. There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature regarding the nature and possibility of Contract theory. On one hand, are those who argue (or assume) that there is, or should be, a single, general, universal theory of Contract Law, one applicable to all jurisdictions and all times. On the other hand, are those who assert that Contract theory should be localized to particular times and places, perhaps even with different theories for different types of agreements. This article considers one facet of this debate: evaluating the relevance of the fact that the remedies available for breach of contract can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. This wide variation in remedies for breach of a (contractual) promise is one central difference between promises in morality and enforceable agreements in law. The article asserts that variation of remedies strongly supports the conclusion that there is (and can be) no general, universal theory of Contract Law.

background

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1921081_code119209.pdf?abstractid=993949&rulid=64782&mirid=5

Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective

Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence between Law and Morality*

In this work I discuss several key aspects of welfare economics and policy analysis and I propose two original contributions to the growing field of behavioral public policymaking. After providing a historical perspective of welfare economics and an overview of policy analysis processes in the introductory chapter, in chapter 2 I discuss a debated issue of policymaking, the choice of the social welfare function. I contribute to this debate by proposing an original methodological contribution based on the analysis of the quantitative relationship among different social welfare functional forms commonly used by policy analysts. In chapter 3 I then discuss a behavioral policy to contrast indirect tax evasion based on the use of lotteries. I show that the predictions of my model based on non-expected utility are consistent with observed, and so far unexplained, empirical evidence of the policy success. Finally, in chapter 4 I investigate by mean of a laboratory experiment the effects of social influence on the individual likelihood to engage in altruistic punishment. I show that bystanders’ decision to engage in punishment is influenced by the punishment behavior of their peers and I suggest ways to enact behavioral policies that exploit this finding.

/pdf/social-welfare-and-behavioral-public-policies-kg26fvzomn.pdf

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

This paper proposes a quantitative approach to study two methodological problems arising when alternative legal rules are compared: a) aggregating individual into social preferences and b) choosing the object of maximization. We consider a redistribution policy that reduces inequality but diminishes total wealth and we specify a set of social welfare functions combining different preferences aggregation methods and maximands. For each social welfare function, we calculate its “price of equity”, defined as the maximum fraction of total wealth that a society is willing to sacrifice in order to implement the redistribution. Comparing the prices for equity across different social welfare function specifications, we identify systematic relationships and we rank them according to the efficiency-equity orientation. Results show that social welfare functions characterized by aggregation methods conventionally considered equity-oriented may reject redistribution policies that are evaluated as welfare-improving by social welfare functions using efficiency-oriented aggregation methods. Similarly, social welfare functions considered equity-oriented because using utility as object of maximization may reject distributive policies that are evaluated as welfare-improving by social welfare functions using wealth as maximand.We argue that a quantitative approach, by expounding the trade-off between equity and efficiency connected to different social welfare functions, may prove useful for rule-makers engaging in the choice of a normative criterion for the evaluation of social welfare.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2280451_code1961717.pdf?abstractid=2232220&mirid=1

Distributive Justice and the Comparison of Legal Rules: Quantify the 'Price of Equity'

/pdf/fairness-and-welfare-from-a-comparative-law-perspective-53j6w5vfia.pdf

Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective

Citations

Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence between Law and Morality*

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

Distributive Justice and the Comparison of Legal Rules: Quantify the 'Price of Equity'

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