Journal ArticleDOI
Law amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In this paper, the authors analyze the economic aspects of a system of strict liability and conclude that efficiency is impossible as a goal for tort law, and that both the normative and positive justifications for the efficiency approach to tort law must be rejected.Abstract:
THE economic efficiency approach to the analysis of the common law, particularly the law of torts, has been growing rapidly in recent years and shows no sign of abatement. Nevertheless, some very fundamental analytic problems have not even been recognized in this literature, much less solved. It is the purpose of this essay to raise these problems in the context of the perennial conflict between negligence and strict liability. The first and major part of this paper will consist of a detailed study of the efficiency rationale for negligence law. Next, we shall analyze some of the economic aspects of a system of strict liability. The overall conclusion is that efficiency, as normally understood, is impossible as a goal for tort law. The law cannot and should not aim toward the impossible. Consequently, both the normative and positive justifications for the efficiency approach to tort law must be rejected. Our reasons for this conclusion can be divided into static and dynamic considerations. The most important by far, however, are the dynamic factors: Precisely because we live outside of general competitive equilibrium and in a world of unpredictable flux, the efficiency case for negligence must fail. In such a world, it is impossible to compare alternative liability systems in terms of judicial cost-benefit analysis or "fine tuning." Instead, they must be analyzed in terms of institutional efficiency-the certainty and stability that these rules impart to the social framework. A static world of general equilibrium would make an efficient tort law possible, and yet render it unnecessary; in such a world, markets would be universal. A dynamic world, however, demands the certainty and simplicity of static law.read more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards
Richard Craswell,John E. Calfee +1 more
TL;DR: In the real world, legal standards (and their enforcement) are seldom certain this paper, and even when the language is more precise the enforcement policies of prosecutors (or the vagaries of the trial process) may also be uncertain.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strict liability versus negligence
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the effects of different liability regimes and examine the allocative effects resulting from the application of different regimes, focusing on the question of whether the outcome under a specific liability regime is efficient or not.
Posted Content
Kaldor-hicks efficiency and the problem of central planning
TL;DR: The authors argues that no such measures can be constructed to implement Kaldor-Hicks -efficient policies, government would require wisdom beyond its grasp and cannot be used for formulating future policies to determine how much every single person would value every possible state of the world, a feat that can never be attained.
Journal ArticleDOI
Knowledge Problems and the Problem of Social Cost
TL;DR: The problem of social cost has been one of the most influential works in the development of welfare economics since A. C. Pigou's "The Economics of Welfare".