From the viewpoint of game method, an empirical study on Chinese students’ risk attitudes in college choice behavior was done in order to see in what ways students choose in the game of college choice. An experiment simulated the application course was carried out ten times in ten different groups of ten students to find the strategy space of students. According to the data got in the experiment, conclusions are drawn that students’ risk attitudes change with their rankings of scores, and students are more risky when they make decisions on small ratio matters, while more risk-aversive on big ratio matters.

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Game and Information Theory in Modern Managerial Economics

Students' Risk Attitudes in College Choice Game under Information Constraint

Market competition has entered into the era of brand competition with economic growth. Brand evaluation represents an important approach for brand management and value enhancement. In this paper, an analysis was made, based on the triangular fuzzy matrix game theory, on the profits and losses incurred by participating enterprises and evaluating institutions due to their adoption of different game strategies. The applications of triangular fuzzy matrix game theory were expanded to the brand valuation field, and a theoretical method for evaluating the current evaluation models was proposed.

https://www.jvejournals.com/article/18927/pdf

Research on brand valuation models based on triangular fuzzy matrix game

Platforms, or intermediaries that serve two distinct user groups in a market, are becoming increasingly common in ecommerce and digital marketing since the advent of web 2.0. This dissertation examines the role of three platforms that facilitate marketing interactions between two distinct user groups. In the first essay, Daily Deal Websites as Matchmakers, I examine the role that daily deal websites (e.g., Groupon, LivingSocial) serve in matching consumers and vendors. Specifically, I am interested in how competition between multiple platforms may segment both sides of the markets and allow each daily deal website to play the role of matchmaker. However, I also show that segmenting both sides of the market is difficult and this may explain the demise of many of these websites. In the second essay, Crowdfunding as a Vehicle for Raising Capital and for Price Discrimination, I investigate an entrepreneur’s optimal decision to set instruments available in a crowdfunding (e.g., Kickstarter, Indiegogo) campaign (campaign goal and funder reward). I find that conditional upon market conditions, consumers’ interest in the proposed product, and the entrepreneur’s need to fund the product through crowdfunding, that the entrepreneur may choose to set his instruments to either raise capital or to price discriminate. In the third essay, Setting Artist Royalties on Music Streaming Platforms, I investigate how a streaming platform (e.g., Spotify, Apple Music) may choose to set its royalty to attract artists to the platform. I explore when the streaming platform may choose to exclude high valuation artists.

Strategic platforms in the digital age

Project leader's lobbying behavior is a common phenomenon because research projects are constrained by investment funds in science-and-technology enterprises. But two decision-making methods of project at home and abroad, static analysis and options dynamic analysis, usually ignore lobbying behaviors, which cause deviation between analysis results and facts. This paper introduces project leader's lobbying for analyzing different results of investment decision under different conditions using information rent theory, and argues that project leader's lobbying plays a dual role of positive and negative. Based on that, this paper thinks that the negative effect may be restrained by the balance of project leader's double identity and setting up reasonable information rent, while positive effect can be used through restriction on lobbying interval and investment performance incentives mechanism.

Game and Information Theory in Modern Managerial Economics

Citations

Students' Risk Attitudes in College Choice Game under Information Constraint

Research on brand valuation models based on triangular fuzzy matrix game

Strategic platforms in the digital age

Notice of Retraction The impact of project leader's “lobbying behavior” on scientific research project decisions

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