scispace - formally typeset
Open AccessPosted Content

Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court

TLDR
Narrowing occurs when a court declines to apply a precedent even though, in the court's own view, the precedent is best read to apply as mentioned in this paper, which is widely condemned as deceptive, as well as contrary to stare decisis.
Abstract
“Narrowing” occurs when a court declines to apply a precedent even though, in the court’s own view, the precedent is best read to apply. In recent years, the Roberts Court has endured withering criticism for narrowing in areas such as affirmative action, abortion, the exclusionary rule, campaign finance, and standing. This practice — often called “stealth overruling” — is widely condemned as deceptive, as well as contrary to stare decisis. On reflection, however, narrowing is not stealthy, tantamount to overruling, or even uncommon. Instead, narrowing is a distinctive feature of Supreme Court practice that has been accepted and employed by virtually every Justice. Besides promoting traditional stare decisis values like correctness, fidelity, and candor, legitimate narrowing represents the decisional-law analogue to the canon of constitutional avoidance. As a rule, an en banc appellate court, including the Supreme Court, engages in legitimate narrowing when it adopts a reasonable reading of precedent without contradicting background legal principles. Under this rule, most if not all instances of narrowing during the Roberts Court are readily defensible — including frequently overlooked decisions by the Court’s more liberal members. Moreover, prominent cases involving narrowing can be grouped into four categories: experimental narrowing, narrowing rules, narrowing to overrule, and aspirational narrowing. Far from being unusual or unwarranted, narrowing is a mainstay of Supreme Court practice — and a good thing, too.

read more

Citations
More filters
Book

Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent

TL;DR: Kozel as mentioned in this paper develops a theory of precedent designed to enhance the stability and impersonality of constitutional law and argues that the prevailing approach to precedent in American law is undermined by principled disagreements among judges over the proper means and ends of constitutional interpretation.
Journal ArticleDOI

Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint

TL;DR: It is shown that no model can capture the U.S. doctrine of precedent without making that distinction between horizontal and vertical precedents, and a precise model is developed that does just that.
Posted Content

Concepts not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments, Opinions, and Precedent

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the debate over the scope of injunctions is an unfortunate and unnecessary distraction, because no one takes universality literally or seriously, and suggest that universality applies to the related constitutional remedy of declaratory judgments, where supporters of universal injunctions err in giving a judgment the prospective legal effects and consequences of an opinion.
Journal ArticleDOI

Implementing Prior Judicial Decisions as Precedents: The Context of Application and Justification

TL;DR: In this paper, the conditions and methods of using previous judicial decisions as a kind of precedents in the processes of application of law within the statutory legal order are discussed, where reference to these decisions should be adaptive (in relation to the elements of the current case), generalizing (forming elements of ratio decidendi) and argumentative and discursive (in respect of the way in which the decisional reasoning and arguments expressed in the prior justification are used).
Posted Content

Constitutional Contraction: Religion and the Roberts Court

TL;DR: The most salient feature to emerge in the first decade of the Roberts Court's law and religion jurisprudence is the contraction of the constitutional law of religious freedom as mentioned in this paper, and it illustrates that contraction in three ways.