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Joseph Harrington is the author of Things Come On (an amneoir) (Wesleyan University Press, 2011), a mixed-genre work relating the twinned narratives of the Watergate scandal and his mother’s cancer; it was a Rumpus Poetry Book Club selection. He is the author of the chapbooks Earth Day Suite (Beard of Bees, 2010) and Of Some Sky (Bedouin, forthcoming), as well as the critical work Poetry and the Public (Wesleyan University Press, 2002). His creative work has appeared or is forthcoming in Bombay Gin, Hotel Amerika, Colorado Review, 1913: a journal of forms, and Fact-Simile, among others. Harrington is the recipient of a Millay Colony residency and a Fulbright Chair. The Spirit of the Laws

Executive review : kontrola konstytucyjności prawa przez władzę wykonawczą w Stanach Zjednoczonych

The Spirit of the Laws

The common law

By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action: Cooper, Philip J.: Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 320 pp., Publication Date: June 2002

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City and county of san francisco

/pdf/america-s-constitution-a-biography-2k8niq0z9i.pdf

America's constitution: a biography.

/pdf/limitations-on-the-use-of-appropriations-riders-by-congress-dogezpto1v.pdf

Limitations on the Use of Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes

The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is the Department of Justice component to which the Attorney General has delegated the function of providing legal advice to guide the actions of the President and the agencies of the executive branch. OLC’s legal determinations are considered binding on the executive branch, subject to the supervision of the Attorney General and the ultimate authority of the President. From the outset of our constitutional system, Presidents have recognized that compliance with their constitutional obligation to act lawfully requires a reliable source of legal advice. In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, writing on behalf of President Washington, requested the Supreme Court’s advice regarding the United States’ treaty obligations with regard to the war between Great Britain and France. The Supreme Court declined the request, in important measure on the grounds that the Constitution vests responsibility for such legal determinations within the executive branch itself: “[T]he three departments of government ... being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions seems to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments.” Letter from John Jay to George Washington, August 8, 1793, quoted in 4 The Founders’ Constitution 258 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987).

/pdf/principles-to-guide-the-office-of-legal-counsel-4nsmqizd6s.pdf

Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel

American law of property : a treatise on the law of property in the United States

/pdf/separation-of-powers-under-the-texas-constitution-4ztok6dovx.pdf

Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution

Recent Presidents have claimed a power to disregard statutes that they deem unconstitutional, prompting critics to make an array of arguments against these assertions. As a matter of text, the Faithful Execution Clause supposedly bars such non-enforcement. As a matter of history, the English Parliament specifically prohibited a royal discretionary power to disregard statutes. Moreover, American Presidents did not exercise a power to disregard unconstitutional laws until almost a century after the Constitution’s creation. Taken together, these arguments are said to refute the regal pretensions of modern Presidents.This Article serves as an antidote to such claims, while sharpening our understanding of the proper Executive Branch stance towards unconstitutional statutes. The critics are correct in supposing that the President lacks a discretionary power to disregard unconstitutional statutes; instead, the Constitution is best read as obliging the President to disregard statutes he regards as unconstitutional. First, the Constitution never empowers the President to enforce unconstitutional statutes. He no more has the power to enforce such statutes than he has power to enforce the statutes of Georgia or Germany. Second, the President’s duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution requires the President to disregard unconstitutional statutes. When the President enforces a statute he regards as unconstitutional, he violates the Constitution no less than if he were to imprison citizens without hope of trial. Third, the Faithful Execution Clause requires the President to choose the Constitution over unconstitutional laws, in the same way that courts must choose the former over the latter. Consistent with these understandings, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson argued that executives could not enforce unconstitutional laws. Indeed, President Jefferson halted Sedition Act prosecutions on grounds that the Act was unconstitutional. According to Jefferson, his duty to defend the Constitution barred him from executing measures that violated it.