Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behavior

TLDR: In this paper, the authors discuss the economic economics of antitrust enforcement and the modern corporation vertical merger guidelines, interpreting the 1982 reforms, and the need for a broader view of the law and economics.

Abstract: Part 1 Mergers: economies as an antitrust defense - the welfare trade-offs the vertical integration of production - market failure considerations antitrust enforcement and the modern corporation vertical merger guidelines - interpreting the 1982 reforms. Part 2 Contracting: the economics of antitrust - transaction cost considerations assessing vertical market restrictions - antitrust ramifications of the transaction cost approach assessing contrast. Part 3 Strategic behaviour: wage rates as a barrier to entry - the Pennington case in perspective predatory pricing - a strategic and welfare analysis pretrial uses of economists - on the use of incentive logic to screen predation. Part 4 Commentary: comments on the political economy of antitrust intellectual foundations of law and economics - the need for a broader view antitrust enforcement - where it has been, where it is going.