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Joseph Harrington is the author of Things Come On (an amneoir) (Wesleyan University Press, 2011), a mixed-genre work relating the twinned narratives of the Watergate scandal and his mother’s cancer; it was a Rumpus Poetry Book Club selection. He is the author of the chapbooks Earth Day Suite (Beard of Bees, 2010) and Of Some Sky (Bedouin, forthcoming), as well as the critical work Poetry and the Public (Wesleyan University Press, 2002). His creative work has appeared or is forthcoming in Bombay Gin, Hotel Amerika, Colorado Review, 1913: a journal of forms, and Fact-Simile, among others. Harrington is the recipient of a Millay Colony residency and a Fulbright Chair. The Spirit of the Laws

Executive review : kontrola konstytucyjności prawa przez władzę wykonawczą w Stanach Zjednoczonych

The Spirit of the Laws

The common law

By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action: Cooper, Philip J.: Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 320 pp., Publication Date: June 2002

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City and county of san francisco

/pdf/america-s-constitution-a-biography-2k8niq0z9i.pdf

America's constitution: a biography.

Our chief magistrate and his powers

Understanding Administrative Law

Recent cases such as Boerne, Kimel and Garrett highlight the fact that the most important question regarding judicial supremacy focuses on the proper degree of deference between the branches rather than the possibility of extralegal defiance of the Court. Extrajudicial interpretation of the Constitution has often been criticized as problematic, insufficient and not authoritative. Although it is widely accepted that nonjudicial actors can and do interpret the Constitution, many constitutional theorists hold to a theory of judicial supremacy that argues that the Supreme Court is the ultimate, authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. This paper critically examines three of the most prominent objections to extrajudicial constitutional interpretations, and corollary defenses of judicial supremacy, and finds each inadequate. The three objections are that extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is 1) anarchic, 2) irrational, and 3) tyrannical. Each posits a corresponding virtue of judicial supremacy in terms of 1) the settlement function of the courts, 2) the deliberative function of the courts, and 3) the countermajoritarian function of the courts. The paper offers analytical and empirical responses to these critiques of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, suggesting reasons why such interpretations should be regarded as more authoritative and deserving of greater deference by the courts. These arguments have implications not only for debates over judicial supremacy per se, but also for the related debate over the proper scope of judicial review.

Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses

Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers. Surprisingly, however, there has been little sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in this context. The scant existing scholarship is either limited to specific subject areas or focused primarily on judicial doctrine without addressing the use of historical practice in broader conceptual or theoretical terms. To the extent that the issue has been discussed, most accounts of how historical practice should inform the separation of powers require “acquiescence” by the branch of government whose prerogatives the practice implicates, something that is viewed as critical to giving historical practice the force of law. Yet the concept of acquiescence has been treated much too casually in the literature. Claims about acquiescence are typically premised on a Madisonian conception of interbranch competition, pursuant to which Congress and the Executive Branch are each assumed to have the tools and the motivation to guard against encroachments on their authority. It has become apparent from political science scholarship, however, that the Madisonian model does not accurately reflect the dynamics of modern congressional-executive relations. This requires a reexamination of the premises and implications of the idea of institutional acquiescence in particular, and of the role of historical practice more generally. Ultimately, we argue, the problems with the Madisonian model are not fatal to crediting historical practice in interpreting the separation of powers. But they do require more attention to the reasons why such practice is invoked, the extent to which the reasons demand institutional acquiescence, and the precise method by which such acquiescence is identified. To illustrate the importance of each of these questions, we present three case studies of constitutional debates concerning the separation of powers in which practice-based arguments are prominent - war powers, congressional-executive agreements, and removal of executive officers.

/pdf/historical-gloss-and-the-separation-of-powers-4zqqu5qnc4.pdf

Executive review : kontrola konstytucyjności prawa przez władzę wykonawczą w Stanach Zjednoczonych

Citations