Introduction:Managing biological risks requires an organizational culture that holistically ensures the biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment of infectious disease agents and toxins, in additi...

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1535676018778538

Japan: Obstacles, Lessons and Future

The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Responsible Conduct in the Life Sciences: A Comprehensive Literature Review:

An Investigation of Biosecurity Education for Life Scientists in the Asia-Pacific Region

In the early 2000s, several publications initiated a debate about the potential misuse of academic life science research. The debate was refueled in 2012, when two studies describing the engineering of human transmissive H5N1 bird flu virus were published. To facilitate the debate on dual-use research of concern (DURC) and regulatory measures, we interviewed life science researchers working in Switzerland about their views on DURC. The results indicate that all scientists interviewed were aware of the debate, however, few had reflected about dual-use aspects with regard to their own work. Although all respondents believed in freedom of research, a majority was supportive of some form of regulation of DURC. This article discusses the major implications of the study, especially regarding the implementation of regulatory measures. In addition, preliminary recommendations are given for raising awareness on DURC in the life sciences among researchers.

/pdf/life-scientists-views-and-perspectives-on-the-regulation-of-40gwpkbwl4.pdf

Life scientists’ views and perspectives on the regulation of dual-use research of concern

Advances in the life sciences are occurring with extreme rapidity and accumulating a great deal of knowledge about life’s vital processes. While this knowledge is essential for fighting disease in a more effective way, it can also be misused either intentionally or inadvertently to develop novel and more effective biological weapons. For nearly a decade civil-academic society as well as States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have recognised the importance of dual-use biosecurity education for life scientists as a means to foster a culture of responsibility and prevent the potential misuse of advances in the life sciences for non-peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the implementation of dual-use biosecurity education for life scientists has made little progress in institutions of higher learning. Professional societies and academic organizations have worked from the bottom-up in developing online dual-use biosecurity education modules that can be used for instruction. However, top-down help is needed from goverments if further progress is to be made in implementing biosecurity education for life scientists.

Education for life scientists on the dual-use implications of their research : commentary on "implementing biosecurity education: approaches, resources and programmes".

The central goal of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is, in effect, to prevent the life sciences from becoming the death sciences. The international community is now debating what steps are necessary to achieve this goal. The author recounts recent efforts to engage and educate those associated with the life sciences about their potential destructive applications, and makes the case for the importance of addressing dual-use education as part of the 2011 BWC Review Conference. The BWC is a valuable forum for promoting national and international efforts, and attention to education could, in turn, help strengthen the treaty. Reaching consensus on future international cooperation and milestones for expanding educational efforts is both possible and necessary.

Japan: Obstacles, Lessons and Future

Citations

The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Responsible Conduct in the Life Sciences: A Comprehensive Literature Review:

An Investigation of Biosecurity Education for Life Scientists in the Asia-Pacific Region

Life scientists’ views and perspectives on the regulation of dual-use research of concern

Education for life scientists on the dual-use implications of their research : commentary on "implementing biosecurity education: approaches, resources and programmes".

A teachable moment for biological weapons: The Seventh BWC Review Conference and the need for international cooperation in education

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