A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

TLDR: The authors argue that the very assumptions underpinning the so-called "duty of civility" should lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it, arguing that the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment rule it out.

Abstract: In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so-called “duty of civility” ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the “duty of civility,” which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole