Showing papers in "Theology in 1967"
TL;DR: This paper pointed out that "no creed in Christendom teaches kindness to animals as a dogma of religion" and that "the primitive Christians by laying so much stress upon a future life, and placing the lower creatures out of the pale of hope, placed them at the same time out ofthe pale ofsympathy, and thus laid the foundation for an utter disregard of animals." They also pointed out the fact that "it was not until the nineteenth century when orthodox Christianity had lost much of its power over European minds, that the idea that it might be a good thing to
Abstract: Or rather, "Theodicy and Anirnal Neglect", for with a few noble exceptions theologians have done far more to discourage than to stimulate a concern for the lower creatures. As Wcstermarck reminded us, "No creed in Christendom teaches kindness to animals as a dogma of religion. . . . Nor is there any such allusion in nlost treatises on ethics which base their teachings upon distinctly Christian tenets."! W. R. Inge conceded that "it is unhappily true that (in the words of A. Jameson in 1854) 'the primitive Christians by laying so much stress upon a future life, and placing the lower creatures out of the pale of hope, placed them at the same time out ofthe pale ofsympathy, and thus laid the foundation for an utter disregard of animals.' "2 Whether or not we agree with Inge's diagnosis ofthe cause ofthe trouble, we can hardly disagree with the historical fact that, to quote Lecky, "the inculcation of humanity to animals on a wide scale is the work ofa recent and a secular age" ;3 or as Aldous Huxley puts it more pointedly, "It was not until the nineteenth century, when orthodox Christianity had lost much of its power over European minds, that the idea that it might be a good thing to behave humanely towards animals began to make hcadway'l." "Weare thus faced with a two-fold problem, first to account for the apparent callousness of Christian theology in this respect, and secondly to enquire on what theological foundation a positive ethic of reverence for animal life should rest. This present article, however, must be confined to the former question, and indeed to one neglected aspect of it theodicy, which I suggest may be as much to blame for the situation as the traditionally harsh interpretation of the doctrine of man's dominion over nature (with almost exclusive emphasis on Gen. 9: 2-3, and 1 Cor. 9: 9), or the theory that animals have no reason or "rational soul" and therefore no rights, on which non sequitur writers like Joseph Rickaby concluded that "we have ... no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, to the lower animals, as neither to stocks and stones.... Much more in all that conduces to the sustenance of man may we give pain to brutes, as also in the pursuit ofscience. Nor are we bound to any anxious care to make this pain as little as may be."5 Mercy is only recommended on the ground that cruelty to animals could dispose one to be cruel to human beings. The charge that theodicy has also condoned cruelty to animals is based
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TL;DR: Hooker as discussed by the authors argues that the sufferings of the Son of Man are not a qualification of the idea of Messiahship, but the inevitable consequence of the rejection of the Messiah.
Abstract: The investigation is limited to St Mark's Gospel; but the same key will unlock at any rate many of the other doors. Within St Mark, Dr Hooker has the courage to take seriously the two occurrences of the phrase in Ch. 2, making an impressive case for their authenticity and relevance to the total scheme. Equally courageous in the present temper is her contention that, in Ch. 8, Jesus was not rejecting \"Messiah\" in favour of \"the Son ofman\": \"the sufferings of the Son ofman are ... not a qualification of the idea ofMessiahship, but the inevitable consequence of the rejection of the Messiah\" (pp. I I I £). In 13 : 26 and 14: 62 she is inclined, with some other scholars, to find, originally, the theme of vindication rather than of parousia. What is wrong with this robustly commonsensical approach? Why have we had to wait so long for views already associated in part with C. H. Dodd and T. W. Manson to be taken up, reformulated in detail, and fortified with such extensive support? There are problems, ofcourse, confronting this solution. One is the familiar fact that there seems to be a distinction between Jesus and the Son of man in Mark 8: 38. Another is the fact that no single, completely self-contained Son of man saying exhibits more than one of the three so-called types. Yet another is concerned with the meaning ofblasphemy in the trial before the sanhedrin. But to all these Dr Hooker has replies which at the very least command respect; and the alternative theories at present fashionable have to reckon with far more serious difficulties, leading, as she shows, to strangely tortuous arguments and sophistries. At any rate, even the most determined opponents will henceforth be compelled to explain why they make that initial assumption about the \"heavenly\" Son of man: and if there were nothing else in this richly suggestive study, that, in itself: would be something ofa break-through.
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TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that a religious explanation cannot really be an explanation because it fails to conform to the criteria for, say, scientific explanation, but such a legislative bar is too easy to be convincing unless it is supported by alternative accounts of the matter which are in detail satisfactory.
Abstract: in order to understand what we believe, and help others to understand, we must be prepared to deal as best we can with any difficulties that arise; and since philosophical difficulties evidently arise, we must try to deal with them. If any such attempt is embarked upon, there are two things to be said about it. The first is that it cannot proceed by knocking off particular doctrines and philosophical problems in total isolation from the rest. It is true that the more completely articulated a doctrinal system becomes, the greater the area it exposes, so to speak, to philosophical criticism, but the greater also is the coherence and explanatory force it achieves if, that is, it is held to succeed. It may be argued that a religious\"explanation\" cannot really be an explanation because it fails to conform to the criteria for, say, scientific explanation, but such a legislative bar is too easy to be convincing unless it is supported by alternative accounts of the matter which are in detail satisfactory.... The second point to be made is that this cannot be an individual enterprise. Perhaps this is part of what Hugh Price intends in denying that religious doctrines are theories. Individuals may have theories about the significance of the Resurrection; but the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection is not such a theory, although it has both cognitive content and explanatory force. There is another reason for Hugh Price's conviction that doctrines are not theories. Our concern with them is not primarily theoretical but practical. The question is, as he puts it, \"Does the Spirit of him which raised up Jesus dwell in me?\" And with this I agree. But I do not see that we cannot properly have a theoretical concern with what is primarily for us of practical concern. Nor are the two concerns entirely independent. Thinking is a form of doing and doing is often best done with thought.