scispace - formally typeset
Open AccessBook

In Praise of Desire

Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In this paper, the authors discuss the nature of deliberation in moral psychology and the role of reason in the process of making decisions, including the rationality of acting for reasons without deliberation and rationalizing reasons.
Abstract
Contents Introduction 0.1 Moral Psychology 0.2 Reason and Appetite 0.3 Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Realizer Desires 0.4 The Many Guises of the Good 0.5 The Work to be Done Part I: Reason Chapter 1: Deliberation 1.1 The Nature of Deliberation 1.2 The Rationality of Acts of Deliberation 1.3 Deliberation and Regress 1.4 Other Objections 1.5 Deliberative Exceptionalism 1.6 Is there an Ambiguity? 1.7 If not Deliberation, Then Representation? 1.8 Thinking and Acting for Reasons without Deliberation Chapter 2: How Deliberation Works 2.1 The Role of Deliberation 2.2 How Deliberation Works 2.3 The Moral of the Story Chapter 3: Thinking and Acting for Reasons 3.1 Objective Reasons and Rationalizing Reasons 3.2 Physical Properties, Contents, and Reasons 3.3 Because of Reasons 3.4 Reasons, Causes, and Mountain Climbers 3.5 Acting for Bad Reasons 3.6 Thinking and Acting for Multiple Reasons and Non-Reasons 3.7 Habit and Inaction 3.8 Acting for Moral Reasons Part II: Desire Chapter 4: Love and Care 4.1 Love 4.2 Care Chapter 5: What Desires Are Not 5.1 Action is not the Essence of Desire 5.2 Feeling is not the Essence of Desire Chapter 6: What Desires Are 6.1 The Reward and Punishment Systems 6.2 The Reward System Causes what Desires Cause 6.3 Intrinsic Desires are a Natural Kind 6.4 Solutions and Promissory Notes Part III: Virtue Chapter 7: Credit and Blame 7.1 Attributability and Accountability 7.2 Good Will and Ill Will 7.3 A Theory of Praise- and Blameworthiness 7.4 Side Constraints 7.5 Conceptualization 7.6 Too Much Credit, Too Much Blame 7.7 Partial Good and Ill Will Chapter 8: Virtue 8.1 A Theory of Virtue 8.2 The Theory Applied 8.3 Virtues and Their Effects 8.4 Virtue and Involuntary Attitudes 8.5 Virtuous Irrationality 8.6 The Unity of the Virtues Chapter 9: Virtue and Cognition 9.1 Familiar Cognitive Effects of Desires 9.2 The Effects of Good Will on Cognition 9.3 The Vice of Being Prejudiced 9.4 The Vice of Being Close-Minded 9.5 The Virtue of Being Open-Minded 9.6 Modesty and Immodesty 9.7 Vicious Dreams Part IV: Puzzles Chapter 10: Inner Struggle 10.1 Akrasia 10.2 The Experience of Inner Struggle 10.3 Inner Struggle Explained Chapter 11: Addiction 11.1 The Puzzle 11.2 The Science of Addiction 11.3 The Philosophy of Addiction 11.4 The Blameworthiness of Addicts 11.5 Addiction in Moral Psychology Conclusion 12.1 Taking Stock 12.2 Looking Forward Works Cited Index

read more

Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

More than just a game: ethical issues in gamification

TL;DR: A normatively sophisticated and descriptively rich account for appropriately addressing major ethical considerations associated with gamification is developed, suggesting practitioners and designers should be precautious about whether or not their use of gamification practices takes unfair advantage of workers or infringes any involved workers’ or customers’ autonomy.
Journal ArticleDOI

The wrongs of racist beliefs

TL;DR: The case of the supposedly rational racist as discussed by the authors is a case that challenges the assumption that the way racist beliefs wrong is that the racist believer either misrepresents reality, organizes facts in a misleading way that distorts the truth, or engages in fallacious reasoning.
Journal ArticleDOI

Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend the idea that degrees of blameworthness and praiseworthiness can depend in part on degrees of difficulty and degrees of sacrifice required for performing the action in question.
Journal ArticleDOI

Running risks morally

TL;DR: The authors defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness, and argue that moral fetishism is an unpleasant sort of motivation that people would have to have to avoid moral greed.