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Anonymous Sealed-Bid Auction on Ethereum

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TLDR
This paper presents a formal model tailored to study auction systems that facilitate anonymity, as well as a generic protocol for achieving bid confidentiality and bidder anonymity using existing cryptographic primitives such as designated verifier ring signature.
Abstract
In a competitive market, online auction systems enable optimal trading of digital products and services. Bidders can participate in existing blockchain-based auctions while protecting the confidentiality of their bids in a decentralized, transparent, secure, and auditable manner. However, in a competitive market, parties would prefer not to disclose their interests to competitors, and to remain anonymous during auctions. In this paper, we firstly analyze the specific requirements for blockchain-based anonymous fair auctions. We present a formal model tailored to study auction systems that facilitate anonymity, as well as a generic protocol for achieving bid confidentiality and bidder anonymity using existing cryptographic primitives such as designated verifier ring signature. We demonstrate that it is secure using the security model we presented. Towards the end, we demonstrate through extensive simulation results on Ethereum blockchain that the proposed protocol is practical and has minimal associated overhead. Furthermore, we discuss the complexity and vulnerabilities that a blockchain environment might introduce during implementation.

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Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

TL;DR: Zhang et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property, which can guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins.
Journal ArticleDOI

An anonymous and fair auction system based on blockchain

TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors presented a blockchain-based online auction solution as well as an auction protocol that uses ring signatures to guarantee anonymity, and the proposed scheme effectively resolves disputes that may arise during the auction.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

TL;DR: Zhang et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property, which can guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins.
References
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Book ChapterDOI

Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing

TL;DR: It is shown how to distribute a secret to n persons such that each person can verify that he has received correct information about the secret without talking with other persons.
Book ChapterDOI

Zether: Towards Privacy in a Smart Contract World

TL;DR: This research examines how smart contract platforms such as Ethereum and Libra provide ways to seamlessly remove trust and add transparency to various distributed applications, yet these platforms lack mechanisms to guarantee user privacy, even at the level of simple payments.
Journal ArticleDOI

Supporting private data on Hyperledger Fabric with secure multiparty computation

TL;DR: In this paper, peers encrypt their private data before storing it on the chain and use secure MPC whenever such private data are needed in a transaction on Hyperledger Fabric.
Book ChapterDOI

Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction on the Ethereum Blockchain

TL;DR: This paper presents a smart contract for a verifiable sealed-bid auction on the Ethereum blockchain and provides an analysis of the proposed protocol and the smart contract design, in addition to the estimated gas costs associated with the different transactions.
Book ChapterDOI

Strain : A Secure Auction for Blockchains

TL;DR: The main idea behind Strain is a new maliciously-secure two-party comparison mechanism executed between any pair of bids in parallel, which allows Strain to achieve constant latency in both the number of parties and the bid length.
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