers, currently in the process of publication, include thoughtful essays by Daniel Callahan, Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson, Leon Kass, and John Fletcher. For a brief report of this conference, cf. W. G. Peter, "Ethical Perspectives in the Use of Genetic Knowledge," BioScience 21 (Nov. 15, 1971) 1133-37. 3 Cf., e.g., Donald Huisingh, "Should Man Control His Genetic Future?" Zygon 4 (1969) 188-99; S. E. Luria, "Modern Biology: A Terrifying Power," Nation 209 (1969) 406 ff.; Kenneth Vaux, "Cyborg, R. U. Human? Ethical Issues in Rebuilding Man," Religion in Life 39 (1970) 187-92. Articles of this kind abound in the medical journals and journals such as Science and Science News. Cf., e.g., New York Times Magazine, March 5, 1972, pp. 10 ff. 4 The very problems theologians decide to discuss are important, for a false move here could bring theology and its important contributions to biomedical decisions into disrepute with the scientific world. Furthermore, too great a futurism would allow existing problems to get solved by default. The matter is complicated by the fact that theologians are at the mercy of the scientific world in deciding what problems are realistic and this very world gives ambiguous answers. For instance, James D. Watson reports of
6 citations
TL;DR: The question of the virginal conception has been debated for a long time in the Church as mentioned in this paper and it has been settled with a negative response about historicity, a response occasionally accompanied with a perceptive hesitancy that the negation threatens a symbolism touching on the mystery of Christ.
Abstract: I A CERTAIN SENSE this is not one of the most relevant problems of theology or exegesis. The solution to it will not help the wretched in the inner city or even the wretched in the suburbs; should it be resolved, there will remain questions of war and peace and even of priestly celibacy. To some the problem will seem a parade example of the purely (or impurely) inquisitive in theology, in short, the \"nosey.\" Yet, in another sense, is it ever irrelevant to be nosey about Jesus, especially when our inquisitiveness touches on his uniqueness? Unless there is something unique about the way \"God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself\" (2 Cor 5:19), even the most \"relevant\" Christian theology becomes irrelevant. In Protestantism the question of the virginal conception has been debated for a long time. In some quarters it has been settled with a negative response about historicity, a response occasionally accompanied with a perceptive hesitancy that the negation threatens a symbolism touching on the mystery of Christ. In other quarters an affirmative answer remains one of the essential criteria of orthodoxy, so that English Bibles that do not carry the word \"virgin\" in Is 7:14 are suspect. In still other quarters the subject is discreetly avoided, except perhaps by a nervous examination board testing a candidate's doctrinal suitability for the ministry. Since the denial of the virginal conception was initiated by the rationalists, there remains a certain suspicion about
TL;DR: The Meaning of God in Human Experience as mentioned in this paper has been singularly influential in American theology and philosophy of religion ever since it was published in 1912, and it has been particularly relevant to our condition now.
Abstract: Sixty years ago William Ernest Hocking's The Meaning of God in Human Experience was published. It has been singularly influential in American theology and philosophy of religion ever since. In fact, Hocking's work speaks even more pertinently to our condition now than it did in 1912. Many of us who have been awakened from our neo-orthodox slumbers are now rediscovering in modes of human experience the proper matrix of theological reflection and interpretation. So we can reread with new approval Hocking's words:
TL;DR: In this paper, Francoeur pointed the way towards a via media in genetic science between unlimited, unrestricted, undirected, socially aloof research and a total retreat from our technological capacities and our God-given powers to create.
Abstract: Γ THE PRECEDING ARTICLE Dr. Robert T. Francoeur points the way towards a via media in genetic science between, on the one hand, "an unlimited, unrestricted, undirected, socially aloof research" and, on the other hand, "a total retreat from our technological capacities and our God-given powers to create." His insistence on the need to search for that via media reveals his conviction that the so-called technological imperative is fatalistic and fallacious. As his essay unfolds, it presents interesting and illuminating material from the history of genetic research and technology and draws a succinct picture of what is or soon will be possible in this field. From the standpoint of Christian ethics all this raises a number of challenging issues. In this present article I shall attempt to discuss some of them.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a train which is gathering speed, racing down a track on which there are an unknown number of switches leading to unknown destinations, and no single scientist is in the engine cab, and there may be demons at the switch.
Abstract: No one—not even the most brilliant scientist alive today—really knows where science is taking us. We are aboard a train which is gathering speed, racing down a track on which there are an unknown number of switches leading to unknown destinations. No single scientist is in the engine cab, and there may be demons at the switch.1
TL;DR: A survey of some theories that have been current in modern ecumenical theology can be found in this paper, where the authors focus particularly on the positions taken by Vatican II, especially in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen gentium) and in the Decree on Ecumenism (Unitatis redintegratio).
Abstract: THE UNITY of the Church is a clear datum of Christian faith, recognized by the creeds and by the Scriptures. According to the New Testament there is and can be only one body of Christ, one bride, one flock, one new Temple, one new Israel, one new People of God. All these images connote unity; it would be out of the question for Christ to have several bodies, several brides, or for there to be several new Temples or new Israels. Jesus, moreover, prayed that there might be one flock and one shepherd (Jn 10:16) and that all His disciples might be one as He and the Father are one (Jn 17:21). Paul gloried in the fact that we Christians, since we know only one Lord, one faith, and one baptism (Eph 4:5), are all members of one another (Rom 12:5). So closely are we united, he declared, that in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor freeman, male nor female (Gal 3:28). All national and racial differences, all distinctions of sex, age, and social class, pale to insignificance in the light of our transcendent unity in Christ. For the Church to be divided, Paul implies, is as impossible as for Christ to be divided (cf. 1 Cor 1:13). The unity of the body of Christ, of course, leaves room for a multiplicity of local congregations that may, in accordance with New Testament usage, be called \"churches,\" but it excludes a plurality of rival and conflicting denominations that reject one another's doctrines, ministries, or sacraments. Almost since the beginnings, however, this dividedness has been the actual condition of Christianity. What is in theory abnormal has become in practice normal, and this anomaly calls for theological explanation. All major Christian traditions have had to grapple with the dilemma posed by the theological necessity of oneness and the factual givenness of division. The present paper aims to explore the resources at hand in contemporary Roman Catholic theology for handling this dilemma. After a typological survey of some theories that have been current in modern ecumenical theology, this essay will focus particularly on the positions taken by Vatican II, especially in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen gentium) and in the Decree on Ecumenism (Unitatis redintegratio). Our reflection on Vatican II in the light of modern ecumenical speculation will, it is hoped, provide some indications of the directions presently open to Roman Catholic theology.
TL;DR: The feeling of future shock or science-fiction syndrome as mentioned in this paper describes the feeling that reality merges with fiction, imperceptibly, without clear boundaries, and because imagination has hardly any rules or limits, the result is a frightening confusion.
Abstract: PEOPLE ARE uneasy. Call it future shock or science-fiction syndrome— the experience is that reality merges with fiction, imperceptibly, without clear boundaries. What is fiction today becomes reality tomorrow; and because imagination has hardly any rules or limits, the result is a frightening confusion. It seems there is nothing scientists could not and would not do. Add to this irresponsible "omnipotence" a touch of pessimism, and the anxiety complex is complete. More recently I came across this uneasiness in a new context. Newspaper reports on scientific issues seem to prepare the public for a fantastic "brave new world" of a biological revolution. They say: "It is possible now.. ." or "It will soon be possible..." and then they present us with some nightmarish monster of biological novelty. Quite recently I read the following: "Through genetic engineering, scientists will be able within a few years to alter virtually any human trait, creating children with blue eyes, prehensile tails, or startling adaptations for a completely different environment." Most of us would be at least slightly shocked by a statement like this, especially because.it is packaged with all the trimmings of reality, since "within a few years" seems to be almost as good as now. In other words, the distinction between the impossible and the real is lost. Scientists can do anything, and in our hypnotic fascination with new discoveries, what we can do we must do, according to the irrational spirit of the technological imperative. No wonder we feel uneasy. But there are some other facets to our anxiety. In a short article, Willard Gaylin presented quite forcefully the uneasiness of many people about the work of scientists, including the scientists themselves. He stated that "the image of the frightened scientist, guilt ridden over his own creation, ceased to be theoretical with the explosion of the first atomic bomb... some biological scientists now wary and forewarned are trying to consider the ethical, social, and political implications of their research... they are even starting to ask whether some research ought to be done at all.. .beginning to shake some of the traditional illusions of a science above morality or value-free science." We can detect trends in our society desiring to curtail scientific research, even by force if necessary, to only beneficial knowledge, which cannot be used for destruction. 1 On dust jacket of David Rorvik, Brave New Baby (New York: Doubleday, 1971). 2 Willard Gaylin, in New York Times Magazine, March 5, 1972.
TL;DR: In the early sixties, a new appraisal of black religion and the emergence of a distinctive black theology emerged as discussed by the authors, and the search for an authentic, indigenous black theology quickly spread beyond Washington and Cone, and soon a considerable body of literature was emerging which was analyzing the black church and the black religious heritage in a new light.
Abstract: W THE theological and cultural history of the sixties is written, the black renaissance will surely be considered one of the dominant factors in the period. Not only in civil rights but also in literature, history, culture, and theology, the black awakening has led to a new awareness of black peoplehood and personhood. From a theological standpoint the most striking aspects of this whole "revolution" have been the new appraisals of black religion and the emergence of a distinctive black theology. The catalytic book in the movement now appears to have been Joseph Washington's Black Religion (Boston: Beacon, 1964), which showed that there are elements of black history and church life which do not fit into the established categories of white theology, and that in fact white Christianity (in all of its diverse traditional forms) is sick unto death because of its deep intertwinings with paternalistic and/or oppressive societies. A second influential book which deepened the analysis of a distinctive black theology and which showed its affinities with the emerging mood of black militancy was James Cone's Black Theology and Black Power (New York: Seabury, 1968). Cone condemned the black churches for so docilely having subscribed to the white man's faith and thereby reinforcing the tentacles of racism in American society. The advocates of black power, he argued, have a more realistic appraisal of the black condition and hence offer a more viable alternative to blacks for the elimination of oppression. Black theology attempts to read the Bible from the distinctive perspective of black suffering and thereby provides a bridge between the Christian heritage and black militancy. The search for an authentic, indigenous black theology quickly spread beyond Washington and Cone, and soon a considerable body of literature was emerging which was analyzing the black church and the black religious heritage in a new light. Washington's The Politics of God (Boston: Beacon, 1967) and Albert B. Cleage, Jr.'s The Black Messiah (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968) received considerable attention, and Cone provided the first systematic exposition of a black theology in his A Black Theology of Liberation (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970). The strident antiwhite posture of Cone made him the foremost interpreter of black theology and indeed a controversial figure even in the black community. Recently, however, two other attempts at a black
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that S. relies entirely on a religiously oriented sociology of knowledge and on theology, and that this approach needs to be supplemented by a philosophical anthropology if it is to avoid making ethics a strictly functional and extrinsic aspect of human existence.
Abstract: impressionistic. But the most serious objection to S.'s project is that, somewhat ironically, he implicitly wants to resacralize all of ethical reasoning. This desire arises from two sources. First, because of his belief that every ethos ultimately rests on some sort of religious credo, there can be no adequate consideration of fundamental ethical questions outside the theological framework. S. relies entirely on a religiously oriented sociology of knowledge and on theology. His approach needs to be supplemented by a philosophical anthropology if it is to avoid making ethics a strictly functional and extrinsic aspect of human existence. Second, S. conceives of religious belief or credo as a more or less self-contained system of symbols. From these symbols he believes that a social ideology can be constructed. This approach is reminiscent of the theology based almost exclusively on propositions or dogmatic statements. S. comes close to moving beyond this approach in his treatment of the relationship between the Trinity and the urban ethos, but a distinct note of what might be called symbolic rationalism persists. But despite these criticisms this is a valuable book. It is especially timely in its attempt to relate a genuinely theological ethic to the categories of modern social analysis.
TL;DR: The fact that a theologian or a church historian must still prove the idea that the gospel has a political message, against a dominant tradition of theoretical apoliticism in theology, is the measure of the Church's continuing forgetfulness of its Jewish prophetic roots and its acceptance of a Platonic, individualistic concept of salvation as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: THE FACT that a theologian or church historian must still prove the idea that the gospel has a political message, against a dominant tradition of theoretical apoliticism in theology, is the measure of the Church's continuing forgetfulness of its Jewish prophetic roots and its acceptance of a Platonic, individualistic concept of salvation. The biblical prophetic message brought together as a single vision the dualisms between the sacred and the secular, the individual and society, the spiritual and the material, which Christianity absorbed through the religious culture of later Hellenism. Israel's God was a God who acts in history—saeculariter. Its ethical message was addressed to the community, and to the individual in his social context. Since the political leaders were mostly responsible for this, much of the prophetic rebuke was addressed to the rich and powerful, "who grind the faces of the poor, bring near the seat of violence, and are not troubled by the ruin of the people." Israel's hope for salvation did not split the human community from the cosmos, but looked forward to a total transfiguration of man and nature in the kingdom of God. This telos of human society in history is not otherworldly in the sense of a flight to heaven which leaves the present world unchanged; rather it implied an ultimate grappling with the systemic disorder in the world itself that would overcome it and bring creation into harmony with God's wilL The prayer which Jesus taught His disciples puts this matter in a nutshell: "God's kingdom come"—which is to say the time and place where "God's will is done, on earth as it is in heaven." Heaven, here, stands as the mandate for what must be done on earth, not as a place of flight beyond the earth to an "other place" beyond earthly potentials.
TL;DR: The Louvain meeting as mentioned in this paper was the last meeting of the World Council of Churches' Faith and Order Commission, which has been held every three or four years since 1951, providing a privileged observation post from which to survey current trends in ecumenism in many nations and communions.
Abstract: FOR MORE than fifty years the Faith and Order movement has been bringing together qualified churchmen and theologians from many Christian traditions to collaborate on those questions of doctrine and polity that underlie the present divisions among the churches. In 1948, when the World Council of Churches came into being, Faith and Order became a Commission of that Council. The meetings of the Faith and Order Commission, which have taken place every three or four years since 1951, provide a privileged observation post from which to survey current trends in ecumenism in many nations and communions. The latest gathering, held at Louvain in Belgium from August 2 to 13, 1971, had been carefully planned more than a year in advance by the Working Committee under the chairmanship of Prof. J. Robert Nelson of Boston and by the Faith and Order Secretariat directed by Rev. Lukas Vischer at Geneva. In attendance were some 115 Commission members, including twenty proxies, and a considerable number of staff, consultants, invited guests, and journalists. Meeting for the first time since the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Uppsala in 1968, the Commission had to consider its response to the new trend toward greater secular involvement to which Uppsala had given added impetus. The Working Committee accordingly selected as the main theme for the Louvain meeting \"The Unity of the Church and the Unity of Mankind.\" This theme was introduced by Prof. John Meyendorff, then acting chairman (and now chairman) of the Commission, at a plenary session on August 3. The main theme was discussed in five Sections, each of which met seven times, from August 4 to 9, and then debated in several plenary sessions from August 10 to 12. In addition to the main theme, the Louvain meeting considered a number of Faith and Order reports that had been requested by previous meetings and completed since the last meeting of the Commission at Bristol in 1967. These reports were reviewed by five Committees, each of which met six times from August 4 to 10. Each of these Committees presented its reports for general
TL;DR: Seely Beggiani's stimulating article "A Case For Logocentric Theology" has treated a question which is fundamental from several points of view as discussed by the authors, and it has broached the issue of the meaning of Jesus Christ for the rest of us men.
Abstract: Seely Beggiani's stimulating article \"A Case For Logocentric Theology\" has treated a question which is fundamental from several points of view. Most important, of course, it has broached the issue of the meaning of Jesus Christ for the rest of us men. And this is always a timely and critical question, one which must always be asked with renewed urgency as well as from a constantly moving point of view. It is an inquiry which can never be exhausted and which remains the perennially central concern of Christian preaching and theology. The major objective of the article seems to be a genuinely kerygmatic one: to bridge the apparent distance between Jesus and ourselves in order that we might more readily recognize and respond to His significance. At least two general tendencies are available in the tradition for bringing Christ closer to us. One of these is to emphasize the human dimensions of Christ, the other to predicate Christological characteristics of men. It seems clear that the approach of Beggiani's paper, while not excluding the first, is that of rethinking the second option. Thus, instead of a Christology \"from below,\" we end up with a quite unique \"anthropology from above.\" The following is intended to be a critique of the manner in which this rethinking is carried out. We may distill from the article three distinct, though closely related, themes which seem to raise problems for theological anthropology as well as for Christian preaching. The first of these is the kerygmatic and hermeneutical assumption that the notion of the Logos, seen almost in disassociation from the humanity of Christ, can serve more suitably and intelligibly than Christ's human nature as the basic category for the Christian's understanding the source of his sanctification. In response to this, I shall argue below that there is a disjunction implied here which is kerygmatically self-defeating precisely because it is theologically unsupportable, especially by way of appeal to Rahner's theology of the symbol. The second theme, correlative to the first, is the notion that the Logos relates or can relate to each human individual in a manner similar to or side by side with and \"approximating\" the hypostatic union; it is hypothesized that each man has a \"potential\" for such an exhaustive
TL;DR: Lonergan as discussed by the authors argues that the human mind is governed by an unrestricted dynamism toward the fulness of truth, reality, and goodness and that from this dynamism one can distil the transcendental notions of the true, the real, and the good.
Abstract: METHOD IN THEOLOGY. By Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. Pp. xiv + 368. $10.00. Among the many works on theological method, this one is outstanding in that it presents an original and internally consistent theory, systematically constructed according to a fully articulated philosophy of human knowing. In the first four chapters Lonergan sets forth the presuppositions of theology: he describes the dynamism of the human mind, explores the nature of method in general, and analyzes faith as \"the knowledge born of religious love\" (p. 115). The fifth chapter, central to the book, sets forth the eight functional specialties that are said to comprise theology. Then in eight additional chapters the author gives fuller explanations of each of these functional specialties. Transcendental method provides the basic framework. L. holds that the human mind is governed by an unrestricted dynamism toward the fulness of truth, reality, and goodness, and that from this dynamism one can distil the transcendental notions of the true, the real, and the good. These notions, taken in reference to L.'s four levels of intentionality (experience, insight, judgment, and decision), yield four transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. The criteria used in transcendental method are thus rooted in the very nature of the human mind. By obeying the transcendental precepts man progressively expands his horizons and undergoes a series of conversions—intellectual, moral, and religious—culminating in the experience of the love of God. By concentrating on the unrestricted dynamism of religion, L. makes ample provision for pluralism in the realms of doctrine, systematics, and communication. Repeatedly he protests against a \"classicism\" that would absolutize some one particular culture with its thoughtforms and categories, but with equal vigor he rejects a relativism that would cut off man's access to the absolute. Divisive pluralisms, he argues, are those that result from an absence of religious conversion or, in other words, from a failure to observe the transcendental precepts. L.'s treatment of transcendental method is, in my estimation, very lucid and helpful. I wish, however, that he had been able to give more emphasis to the notion of mystery and to bring out the positive value of symbols for clarifying and intensifying the experience of mystery. L. is perhaps too confident of man's power to conceptualize the transcendent, including revelation, in an objectifying way and thus to move beyond symbol—a term he regularly uses in a pejorative sense as if
TL;DR: The first book by a non-Catholic to have won the Shea prize for the American Catholic Historical Association (AHA) was as discussed by the authors, and it is the only book to date to have been recognized by the AHA.
Abstract: school, Ammonius, was never baptized but, by baptizing Aristotle, did something which, directly or indirectly, was to prove far more important for the future development of Christian doctrine in the West. Analogous considerations would apply from a slightly different point of view to such writers as the Pseudo-Dionysius and particularly Boethius, who, as Courcelle has shown, had probably been a student of Ammonius in Alexandria and whose works reflect some of the same general preoccupations. Whatever else may be said about it, the book as a whole bears out P.'s claim that there is more to be learned about what the early Christian believed and taught than was recognized by the older history of dogma. As such, it fully deserves the lively interest with which it has been greeted not only by theologians and Church historians but students of intellectual history as well. The fact that it is the first book by a nonCatholic to have earned the Shea prize awarded by the American Catholic Historical Association bears eloquent witness to the thoroughly ecumenical spirit in which it was written. More than most endeavors of its kind, it is capable of providing a much-needed antidote to what P. himself once described as \"the murky subjectivities of a religious solipsism that cannot see beyond the borders of its own century.\
TL;DR: In this article, B.'s work is deliberately limited to a study of marriage and the family, and these very limits make possible the presentation of an excellent work in readable yet scholarly form, which is a worthy picture of early Christianity's first great scholar setting forth the beauty of Christian marriage more clearly than any work since Ephesians.
Abstract: notions of indissoluble marriages. Origen (Comm. in Mt. 23) speaks clearly of the dissolution of marriages before death. To reject the propriety of the word \"indissolubility\" in pre-Nicene studies is not to conclude that remarriage is tolerated, and yet it does avoid a retrojection which could be hermeneutically disastrous. While the scope of B.'s work is deliberately limited to a study of marriage and the family, these very limits make possible the presentation of an excellent work in readable yet scholarly form. B. has broken new ground and given us a worthy picture of early Christianity's first great scholar setting forth the beauty of Christian marriage more clearly than any work since Ephesians.