Poser la question du divin chez Aristote, c’est determiner a quelle question la conception aristotelicienne du divin est censee repondre. L’examen methodique de l’integralite du corpus aristotelicum et, tout particulierement, des trois textes dans lesquels Aristote place l’etude des realites divines au centre de son enquete (Physique, VII-VIII ; De Cœlo, I-II, Metaphysique, Lambda) permet de formuler deux conclusions principales. En premier lieu, il apparait clairement que la question du divin n’est pas, aux yeux d’Aristote, de nature theologique, mais archologique. Nulle part, en effet, l’etude du divin n’est menee pour elle-Meme; elle s’ancre, au contraire, dans un examen explicitement dedie aux principes premiers de la phusis ou des ousiai. La conception aristotelicienne du divin et des dieux est ainsi le produit d’un examen methodique des etres premiers et des principes, examen grâce auquel Aristote espere produire une determination rigoureuse du mode d’etre du principe en tant que tel et resoudre, par la meme, certaines apories relatives a la question de l’arche. En second lieu, il convient de noter que les principaux textes devolus a l’etude des etres divins se distinguent les uns des autres par des nuances methodologiques significatives. Selon que la question du divin prend naissance au sein de la science naturelle ou de la science des substances, selon qu’elle appartient a la physique ou a l’ousiologie, la preuve de l’existence des realites divines, de meme que la description de leur nature et de leurs fonctions, font l’objet de formulations diverses, toutes infeodees a la logique conceptuelle de la science qui les rend possibles. En somme, chaque examen des realites divines se distingue par sa tournure singuliere, qui n’est autre que le produit de la regionalisation des discours, c’est-A-Dire de leur adaptation methodologique aux outils de la science qui les engendre.

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Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II, and VIII.

La question du divin dans la philosophie aristotélicienne

Modern medicine faces fundamental challenges that various approaches to the philosophy of medicine have tried to address. One of these approaches is based on the ancient concept of phronesis. This paper investigates whether this concept can be used as a moral basis for the challenges facing modern medicine and, in particular, analyses phronesis as it is applied in the works of Pellegrino and Thomasma. It scrutinises some difficulties with a phronesis-based theory, specifically, how it presupposes a moral community of professionals. It is argued that Pellegrino and Thomasma's concept of phronesis corresponds to a Hippocratic concept of techne, and that this latter concept seems to address many of the challenging issues Pellegrino and Thomasma also address. Thus, if modern medicine is to find its philosophical model in ancient concepts, it appears that the Hippocratic techne is closer to the ancient concept of medicine than the Aristotelian phronesis, and that it might avoid many of the pitfalls of a phronesis-based approach.  Die moderne Medizin scheint fundamentalen Herausforderungen gegenuberzustehen. Mit diversen Ansatzen hat die Philosophie der Medizin versucht, diesen Herausforderungen zu begegnen. Ein solcher Ansatz basiert auf dem alten Konzept der Phronesis. Dieser Artikel geht der Frage nach, ob dieses Konzept der modernen Medizin als moralische Grundlage bei der Losung ihrer Probleme dienen kann. Die Analyse gilt insbesondere den Anwendungsformen der Phronesis in den Arbeiten von Pellegrino und Thomasma. Es werden einige Schwierigkeiten der auf Phronesis basierenden Theorie aufgezeigt, insbesondere die von ihr vorausgesetzte Moral des Berufsstands. Es wird der Standpunkt vertreten, dass das Konzept der Phronesis von Pellegrino und Thomasma dem hippokratischen Techne-Konzept entspricht und dass sich dieses Konzept mit vielen der schwierigen Probleme, die sie ansprechen, auseinandersetzt. Wenn die moderne Medizin tatsachlich ihr Vorbild in antiken Konzepten finden sollte, scheint die hippokratische Techne dem antiken Konzept der Medizin naher zu sein als die aristotelische Phronesis und viele Probleme des auf Phronesis basierenden Ansatzes umgehen zu konnen.  La medecine moderne semble etre confrontee par des defis essentiels. La philosophie de la medecine a tente par differentes approches de repondre a ces defis. L'une de ces approches se fonde sur l'ancien concept de la phronesis. Le present article examine dans quelle mesure ce concept peut servir de fondement moral a la medecine moderne pour faire face a ces defis. L'analyse s'attache en particulier aux applications de la phronesis dans les travaux de Pellegrino et de Thomasma. Certaines difficultes inherentes a une theorie fondee sur la phronesis sont examinees, notamment le postulat d'un consensus moral de la profession. L'article defend le point de vue selon lequel le concept de phronesis de Pellegrino et Thomasma correspond a un concept hippocratique de techne et que ce concept␣semble s'attaquer a un grand nombre des problemes complexes qu'ils abordent. Si␣la medecine moderne devait veritablement trouver son modele dans␣les concepts de l'Antiquite, il semble que la techne hippocratique soit plus␣proche du concept antique de la medecine que la phronesis d'Aristote et qu'elle pourrait s'eviter bien des problemes lies a une approche fondee sur la phronesis.

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Medicine as practical wisdom (phronesis)

The aim of this thesis is to try to answer the question as to how and to what extent the Aristotelian wise ruler will intervene in the life of the political community with a view to making people and communities better, both when he lives in the best and happiest city and when the polis is far away from the ideal conditions. I outline what I take to be a plausible account of political activity, in particular from the perspective of people in power, in the light of the most relevant ethical issues discussed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics: happiness, ethical excellence, wisdom, law, justice and friendship. The idea of power that I intend to emerge is not that of the power of individuals, an exclusive possession of rulers, but of a kind of political activity that requires some kind of involvement of the ruled for its full-fledged actualisation. In the first half of this work (chapters 1-6) I investigate the aims and methods of the art of the lawgiver, mainly with reference to the ideal polis. I begin by treating the issue ')f human happiness as the aim pursued by political expertise, and show a possible way in which individual conceptions of happiness may be reconciled with such an aim. Then, I introduce the issue of phronesis as the faculty enabling those in power to set out what forwards happiness, and try to show its relationship with ethical excellence. The issues of law, justice and friendship I treat as expressions of political wisdom; but I insist on political friendship as the ideal in the light of which a higher kind of justice might be realised in existing political communities. In the second half of my work (chapters 7-10) I illustrate how principles of natural justice are variably instantiated in existing political communities and how their instantiation affects the quality of constitutions. I also investigate the possibility of govemm_ent by wise rulers in imperfect communities and the extent to which Aristotle thinks such rulers may bring about a transformation within them; special regard will be paid to the 'polity', conceived as the outcome of a wise activity of transfomation in bad communities. Chapter IV: The' Other-regarding' Aspect of Universal Justice 115 4. 1: Introduction 115 4.2: Ethical Excellences in Universal Justice: Their Political Nature 117 4.3: Ethical Excellences as Forms of Isotes 126 4.4: Conclusions 137 Part ill: Political Friendship: A Path to Authentic Justice Chapter V: Between Advantage and Ethical Excellence. The Relevance 140 of Friendship in Political Theory 5. 1: Introduction 140 5.2: llOAI'ClICi] <plAza. A Real Form of Friendship 141 5.3: The Double Nature of Political Friendship 151 5.4: Conclusions 163 Chapter VI: Relationships between Political Friendship and Justice 165 6.1: Introduction 165 6.2: Friendship or Justice? A Reading of NE VIII, 1155a22-6 167 6.3: Correspondences Between Levels of Justice and Friendship 175 6.4: Conclusions 186 Part IV: Nature and Convention. Instantiating Natural Justice in Political Constitutions Chapter VII: A Justice in the Making. Nature and Convention in Political Justice 7. 1: Introduction 7.2: How Natural is Natural Justice? Ideal and Conventional in 1:0 <pveJ"l1coJ) 6i1caloJ) 7.3: Conventionality in Natural Justice 7.4: Conclusions Chapter VIII: The Changeability of Natural Justice 8. 1: Introduction 189 189

Power and wisdom : the craft of ruling in Aristotle's philosophy

The history of ancient Greek education starts with Homer. His epics repeatedly praise the “virtue ( )” of the chivalric mind: thus, education in antiquity originates as the education of the chivalric mind. This is the first step with which scholars of pedagogy and history start to describe ancient Greek education. In the Spartan milieu, this education takes on a military colouration: Spartan education aims at developing virtue in soldiers. The era of “old Athenian education ( )” follows it. This education shifts away from military virtue to virtues in the field of sport and music: it comes to stress the importance of “being a man both beautiful and good ( )”. With the appearance of the Sophists, this education shifts its emphasis to the education of virtue in the fields of neither sport nor music, but to the education of virtue in the field of politics. In the course of this history, many intellectuals, such as philosophers and Sophists, expand on the controversy regarding the nature of virtue and the process of education. Their struggles bear fruit in the era of Hellenism, and the tradition is inherited in the Roman Empire. Thus, the history of ancient Greek education may well be said to be the history of the transition of the concept of virtue, i.e., the history of the transition

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How Aristotle’s Theory of Education Has Been Studied in Our Century

Abstract Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn‘t generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle‘s views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness.

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Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II, and VIII.

Citations

La question du divin dans la philosophie aristotélicienne

Medicine as practical wisdom (phronesis)

Power and wisdom : the craft of ruling in Aristotle's philosophy

How Aristotle’s Theory of Education Has Been Studied in Our Century

Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and Contemplation