Kant’s Tactics in the Transcendental Deduction

Kant's transcendental deductions : the three Critiques and the Opus postumum

edness of separated opposites. 53 It is `this speculative account of experience' which persists in acknowledging predicament and recognises the validity of contradiction by which Rose radically recasts the hidden meaning of Hegelian speculative philosophy. With this context in mind, I now explore Hegel's legacy and his feud with his philosophical contemporaries, Fichte, and in various ways, Schelling, but more importantly, how this circle of philosophical exchange developed as a critical response to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 4 This illumination of the Enlightenment period will help to clarify the importance Rose attaches to Hegel, and in turn, her dealings with contemporary thought and experience, particularly the concerns she raises in the next chapter with sociology and its reasoning for and within social theory. 51 JM, p. ix. 52 Ibid. 53 This gives rise to earlier indications of the idea of a ̀ broken middle' in Hegel's dialectic of 'Lordship and Bondage'. See POS, § 188. I will return to a more detailed discussion of Hegel's contribution here in the last chapter of this thesis, ̀salvation'. 54 See for example, F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); G. Di Giovanni 'The First Twenty Years of Critique' in P. Guyer (ed. ) The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 417-448; G. D. Giovanni & H. S. Harris (ed. ), Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985). For Criticisms of Kant, see J. G. Fichte, Science of Knowledge [Wissenschaftslehre] (1794) trans. and eds. P. Heath & J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); F. W. J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy (185661) trans. & ed. A. Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); G. W. F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, (1802) trans. W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), sect. A, POS, §§ 189, 'Kant' in Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1833-6), trans. E. S. Haldane and F. Simpson (London: Routledge, 1968), Vol. III, pt III, sect. III.

The 'void' in Simone Weil and the 'broken middle' in Gillian Rose : the genesis of the search for salvation

Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Kant's account of causation is central to his views on objective truth and freedom. The Second Analogy of Experience, in the Critique of Pure Reason,where he provides his defense of the causal principle, has long been the focus of intense philosophical research. In the past twenty years, there have been two major periods of interest in Kantian themes, The first coincided with a general turn away from positivism by analytic philosophers, and resulted in a fruitful interchange between Kant scholars and those who applied Kantian ideas to contemporary philosophical problems. In recent years, a new surge of interest in Kant's work occurred along with the developing controversy over realism generated by the work of Dummett and Putnam. Scholars now appreciate the extent to which the Kantian causal principle is illuminated by the philosopher's argument that his transcendental idealism supports an empirical realism. And in turn, Kant's views on objectivity, causation, and freedom are especially relevant to the philosophical concerns raised by the new debate over realism. The eight papers in this book are drawn from two conferences that honored Lewis White Beck, an influential Kant scholar. Together with the introductory essay by the editors, they show the continuing relevance of Kant's analysis for the present-day philosophy of causation.

Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity

The Normativity of Law

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, his main work of theoretical philosophy, frequently uses metaphors from law. In this first book-length study in English of Kant's legal metaphors and their role in the first Critique, Sofie Moller shows that they are central to Kant's account of reason. Through an analysis of the legal metaphors in their entirety, she demonstrates that Kant conceives of reason as having a structure mirroring that of a legal system in a natural right framework. Her study shows that Kant's aim is to make cognisers become similar to authorized judges within such a system, by proving the legitimacy of the laws and the conditions under which valid judgments can be pronounced. These elements consolidate her conclusion that reason's systematicity is legal systematicity.

Kant’s Tactics in the Transcendental Deduction

Citations

Kant's transcendental deductions : the three Critiques and the Opus postumum

The 'void' in Simone Weil and the 'broken middle' in Gillian Rose : the genesis of the search for salvation

Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity

The Normativity of Law

Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason

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Kant’s Transcendental Deduction

Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Moral Law

The shortest way: Kant’s rewriting of the transcendental deduction

Why is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction So Difficult?